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GAO Statement
"We recommend that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals and make a new source selection decision, consistent with our decision."
UPDATE:
The GAO sustained Boeing's tanker protest on seven different criteria. Explained in English. Follow the link below.
GAO Statement
"We recommend that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors, obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals and make a new source selection decision, consistent with our decision."
UPDATE:
The GAO sustained Boeing's tanker protest on seven different criteria. Explained in English. Follow the link below.
1. The USAF used a different ruler than the one Boeing thought they were using.
The Air Force, in making the award decision, did not assess the relative merits of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria identified in the solicitation, which provided for a relative order of importance for the various technical requirements. The agency also did not take into account the fact that Boeing offered to satisfy more non-mandatory technical "requirements" than Northrop Grumman, even though the solicitation expressly requested offerors to satisfy as many of these technical "requirements" as possible.2. The USAF said "no points for extra credit" then awarded extra credit points to Northrop.
The Air Force's use as a key discriminator that Northrop Grumman proposed to exceed a key performance parameter objective relating to aerial refueling to a greater degree than Boeing violated the solicitation's evaluation provision that "no consideration will be provided for exceeding [key performance parameter] objectives."3. Northrop Grumman didn't adequately show that they could refuel all the Air Force's fixed wing aircraft.
The protest record did not demonstrate the reasonableness of the Air Force's determination that Northrop Grumman's proposed aerial refueling tanker could refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing tanker-compatible receiver aircraft in accordance with current Air Force procedures, as required by the solicitation.4. The USAF told Boeing they met a key requirement, but later decided they hadn't fully met it and didn't tell them while still talking to Northrop about it.
The Air Force conducted misleading and unequal discussions with Boeing, by informing Boeing that it had fully satisfied a key performance parameter objective relating to operational utility, but later determined that Boeing had only partially met this objective, without advising Boeing of this change in the agency's assessment and while continuing to conduct discussions with Northrop Grumman relating to its satisfaction of the same key performance parameter objective.5. The USAF interpreted Northrop's refusal to meet a specific maintenance requirement as an "administrative oversight" when it may not have been.
The Air Force unreasonably determined that Northrop Grumman's refusal to agree to a specific solicitation requirement that it plan and support the agency to achieve initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of the first full-rate production aircraft was an "administrative oversight," and improperly made award, despite this clear exception to a material solicitation requirement.6. The USAF made errors in determining how much the tankers would cost over their life and later admitted that the correct formula had given the advantage to Boeing.
The Air Force's evaluation of military construction costs in calculating the offerors' most probable life cycle costs for their proposed aircraft was unreasonable, where the agency during the protest conceded that it made a number of errors in evaluation that, when corrected, result in Boeing displacing Northrop Grumman as the offeror with the lowest most probable life cycle cost; where the evaluation did not account for the offerors' specific proposals; and where the calculation of military construction costs based on a notional (hypothetical) plan was not reasonably supported.7. The USAF used their own metrics to estimate Boeing's cost and also couldn't prove that their estimates would produce reliable results.
The Air Force improperly increased Boeing's estimated non-recurring engineering costs in calculating that firm's most probable life cycle costs to account for risk associated with Boeing's failure to satisfactorily explain the basis for how it priced this cost element, where the agency had not found that the proposed costs for that element were unrealistically low. In addition, the Air Force's use of a simulation model to determine Boeing's probable non-recurring engineering costs was unreasonable, because the Air Force used as data inputs in the model the percentage of cost growth associated with weapons systems at an overall program level and there was no indication that these inputs would be a reliable predictor of anticipated growth in Boeing's non-recurring engineering costs.
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