The Vulcan bombing raid on Port Stanley, during the 1982 conflict was, then, THE longest bombing raid ever carried out:
Three 22-year-old Avro Vulcans B2s drawn from No. 44, 50 and No. 101 Squadron RAF were deployed to Wideawake airfield on Ascension Island. The Vulcans were captained by Squadron Leader Neil McDougall, Squadron Leader John Reeve and Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers. The wet wings could contain 9,200 gal (41,823 litres), so eleven Victor tankers, including two standby aircraft, were required to refuel the Vulcans before and after their attacks on the Falklands. The attacking Vulcan was refuelled five times on the outward journey and once on the return journey, using over 220,000 gallons of aviation fuel during the mission. Each aircraft carried either twenty-one 1,000 pound (450 kg) bombs or four Shrike anti-radar missiles (Dash 10 pod) with three 1,000 gal (4,546 litres) auxiliary fuel tanks in the bomb bay. The bombs were intended to cause damage to Argentine installations, especially Port Stanley Airport; it was hoped that the attacks would cause the defenders to switch on defensive radars, which would then be targeted by the missiles. The lighter Shrike armed Vulcans could loiter in the area longer than the bomb armed Vulcans.
The military success of Black Buck remains controversial to this day with some independent sources describing it as minimal , the damage to the airfield and radars being quickly repaired. The runway continued to be used by Argentine C-130s until the end of the war. The Argentines left the runway covered with piles of earth during the day causing British intelligence to surmise that repairs were still in progress. This deception misled the British as to the condition of the airfield and the success of their raids.
British sources claimed that Black Buck was responsible for the withdrawal of Mirage IIIEA from operations over the islands. However, according to the official FAA report they made 58 sorties during May and June, providing decoys for the strike units with particular success on the 8 June attacks against the British landing ships. Their lesser internal fuel capacity, compared to the IAI Daggers, as well their lack of air refueling capability, prevented them from being used in the escort or combat-air role.
To the British, the raids achieved a number of non-material objectives, including demonstrating British willingness and ability to attack Argentine forces on the islands. It also demonstrated the ability (albeit limited) of the RAF to strike at the Argentinian mainland if necessary.
At the time, it was the longest bombing raid in history, covering over 4,000 nautical miles (7,000 km), all of which were conducted over the open sea. This record was not broken until an American B-52 flew from the USA to Iraq, and then returned to RAF Mildenhall in England during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, although a major difference between the two was that the B-52s benefited from forward pre-positioned tankers for their aerial refueling.
The first surprise attack on the islands, on 30 April-1 May was aimed at the main runway at Stanley Airfield. Carrying twenty-one 1,000 lb general-purpose bombs, the bomber was to fly across the line of the runway, with the time between each bomb release having been carefully calculated to ensure that at least one bomb would land on the runway.
For the mission, two Vulcans took off from RAF Ascension Island. XM598 took the lead, and XM607 flew some of the way as a reserve. Shortly after take off, XM598, commanded by Squadron Leader John Reeve, suffered a pressurisation failure (a rubber seal on a side window had come loose) and was forced to return to Ascension. XM607, captained by Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers, took over and successfully cratered the runway with a single direct hit near the runway's mid point. However, it still remained operational for the Argentine C-130 Hercules transports. Other bombs fell to the side of the runway, and caused slight damage to tented installations in the airfield perimeter
The attack took the Argentinians completely by surprise and had a political effect far greater than any material damage caused. They were still convinced that the British would not commit themselves to battle and that the crisis would be resolved diplomatically.