Why do the airline keep on saying that the black boxes may not be found? What gives?
They should be more than determined to get their hands on these black boxes to find out the cause(s) of
this catastrophe. It is not enough just to blame the weather unless there is something more to be learned
from this tragedy. Whether it be an aircraft or system design flaw that could be improved or human factors related,
something definitely would be learned when the black boxes are found and their contents read and analyzed.
The UK Telegraph and French paper Liberation both report the debris is not from AF447.
The oil slick is from a ship the Brazilians now say. (If the aircraft broke up in the air I do not see how a kerosene slick could form – and if the wings remained intact most likely the wings would sink taking the fuel with them – similarly if the aircraft managed to ditch).
French TF1 TV news at 8pm on Wednesday showed the French Navy, flying round the clock out of Dakar, reporting no sign of any of the debris reported by the Brazilians and that the large piece of metal or whatever it was, was from a fishing boat. Yesterday evening (4/06) the French Navy had still found nothing in the area reported by the Brazilians. Their AWACS did now report some other “interesting” radar returns but that is all.
If you look at the aircraft track, I would have turned left to be generally heading towards Brazil – a right turn takes you further away from land.
Nestor: Why do the airline keep on saying that the black boxes may not be found? What gives?
If we go back to basics, regardless of whether airspeed indications are conflicting, in error, or a total loss of all flight instrument indications has occurred, all one needs to maintain some reasonable semblance of attitude and airspeed control is to set an appropriate power setting (which one knows simply from repetative experience) and fly an attitude through turbulence. Sure there will be excursions, but the airspeed will average out at around a sensible turbulence penetration figure. A chum of mine, who is a retired B-747 skipper, operates a Tecnam Golf. When he first showed me his new machine, he pointed out the self-contained, dry-cell battery powered Attitude Indicator he had fastened to the instrument panel. He said it was reliable and accurate. This is a "stick-on" instrument which cost only a few hundred dollars. Why on earth don't Airline Operators use items like this as emergency back-ups? If I was still flying, I would buy my own personal unit. I know it may be an "old-fashioned" concept, but ATTITUDE combined with POWER will always result in a given PERFORMANCE.....or am I missing something somewhere?
Debris including a couple of bodies have been found. Surely, we can optimistically hope that the black
boxes will follow suit given the hi-tech equipment available now to do this job. After those black boxes are
found, read and analyzed, an improved system design giving the pilot complete control sans the computers
of fly-by-wire technology which in this instance of high G-forces and icing conditions have failed would be
developed. The will to survive in humans far surpasses the limits of his man-made devices. I could only imagine what the pilot
felt as he tried to fly his plane in Direct Law after his aircraft suffered multiple system failures in a very
hostile environment. Good judgment is the result of experience, usually bad, and whether you live or not
many will profit from it so that history will not repeat itself again to exact a heavy toll on lives. The black boxes
are, so to speak, are the history books.
The fin is a hollow carbon fibre box as is the rudder it is interesting to note that the rudder is attached it would be a fare assumption that it hit the sea in a horizontal trajectory any impact to the front or rear would have either damaged the leading or detached the rudder. it also looks like it has broken off at the attachment points as there doesn't appear to be any of the fuse attached, again showing that the forces applied separated the fin from its attachments, unlike the tailplane which i presume is attached to a torsion box so theres little chance of finding those. Lets hope its not another structural overload situation as we saw in the AA A300 accident.
It sounds familiar?
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: October 26, 2004 SB-04-31
NTSB SAYS PILOT'S EXCESSIVE RUDDER PEDAL INPUTS LED TO
CRASH OF AMERICAN FLIGHT 587; AIRBUS RUDDER SYSTEM DESIGN & ELEMENTS OF
AIRLINE'S PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM CONTRIBUTED
D.C. - American Airlines flight 587 crashed
into a Queens neighborhood because the plane's
vertical stabilizer separated in flight as a result of aerodynamic loads that
were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal
inputs after the aircraft encountered wake turbulence, according to a final
report adopted by the National Transportation Safety Board today. The Board said
that contributing to the crash were characteristics of the airplane's rudder
system design and elements of the airline's pilot training
At about 9:16 a.m. on November 12, 2001, flight 587, an
Airbus A300-605R (N14053), crashed in Belle
Harbor, New York shortly after
taking off from John F. Kennedy
International Airport on a flight to Santo Domingo. All 260 people aboard the plane
died, as did five persons on the ground. This is the second deadliest aviation
accident in American history.
The aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder were found
Bay, about a mile from the
main wreckage site. The engines, which also separated from the aircraft seconds
before ground impact, were found several blocks from the wreckage site. The
Safety Board found that the first officer, who was the flying pilot,
inappropriately manipulated the rudder back and forth several times after the
airplane encountered the wake vortex of a preceding Boeing 747 for the second
time. The aerodynamic loads placed on the vertical stabilizer due to the
sideslip that resulted from the rudder movements were beyond the ultimate design
strength of the vertical stabilizer. (Simply stated, sideslip is a measure of
the "sideways" motion of the airplane through the
The Board found that the composite material used in
constructing the vertical stabilizer was not a factor in the accident because
the tail failed well beyond its certificated and design
The Safety Board said that, although other pilots
provided generally positive comments about the first officer's abilities, two
pilots noted incidents that showed that he had a tendency to overreact to wake
turbulence encounters. His use of the rudder was not an appropriate response to
the turbulence, which in itself provided no danger to the stability of the
aircraft, the Board found.
The Board said that American Airlines' Advanced Aircraft
Maneuvering Program contributed to the accident by providing an unrealistic and
exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence on heavy transport-category
aircraft. In addition, the Board found that because of its high sensitivity, the
A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder
pedal inputs at higher speeds.
In particular, the Board concluded that, before the
crash of flight 587, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect
rudder pedal inputs have on the A300- 600 at high airspeeds, and how the
airplane's rudder travel limiter system operates.
The Safety Board's airplane performance study showed
that the high loads that eventually overstressed the vertical stabilizer were
solely the result of the pilot's rudder pedal inputs and were not associated
with the wake turbulence. In fact, had the first officer stopped making inputs
at any time before the vertical stabilizer failed, the natural stability of the
aircraft would have returned the sideslip angle to near 0 degrees, and the
accident would not have happened. (The Board estimated that the sideslip angle
at the time the vertical stabilizer separated was between 10 and 12.5
The NTSB issued eight recommendations in today's report.
Among the seven sent to the Federal Aviation Administration were those calling
for adopting certification standards for rudder pedal sensitivity, modifying the
A300- 600 and A310 rudder control systems to increase protection from
potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high speeds (a similar
recommendation was issued to the French equivalent of the FAA, the DGAC), and
publishing guidance for airline pilot training programs to avoid the kind of
negative training found in American Airlines' upset recovery
Because this crash occurred two months after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, there was initial concern that it might have
been the result of an intentional criminal act. The Board found no such
evidence, nor did any law enforcement agencies provide evidence that the
accident may have stemmed from criminal conduct. The Board said that witnesses
who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing misting
fuel released from broken fuel lines, a fire from the initial release of fuel or
the effects of engine compressor surges.
A summary of the Board's report may be found under
"Publications" on the agency's website at www.ntsb.gov. The full report will
appear on the website in about four weeks.
Can you fly without energy ,stabilizers and perhaps tail , in the middle of a storm?
it's only (one more) theory.
Gradually we are hearing hints of the usual "pilot error" as a contributing cause to the accident. Sad as it is, we have to be pragmatic and less corporative in the releases from the different responsible players. Modestly, I say according to what I have been reading - activity plus one or several strikes plus incineration of the electrical system. Once this happens the joystick is not worth its weight in plastic and all comm dies with the pitot heat and so on (at one time, given as a probable cause). So why try to confuse the issue? Come clean. I guess the PR boys from Airbus et al, will see to it that the cause of the design fault remains in the dark. It is up to "converging factors" or something like that. After all the USAF is only buying $40b the first go-around with another possible $60b as an encore of the same model A330. But as we know Americans are "stupid" and will settle for any Airbus formal explanation of the tragedy. I imagine in the decision of the USAF purchase there could not be any violation of the FCPA. Besides it would be unthinkable for Airbus to offer such a violation of a country's law.
It was with great local press exposure that the President of Argentina refused, 48 hours ago, her A340 to take her to the Swiss capital and caused a mad rush to find at the last minute one of the very few G5's in the country.
Aircraft galley found floating at sea