In a stunning and candid critique of its chief competitor, Airbus has crafted a comprehensive competitive analysis that touches on nearly every aspect of the troubled 787 programme gleaned from Boeing proprietary data and an embedded network of sources from inside the Dreamliner's global supply chain.
The expansive 46-page document, obtained by FlightBlogger, titled Boeing 787 Lessons Learnt, was compiled by Airbus Head of Engineering Intelligence Burkhard Domke and was presented internally on 20 October 2008.
The presentation examines key design, weight, engine, certification, production and schedule issues facing Boeing's 787 Dreamliner.
Competitive intelligence is a standard practice in the aerospace industry, but the information revealed in the Airbus analysis reveals a scope and specificity of the data collected.
The document includes what appear to be seven slides labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY with a format style used in Boeing presentations, including two that appear to have been photocopied, raising questions about the methods and sources the European consortium utilizes to collect its data.
Airbus claims the presentation, as well as its competitive intelligence gathering methods, fully comply with all laws. Though when approached about how the information was gathered, Airbus declined to address it specifically, suggesting that a lot of data labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY is freely available online. Airbus added that not all documents labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY are in fact proprietary. A spokesman emphasized that Airbus closely watches the market to draw its own conclusions, as do its competitors.
A search engine query for "Boeing Proprietary PPT" did not yield the slides in question.
Boeing declined comment until it reviewed the presentation.
CONTINUED BELOW
The expansive 46-page document, obtained by FlightBlogger, titled Boeing 787 Lessons Learnt, was compiled by Airbus Head of Engineering Intelligence Burkhard Domke and was presented internally on 20 October 2008.
The presentation examines key design, weight, engine, certification, production and schedule issues facing Boeing's 787 Dreamliner.
Competitive intelligence is a standard practice in the aerospace industry, but the information revealed in the Airbus analysis reveals a scope and specificity of the data collected.
The document includes what appear to be seven slides labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY with a format style used in Boeing presentations, including two that appear to have been photocopied, raising questions about the methods and sources the European consortium utilizes to collect its data.
Airbus claims the presentation, as well as its competitive intelligence gathering methods, fully comply with all laws. Though when approached about how the information was gathered, Airbus declined to address it specifically, suggesting that a lot of data labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY is freely available online. Airbus added that not all documents labelled BOEING PROPRIETARY are in fact proprietary. A spokesman emphasized that Airbus closely watches the market to draw its own conclusions, as do its competitors.
A search engine query for "Boeing Proprietary PPT" did not yield the slides in question.
Boeing declined comment until it reviewed the presentation.
CONTINUED BELOW
PRODUCTION ISSUES
Among the "lessons learnt" by the European airframer, Airbus cites Boeing's challenges with beginning 787 production across the whole of its supply chain. Airbus believes Boeing's early production issues fundamentally originated in a lack of oversight on both design and assembly integration for the high level of outsourcing.
All of this was further exacerbated, according to Airbus, by "low-wage, trained-on-the-job workers that had no previous aerospace experience" working at supplier partners. Airbus believes "inadequate supplier capability in design," contributed further, citing as an example that "Vought had no engineering department when selected" by Boeing.
Combined with an "insufficient supply of frame, clips brackets and floor beams" the result was a "loss of configuration" control stemming from production records on "deferred work that were found to be incomplete or lost in transfer." In addition, parts that did arrive complete to final assembly were "found to be completed incorrectly" requiring additional rework in Everett.
In addition, Airbus cites a quality assurance cycle time that was not in line with the production rate demand, as well as a "lack of qualified non-destructive inspection/quality assurance personnel (NDI/QA) and equipment at Tier-2 and -3 suppliers."
With the pressure to expedite pre-assembly growing, Airbus believes Boeing and its partners chose to defer "non-destructive inspection from its Tier-2 and -3 suppliers to Tier-1 partners." The situation was only made more complicated by the additional deferral of NDI from its tier-1 partners directly to Everett to rush major assembly.
A shortage of fasteners has been a highly publicized challenge to the Dreamliner, yet Airbus delves deeper into the cause. The shortage, Airbus believes, was driven by a late redesign of a sleeved fastener for lightning strike protection that primarily impacted Mitsubishi's wing production. As a result, Alcoa, Boeing's fastener supplier was unable to meet demand in time.
Airbus says that at the time the redesign was completed, production lead-time was approximately 60 weeks, leading to "limited availability of tailored-length fasteners."
As a result, fasteners were installed with stacks of washers as a work around for the improper length, forcing Boeing to publicly concede that thousands had to be removed and replaced to incorporate the proper design. Airbus also believes that Boeing's fastener solution "infringes a BAE patent owned by Airbus," though it is not known if Airbus has acted upon this alleged breach of intellectual property.
WEIGHT GAIN & PERFORMANCE
Boeing has publicly acknowledged that the Dreamliner is over its initial targeted weight, but the airframer has never specified the extent of the weight issue. An intensive weight reduction program is underway to minimize the impact on aircraft performance.
Using a Boeing proprietary chart with additional labelling, Airbus believes Dreamliner One has gained 21,050 lbs since firm configuration, which came in September 2005, three months later than initially planned.
According to the chart, which appears to originate from a Boeing Commercial Airplanes update that took place in April of 2008, the significant weight growth originates from fuselage detail sizing and design, accounting for 4,300 lbs, as well as wiring and installation, accounting for 3,250 lbs.
Based on its April 2008 assessment, Airbus expects the initial production 787s to have a maximum empty weight of 4.5 tonnes higher than the original firm configuration of 95.5 tonnes. As a result, Airbus estimates early 787 performance to be 6370 nm with 248 passengers in a two-class configuration, significantly less than the 7,650 - 8,000 nm advertised by Boeing. Based on these Airbus estimates, this would impact launch customer All Nippon Airways and Chinese airlines primarily.
In September, Airbus announced it would offer an A330-200 with a MTOW of 238 tonnes, an increase in five tonnes, to blunt the record 787 sales by offering an A330 with comparable range to the initial 787 deliveries.
At the time, Derek Davies, Investor Marketing Director for Airbus, defined "initial deliveries" as the first 20 787s that complete final assembly with a MTOW of 219.5 tonnes. Davies appeared to be quoting information used to create this intelligence briefing.
Airbus speculates that a 227.9 tonne MTOW 787-8 variant will be introduced beginning with LN20. The report cites a photocopied Boeing proprietary document from a "Boeing source dated August 2008" that shows "a revised airframe supporting this weight increase. This includes strengthening of the outboard wing, the center wing box, the wing leading edges, the MLG wheel well, and the center fuselage as well as enhancing manoeuvre load alleviation."
Though Airbus speculates that the increased MTOW "might also conceal a major impact of the center wing issue."
In addition, Airbus believes that both the General Electric GEnx-1B and Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines are rumoured to have missed specific fuel consumption targets by 2-3% and 3-4% respectively.
"We've continued to make tweaks to the engine and we will make fuel spec when we reach entry into service," GE said.
Rolls-Royce did not return calls seeking comment.
Airbus speculates that a rumoured design change to the Trent 1000 low-pressure turbine could require Dreamliner One to switch to GEnx engines. Though, a 787 programme source confirms that Rolls-Royce compatible pylons had been recently reinstalled on Dreamliner One.
RAMPUP FORECAST
As far back as May 2003, Airbus had at its disposal the internal 787 (then 7E7) production guidance, when, according to the document, Boeing anticipated a peak production rate of seven 787s per month by 2010. However, by October 2005, with the order book swelling, Boeing shifted to a more aggressive ramp up with greater than 10 787s being produced per month by 2011. According to Airbus, Boeing upped its production guidance again in February 2007 as the 787 order book climbed towards 500 to meet a rate of 10 787s per month by the start of 2010.
With the 787 delays taking a toll on the projected ramp up, Boeing scaled back its delivery guidance in April 2008 to achieve rate 10 by 2012, two years later than planned.
Airbus's own estimate, dated September 2008, of 787 production does not have Boeing reaching rate 10 until 2015. Airbus also cites one airline source that was, "Advised by Boeing that the production ramp-up would be patterned after what was achieved with the 777 program. This would mean that only a rate of 7 would be achieved in 2012."
Airbus cites the supply chain as the central constraint to achieving a higher production rate, even as Boeing is being encouraged by customers to build a second final assembly line. Airbus believes partners Kawasaki, Alenia and Hawker de Havilland are investing in new production equipment to support the ramp up, while Spirit AeroSystems, Vought and Global Aeronautica are preparing for a more gradual ramp up.
Also detailed in the report is Boeing's relationship with wing producer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which Airbus believes has only committed to rate 7 for wing shipments with a factory sized for rate 10. The report adds that, "Any plan to increase to rate 10 put on hold due to differences with Boeing over financing" and that "MHI did have a preliminary order for additional tooling which was cancelled" with "no intention to invest in production beyond rate 10."
Airbus speculates privately on the future of Boeing's San Antonio facility intended for refurbishment of the first 20 787s, pointing out that the "Site is on seven year lease, what for?"
Within this supply chain constraint is a central question of the fundamental material choices Boeing selected for the 787. The monolithic carbon fibre fuselage barrels are produced by tightly wrapping, or laying-down, uni-directional carbon tape around a mold. Airbus believes the tape lay-down rates are a central pacing item to a robust production ramp up.
Airbus analyzed a public lecture given on 13 November 2007 by Al Miller, 787 Director of Technology Integration, regarding the Dreamliner at University of Washington. Airbus recreated a graph by Mr. Miller detailing the material lay-down rates. His chart assumed material could be laid-down with a 2006 demonstrated rate of 80 lbs/hour with a single-head machine.
However, Airbus competitive intelligence tells a different story. Airbus believes that Boeing suppliers were actually only able to lay-down 8-9 lbs/hour at the time production began in 2007 and had gradually increased to 19 lbs/hour. Airbus expects the rate to increase to 30 lbs/hour once a dual-head machine arrives, well below the initial goal of 100 lbs/hour with a single-head machine.
Airbus cites Spirit, a tier-one structural partner on the 787, as the source of this actual lay-down rate data. Spirit is a major structural partner on the A350 XWB programme, responsible for the fabrication of Section 15, the central fuselage composite structure, at a new facility being built in Kinston, North Carolina. The A350 XWB competes directly with Boeing's 787 and 777 aircraft.
When approached for comment, Spirit says it is unsure of how Airbus obtained this information and added that the company "takes great measures to protect the intellectual property of our customers."
For the composite A350 XWB, Airbus selected a composite panel design rather than the 787s monolithic design for its fuselage sections.
LOOKING AHEAD TO 787-9
Airbus completes its analysis of the 787 programme with a look at the future of the Dreamliner in the 787-9. The airframer examines the larger 787-9 variant that will follow the 787-8 with an entry into service in 2012. Airbus believes Boeing will design significant performance improvements into the -9 that will then be incorporated into a major block point change around LN100 for the -8.
Airbus cites two BOEING PROPRIETARY presentation slides titled 787-9 Configuration Features which claims that a revised aft-body join, new floor beams, seat tracks, composite wing ribs and structural fuel vent stringers, as well as a "revised structural architecture" for the horizontal stabilizer will all find their way into the 787-8 and -9.
The combination of supply chain woes, design changes and production forecasts are all central to what Airbus believes is the "conundrum" for Boeing's 787 programme: "Either wait for the 787-9 design spin-offs to limit number of low-value 'wave one aircraft'...or ramp up fast to recover delay in deliveries to customers."
Yet, almost paradoxically, Airbus concedes that the "787-9 design [is] on hold pending availability of 787-8 ground and flight test data." Adding, "ground and flight loads data essential to calibrate [finite element method] models" and "aero[dynamic] and engine performance data essential to determine need for additional weight savings."
Among the "lessons learnt" by the European airframer, Airbus cites Boeing's challenges with beginning 787 production across the whole of its supply chain. Airbus believes Boeing's early production issues fundamentally originated in a lack of oversight on both design and assembly integration for the high level of outsourcing.
All of this was further exacerbated, according to Airbus, by "low-wage, trained-on-the-job workers that had no previous aerospace experience" working at supplier partners. Airbus believes "inadequate supplier capability in design," contributed further, citing as an example that "Vought had no engineering department when selected" by Boeing.
Combined with an "insufficient supply of frame, clips brackets and floor beams" the result was a "loss of configuration" control stemming from production records on "deferred work that were found to be incomplete or lost in transfer." In addition, parts that did arrive complete to final assembly were "found to be completed incorrectly" requiring additional rework in Everett.
In addition, Airbus cites a quality assurance cycle time that was not in line with the production rate demand, as well as a "lack of qualified non-destructive inspection/quality assurance personnel (NDI/QA) and equipment at Tier-2 and -3 suppliers."
With the pressure to expedite pre-assembly growing, Airbus believes Boeing and its partners chose to defer "non-destructive inspection from its Tier-2 and -3 suppliers to Tier-1 partners." The situation was only made more complicated by the additional deferral of NDI from its tier-1 partners directly to Everett to rush major assembly.
A shortage of fasteners has been a highly publicized challenge to the Dreamliner, yet Airbus delves deeper into the cause. The shortage, Airbus believes, was driven by a late redesign of a sleeved fastener for lightning strike protection that primarily impacted Mitsubishi's wing production. As a result, Alcoa, Boeing's fastener supplier was unable to meet demand in time.
Airbus says that at the time the redesign was completed, production lead-time was approximately 60 weeks, leading to "limited availability of tailored-length fasteners."
As a result, fasteners were installed with stacks of washers as a work around for the improper length, forcing Boeing to publicly concede that thousands had to be removed and replaced to incorporate the proper design. Airbus also believes that Boeing's fastener solution "infringes a BAE patent owned by Airbus," though it is not known if Airbus has acted upon this alleged breach of intellectual property.
WEIGHT GAIN & PERFORMANCE
Boeing has publicly acknowledged that the Dreamliner is over its initial targeted weight, but the airframer has never specified the extent of the weight issue. An intensive weight reduction program is underway to minimize the impact on aircraft performance.
Using a Boeing proprietary chart with additional labelling, Airbus believes Dreamliner One has gained 21,050 lbs since firm configuration, which came in September 2005, three months later than initially planned.
According to the chart, which appears to originate from a Boeing Commercial Airplanes update that took place in April of 2008, the significant weight growth originates from fuselage detail sizing and design, accounting for 4,300 lbs, as well as wiring and installation, accounting for 3,250 lbs.
Based on its April 2008 assessment, Airbus expects the initial production 787s to have a maximum empty weight of 4.5 tonnes higher than the original firm configuration of 95.5 tonnes. As a result, Airbus estimates early 787 performance to be 6370 nm with 248 passengers in a two-class configuration, significantly less than the 7,650 - 8,000 nm advertised by Boeing. Based on these Airbus estimates, this would impact launch customer All Nippon Airways and Chinese airlines primarily.
In September, Airbus announced it would offer an A330-200 with a MTOW of 238 tonnes, an increase in five tonnes, to blunt the record 787 sales by offering an A330 with comparable range to the initial 787 deliveries.
At the time, Derek Davies, Investor Marketing Director for Airbus, defined "initial deliveries" as the first 20 787s that complete final assembly with a MTOW of 219.5 tonnes. Davies appeared to be quoting information used to create this intelligence briefing.
Airbus speculates that a 227.9 tonne MTOW 787-8 variant will be introduced beginning with LN20. The report cites a photocopied Boeing proprietary document from a "Boeing source dated August 2008" that shows "a revised airframe supporting this weight increase. This includes strengthening of the outboard wing, the center wing box, the wing leading edges, the MLG wheel well, and the center fuselage as well as enhancing manoeuvre load alleviation."
Though Airbus speculates that the increased MTOW "might also conceal a major impact of the center wing issue."
In addition, Airbus believes that both the General Electric GEnx-1B and Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines are rumoured to have missed specific fuel consumption targets by 2-3% and 3-4% respectively.
"We've continued to make tweaks to the engine and we will make fuel spec when we reach entry into service," GE said.
Rolls-Royce did not return calls seeking comment.
Airbus speculates that a rumoured design change to the Trent 1000 low-pressure turbine could require Dreamliner One to switch to GEnx engines. Though, a 787 programme source confirms that Rolls-Royce compatible pylons had been recently reinstalled on Dreamliner One.
RAMPUP FORECAST
As far back as May 2003, Airbus had at its disposal the internal 787 (then 7E7) production guidance, when, according to the document, Boeing anticipated a peak production rate of seven 787s per month by 2010. However, by October 2005, with the order book swelling, Boeing shifted to a more aggressive ramp up with greater than 10 787s being produced per month by 2011. According to Airbus, Boeing upped its production guidance again in February 2007 as the 787 order book climbed towards 500 to meet a rate of 10 787s per month by the start of 2010.
With the 787 delays taking a toll on the projected ramp up, Boeing scaled back its delivery guidance in April 2008 to achieve rate 10 by 2012, two years later than planned.
Airbus's own estimate, dated September 2008, of 787 production does not have Boeing reaching rate 10 until 2015. Airbus also cites one airline source that was, "Advised by Boeing that the production ramp-up would be patterned after what was achieved with the 777 program. This would mean that only a rate of 7 would be achieved in 2012."
Airbus cites the supply chain as the central constraint to achieving a higher production rate, even as Boeing is being encouraged by customers to build a second final assembly line. Airbus believes partners Kawasaki, Alenia and Hawker de Havilland are investing in new production equipment to support the ramp up, while Spirit AeroSystems, Vought and Global Aeronautica are preparing for a more gradual ramp up.
Also detailed in the report is Boeing's relationship with wing producer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which Airbus believes has only committed to rate 7 for wing shipments with a factory sized for rate 10. The report adds that, "Any plan to increase to rate 10 put on hold due to differences with Boeing over financing" and that "MHI did have a preliminary order for additional tooling which was cancelled" with "no intention to invest in production beyond rate 10."
Airbus speculates privately on the future of Boeing's San Antonio facility intended for refurbishment of the first 20 787s, pointing out that the "Site is on seven year lease, what for?"
Within this supply chain constraint is a central question of the fundamental material choices Boeing selected for the 787. The monolithic carbon fibre fuselage barrels are produced by tightly wrapping, or laying-down, uni-directional carbon tape around a mold. Airbus believes the tape lay-down rates are a central pacing item to a robust production ramp up.
Airbus analyzed a public lecture given on 13 November 2007 by Al Miller, 787 Director of Technology Integration, regarding the Dreamliner at University of Washington. Airbus recreated a graph by Mr. Miller detailing the material lay-down rates. His chart assumed material could be laid-down with a 2006 demonstrated rate of 80 lbs/hour with a single-head machine.
However, Airbus competitive intelligence tells a different story. Airbus believes that Boeing suppliers were actually only able to lay-down 8-9 lbs/hour at the time production began in 2007 and had gradually increased to 19 lbs/hour. Airbus expects the rate to increase to 30 lbs/hour once a dual-head machine arrives, well below the initial goal of 100 lbs/hour with a single-head machine.Airbus cites Spirit, a tier-one structural partner on the 787, as the source of this actual lay-down rate data. Spirit is a major structural partner on the A350 XWB programme, responsible for the fabrication of Section 15, the central fuselage composite structure, at a new facility being built in Kinston, North Carolina. The A350 XWB competes directly with Boeing's 787 and 777 aircraft.
When approached for comment, Spirit says it is unsure of how Airbus obtained this information and added that the company "takes great measures to protect the intellectual property of our customers."
For the composite A350 XWB, Airbus selected a composite panel design rather than the 787s monolithic design for its fuselage sections.
LOOKING AHEAD TO 787-9
Airbus completes its analysis of the 787 programme with a look at the future of the Dreamliner in the 787-9. The airframer examines the larger 787-9 variant that will follow the 787-8 with an entry into service in 2012. Airbus believes Boeing will design significant performance improvements into the -9 that will then be incorporated into a major block point change around LN100 for the -8.
Airbus cites two BOEING PROPRIETARY presentation slides titled 787-9 Configuration Features which claims that a revised aft-body join, new floor beams, seat tracks, composite wing ribs and structural fuel vent stringers, as well as a "revised structural architecture" for the horizontal stabilizer will all find their way into the 787-8 and -9.The combination of supply chain woes, design changes and production forecasts are all central to what Airbus believes is the "conundrum" for Boeing's 787 programme: "Either wait for the 787-9 design spin-offs to limit number of low-value 'wave one aircraft'...or ramp up fast to recover delay in deliveries to customers."
Yet, almost paradoxically, Airbus concedes that the "787-9 design [is] on hold pending availability of 787-8 ground and flight test data." Adding, "ground and flight loads data essential to calibrate [finite element method] models" and "aero[dynamic] and engine performance data essential to determine need for additional weight savings."
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