Siva Govindasamy: September 2008 Archives

It is the Lockheed Martin F-35 silly season again. Every few weeks, the Joint Strike Fighter's critics feed a story to the media about the aircraft's alleged shortcomings. That happened in Australia earlier this week.

Air Power Australia, which describes itself as an independent defence think-tank, was formed by several ex-Royal Australian Air Force officers and is opposed to the selection of the JSF for the country. Recently, it claimed that the fighter displayed inferior performance and range when compared to the latest Russian and Chinese aircraft during simulated war games conducted by USA-based think-tank RAND Corp.

Local and international media picked this up and reported on it extensively, leading to a re-opening of the debate on the F-35's viability as the future of Australia's air force strike capability. There was only one problem - the report was false. Simply put, it was another example of the sensationalist reporting has crept in with regards to the F-35.

RAND responded by saying: "Those reports are not accurate. RAND did not present any analysis at the war game relating to the performance of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, nor did the game attempt detailed adjudication of air-to-air combat. Neither the game nor the assessments by RAND in support of the game undertook any comparison of the fighting qualities of particular fighter aircraft."

Australian defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon waded in, saying that he was one of the few people in Australia who had access to the entire classified briefing on the JSF's capability. The F-35's detractors were misrepresenting the aircraft's alleged deficiencies, he added.

The thinking in Canberra has not changed in the last few months. Australia remains committed to the F-35 programme, but it will not make a decision on whether it would actually purchase the aircraft until some time next year. If there is a further delay, it could order more Boeing F/A-18E/Fs to prevent a further drop in its strike capability. That option, however, appears unlikely for now.

The delays and problems that have plagued the F-35 have been widely reported, and the aircraft has some way to go before it convinces many in the industry about its viability. Given what it sets out to do, it is good that there is a healthy debate about the programme.

However, that does not mean that the F-35 deserves some of the pot shots that it gets. Its critics would do well to check their facts - and with RAND - first before making any public statements in the future.

Japan has finally confirmed what everyone figured would happen anyway - it has delayed its F-X competition in order to continue lobbying the USA for information on the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor.

It is silly, though. The Japan Air Self Defense Force's capability will keep dropping, and there is no guarantee that Washington would allow the Raptor to be exported. It would be far better for the Japanese to get on with the programme and select another fighter. Yet, they stubbornly wait for the US Congress to change its mind when there are no clear indications that this would happen in the near future.

This is symptomatic of the malaise that afflicts the country's military procurement policy. A gradual year-by-year decision-making process increases the cost to the Japanese taxpayer and hardly benefits the service, and is clear evidence of an acute lack of forward planning. That is probably also why it did not join the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme when it had the opportunity.

Australia, on the other hand, knows that its future lies with the F-35, which the USA is willing to export. It also realises that the aircraft's delivery could be delayed from the target of 2015. It may be unhappy about this, but at least it is doing something about it. Canberra ordered 24 Boeing F/A-18E/Fs to plug the gap between the retirement of its fleet of General Dynamics F-111s and the induction of the F-35.

Japan can teach the world many things, but its bureaucrats at the defence ministry in Tokyo could learn a thing or two from their Australian counterparts. They should forget about the F-22 and simply order the F-35.

The pieces are finally falling in place for the Mitsubishi Regional Jet. Its manufacturer Mitsubishi Aircraft has been lining up the design and manufacturing know-how over the last year, but what it sorely lacked was the marketing and after-sales expertise in the passenger jet business.

That should now come with Boeing's involvement in the programme as a consultant. Granted, the US company will not be investing in the programme itself. But its years of experience in the commercial aviation market will be useful as it helps to guide the people at Mitsubishi through the MRJ's formative years.

Here is the question: will Boeing eventually invest in the MRJ as a way to get into the regional jet programme? It may be a logical extension of its commercial aircraft business, given the strong growth potential for the regional aircraft sector. It would also be a low-risk approach if Mitsubishi leads the initial development of the aircraft. Watch this space.

Why in the world does India want to manufacture regional jets, when it already has so much on its plate?

An Indian Regional Jet will join a crowded field in which newcomers from Japan, China and Russia will also be competing with the incumbents, Brazil's Embraer and Canada's Bombardier, for market share. Analysts say that one or more manufacturers will eventually have to drop out due to the intense competition.

National Aerospace Laboratories, the Indian state-owned agency leading the study, is keen to involve either Bombardier or Embraer. But if they decline, New Delhi must spend an enormous amount of time and money to develop the technology. Either way, it is impossible for an IRJ to fly by the stated target date of 2012.

Ultimately, this project appears to be more about keeping up appearances. Successful aircraft programmes are a source of national pride, and India is probably keen to show that it is as capable as other leading emerging economies like Brazil, China and Russia.

In truth, India is late to the party. Its decision to manufacture regional aircraft has little economic rationale. It would take too long, cost too much, and have too low a chance of success. Instead of starting a new programme, it would be far more sensible to complete those it has already begun.

These include the Saras 14-seat twin turboprop, Tejas Light Combat Aircraft, and Sitara Intermediate Jet Trainer, which are long overdue and have already cost Indian taxpayers far too much. If India really wants to be taken seriously as an aircraft manufacturer, it could start by bringing those programmes to fruition first.