First, thx to Mx K-J for a great piece.
Second, it is clear that Boeing's complete botch of the 787 opened the way for the A330 renaissance, including making the cost to AB of the payload/range improvements worthwhile. If the 787-8 proves to be only marginally better than the A332, AB may even add GenX type engines to it. The irony is that AB's response to the -8 may turn out to be very much like the improved 332 which they originally offered as competition for the 787-8 and which the industry, relying on Boeing's puffery of or even lies about the 787's performance, rejected. Had Boeing been able to deliver the 787-8 even a year late (ie now) and thus been able to ramp up production to 10/month by about mid 2011, then the 332 would not have gotten the burst of orders it has received and AB would not have that nice, lucrative four year production cushion. Most importantly, Boeing would have achieved its strategic goal of dominating the entire mid-sized wide body market (220-385 seats), which is the most lucrative in commercial aviation. This dominance was possible because AB's botch of the 380 meant that it did not have the resources to build a new competitor to the 787-8 and the 777-200ER/LR and - 300ER had destroyed AB's 345 and 346 lines.
Third, one question worth investigating is how Boeing came to outsource both the radical design and production of the 787, and also not to carefully supervise its partners' work, so that Dreamliner One arrived at Seattle needing about 30,000 parts instead of the 1200 Boeing expected? Who actually made this decision? What risk analysis was made? Did the impending implosion of the 787 program cause Alan Mullaly to depart for Ford?