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A month later, Boeing continues work developing 787 wing fix

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wingworkingarea_mod.jpgWith almost a month since Boeing announced it was forced to ground its 787s for structural reinforcement, the company continues to work to develop, install and test a fix that can get its troubled Dreamliner into the sky after more than two years of delays.

According to a senior program source: "There is good news and bad news. The good news is we know what to fix, and how to fix it. The bad news is the location is a [expletive] to get to."

Boeing says that revised schedules for first flight and delivery remain under review, as they have been since the company's June 23rd news conference.

DIAGNOSIS & DEVELOPMENT

While the fix is being developed and a fully revised schedule finalized for airlines, sources at both Boeing and partner suppliers indicate that the existing production plan has slid roughly one and a half to three months for the delivery of Airplane Ten's components to Everett, even as suppliers continue to prep parts for shipment.

The slip, the sources say, allows Boeing to finalize and test the fix and limit the number of aircraft in final assembly required to undergo the fix in Everett. Boeing previously stated that any fix developed would be able to be installed no matter the location of the parts in the supply chain.

Airplane Eight, ZA101, is expected to begin final assembly operations before the month is out, with parts for Airplane Nine, ZA102, believed to be arriving beginning in early August. The slip, one supplier sources say, could mean that structural components for Airplane Ten, ZA104, may not arrive until October. The customer ZA-designations are non-sequential.

The side-of-body issue was first discovered in late-May during a test that saw lower wing loads than the April 21st test of 120-130% of limit load. The test revealed the weakness in the upper section on the stringer caps of the wing to body join at the side of body of the aircraft.

A corps of Boeing engineers are working 80-hour weeks to design the fix that allows the 787 to fly with a robust flight envelope and achieve FAA certification with 150% of limit load on the wing, sources say.

For the development of the remedial fix, widely believed to be made of titanium, engineers have to design a modification that avoids two potential challenges down the road.

Veteran structural engineers tell FlightBlogger that the key to developing a reinforcement centers around ensuring that the loads that caused the initial problem at the site of the wing stringer caps are not redistributed elsewhere causing a further structural issue.

Second, as the area is stiffened Boeing engineers must take great care to develop a fix that isn't susceptible to long term fatigue issues that come from the normal structural aging of the aircraft.

These challenges aren't unique to structural engineering on the 787, in fact, they are part of the normal checklist that comes with developing the solution that is the 3-dimensional puzzle of designing aircraft. This is not to say, however, that solving the problem is any less complex, difficult or time consuming.

INSTALLATION

Several program sources indicate that August is a crucial month for the wing fix as the development phase moves into the installation phase.

Boeing reiterated that its engineers are "working with urgency", and no internal timeline has been finalized for the testing or duration of the installation of the fix.

Sources say the area that will be reinforced at the side of body is extremely tight and difficult to reach as the installation area of the fix will provide very little room to install the fasteners to secure the reinforcement.

The installation of the fix may begin as early as the middle of August, with installation times  around one month for each already assembled airplane, sources estimate.

Boeing has nine 787s at its Everett facility (6 flight test, 1 production, 2 ground test) that have gone through, or continue to undergo, final assembly operations, and structural sections for a 10th (Airplane 8) continue to arrive.

ZA001 is expected to leave the flight line for Paint Hangar 45-03 where the first 787 will undergo installation of the fix.

ZA002 will remain on the Everett flight line and the area around the side of body will be covered with a specially ordered tent to protect the aircraft.

In addition, Boeing has moved the approximately 50-foot long, two-thirds span test wing box, known as the "Dash 18" wing, from the company's Seattle Development Center to Building 40-23 where 787 static testing has been taking place in Everett.

The company is considering using the test wing box, which was formally broken in November 2008 above 150% of limit load, to test installation methods as a dress rehearsal before modifying the static test airframe and ZA001.

PERMANENCE & PRODUCTION

Even with the remedial fix in the works, a key discussion centers on the future of 787 production and when the permanent fix is designed into the wing to body join.

Sources say a revision of the upper part of the wing to body join is almost certainly necessary to create a permanent long-term solution and eliminate the time consuming installation of the remedial fix.

Boeing says there are about 40 787s in process throughout the global supply chain and a question yet to be answered is the timing of incorporation for the permanent fix.

Boeing has already planned a series of blockpoint changes to incorporate weight reduction and performance improvements into the design of the aircraft. The first major blockpoint was for ZA100, the first production 787 (Airplane 7), with the next expected to follow around Airplane 20.

Airbus faced a similar challenge when the A380 wing ruptured below the 150% mark in 2006 forcing the European airframer to modify aircraft already in final assembly. Airbus eventually incorporated its own remedial fix into A380 production before the wings were delivered to Toulouse, however the company has had to redesign the effected area as a long-term solution.

Photo Credit Fortune Magazine

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66 Comments

Jon this is gold for us. Pure 24 carrot gold. Thanks so much!!!

Jerry1t

This may be pure gold for Tom B but I find it a disturbing account of what appears to be a complex solution for a complex problem. After all is said and done, it still does not manage to fit into my mind.

With all the clarity that Jon brings to the description, it still sounds like it is unresolved and forces engineers to work" 80 hour weeks " I remember Scott Francer saying that a handful of fasteners will solve this problem "in situ" . And now we are presented with an ongoing effort to come up with a solution.

I am sure there will be more accolades about how great and efficient this plane will be and how it will change flying forever. But until this plane is able to fly it remains a myth...and an expensive one at that.

It is still outrageous that Boeing and its Parrners could not manage to design a plane where the wings would hang tight and enable it to fly. You think they would have learned from Airbus' similar problem but clearly, they did not.

No one has been more of a fan of the 787 than I, but I am worn out by the excuses and failures on the part of this team to get things right. One of the key and crucial parts of a plane and they design it inadequately.

Please do not fill this column with tales of challenges and how this is expected. That is just "plane" nonsense. This is another screw up and it will cost in terms of time and monies . All sorts of excuses will follow but that is just sentiment.

This is a another failure on the part of Boeing and it does not leave me with any confidence about its schedules, its solutions, its promises, etc. Until they manage to get the 787 in the air flying it is a project in the works and one that has been terribly mishandled.

I wish I felt better about this endeavor, but Boeing and its Partners have taken alot of joy and cost out of this and have left alot of credibility issues still unresolved.

Would Scott Carson and Scott Francer please show us that handul of fastners at tomorrows earnings presentation.

Boeing Investor


The more I read this account, the more discouraging it appears.

There remain many challenges before a solution is designed and installed.

The article is an attempt to bring some order and clarity to a problem that , in truth, remains disorderly and lacking in clarity.

How very disappointing.

Just as I have said before. Installation of the fix in-situ on completed aircraft will be neither easy nor cheap, and the latest confirmation illustrates Boeing's folly of continuing wing/body joins, rolling out, and fueling aircraft before the repair is installed.

Ask anyone familiar with composite aerostructure asssembly and they will tell you one of the most difficult operations is close tolerance drilling of a titanium composite stack of materials. And they will most likely tell you that THE most difficult is back drilling into titanium to match existing close tolerance holes in the underlying composite, without damaging the existing fastener holes in the composite.

By continuing joins, Boeing raises the danger/difficulty to new hights, by adding restricted access, entry into a confined space, and entry into at least some wet fuel cells.

Jerry1t

Does Raoul's comment make sense. It seems to. Why are they fueling up the planes and readying them for flight testing when they do not have a solution to a problem for any of them yet.

Would someone explain....

Boeing Investor

Will be very interesting to see how Jim McNearny covers this topic at tomorrow's earnings call. Since he was unaware of the problem a few weeks ago, will he be aware of it tomorrow? His able sidekick Scott Carson may be prgrammed to be called in to conjure up some minor excuses and schedule promises

Concerned

This makes my head spin.

This is a three dimensional problem that has yet to be solved

airplanesense

After reading Jon's as-usual excellent description and all the above postings, it now seems evident it is time for Boeing to bite the big bullet: forget the interim fix/modification, redesign the entire body join area, and build and fly only a/c with the permanent redesign, even if it means scrapping all previous builds. If Boeing proceeds with the interim fix/mod what will it gain? Degraded a/c with the fix, reduced capability, and all this will further delay the permanent redesign. At this pathetic state more delay to build only the permanent redesign is now the least worst option.

Regarding the comment about Boeing "continuing ... fueling aircraft". I don't believe they have fueled any additional 787's since this issue was discovered. ZA001 and ZA002 had already been fueled, and ZA005 will not be fueled, it was only painted, it will have some engine weights installed, and then will roll back into the factory.

Regarding the comments which state that the design of a solution is still "an ongoing process"... That is not how I read the article. I believe a source stated that Boeing knows "what to fix, and how to fix it". So the fix is known, it just happens to need to be installed in an area that is difficult to access.

I'm not one to jump on the Boeing bandwagon, and I do still have some misgivings about the 787 as a whole, but in the interests of clarity I felt it important to straighten those two facts out.

Just as an FYI - KiroTV has some footage from Chopper7 today showing the work being done outside with the panels taken off.

http://www.kirotv.com/video/20129150/index.html

Well Jon,
The first two comments on this came from Tom and Jerry, unfortunately somewhat appropriate for the state of this programme.
A very concise record than you.
Dont know how much titanium has to be added, but it weighs about 9lbs. per cubic inch I think.
A lot of opportunities for weight increase?

MT snogglethorpe

@andrew:

The density of titanium is about 4.5 g/cm^3, or 0.18 lb/in^3.

Thanks Snogglethorpe
My bad metric convesion

Another excellent piece by Jon. You may not generate as high a frequency of posts as other flight blogs out there, but your articles are sure worth the wait.

Robert Wilson

How ironic it is that we celebrate the 40th anniversary of man landing on the moon.

The knowledge, design and commitment it must have taken to achieve such a endeavor, only to fast forward to today’s endeavors with the A380 and Boeing 787, makes one think that we have digressed in time as far as knowledge, design, and commitment when we see what it takes to get a new aircraft off the ground in this century.

Mars never looked so far away.

While this design boo boo is distressing as usual, some people with short memories don't remember that most new Boeing aircraft models through the years have had problems similar to this in one way or another when first rolled out. Usually, the fixes were add-ons until later in the program where the designed in fix could be picked up in the regular production.

Not such a big deal. Some fixes are difficult to incorporate, some are not. The big concern is trying to correct the finite element modeling in that area.

Of course, this also gives the naysayers ammunition for their anti 787/boeing rants. There is plenty of ammunition for that already due to the poor performance of corporate management, but the repair problem is, relatively speaking, not that uncommon in new airplane design.

@ Robert

"Mars never looked so far away"

I couldn't agree with you more on that. I also think that we have degraded in the level of accomplishment over the past 40 years.

Frank Williams

Re: "Mars never looked so far away"...

My dad built stuff that was flown to the moon, plus components of earlier orbital craft. He and his peers were united in a unique, brash, exploration that happened to be vital to the national security of the day. Yes, they made mistakes...
Boeing is not building the new jet just to see if it can be done or to see if they themselves can make it fly! They are building it to be the best possible aircraft for others to buy and safely operate day in and day out. It's a completely different kind of goal that is technologically daunting and, in it's own way, also brash. That much I like, even though as an investor I am not happy. But I have a sense for the world of the professional engineer. Revolutionary designs will always benefit by 'experience'. I only hope that Boeing locks down and patents every possible morsel of structural and operational insight that has come at such a dear price!

Frank

Liz,
Jon's post states specifically that they are still designing the fix. They may know how to fix it, but the part(s) still needs to be modelled in 3D, analysed by a stress guesser (static, dynamic, on its own and as installed on the wing, damage tolerance, fatigue etc.), then drawings are made of the parts, of the assemblies and of the installations. There will be at least 2 different versions (1 for repairs & 1 for assembly line, which is a standard aerospace methodology. So no, they will not be scrapping existing wingboxes &wings, if that is what Airplanesense is suggesting) plus it will be installed and fully tested on the static rig and will have to be installed on the fatigue rig. They may want to risk installing the fix on ZA001 before the results come back from the static rig but that will be a decision for the "adults". Typically one would not wait but we are talking about a revolutionary program here, so who knows!?
What Raoul says about the difficulty of back drilling is accurate. Not sure about going into the fuel cells will be required.

@ Tom B and Robert Wilson

I'd say that bureaucracy is to blame for this state of industry. Things just takes ages to get done by the time the decision makers made up their minds. And then there's preasure and things gets rushed and you're stuck with a fix.

@ Liz M

I'm with you on this.

Jon, I am unclear on something here. The test that ran the loads up to somewhere between 120% and 130% in April supposedly did not reveal the problem with the "side of body" join. It appeared in some test with lower loads that occurred in late May. The test in April that went beyond 120% was supposedly not required for first flight. Boeing claims that the 787 could have flown albeit with such a small flight envelope such that it would not have been worth it to fly.
Here are a few questions:
1. Why can Boeing not give out the exact percentage of limit load was achieved in the April test? Surely their instrumentation should be accurate enough to measure this.
2. Did the damage occur during the April test or during the May test?
3. If it did occur during the April test, why did they not find the damage until the later test?
4. If the damage actually did occur during the May test (with lower loads), should not Boeing be totally worried about such an issue? After all, this would be roughly a case of fatigue failure occurring after a very limited number of load applications.
5. Had Boeing not gone "above and beyond" the requirements for their first flight tests, could one surmise that they could have had an unfortunate "incident" with their flight test aircraft?
Regards,
JOhn

Engineer

I may not be in the aviation industry but my experience working with composites tells me that boeing's computer modeling isn't as accurate as they think it is... composites behaves entirely differently from aluminum. the damage might have been the result of both the April and May test. The high loading test in April might have left residual stress in the composites and the lower loading test in May just added the stress causing the delamination to happen...

If Boeing were to take these issues lightly again and rush to get things fix and deliver the plane solely to avoid more delay penalties, i believe they are going to run into more delays... Not just that but the 787 might just end up being a short term plane when the composites problems causes its maintenance cost to escalate tremendously after few years into service... Before long, airline operators will starts to sell and get rid of this costly plane when it underperformed... (similar to airbus A340)

I remain sceptical of this aircraft's economic values, performance and credibility. If i were an investor, I'd be really concern...
I'd say at the rate things are going, by the end of the day the 787's first flight might just be months apart from the A350 which is scheduled to be in 2011...

Recipe For Disaster

Follwoing comments were apparently found on Aviation Week (cannot find them myself).

"Boeing decides to build an airplane having performance not previously achieved, using engines not yet built, claiming fuel specifics not yet attained, and constructed out of materials never before used for a similar purpose. It specifies a barrel-fuselage structure never before used on a large plastic airplane. It uses vendors not familiar with the material and designs using computer models that aren’t verified. It outsources nearly all work using vendors inexperienced with Boeing and its processes.

It specifies an electrical system having three times the power of existing aircraft systems, designed using a wild frequency technique not previously used, operating at twice the voltage of previous airplanes, using a system designer who hadn’t previously designed such systems.

It guarantees to do this with top-level management that has never built an airplane or managed outsourcing, on a schedule never before achieved on a conventional airplane, and plans not to pay the vendors until the airplane is delivered.

What could possibly go wrong?

Concerned

Recipe for Disaster: Considering all the obstacles you described, the 787 has done very well up to this point.

diane wilson

Before we get too carried away with these comparisons between the Apollo program and the 787, let's not forget Apollo 1, OK? No one died because of the 787 wing design error. Boeing kept the lid on "go fever", unlike NASA on Apollo 1 and on Challenger. And let's not forget that Apollo had other serious design issues throughout the program, including nearly crippling weight issues with the lunar lander. NASA flew the first several Apollo missions, knowing there was a "Block II" design coming that fixed major issues.

There's a lot to criticize about the way Boeing managed the 787; they took far too many risks and rushed the schedule, probably due to financial pressures more than inexperience or carelessness. They outsourced too much, including outsourcing too much risk, and they've paid for that on every schedule slip.

On a project as complex as Apollo or the 787, especially on life-critical projects like these, there are bound to be major problems and delays. It's unfair to trash Boeing for the design errors. They're doing the right thing by delaying the schedule when it needs to be delayed. Nobody wants their mistakes to kill people.

So let's keep some perspective, OK?

It must be an absolute [expletive] to get to if it'll take a whole month to install on each airframe.

To all those who bemoan what's happened, this is part of designing and certifying an aircraft and it's *why* static testing is still carried out on a full scale airframe. Past programs have had problems which show up in static testing. What's different now is that this program is much more visible than any before. The program has had plenty of problems, but mostly on the project management side rather than design deficiencies.

Jaypee,

1. As far as I can tell, and I've done some digging around, the 120 - 130% number came from Jon's sources. I can't find anything directly from Boeing saying anything other than the wing was tested to limit load.

2. I believe the April test.

3. They found it in May because during the May test the strain gauge readings were unexpected, and then they went in to investigate why. I don't know whether or not they could have picked it up in the April test.

4. Extremely low cycle fatigue. No, this is static.

5. Unlikely. The test program on the static test airframe would be used to gradually expand the flight test envelope. At no time would they have flown beyond an envelope which they had not validated as safe.

To Recipe For Disaster on July 22, 2009 6:32 AM

Most of the stuff that was mentioned is not that
much different from what the Airbus A380 uses.

And forex most of the "Super" electrics seem to
be done by Hamilton Sundstrand for _both_
airframers to similar specs ( Airbus as a first afaiu ).

The Dreamliners brandnew instrumentation bus
is a product Airbus explicitly asked for first
( With less Bumm, Bumm for sure )

Barrels are by Airbus oppinion an innovative dead end
as it only allows to place stringers in CFRP but
requires separate installation of frames ( done in
titanium which is expensive to machine and does not
really match with CFRP all that well.)

Boeings issues with manufacturing partners seems to
be a specific Boeing problem. i.e. the same firms
work for others without issue.

It all comes down to a PPT design that tried to be
different for differences sake ( and the differences
excessively blown up at that ).

Solid blame can be put on Boeing management.

We can't say much about manufacturing and construction
except that both are heavily taylored to a workplace
void of distances.
Boeing guy:
"We have an engineer on the shopfloor
in 5 minutes to fix issues".

How to do the organisational part of distributed manufacture
and construction was an unknown unknown, i.e. no experiece
at all and no idea how it is done succesfully.

An employee from the manufacturer building the rear bulkhead told about a management info that implied a further
12++ month of delay towards first flight:
> http://www.aero.de/community/topic.php?id=3977&page=5
( no oppinion about the quality of this info )

uwe

DAFlieger


Hi,

Found this interesting link at Seattle Times... The 787 would not fly this year:

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/boeingaerospace/2009513152_boeing22.html

:-(

DAFlieger

Concerned

Diane Wilson: Boeing was very wrong to its shareholders and supporting Carriers by making outlandish promises and trying to rush the success of a large scale and risky project.

They, more than anyone, should have understood the complexity of what they were facing and should never of been so cavalier as to think they could pull it off without challenges and delays.

In addition to that, they continued to indicate that all was going well when an earleir recognition of issues would have been more realistic. This habit continued to last month when assurances were given for first flight.

Most people acknowledge Management's failures here more than the technological side.

Cliff Ransom

Please add me to distribution for your well-written e-mails.

A different perspective:
What if De Havilland did more testing and listened to respected consultants (such as Whittle) and did not rush the Comet into production - it is not beyond credibility to believe that De havilland would be one of the top Aircraft manufacturers today- rather than what it is, just a memory.

another view;-
Airbus elected to go the more conservative composite route for the A350, even though they started their design so much later - did they see something that Boeing missed?

diane wilson

@Concerned, I guarantee to you that the agressive schedule is due in large part to pressure from Wall Street and from shareholders. They are not blameless, and it takes very strong management to stand up to them. Shareholders tend to take very short-term views, and that can be (and usually is) detrimental to long-term, high-risk development programs. In addition, shareholders want certainty in a world where certainty doesn't exist.

Like any large company, Boeing's internal communication is not flawless, but on the other hand, I can easily understand that they would not want to share bad news with investors until they have both the technical facts and the business facts well understood.

Outsider

It's a 4-d (actually, n-d) problem. To think that it's 3-d ignores functional (actually, more than one axes) requirements.

'Knowing how to fix' has many senses. Bringing any of these hypotheses to a workable conclusion is what engineering is at the core.

It's nice that managers are stepping back and letting the engineers work.

By the way, does Carson have laryngitis?

Shareholder

Listening to Earnings Conference call..McNearny's address takes 787 with stride and indicates a fix is in place and only implementation is the challenge. Not alarmed nor thwarted but indicates "lesson's learned"

I understand this attitude but it is a standard corporate coverup for failures and mistakes. Challenges always exist but this CEO would never own up to mismanagement. Its just categorized as a normal matter thus exculpating their ability to eliminate or minimize these problems.

Corporate stonewalling is characteristic of Boeing and the present Officers are masters at it

Edouard

Talk to serious insiders, talk to engineers working with aerospace subcontractors on both sides of the pond, and most, if not all of them, will tell you that going the full plastic and full barrel option for an airplane of this size was the riskiest possible. If the 787 ever flies, it will be a very average product, to the deep disappointment of the 50 + airlines who succombed to Boeing's PR. Let's hope Airbus will learn the full lesson of this fiasco and draw the right conclusions with regard to the A 350 (like beeing modest and transparent, for a start...).

anonymous

Did Jim M say (Freudian slip) "you can't believe me"?

Jerry1t


Do I detect a French bias in Edouard's comment. I think this subject has been explored many times and remains one of opinion and not fact.

To Jerry1t on July 22, 2009 12:27 PM

The observable bias seems to be more towards reality.

uwe

Trapperpk

Wing Fix? It sounds like the priority should be a Boeing fix. Did Boeing use a high risk method of having no prototype to test its theories before proceeding forward and rely exclusiviley on computer modeling on new technologies and design? Now Boeing has sold units already into production before first flight. To quote an old friend from Hollywood,"this is a fine fix you got us into Ollie". I am a fan of Boeing and always have been. I believe better people than me create, design and build this aircraft. But somewhere in all this muddle, decisions are made that betray the effort to build the best commercial aircraft in the the world. Boeing decision makers should check their pride and arrogance at the door and "get er done". Sack Oliver and Hardy and move forward.

Edouard

To Jerry1t:
From a purely academic point of vue, a drop of european bias on a blog which, regardless of its true excellence, is 99% US biased, is not in itself a bad thing. And it seems that my comments have ==already== been, at least partially, vindicated by facts,

Frank Williams

Can anyone comment on the accuracy of the image and nature of the modifications as reported here?

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ABPub/zoom/html/2009513154.html

This retrofit work does appear to be a significant challenge, but attitude is very important with problems like these. ...tough to be working in a fishbowl with so much media attention!

Frank

Jerry1t

Edouard & Ewe,

Both of you are from the Continent, if I remember correctly ,and do have a European bias... perfectly understandable and not an object of criticism.

I do believe that this subject has been debated on many of the blogging pages and , in truth, cannot be proven until the distant future.

EADS will learn alot from the 787 but it will remain unproven as to which is the best approach until many years have passed.

To Jerry1t on July 22, 2009 3:49 PM

Another voice with a European bias:
http://www.rbogash.com/boeing_delay.html
;-)

On Bias:
We certainly have a European viewpoint
which has lost quite a bit of nationalistic
flag waving in the post WWII era.
( Germany certainly had it's time of
flag waving hubris in recent history.)

When I look at the caveats Airbus posted about
Dreamliner design principles the least they will
get is assurance to have reasonably good
judgement.

uwe

WingBender

I should point out that there is more to devising a fix than simply designing a fix. One must also design a manufacturing plan to implement the fix. The aircraft will have to be supported properly. Special tools may need to be built. Special considerations for confined space work will need to be accomodated. The individuals performing the work will likely need some special training.

Pointman

I think if Boeing hadn't given away the wing and wing box assembly to overseas partners the discovery and fix would have been made earlier.

That is the first time Boeing as given away that exclusive structural property.

It's a wholly different process to walk over to the other side of the factory and talk with the assembly engineers in process- as opposed to breaking business/cultural obstacles to have a dialogue.

I read somewhere that the Partners hold their own proprietary patents on their parts and drawings that they supply to Boeing- hampering quick redesign and recovery from setbacks.

Maybe someone could clarify that information..

Rumors are running rampant all over the factory regarding shutdowns and layoffs in the 787 program- the wish is that management would be honest and level with the workers and investors so we're not blindsided again.

Paulo M (Johannesburg, RSA)

Jon - excellent, excellent post. In my opinion, this post has done a considerable service to faith in Boeing* sorting out a very difficult - complex, and highly publicized program.

That someone that leaked this information belongs to the part of the Boeing Company that is precise, they know their trade, they know exactly what is going on, they know exactly how to get things to WORK, and they belong to the exactly the same culture that built the Boeing 747, the Saturn V/Apollo system, the Airbus A300, and the BAe/AƩrospatiale Concorde - whether or not we, the public agree with these programs.

These people are engineers, they make things WORK and they are the only reason why there's still high regard surrounding Boeing and - like the general sentiment here agrees - in sharp contrast to Boeing (and Airbus) Management.

Boeing's problems are the result of non-engineering people making decisions on behalf of engineering folk. Things as seemingly simple as product schedules ARE exclusively for engineers to reasonably decide - NOT Wall Street. It requires input from people working the actual design. That the 787 has been the single largest industrial effort worldwide over the past couple of years is a pointer to the complexity involved in coordinating its manufacture and assembly.

That the 787 has been delayed is a victory in common sense to allow for normal procedures in aircraft development. Hear, hear! The people that matter are in control.


Hi,

I agree with Paulo: maybe Boeing made several mistakes with such a tight schedule approach, but I prefer they take their time now, and get it right.

All the best Boeing!

DAFlieger

alloycowboy

I am just wondering what this repair/fix says about Boeings 787 FEA wing modeling. How wrong did they get they get it? Is it me or is the over built DC-3 starting to look pretty good.

A report on A.net says that the computer model identified and highlighted the problem.
It was not then addressed for reasons not stated.

T. Varadaraj

Wow! The Bogash blog gives me a sense of "deja-vu all over again"! At least two companies that I was involved with at had the acquired company tail wagging the acquiring company dog into the ground. They were relatively small, so it's amazing to see that even a big company like Boeing can suffer the same fate.

Boeing is starting to look like a turn of the century dot-com company. Sure hope the 787 is not the dot in the dot-com.

Delays Delays

It seems that Boeing has not responded to the SeattleTimes article quoting the 2 engineers. To me, this speaks volumes.

Hey Jon,
I am not seeing a comment I wrote in reply to
Layman on July 22, 2009 9:45 AM.
closing with a reference to "Eye of an Octopus"

partial repeat here:

The British Aero(space)industry downfall was separate
from this.

Looking through EU research works on CFRP construction
techniques seems to point to structurally complete
panels ( stringers and segmented frames ) as viable
building blocks. Ultimately the only fasteners remaining
will be at the panel borders.
( skin, framesegments, stringers )

Producing barrels that need the installation of frames
(high expense titanium ones at that) post bake looks
like a dead end in this respect.

Thus the panel approach may look conservative for
the naive or biased commentator but misses the
innovation completely.

To some other posters:
Truth can not have bias ( though one might see it as such
from a PC point of view )

uwe

Jerry1t

The Seattle PI writes an article quoting "two engineers" who indicate that the fix will take longer than anticipated and the 787 will probably not fly until next year.

The reporter does not inform the reader whether the engineers are Boeing engineers or two civil engineers who live nearby.

The story gets picked up on the web and is actually referred to in the NYTimes this morning.

All of this is unsubstantiated information.

But what is substantiated information? That has not been established yet except for the words of the Boeing President who indicates the fix is containable and local and the implementation will be established shortly and a new schedule announced.

So that is the condition we are living with right now. A formal schedule announcement and repair specifications will follow sometime in the next quarter. One either has faith in Boeing, which has been testing our faith, or believes rumor and speculation and armchair engineers. It is an uncomfortable period .

Uwe

To Jerry1t on July 23, 2009 8:52 AM

> All of this is unsubstantiated information.

Weighing all the rumors, following leads,
taking official Pravda with an adequate amount
of salt: all this makes good journalism.

After 3 years of official Boeing bulletins
that deflate to obvious missguidings or outright
lies in ever shorter livetimes contrasted by
on first blush "unsubstantiated" rumors that
tend to bloom into even bigger problems in reality
you are not going to tell us that as long as
a Boeing press release states that everything is well
we should ignore all rumors or factual reports
produced by other sources?

uwe

Anonymous

I have to say, it's disappointing to see Jon continue to play cheerleader for Boeing. Jon is always very quick to report positive milestones such as "rock[ing] the gauntlet" but less so on negative news that shows Boeing is in disarray.

Specifically, I find it unbelievable that there is no post about the rumor that first flight is delayed at least one more year, no post about the earnings call and how Boeing skirted or avoided many tough questions about the fix, the program, etc.

Jon's technical posts may be of high quality, but as far as news, investigation, and commentary, in my humble opinion, he might as well be a Boeing spokesman.

just wondering

Earlier this month I heard the rumor that Boeing was going to start laying off the MT's on the 787 program. Apparently there are "too many MT's wandering around". My supervisor confirmed that rumor. He has told us to "Look busy even if you have nothing to do. They're looking for reasons to get rid of more people". And yes,I work on the 787 program/fiasco. The rumor of possible shutdowns?! Wouldn't surprise me. Another rumor I've heard is that the fasteners and the wiring on plane 7 is screwed up and need to be replaced. That wouldn't surprise me either.

To Anonymous on July 23, 2009 10:14 AM

Afaik Jon started out as a professed Boeing fan
with an investigative mind.

He never went overboard in dissing rumors but
tried to get information for substantiation (or
not, see the delam issue short of Xmas 2008).

But i have the impression that he has been conciously
missled at that time. He certainly seems to have lost
his innocence.

I like his reporting style ( though I can't really get
into the "freshly painted planes are so sexy" thing )
and I like him not jumping into the rumor millrace
but waiting for unsubstantiated information to condense
into a more reportable presentation.

uwe

Jerry1t

Ewe,
I certainly understand your response and do not find it offputting in any way.

I am trying to entertain the possibility that lessons have been learned and that there is an actual attempt to address the issue in the best way possible.

Given that posture, I think we are hearing alot of rumors but do not truely know the extent and time frame in front of the fix. That two unindentified engineers get more credence than the President of the Company is an example of this and is unfortunate.

I am only saying that we do not know the factuality yet but hope it will emerge from credible sources...including the Company

SonOfEinstein

It's time to focus on re-designing the joint.

The interim repair will NOT suffice. It's too challenging to implement feasibly. It won't work.

Scrap the current wings on ZA001 thru ZA006 and replace them with new wings from Mitsubishi with the newly-incorporated interface when they are ready.

Tack on another year to the schedule and bite the bullet.

And BTW ... fire Scott Carson while they're waiting for it all to happen.

SoE

I 'somewhat' agree with "SonOfEinstein" in that Boeing might just have to "bite the bullet" if this intermediate wing repair job doesn't work out as planned. Ideally, it will suffice for the test airplanes (hopefully!) but I'm quite concerned that it's not the long-term solution, and Boeing engineers and management obviously realize this.

I have also heard rumors about a production line shutdown - and this would clearly be necessitated by the fact that Mitsubishi is going to have to RE-TOOL the wing mould to incorporate the PERMANENT solution for this wing-body join interface.

Realistically, I don't see the 787 entering service for another two years, because it's going to take another six months for first flight (optimistically), and then roughly another year for flight testing. Tack on some margin of six to eight months for more UN-expected issues, and you have late 2011 for first deliveries, or roughly FOUR years past the original estimate.

But it's better to be SAFE than SORRY.

Now the ONLY question is, with all these delays, engineering cost overruns, penalties and cancellations, is this plane going to be PROFIT-able?

Them bean-counters better start sharpening their pencils!

For those of you who have bragged about the A330,340, 380 series, I talked to a guy who deals with Singapore Airlines, and he says that the 380 has been a nightmare, Airbus having had basically an AOG team on site in Singapore to try to keep the airplanes flying. Also, the 380 tears up the runways so bad in places (because Airbus can't install body gear steering like the 747 because of the extra weight) that they have to turn it in extra large curves in order to keep from tearing up the runway. The airplane is sometimes followed by rolling machines to flatten the runway back down.

Also, either the 330, or the 340, don't remember which, have to have the upper wing skins replaced in situ because of cracking. They milled the skins too thin, and replaced them, only to have the new skins evidently crack as well, so now they have to do it again.

Folks, problems like these are not that uncommon with new airplanes, both Airbus, and Boeing. The 787 will be corrected, just as previous Boeing airplanes with similar structural problems have been.

Of course, it was also mentioned that many managers at Boeing don't understand just how the 787 programs got so screwed, except they were not allowed by Corporate to fill the 787 design program with experienced 777 people, the corporate feeling being that they were too old, didn't understand the new material and assy paradigm being pursued by the beancounter corporate types, who of course, don't understand anything about producing an airplane, regardless of material.

Where's Mulally when you need him. He should be hired back because he really does understand the creation of new airplane programs.

Engineer

Interesting... I wonder if Qantas and Emirates also have the same problem with their A380? considering Singapore Airlines A380 only seats 425 people as compared to some 600+ on Emirates Airline. Shouldn't Singapore Airline's A380 be much lighter then Emirates?
Maybe the problem lies with the runway. Singapore's Changi Airport is built on reclaimed land. There is a possibility that the soil under the runway pavement cannot take the weight from the A380 as they never anticipated such a heavy aircraft 30 years ago when they built the airport.

As a member of the flying public, I am not all that enthused about flying on the 787, even though I think it is a stunningly beautiful aircraft. There have been just too many technical problems for me to consider the plane reliable and dependable. I'll stick to the 777 thanks!

@ jamie:
If the technical issues (improper fillet relief in some titanium fittings, which is more of a manufacturing defect than a technical issue; and a disbond above limit load) I'm pretty sure you should reconsider flying on any airplane. For that matter driving any automobile, have you seen the recalls that they issue for those horribly unsafe machines!?

JIM HELMS

I'll let the comments sink-in overnight! Scrubbing the project is looking more attractive. Don't forget the USAF B-2 bomber crash at Guam last year. It was made from Advanced Composite Materials - like the 787. It burned very well. Google IT and decide or your self. The crew - they ejected safely before it came to a stop.

JIM HELMS

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