I disagree with comments by Seat 1A. Yes the electrical failures, ADIRU and ISIS failures etc are clearly a cascade effect and secondary to the cause but clues to the cause are found in the Chronological sequence of faults reported by ACARS and require a little imagination to join the dots.
For the same reason I also disagree with BEA criticism of public speculation. Participation of public and pilots alike in various online forums debating the facts as they came to light has worked like a supercomputer performing an Ockham's Razor analysis in record time.
The prospect of a bomb and lightning were evaluated and discarded quite quickly. This intense speculation has actually helped to narrow focus on super cooled water ingestion by the pitot tubes and subsequent blockage by ice formation blinding aircraft sensors.Indeed at 0210Z one of the very first failures reported was loss of pitot ports, followed by rudder limit failure, indicating potentially that the autopilot and subsequently the crew were already unable to fly at correct attitudes.
Autopilot did not disengage until 0211 according to ACARS and ADRIU/ISIS failure followed loss of static ports.
Questions will now have to centre on weather crew selected pitot heat prior to entry into the CB cloud ?
Some questions will naturally devolve on the very wisdom of flying into such a system when an Iberia flight took significant avoiding action, whilst AF447 did not ?
My belief is that very quickly after losing static ports the aircraft first assumed an attitude which over stressed the wings and cabin perhaps contributing to some of the noted failures and shortly after the aircraft began to tumble and broke up. That seems a logical sequence.