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cussions, British Aerospace has been
investigating in considerable detail
participation in a European pro-
gramme involving the A300B10 and a "
Jet 130/160-seater. In the meantime
Boeing has offered British Aerospace participation in the 757. The package of work for British Aerospace, amounting to approximately 20 per cent of the aircraft, is similar to that originally offered, but in several re-spects contains the same important commercial criteria which it was not found possible to accept last year. "A decision on the best collabora-tive project for British Aerospace de-pends on a number of complex factors including the best match of industrial partners, work-sharing and aircraft marketability, all of which are being actively and carefully assessed."
In recent public discussions of Boeing's proposals, it has always been assumed that British Aerospace had been offered the opportunity to design and build the 757 wing. But the suggest tion that the value of the package was as low as 20 per cent is surpris-ing.
British Aerospace underlines in its statement the qualities of the One-Eleven and the proposed One-Eleven
600. The company points out that "over 220 BAC One-Elevens are in service with world airlines, 25 of which are with British Airways, which, we understand, has no inten-tion of replacing them. For the air-line's future requirement, British Aerospace has put forward a new and improved version of the aircraft which we believe is technically and opera-tionally satisfactory. It is understood that British Airways has sought per-mission to acquire 19 Boeing 737s at a total investment of £140 million, instead of the same number of One-Elevens at a total investment of £129 million. This proposal rests on the assumption that a greater operating surplus can be generated o\er 14 years by the larger 737. The airline figures are based on detailed traffic forecasts up to 1994.

Minor changes important
"Since comparatively minor changes in basic assumptions or in traffic pre-dictions can materially affect the operating surpluses forecast, there must be a considerable potential mar-gin of error in the final outcome pre-dicted. For example, a one per cent difference in operating costs, which is well within the estimating margin of error, makes a difference of £15 mil-lion in the comparative figures.
"From the middle of the 1980s, air-craft in this category with new-technology engines will progressively become available, and it is unlikely that any aircraft now chosen will be in service on the major British Air-ways routes until the 1990s. Until this time the BAC One-Eleven is a highly suitable and profitable aircraft, and its purchase would avoid the high costs of introducing a new aircraft type. The BAC One-Eleven is a British

aircraft with British engines and almost wholly British equipment, operating profitably throughout the world. Its purchase would not only save about $250 million in foreign ex-change, but directly assist the efforts of British Aerospace and the other British manufacturers concerned in the important export markets which are materially affected by decisions of the national carrier. It would also provide additional employment in the UK."

British Aerospace is clearly deter-mined to retain an across-the-board design capability and wants to be deeply involved in marketing and pro-duct support of any new type. It sees new technology and new engines as essential for aircraft designed for the mid-1980s and 1990s. These: questions have already been raised with Boeing.

Boeing conditions outlined
In a letter written to British Aero-space on February 22, Boeing presi-dent Tex Boullioun outlined his company's conditions for collaboration and these, as they stand, are in many ways incompatible with the aspirations of BAe. According to Tex Boullioun, Boeing could require that in any col-laborative project:
• The aircraft would be sold, as-
sembled, and delivered to the airlines by Boeing with all performance guarantees, warranties, and post-delivery support provided to the air-lines by Boeing.
• Boeing would retain programme
management and design leadership.
• Follow-on sustaining engineering
would be at the Seattle final assembly location . . .

«... compatible with Boeing tooling concepts and criteria.
• British Aerospace would be ex-
pected to agree to a firm fixed unit price contract for its work, based on US dollars and escalation factors.

• Final negotiated price would not exceed Boeing in-house cost plus an allowance for reasonable profit. Pay-ment schedules would be tied to deliveries of aircraft to the airline customers.

Collaboration

Although the current debate has centred around the possibility of col-laboration with Boeing or with Europe, with the two seen as mutually exclusive, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed tell Flight that partnership proposals from them are still very much alive. Both stress that unlike Boeing they appreciate Britain's com-mitment to Europe and are not trying to pressurise British Aerospace into a hasty decision.

Lockheed's long-standing proposals centre on the TriStar 600, the twin-engined derivative of the basic trijet. Willis Hawkins, president of Lock-heed California, is on record as say-ing that British Aerospace could be "in charge" of the new aircraft. The new TriStar 600 could be 80 per cent new and require a new wing, centre

section and nose and rear fuselage Lockheed has suggested to Lord Beswick that the two companies should initially carry out a joint study of the market for a 180/200-seat twin before committing the TriStar 600 to production.
McDonnell Douglas has not recently discussed collaboration but describe its proposals, still very much on offer, as a "sandwich." The bread would be long-term collaboration on a super-sonic transport plus a marketing agreement on the proposed HS.14 feederliner. The meat could be joint production of the ATMR (advanced-technology medium range). The 166 200-seat ATMR would have the six-abreast fuselage section of the DC-8 a new wing and tail and would be powered by twin CF6-32s, RB.211-535s or JTlODs. With a floor width of 155-2in, ATMR would, according to McDonnell Dojuglas, be more com-fortable than the 148in-width 707/727/ 737 series. Work on the new DC-9-80 has been substantially allocated bu the British could be involved in the wide-bodied DC-X-200 proposal, which is still being shown to airlines.

United order

The ATMR was evaluated by United alongside the Boeing 767-200 and A300B10. But ATMR has already been eliminated from the competition, and a final decision between the Boeing and European proposals will probably not be made until June. The airline i expected to place an order for its fina choice during July (see Sensor las week). The importance of the United order is such that Boeing cannot from a marketing point of view let the order slip through its hands, while from a financial point of view it can-not afford to underprice such a larg sale.

Troubled Narita

scheduled to open
late next month

THE Japanese Government has s May 20 as the date for the much postponed opening of the new Toky airport at Narita. Reports from Tokyo suggest that the Japanese police ma

a series of raids throughout the country last week, seeking to disarm and

neutralise anti-airport campaigners

Nevertheless, opponents of the aiport have already begun work on a

steel tower, the third such obstacle at the end of Narita's runway in an attempt to disrupt operations.

The Japanese Government is planing to introduce a series of new law

before May 20 to prevent a repetition of the violent scenes last month, whe the new control tower was broken into and ATC equipment smashed.