Air France aircraft from Brazil to France disappears

 Why do the airline keep on saying that the black boxes may not be found?  What gives?

They should be more than determined to get their hands on these black boxes to find out the cause(s) of

this catastrophe. It is not enough just to blame the weather unless there is something more to be learned

from this tragedy. Whether it be an aircraft or system design flaw that could be improved or human factors related,

something definitely would be learned when the black boxes are found and their contents read and analyzed.

The UK Telegraph and French paper Liberation both report the debris is not from AF447.

http://www.liberation.fr/monde/0101571483-les-debris-recuperes-ne-sont-pas-ceux-de-l-af447

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/5448472/Air-France-plane-debris-is-not-from-lost-aircraft.html

The oil slick is from a ship the Brazilians now say. (If the aircraft broke up in the air I do not see how a kerosene slick could form – and if the wings remained intact most likely the wings would sink taking the fuel with them – similarly if the aircraft managed to ditch).

French TF1 TV news at 8pm on Wednesday showed the French Navy, flying round the clock out of Dakar, reporting no sign of any of the debris reported by the Brazilians and that the large piece of metal or whatever it was, was from a fishing boat. Yesterday evening (4/06) the French Navy had still found nothing in the area reported by the Brazilians. Their AWACS did now report some other “interesting” radar returns but that is all.

If you look at the aircraft track, I would have turned left to be generally heading towards Brazil – a right turn takes you further away from land.

Nestor:

 Why do the airline keep on saying that the black boxes may not be found?  What gives?

The information about the deep of the wreckage around that area is about 4.000m. The limit for diving is about a couple of hundred meters, I think it's about 300m. So as you can imagine this is way too much to get into the place and find the black boxes. Only with submarines. I think at this kind of deepness the only endeavour made, was for the Titanic and with years of planning ahead. The same sub equipment is being used now on this case. But the possibilities of finding the black boxes are very very small. So this is what the autorities are saying. We have to face real facts and limitations, perhaps we'll never find it.

if these comments are true, unfortunately my fear about an all of a sudden explosion is probably correct by the sound of it. In the TWA incident a few years back, other aircraft pilots saw the same events, of course the reason of the explosion different.  an in-flight break up could result to the same phenomena, with fuel tank explosions (in-tank fuel levels at this point of the journey and fuel vapour/air ratio are low enough to allow it). Hence to be able to find evidence of this crash now it will be very difficult considering the vast amount of area the debris could be located taking into account the momentum of the aircraft...

 

 

 

 

 

if these comments are true, unfortunately my fear about an all of a sudden explosion is probably correct by the sound of it. In the TWA incident a few years back, other aircraft pilots saw the same events, of course the reason of the explosion different.  an in-flight break up could result to the same phenomena, with fuel tank explosions (in-tank fuel levels at this point of the flight and fuel vapor/air ratio are low enough to allow it). Hence to be able to find evidence of this crash now it will be very difficult considering the vast amount of area the debris could be located taking into account the momentum of the aircraft...

 

If we go back to basics, regardless of whether airspeed indications are conflicting, in error, or a total loss of all flight instrument indications has occurred, all one needs to maintain some reasonable semblance of attitude and airspeed control is to set an appropriate power setting (which one knows simply from repetative experience) and fly an attitude through turbulence. Sure there will be excursions, but the airspeed will average out at around a sensible turbulence penetration figure. A chum of mine, who is a retired B-747 skipper, operates a Tecnam Golf. When he first showed me his new machine, he pointed out the self-contained, dry-cell battery powered Attitude Indicator he had fastened to the instrument panel. He said it was reliable and accurate. This is a "stick-on" instrument which cost only a few hundred dollars. Why on earth don't Airline Operators use items like this as emergency back-ups? If I was still flying, I would buy my own personal unit. I know it may be an "old-fashioned" concept, but ATTITUDE combined with POWER will always result in a given PERFORMANCE.....or am I missing something somewhere? 

 Debris including a couple of bodies have been found.  Surely, we can optimistically hope that the black

boxes will follow suit given the hi-tech equipment available now to do this job.  After those black boxes are

found, read and analyzed,  an improved system design giving the pilot complete control sans the computers

of fly-by-wire technology which in this instance of high G-forces and icing conditions have failed would be

developed.  The will to survive in humans far surpasses the limits of his man-made devices.  I could only imagine what the pilot

felt as he tried to fly his plane in Direct Law after his aircraft suffered multiple system failures in a very

hostile environment.  Good judgment is the result of experience, usually bad, and whether you live or not

many will profit from it so that history will not repeat itself again to exact a heavy toll on lives. The black boxes

are, so to speak, are the history books. 

 

The fin is a hollow carbon fibre box as is the rudder it is interesting to note that the rudder is attached it would be a fare assumption that it hit the sea in a horizontal trajectory any impact to the front or rear would have either damaged the leading or detached the rudder. it also looks like it has broken off at the attachment points as there doesn't appear to be any of the fuse attached, again showing that the forces applied separated the fin from its attachments, unlike the tailplane which i presume is attached to a torsion box so theres little chance of finding those. Lets hope its not another structural overload situation as we saw in the AA A300 accident. 

 

It sounds familiar?

 

Source: http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2004/041026.htm

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: October 26, 2004   SB-04-31

NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED

Washington, D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder system design and elements of the airline's pilot training program.

At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle Harbor, New York shortly after taking off from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation accident in American history.

The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found in Jamaica Bay, about a mile from the main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot, inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the air.)

The Board found that the composite material used in constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design limits.

The Safety Board said that, although other pilots provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the aircraft, the Board found.

The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher speeds.

In particular, the Board concluded that, before the crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.

The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5 degrees.)

The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report. Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery training.

Because this crash occurred two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

A summary of the Board's report may be found under "Publications" on the agency's website at www.ntsb.gov. The full report will appear on the website in about four weeks.

• Filed under: Air France, Brazil, F-GZCP, AF 447

http://www.casa.gov.au/wcmswr/_assets/main/airworth/airwd/adfiles/over/a330/a330-076.pdf

Can you fly without energy ,stabilizers and perhaps tail , in the middle of a storm?

it's only (one more) theory.

I keep reading that icing of the pitot tubes could be a major contributing factor in the crash of Air France Airbus 330, but surely these would be electrically heated to prevent this from happening? John.

Gradually we are hearing hints of the usual "pilot error" as a contributing cause to the accident. Sad as it is, we have to be pragmatic and less corporative in the releases from the different responsible players. Modestly, I say according to what I have been reading - activity plus one or several strikes plus incineration of the electrical system. Once this happens the joystick is not worth its weight in plastic and all comm dies with the pitot heat and so on (at one time, given as a probable cause). So why try to confuse the issue? Come clean. I guess the PR boys from Airbus et al, will see to it that the cause of the design fault remains in the dark. It is up to "converging factors" or something like that. After all the USAF is only buying $40b the first go-around with another possible $60b as an encore of the same model A330. But as we know Americans are "stupid" and will settle for any Airbus formal explanation of the tragedy. I imagine in the decision of the USAF purchase there could not be any violation of the FCPA. Besides it would be unthinkable for Airbus to offer such a violation of a country's law.

It was with great local press exposure that the President of Argentina refused, 48 hours ago, her A340 to take her to the Swiss capital and caused a mad rush to find at the last minute one of the very few G5's in the country.

Thank you.

 

 Aircraft galley found floating at sea 

 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1193613/Found-Galley-kitchen-doomed-Air-France-flight-discovered-floating-intact-middle-Atlantic.html