First activation of the Boeing 787s electrical system is likely to slip again, forcing first flight and entry into service further back into 2009.
Power-on could occur as early as mid-April according to senior Boeing representatives, yet, internal assessments of the pace of work on Dreamliner One suggest that the milestone could slip to June with slightly more than half of the 600 jobs, or tasks, remaining before power-on.
At least one 787 customer, who spoke with FlightBlogger on the condition of anonymity, has been told by the manufacturer that power-on will likely slip to June.
Boeing was unreachable for comment on the entirety of this report, however, sources familiar with the situation say that the airframer has not formally notified any customers to changes in the power-on schedule.
Paperwork and Design Changes Slowing Assembly
According to program sources, the slow pace of work in recent months can largely be attributed to what are known as rejection tags. Those tags occur when a discrepancy exists between the design and the product. For example, during the normal manufacturing process, holes are drilled to install fasteners. Occasionally, those holes have to be drilled a second time if there is an issue with the first hole. As a result, the hole is considered to be “non-conforming” requiring a larger diameter fastener and must be checked through a quality certification process.
One foundational tenet of the 787 program, according to program sources working with the aircraft, was the idea of a “super-mechanic” who held all the necessary certifications to self check work to appropriate airworthiness standards.
According to sources across the program, over the past year of assembly the self-certification process has become an impediment to progress rather than an enabler of efficiency.
As a result, the 787 program has begun to shift from a system of self-certifying manufacturing staff to a more traditional system of quality assurance similar to Boeing’s legacy programs. The revised system is first being implemented for out-of-sequence traveled work and is expected to be expanded to the entire final assembly process.
The revised system is a “positive step,” says one person working with the aircraft.
By using its traditional quality assurance system, Boeing is able to better control and group the number of rejection tags to reduce paperwork and solution time. For example, under the original system, four non-conforming holes in the same area of the aircraft were filed as four individual issues rather than just one. The new system would streamline the process by grouping these rejection tags together, cutting paperwork, in this example, by 75%.
At another level, minor, yet time consuming, design changes are occupying significant resources.
Often, “Parts are not delivered and substituted with different parts or mechanics make mistakes. Sometimes design error makes it impossible to build as designed,” said one source familiar with the situation.
Each redesign has to go through an extensive process that slows the path to power-on.
Boeing released a statement on the subject as this analysis was going through final revisions:
“It is normal during the development of a new airplane to discover the need for design enhancements. We are working with our partners to address the need for design changes in some areas. While these changes are not good for final assembly because they are dealing with traveled work at this time, the design changes are not the sole pacing item.”
Traveled Work Still a Challenge
As traveled work arrives in Everett, the completion of assembly varies greatly amongst supplier partners. If you walk from one end to another, Dreamliner Two looks like a, “Timeline from nose to tail. The farther you go back, the more work it needs,” says a 787 program staffer.
The front of the aircraft, Section 41, the nose section, was delivered from Spirit Aerosystems in Wichita, Kansas 97% complete, according to program sources in Everett.
The center fuselage, say sources in Charleston, which is assembled at Global Aeronautica in Charleston contained significant wiring, flight test equipment, ducting, systems and insulation in the forward Section 43 and the center wing box, but significantly less in Sections 44 and 46 toward the rear of the aircraft.
The aft fuselage, Sections 47 and 48, which is manufactured and assembled by Vought Aircraft Industries, is the largest source of traveled work, according to sources in Everett and Charleston. The aft fuselage, which was delivered in early February, had roughly a dozen jobs remaining before it could be considered structurally complete. It lacked any wiring, ducting, insulation or systems when it departed Charleston for Everett.
Looking Ahead
With the next quarter beginning, according to schedules, all flight test aircraft are scheduled to be undergoing final assembly in Everett by the middle of the year.
Center fuselage sections for Dreamliner Three and Four are currently undergoing assembly at the Global Aeronautica plant in Charleston. Major structures for Dreamliner Five have not yet arrived for integration in South Carolina from Italy and Japan.
Spirit Aerosystems has produced 21 forward fuselage shipsets which are at various levels of completion. Five have been delivered to Boeing, four of which are going through final assembly and one for additional structural testing. The pace of manufacturing these nose sections, according to sources in Wichita, have been so brisk that production has been forced to slow and structures are being wrapped for storage on site. In some cases, staff has been diverted to other areas to best utilize resources.
Even with the slow pace of the program, progress is still being made. According to sources working with the test flight aircraft, major components for the flight deck of Dreamliner One have arrived on the factory floor and are being prepared for installation. In addition, control surfaces are being installed on the wings as structural work is completed. Boeing has been focused on preparing Dreamliner One for flight, say program sources. Progress on the first aircraft now exceeds Dreamliner Two in preparation for power-on and first flight. However, having both aircraft ready for flight at the same time is the ultimate goal as a contingency plan in case problems arise.
According to program sources, the static airframe, which is positioned behind Dreamliner One at position three, is wrapping up its assembly process and is expected to move to the Building 40-23 for static testing as early as the end of the month.
Dreamliner Two is still undergoing fuselage body join to mate the three major structural assemblies at position one in the Everett factory.
Potential for Further Delays
Multiple sources in areas of responsibility across the program note that an additional delay in first delivery appears to be inevitable. Any push back of power-on invariably pressures first flight and would likely have a further impact on certification and first delivery timetables.
Boeing representatives, however, have maintained that the schedule is unchanged.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Chairman and CEO Scott Carson told a group of investors February 6th that, “We’re making very solid progress on [assembly] as we move towards…first flight at the end of the second [quarter].”
Vice President of Marketing for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Randy Tinseth was quoted at the International Society of Transport Aircraft Trading (ISTAT) conference March 11th stating that they company is focused on getting power on “sometime in the early beginning of the second quarter.”
Key Boeing customers have expressed doubt publicly about the current schedule.
Steven Udvar-Hazy, Chairman and founder of the International Lease Finance Corportation (ILFC), Boeing’s largest 787 customer, was quoted at a presentation at the JPMorgan’s aviation conference in New York City on March 18 as expecting power-on in June and first delivery to take place in the third quarter of 2009.
Boeing is expected to release the results of its comprehensive assessment of the 787 program schedule in the coming weeks.




This is one of many problems with travel work. It cuts into time so much. Great info jon. When will we see this thing flying? This is turing into an A380 saga. I now regret saying that the 787 will be delivered on time.
P.s Is there any word of any airline thinking of canceling their order or any airline already caneling their order for the 787?
Q: When will we see this thing flying?
A: If I had to put my money on it, I'd say about a year after the original plan. So anywhere between the end of August to early October. Certification would be about 12 months after. However, no one is sure of the unknown unknowns that have yet to be seen and what they will do the program.
Q: Is there any word of any airline thinking of canceling their order or any airline already cancelling their order for the 787?
A: Nope, none that I have heard. I don't think this will happen honestly. The demand for next generation long range 250-310 seat aircraft is just too high right now. If someone does cancel, look for other customers to renegotiate their terms to get early delivery slots, or new airlines to fill the vacancies. A330s and older 767s are in VERY high demand right now driving up lease rates, no one will cancel their orders based on an 18 month delay - it would have to be something more serious than that.
I hope some airlines will cancel their orders. It will leave some prod slots for US customers.
Key 787 Customer: Wing Has Design Problems
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story.jsp?id=news/787DELAY03198.xml&headline=Key 787 Customer: Wing Has Design Problems&channel=comm
Excellent work, Jon.
I wonder if history will look at this iteration of the 787 as a successful failure - kinda like the Beechcraft Starship. I imagine future 787 versions (or 7-anything-7) will be alot better because of this. Also, why is no one taking a hard look at the software managing this project? Seems like it needs an overhaul as well.
Spirit is essentially Boeing under another management which, as a reminder, was from Boeing,to boot.
Spirit, then, had a head-start on everyone else as it was involved with the early conceptual, and exploratory [read composite] work while still part of Boeing.
It's nice that Jon got someone to talk to him about the 'super-mechanic' idea. How many other of these supposedly progressive ideas will not pan out? That is, there are probably others that will need attention.
There was also a notion of the 'generic-engineer' who could do everything, assisted, of course, by computational tools.
Let's not forget that the whole issue of the material, et al, has only been scrutinized from analytical and laboratory settings. When the thing does fly, it'll be interesting to see how many gotchas pop up.
How many factors related to a 'perfect storm' have yet to appear on the horizon?
Very good reporting Jon, but terrible news for aviation.
Given that Boeing are now going to have to make a provision of about $7Bn. for penalty payments and their ongoing non-recurring development costs, I fear for the ability of some of the level 3 and down suppliers survival in the current credit crisis. Traditional property collateral used by corporations for credit lines is getting very difficult.
Failure of some suppliers could set the programme even further back, and assumptions that "cash-rich" Boeing can bail out troubled suppliers may be a trifle optimistic.
Time will smooth the whole flow out but time is the major factor in these times.
Ohh, for big scaled up Pratt GTFs slung under these wings instead of Trents. Hey,that old Trent name sounds stale.
They're called non-conformance reports (NCRs). More informally they're referred to as tags.
A non-conformance is recorded whenever something in the part does not conform with the design, e.g. dimensions are outside the specified limits, defects are larger than allowed. An NCR can be "bought off" with reference to stress reports to show that with the non-conformance is still safe, or by further analysis to show that it is safe, or as you suggest a rework is carried out which itself must be shown to be safe.
NCRs can be a large drain on resources, whether at final assembly or at suppliers, and can delay production while part are quarantined or while an assembly jig is sitting idle with parts in it while the NCR is being processed. Where we are it takes an average of half a day of an engineer's time to clear each NCR.
Whenever Boeing talked 'lean efficiency' what they really meant was 'low cost'. But there's no such thing as a 'super mechanic' for ten dollars an hour.
Greed never pays off. Time to get some heads rolling accross the board (pun intended)
Current news filtering out is that there are serious issues with the wingbox and undercarriage. Any info on those Jon?
"Ohh, for big scaled up Pratt GTFs slung under these wings instead of Trents. Hey,that old Trent name sounds stale."
Not as stale as P&W! There's a reason P&W is not on the 787. ;-)
No offence but i wonder what the Boeing fanboys with blinders on who were running their mouth at Airbus a year ago have to say now...
Unknown Unknowns? Just wait until power is applied. Then await performance of the 'all electric' concepts where wild frequency generators drive electric motors to drive compressors for cabin pressurization, for anti-ice, for cabin air conditioning and all, functions that have been provided by engine bleed air on other airplanes. Serious doubts there will ever be a Boeing facility named "Alan Mulally Center for Technical Excellence".
Thanks Jon for the reply.
Do Boeing not have Quality Control?
We keep reading Quality Assurance.
A. Bring back the design prototype. Allow time for the necessary inevitable sorting out-- and redesign. You can't build these things on a computer. Stop lying to customers; marketing writing checks that production (and QA) can't cash.
B. This may be the first and last single barrel large commercial aircraft. It is heavier and more expensive than what Airbus is going to do- composite frame and skin (possibly stringers) assembled more or less traditionally. Airbus may have backed into the better solution.
C. Does anyone know what will happen when a worker punches a 20 cm. hole into a plane with ground equipment? Can you Bondo a barrel? Does the entire barrel have to be replaced?