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Flash: Boeing 787 won't fly in 2008 (Update2)

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Citing the extended work stoppage of the 57-day IAM strike, Boeing says the 787 Dreamliner will not accomplish its goal of flying by the close of the fourth quarter of 2008.

Boeing adds that it will not set a new target date for first flight or first delivery while a full assessment of the programme's post-strike status remains ongoing. Boeing's last schedule called for delivering the first 787 to launch customers All Nippon Airways in the third quarter of 2009.

This latest delay is the fifth slip for the first flight of Dreamliner One since September 2007, and suggests the event could occur almost two years after the original schedule target.

Included in the assessment is a costly manufacturing error. Boeing acknowledges a need to reinstall slightly less than 3% of all fasteners throughout its production system.

The fix covers about about two dozen shipsets spread all over the world, which include the four flight test and two ground test aircraft currently in Everett, Washington.

"The issue is with installation of the fasteners, not the fasteners themselves,'' Boeing says.

As a result, the company is conducting a root cause analysis to determine the exact source of the problem. A preliminary examination indicates that unclear specifications for the fasteners resulted in misinterpretations at the time of installation.

As a result, Boeing is reworking those specifications and supplying the workforce in both Everett and the partner base with additional training to ensure this problem does not repeat itself.

Boeing is "not aware" of any other installation issues on the aircraft that would require a reassessment.

The company emphasizes that the 787 programme's quality control system caught this problem before any non-conforming parts were allowed to fly.

Boeing says the problem was discovered two weeks ago during a scheduled inspection of the airframe undergoing static testing in Building 40-23 at the Everett facility. As a result of the findings on the static airframe, Boeing began randomly sampling fasteners across the other flight test aircraft and found the problem to be widespread.

Of those 3% of fasteners, many are either too short or too long. This leads to small gaps beneath the head of the fastener, a design non-conformance requiring reinstallation.

Although the exact number of fasteners requiring reinstallation was not disclosed, Boeing has said that the 787 uses 80% fewer fasteners than an aluminium aircraft of equivalent size. The 767, slightly smaller than the 787, has roughly 1.8 million fasteners per plane. This estimate could place the number of required fastener reinstallations in the thousands across the programme.

Boeing emphasizes that no improperly installed fasteners will travel from supplier partners to Everett, minimizing the additional traveled work.

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22 Comments

is the IAM strike a convenient excuse for a 2008 - 2009 switcheroo ...?

I really regret now saying that the 787 won't be delayed as the A380 on your old blog Jon. I really do. What a blow to the company and airlines once again with this great bird.

it is not delayed "as the a380". It is worse. A380 was about 18 motnhs delayed at its first delivery but for the dreamliner it is the first flight which is delayed by approx. 20 motnhs now (A380 was about 6 motnhs overdue for this event). Planned industrial ramp-up is not even secured as non-existing yet.

and many were dogging airbus for their delays.... this is indeed a blow to boeing. was it a deserved blow? thats up for discussion i suppose. pride almost always comes at a cost imho. but either or, i cant wait to see it fly!

and many were dogging airbus for their delays.... this is indeed a blow to boeing. was it a deserved blow? thats up for discussion i suppose. pride almost always comes at a cost imho. but either or, i cant wait to see it fly!

and many were dogging airbus for their delays.... this is indeed a blow to boeing. was it a deserved blow? thats up for discussion i suppose. pride almost always comes at a cost imho. but either or, i cant wait to see it fly!

"Boeing says the problem was discovered two weeks ago during a scheduled inspection of the airframe undergoing static testing in Building 40-23 at the Everett facility. As a result of the findings on the static airframe, Boeing began randomly sampling fasteners across the other flight test aircraft and found the problem to be widespread."

So something moved it the static test frame? That surely makes this a very serious issue. Apart from the time taken to locate, remove, repair damage caused in removal and replace the fastners this must mean that all the static tests will need to be redone. I doubt this thing will fly before Q2 09.

It will also add to the FAA's concerns about fast tracking certification using computer models.

T. Varadaraj

Just wondering if these problems would have cropped up and festered if Alan Mullaly, an out and out plane guy, was given the CEO job instead of McNerney. Also, does it mean that the airplane business is fundamentally different from other businesses because of how the product is planned, designed, inspected and manufactured?

It begs the question of oversight. Who was/is signing off on improperly installed fasteners? What was/is the overall competence level of the vested partners and their suppliers? Does Boeing really know what it has at this point? This junior exec idea of outsourcing everything and putting a Boeing stamp on it belongs in the trashbin of history.

Someone check my math here (it's been awhile:) 259,200 fasteners?

I'm one of the most pro-Boeing zealots on the planet, but this fracking stinks.

I'd say it would be closer to 10000-12000

"Someone check my math here (it's been awhile:) 259,200 fasteners?" (Lee)

OR:

"I'd say it would be closer to 10000-12000" (Dan)

I think you're both right. 10000-12000 per airframe multiplied by "about two dozen shipsets".

The problem is, the faulty assembled fasteners must be detected first, maybe not the 259,000, but much more than 12-10,000 fasteners have to be tested. For this they would have to disasemble at least partially the planes. Would the FAA also accept the planes that showed a lost of quality control?

maybe it's time to ask wether the very concept of building a plastic aircraft of such a magnitude from scratch was not simply flawed considering the state of aeronautical ingeneering - not to mention the risk inherent to the 787's industrial model. It might have been wise to validate the concept first with a smaller, simpler airplane. But of course, Boeing knows best...How long shall we have to wait untill the "dream" eventually becomes a flying reality? it seems nobody -Boeing included - realy knows.

T. Varadaraj

Ed:
"maybe it's time to ask wether the very concept of building a plastic aircraft of such a magnitude from scratch was not simply flawed considering the state of aeronautical engineering"

or it could be that this whole mess happened because Mcnerney just didn't grasp the fundamentally different nature of airplane building compared to other industrial products he was involved with at 3M and GE and consequently put in much lighter oversight processes than required?

Most of the supposedly "junior" Boeing partners are involved
with other aircraft manufacturers too. They have no history
of carelessness or disinterest.

But Boeing has ZERO experience with large scale distributed
manufacturing.

The fasteners issue seems to indicate that Boeing had itself
pieces for "plane kits" manufactured by various partners and
is just now trying to build a first prototype from one of
these ( large scale serial production) kits.

ANY change that will have to be done now ( extremely late in
the developement cycle) will incure immense cost.

uwe

Boeing bit off too much. A radical step change in both product and production scheme without traditional oversight--what could go wrong? Demoralization of your 'own' workers for starters. Oversight itself was outsourced--the 'partners', sharing risk (co-owners), oversaw themselves and their own supplier network. There were cultural issues as well, issues of face trumping micromanagement by the prime. If the Airbus experience is a guide, there will be increasing darkness forcing a more humble and transparent posture and management restructure. From a customer perspective, this is dangerous ground; time is ally to Airbus.

Blu Yonder

Sorry, but flash news normally means something new and beyond anyone's dreams.

Where exactly is the novelity of this fact? The poll regarding when the B787 is going to fly indicates what the people in the industry feel.When Boeing said that it's going to fly this year, people said "... yeah, right..."

Was there some law about misinforming customers and shareholders?

Luke (Wichita)

If first flight was going to be in Q4 2008, and the machinists go on strike for 2 months, there's a 66% chance that a day-for-day slide will push the first flight into Q1 2009. Why is it so surprising that this happened?

I don't know that I ever heard of first flight being in October, so that makes the slide from a 2 month slide more like 100% chance of being in 2009.

Luke,

First flight was announced early Q4 I am not an english native speaker, yet I understand early as before November 15th and even more as October (cause mid november is midQ4).

Besides, if the strike gives delay to the 1st flight (one day strike is one day delay as hypothesis (could be wrong as Enginners were not striking)) it remains that the fatsteners issue is new and late. The time to correct it has a far more delay potential than the strike.

Luke:
Having read about the fastners issue, it seems to me that the real question today is 'how", rather than "when". A good start for Boeing would be to make a transparent and honest assesment of the program as of today, instead of continuing to feed the financial and technical community with the marketing rethorics it has resorted to since day one.

jon whitworth

Clay, tell me more about fast tracking certification using computer models.

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