Commentary: It's time for Boeing to talk. To itself.

Remember the "drop a grenade in the office" quote back in the Bair days.?

Jon

By the way, "the emperor has no clothes" is common condition in corporate America. A Corporation's communication flow tends to filter critical data upward to protect programs and its leadership from the appearance of (actual)incompetance. The emperor is last to know about the naked truth and its embarisment. Usually this discovery is accomplished after speaking to large crowds in bold tones. Somebodies gettin wacked!

Ouch!

Jon,
This is an excellent and appropriate commentary.and It is written with balance and thoughtfulness.

I am very pleased that you made these thoughts public as they are expressed in many blogging forums with more anger and criticism. I was outraged at the way Boeing handled this cancellation. These last minute problems may well be a part of the process but Boeing's record has been so blemished from the past that this call just seems to be a continuation of poor communication and credibility.

There is something flawed in the reasoning that two days before the call , there was still a possibility of it flying. It indicates a rushed finish, an incomplete total diagnosis and promises that should never have been made..

One wonders whether Scott Carson and Jim McNearny are capable of changing the way this Company communicates and whether they are capable of being the leaders they are hired to be. They are now trapped by their own lack of credibility and have brought another cloud over this Company

It's typical in corporate America these days for management to be largely clueless about the reality in the trenches, or at least that's the perception from the trenches.

However, we of the trenches also see the "Management says 'Make it so'" attitude that is pervasive. "It will be done on July 1." And everybody struggles to make it so. Usually, there is no corresponding increase in resources, but even if management decides to add resources, we end up with the "9 men/1 month=baby" problem. Invariably, July 1 rolls around and no matter how much catchup work is done, the impossible does not become possible.

I think Boeing's biggest problem is spreading itself too thinly across both the country and its suppliers. If you're in Chicago trying to manage people and processes in Washington, South Carolina, Derby, Connecticut, Kansas, wherever... you just can't be as effective as if you're on the scene. And if you are a "Make it so" manager, then it's even worse, because you think you know, and you simply cannot be public about how things are going if you don't know.

Or something like that. What do I know? I'm just an engineer in the trenches.

Mr. Eccles makes several good points and probably gives the explaination that covers this crime.

But I am not convinced that this problem exists in all Corporations but it probably does here. With modern communication tools and a effective management team, there are many ways to stay in touch with the reality of operations.

Good and effective management should be aware of these issues and try to overcome these blindspots. Boeing has failed to accomplish that level and we see the results.especially with a complex process as is the 787 It allowed controls to get away from them and its internal communication too. This is a management and Board failure.

Many comments on this site and other indicated the valid dissatisfaction from the trenches. Some of may have been gripping but much of it seemed sincerely frustrating...as does Mr. Eccles posted remark.

Jon,

I wonder if it isn't a problem with upper management who come from non technical backgrounds having a problem grasping the significance of the technical problems and issues the 787 is facing. To put it more bluntly there is a communications disconnect between the engineers and the finance geeks. The finance geeks keep trying to push on the rope and all they are creating is more slack in the rope.

You forgot one thing jon. Or didn't know, so I'll write it for you:

"And the painted plywood vertical tail was immediatly removed, cut up with saws, and fed into an awaiting brush chipper, erasing any evidence of it's existance".

Don't try to get a statement on that from Boeing Jon, they will NEVER admit it.

I'm a design engineer at a supplier working on a "troubled" part of the 787.
When I step back and take a look at the good work that has been done - I am amazed. The advances made on this aircraft go way beyond anything flying today. We were all thrilled at the taxi test videos. the voices of the cynics were drowned out by our congratulations. In just a few years, the armchair quarterbacks of today are going to talk about how great the 787 is compared to whatever next plane comes from Airbus.
I can understand that some people find satisfaction by sitting on the sidelines and criticizing the design and management of this aircraft. Don't forget that there are thousands of engineers and project managers putting their heart and soul into building the 787. It is an incredibly difficult task. We are here to build this plane and solve problems. We work nights and weekends to get the job done because it is personally important to us.
Don't underestimate our courage either. It is not easy to discover bad news and then get rushed into a meeting with higher-ups to explain what is happening, but I have never seen anyone hold back. We DO communicate with each other, and are honest about how to build a safe aircraft and how long it is going to take. I've seen my own project manager suck it up and deliver incredibly bad news. We've all gotten yelled at, but the successful ones among us keep going and get the job done.
Even the Boeing management that I have dealt with has been top-notch. They are working hard in an incredibly difficult program structure to deliver as efficiently as possible with no compromises in safety. This includes high-level management.
Some people have thought that criticizing everything is just "telling it like it is." If they put their energy into solving problems and driving towards success instead of smugly pointing out management hypocrisies, we would be much closer to schedule.
Try this: Take an honest look at the technology, project management, and even the supplier integration and ask yourself if you have what it takes to be a part of 787.

Pretzel, I think the vast majority of people realise that the 787 represents an amazing technical achievement, and that to bring to this point has required an enormous amount of commitment from thousands of people.
In fact, I think you'll find the fiercest (rational) criticism of the 787 project comes from those who really care about this project, and this company - because the great work of many like yourself has been tainted by the stumbling of others who have focussed relentlessly on PR over substance. The "roll-out" in 2007, and claims of "most successful airliner launch in history" have became symbolic of that.

Jon,
In one of my earlier comments I had noted the fundamental problem with the 787 program: changing both the technology and the process at the same time. On a program that is of this size and scale it can only add more complexities to already difficult challenges.

Jon,

I loved the thoughtfulness of your article. I am always fascinated by the inner workings and I found your timeline enlightening and well thought out. I was also very impressed by the comments left by those before me. I sometimes wonder why Boeing left the tried and true structure they used during the development of the 777. I know the cost structure was one of the ways Boeing could create efficiencies and pass those efficiencies on to its customers. Little did they know the problems it would create. Also, taking one look at the economy over the last few years must have played a role in the decisions made.

I also want to say one thing to those that have posted above. As a pilot for one of the US carriers getting the 787, there is a good chance that I will one day get to fly one. New technology aside, I only wish to have a safe aircraft under me and I want to thank all of you who are putting office politics aside and working tirelessly to bring the 787 to fruition. My thanks goes to you and your families for the sacrifices that I am sure you are making every day.

Keep up the great work, Jon.

I told Scott Carson in a meeting that the instructions that you get at Ikea where better than the work instructions that are used by the mechanics trying to assemble the 787. He smiled and laughed at me when I made those remarks. Ethically he needs to be replaced along with many of the middle and upper management. Too many chiefs who want to control. As a mechanic who has 10+ years working at Boeing, the 787 needs to be rethought on the need of technical skill is needed to put it together. Now it is said they want a second line in S.C. Go ahead create another problem without even fixing the original root cause. Time and time again management refuses to listen. They the strike for all of their delays! Customer is always right "Boeing is run by bean counters and lawyers" was said by Qatar airways recently said.

I am sure a million people will chime in. I am not even in aerospace, but and avid follower. My work, however, does allow me to meet many workers at Boeing in the NW. I always ask after the 787, and how things are going. My impression is not of a bunch of critics, but more of frustration. I remember one saying to me ..."if only they would just let us build the plane".
However, I do realize that I am the "blind" man feeling the elephant, with no way of possibly knowing the big picture. It's just that I love Boeing, always breath a sigh of relief when I am about to cross the oceans on a "locally" made product. I just don't want to see this slip away.
Democracy is a messy thing. Every one can give their two cents worth. But in the end, it's the best we have. So,I don't see Jon's blog as a purely critical view of Boeing, more like a hook to hang a good debate on, so we can get this plane in the air, and be proud, as mentioned above, of this great new innovative product.

I would love for someone to ask Mr. Carson if he is incompetent or a liar. Based on the happenings of the last month, he has to be, in my eyes, either one or the other.

You know, these days they call liars - strategiests. But, anyway, liar - is better definition in this case.

My question is' "What is so different with the 787 as compared with other new technical marvels Boeing has achieved in the past- delivered on time with the 707/737/747/777 models?"
From it's creation the 787 program has gone out of it's way to be 180 degrees opposite to every successful Boeing legacy manufacturing process.
The "New Breed" at Boeing expecting to put a revenue aircraft into the air using untested materials, partners, technology, drawings, managers, all at once was fantasy at best.
This is the only program I know of where management failure is rewarded by promotion and bonus.
Now we are 2 years and counting....and the excuses keep coming.

Excellent article Jon.
I work at a very small supplier of detail composite parts, and am in the know of some of the tech issues on the 787 (just on a detail part level) - When talking to engineers actually fixing those problems, they always mention the constant pressure to report 'good' news to their superiors. Maybe a case of sales and PR people running the show instead of guys who actually know what it takes to run a programme of this complexity?

I could not have said it better than Jery1t did:
'This is an excellent and appropriate commentary and It is written with balance and thoughtfulness.'

Congratulation for this good work. It would now be interested to read a comment on this from Boeing HQ. May be we will know this in a few years from now.

Count me amongst those who find this a good post. You might not win many friends with the corporate gang, but you have enhanced and anchored your status as a journalist with this commentary/editorial.
Cheers,
John

Boeing has turned into a 3 ring circus on this project. They now have about 0 credibility. Im greatly surprised we have not seen another 100 frames cancelled this week. If I ran an airline, I know I would have cancelled the order and taken the A-330 instead.

Boeing upper management is still running around in their little glass bubble oblivious to what happens down on the shop floor.

Hiding in an office disconnected from 787 reality is nuts! It's time to leave your over stuffed suits in the closet. get down on the floor, out on the flightline and get to know every engineer, inspector, supply clerk, mechanic, truck driver right down to the janitors. It's "OK" to reach out and put a finger on the pulse and yes it's "OK" to listen!

All the 787 problems just didn't pop up over night...

Boeing Upper management preaches one type of culture for the employees but yet there is a whole different culture that exists in the upper management structure. I keep hearing upper management running their lips tell the customers, press and the share holders the ship is finally sailing into smooth waters. The truth of the matter (and they know it) is, while they run their lips, the ship is sinking under them!

It's time for a change....UN-STUFF THE SUITS!

The circus dosen't need to come to town

BOEING is already a 3 ring circus.

Pretzel is sincere in his feelings and comments, as are others. There are two sayings that I feel sum up Western corporations

"There are two types of people in technology - those who undertand what they don't manage, and those who manage what they don't understand." Putt's Law

"Given time, all technology organisations suffer a competence inversion." Corollary of Putt's Law.

In all that has been written here, one can see this being enacted on some scale. It is the modern way to pormote people quickly, and on the basis of 'doing it on the 1st July' - those that do proceed, those that don't, don't.

It seeems to me that the concern here is the desire to throw more and more 'project management' at these thigns without considering that this is a reflection of methods of working that don't function - we have to lead the process, not lead the people. I recall this being well summed up by someone I know - I've left out the company names.

At *** we had to work hard to get teh task done. Here, anythign you want to get done is hard work.

Maybe the processes that support and enable this change in technology cannot enable hard work, and they are just too much like hard work to operate? Just a thought...

It's nice to see all this coverage. And, it's great to have the comments, many of which were put in by myself. I'm going to make commentary on what Jon reported as well as the discussion that ensued. It is very interesting that one can see a wide range, including obvious plants from the company itself.

Expect a series of polls soon.

Unfortunately, I have to agree with the poster who said that people in management (if they are indeed that out of the loop), have to be clownishly incompetent or huckster/liars. I am afraid it is the latter. The fact the first plane was a Disney-prop of incompleteness points this out. In my opinion this was un-ethical and stock manipulation to roll-out something so phony and misrepresented. It gave people the false hope that the scattered-all-over-with-no-control supply chain would actually work.

With the purchase of Vought it becomes clear now, even from Scott Carson’s own mouth, talking about “efficiencies”, that the outsourcing at all cost model is a historic failure. Even if the plane flies tomorrow the billions that have been lost, the lost deliveries, the time and technological advantage over Airbus that has been squandered, will never be able to be replaced. The purchase of suppliers now is damage control.

The person who spoke of the “emperor with no clothes”, yes, that is exactly the nick name the moving line has been given. The purchase of Douglas (Boeing lost billions), the moving line (no one will speak on the record of the real cost), and now the great albatross of the 787. Sadly, the only way for someone above the level of the hundreds of vice presidents at Boeing can lose their job is to screw their secretaries. Simply doing a really, really poor job is not enough to be fired. Incompetence is sometimes transferred and usually covered up, and somehow described as a retroactive success (as buying Vought is now).

There is no accountability at the top. The only people who truly care about the companies’ long term success are those most personally invested in it, the longtime employees. Not the Johnny come latelies like McNerney that have no ties to the community or the company or its grand history.

It comes down to two pssibilities: 1) Boeing's leadership is lieing, or 2) Boeing's culture does not promote truthful communications to leadership. The bottom line is that the company leadership sets the culture! Either way, the credibility and responsibility belong with Boeing Commercial Airplanes CEO, Mr. Scott Carson. Changing 787 program leadership (again) is not the solution - the responsibility is solely Mr. Carsons.

As a supplier to the 787 program, I see a problem that hasn't gotten a lot of press.

The partner model is seriously flawed. In the perfect world, each parner performs their tasks in lockstep with the others - analogous to a rowing team. The reality is that each partner is lashed to its own suppliers in a sort of three legged race against the other partners.

The problem is that no one wants to win - everyone wants to come in second to last. Losing, or being the one holding up the schedule, draws international embarrassment, so no one wants to lose. But, completing the assigned task more than a week or so before the slowest partner means holding very expensive ($millions) inventory.

This has created a stage for all sorts of theatrics. The partners can see, often more easily than Boeing managers, who is going to be holding up the program (keeping in mind that this race is like the Tour de France, where there are dozens of race segments.)

But no partner is going to tell Boeing, "We aren't going to hit our promise dates because we know that the spoilers will be late."

Instead, they brick wall over a "spec change." Or, they tacitly conspire to tangle fastener procurement to the point of non-functionality (FUBAR might be better used here.) Or, they find a Boeing selected single source supplier in their ranks and hobble that supplier so that a delay in the partner schedule is traceable back to Boeing. (The way they do it is like a kid tripping his little brother every time mom looks away and then claiming the little brother can't walk.)

Boeing managers have dismissed the theory because they do not believe that the partners are sufficiently clever to perpetrate such schemes. But the partners had schedules requiring them to build hundreds of millions of dollars worth of assemblies yet they knew they wouldn't be paid for months, even years. The partners had to figure a way out of that trap.

The partners resorted to all sorts of shinanigans at the level of the minute details with the ultimate effect of deliberately misleading Boeing at all levels.

The latest side body join problem may be entirely encompassed by Boeing's internal communication loop.

But, the entire program has been rife with deceptions vigorously advanced from low levels at the partners to low levels at Boeing over small details. This creates context for senior partner managers to rationalize delays to senior Boeing managers. The delays appear fixable to Boeing management because they are presented as quantifiable technical or commercial problems. Boeing still hasn't realized that those problems were created and have been nurtured as the partners means of controlling the schedule and thus, their cash flow. The problems won't get solved until the partners decide to let them be solved (or Boeing decides to take and pay for each deliverable on each partner's schedule.)

The thing about airplanes is that they don't fly until the last bolt is torqued down and the last i is dotted. The devil really is in the details. Boeing's internal communications are based almost exclusively, because of the partner model, on communications from the partners.

Who knows? Boeing may not be able to avoid making garbage out of good information. I do know that Boeing is not clever enough to make good information of the garbage that is coming in.

Take it from a former Boeing employee, the culture does not let 'truth' rise; rather, what those silly ones at the top get is what they deserve, crap.

Now, are all companies in the military-industrial complex of this type (I know, the concept ages me)? Well, I have worked for several. For some reason, Boeing is different; I could never put my finger on it.

But, there was a Tech Excel program developed to allow a way to ascend career-wise without going into the monkey-ish stuff (yea, you, Scott C). That is, it was a double ladder with supposedly those higher up on the rungs of the TE ladder having as much authority (over matters, not employees) as did those who dance that silly dance the managers are so noted for (when will they wake up to the fact that raking in 10s of millions (Turner, you, too) doesn't make them successful in any but a superficial sense?).

Too, one would think that a motivation for the program was to allow some people (who did not feel it an insult to deal with facts and data) actually look at things with proper eyes (not that mind-set from the back-slapping hordes - yes, so many of them as to be very heavy organizationally).

We have not heard from the TEs on the 787, that I can remember. So, was the program trashed?

Anyway, we have something that we can toast to every year, even when the thing flies.

We need LeeLaw to coin something new for us. 'potemkin' is old hat.

To Mel on July 10, 2009 1:24 PM

A very interesting and valid viewpoint indeed.

But why does this hit Boeing so much harder than
Airbus _the_ long time distributed manufacturer?

Beyond the basic mechanism is it inability to span
differnt cultures or the predominance of "dumb"
non engineering types in middle and upper management?

What about the potentialy overreaching contract
arrangements pressed through by Boeing?

uwe

Pay attention kids. This comment: "By Mel on July 10, 2009 1:24 PM" has more truth in it than a decade of statements by Scott Carson or Jim McNerney.

Here's a poli-sci view:

Boeing's business model for the 787 was based upon colonial logic. The idea was that the partners and vendors would behave mechanically....doing precisely what Boeing wanted when Boeing wanted it.

However, the colonial model only works if you have the ability to project force and impose your will upon the colonists. If you don't, those pesky colonists will start acting in ways that maximize their self-interest rather than the interests of the colonial masters.

We've seen that from A to Z in this program....and anyone who spoke the truth to Boeign corporate was punished. Now, there is a bureaucratic battle within Boeing between the McNerney camp who argue that their business model is fine but the execution was bad....and the experienced technical workforce (including those now in management) who believe the business model is fatally flawed.

To Ray on July 10, 2009 2:04 PM

For a change reader comments are a fount of insight.

Describing Boeing as colonial is an interesting insight
that jibes with my (tentative) assumption of overreach
by Boeing in partner interaction.

Essentially risksharing partners then are limited to
taking a share of Boeings risk plus having to bear
their own risk as well.

This would explain why the japanese partners have been
extremly reluctant to expand production capabilities
beyond the initial commitments and why others have
an unblemished manufacturing relationship with Airbus.

Hubris then lies in placing blame on the partners.

Does Boeing have a chance to understand this short
term and work succesfully with equal partners on top
of the engineering problems ( systemic and technical )
they are encountering (not only ) in the 787 project?

uwe

Hi Uwe,
AIRBUS distributed model was different of what Boeing made.
National companies building parts or assembling aircraft were the owner of the 'economic interest group' named AIRBUS. This organization built A300, A320 and 330/340.
The "integrated" AIRBUS compagny - in EADS - built the A380, and surprisingly had to face management problems... One old AIRBUS chairman - very angry - explained that such problem would have not appear with the old AIRBUS structure, as the one faulty for the delay was supporting the biggest part of associated finacial penalties. This rule dissapeared in the integrated company.

No, Boeing was in fact opening creating its own path.
More funny, AIRBUS is engaged in the same way of masssive partnerization, with more and more fear in the tech teams, coming with the same kind of dissatisfaction. People are/were engaged on work and product but feel more and more that it does not pay.
Last, their job are transferred offshore...

Ray and Uwe,

Great comments.

In my view, another issue with the 787 has been, ironically, its success.

Boeing fretted at the cost of a new airplane but also at the cost of inaction. Someone at Boeing knew how badly aerospace material and component suppliers want to be on new programs because of the annuity value of being the incumbent. So, they decided to "sell" partner slots. The buy-in was putting up the money for engineering, facilities, tooling and inventory.

Each of the partners have put up tens to many hundreds of millions of dollars to be on the team. No one was supposed to be paid until the first delivery although some "progress payments" have been made. So, each company had a picture of what they were going to put in, and then set their pricing to affect a break even at several hundred shipsets (each partners' break even point is different and a guarded secret.)

At the start of the program, each partner maximizes their individual chance of success by pulling whatever levers they can to make the program successful - meaning they do the work that was assigned to them. When the program had only sold the launch customer 50 planes, I am sure all those fellas were up at 6 and hard at it.

But sales quickly flew past 400. By then, all the partners were past break even in their models. And, importantly, with 400 plus planes sold, everyone, especially the partners, knew that Boeing would turn heaven and earth (as in pay any cost) to put this bird in the air.

So now it is in each partner's individual interest to raise prices and reduce cost.

On the price side, each partner was given a sole source contract and by this point was too deep into the program to be replaced (if Boeing doesn't like their performance, the only real option is to buy the partner.)

Accordingly, the program bogs down with claims by the partners of changes to the specs or in the scope of work that require a "reset" in the contract (a price increase.) I would wager that this cost Boeing tens of thousands of management hours, effectively distracting them from issues related to building the airplane.

On the cost side, not only would partners make themselves someone's victim to the effect that their deliveries would be delayed and thus preserve their cash, but also they would "engineer" shortages of something (engineering, materials, tooling, etc.) to the end of becoming a pacing item in the schedule. Of course, it would be made to look like someone else's (preferably Boeing's) fault but the inevitable result was that Boeing would show up with a suitcase full of cash and a bus load of people to resolve the issue. This approach has saved the partners millions on elements of the program that they had budgeted for at the program's outset.

And, as stated above, this all made it impossible for Boeing, management and otherwise, to know what actually was going on.

Personally, I have never met a dumb Boeing or partner employee. More than other large companies, Boeing people are remarkably bright, honest, forthcoming and diligent. And, while there were cultural challenges, I think Boeing embraced and met the challenges to the effect of creating an important step toward global harmony. (It doesn't make airplanes fly, but they deserve credit for it.)

Net, I think the partner model is flawed logically - the only fix would be to scrap it and try something different. That said, given the partner model, I think the program would be farther along if the program had made its first few deliveries with less than 200 airplanes sold.

"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."
-- quote by Richard Feynman, physicist (and brilliant pragmatist), as repeated from the Rogers' Commission Report into the Challenger Crash Appendix F - Personal Observations on Reliability of Shuttle (June 1986) Full Report

Boeing needs to tattoo this quote on the forehead of every decision maker in the company. The credibility problem will ultimately prove far more costly tp repair than the engineering issue they finally revealed.

To mel on July 10, 2009 6:10 PM

imho that is not quite correct.
in german that would be called "Geschichtsklitterung".

Boeings boast of "having an engineer in 5 minutes
on the production floor to fix any problems" is
a complete missmatch with distributed manufacturing.

Distributed manufacturing requires absolutely faultless
preplanning. ( see the cable run missmatch on the A380 )
Any potentiall issues must be cleared before any
partner is loaded with work.
A major part of work is to deflate the volume of the
"unknown unknowns" ( The single thing dumb Rummy got right ).

All turns around the banality of producing the right things
in the required quality. ( Just think like VW. You have
to have complete certainty on processes in such a way that
you only need to take occasionall samples to prove quality. )

uwe

I have seen several versions of "the emperor has no clothes" or the leadership is just incompetent discussion lines.

Maybe the best approach would be to ask how could Carson and McNerney not know? Is there any way possible that they could not know?

Brand new employees have visited the 787 line one time and have been able to figure it out. Both Scott and Jim visited the lines many times. For a time Carson was visiting the line weekly. They know the problems and have crafted exactly the system of fear needed to keep the problems hidden, not from them but from the shareholders and valued customers.

Every morning our emperors look at their naked bodies (one pasty and saggy, the other artificially tanned) in the mirror and go to work trying to convince people they are clothed.

It's not just at Boeing Commercial, it's even worse on the Defense side. Most of the Execs are ex military officers who still believe they have stars, leafs or bars on their shoulders. Their words and wisdom are not to be questioned, or else !
This explains why BOEING has not won a single major Defense Program for years, It is pure arrogance.
Before the mergers of the mid 1990s, engineers ran Boeing Defense, now its washed up retired Generals, Colonels and Navy Captains aka cronies.

Uwe,

Thanks for "Geschichtsklitterung". Great concept. I can use that one.

If I follow you, and I want to so please correct if you have a chance, you are saying that Boeing commits to solving emergent problems with less emphasis on planning. They may bill it as a belt and suspenders approach - we'll plan out all forseeable problems and we'll quickly solve the ones we missed. Aren't you saying that their willingness to react to unk unks betrays their stated desire to plan through them?

If this is your point, I agree. The partner model would have required a completely different culture at Boeing and completely different checks and balances in the actual partner contracts to be reasonably functional. Otherwise, the partner model is illogical.

All that said, it is worth noting that the partners are keenly interested in the plane being delivered as soon as possible, so all are eager to resolve this multifacited, quasi "prisonor's dilemma." Then, the program can enter a third phase which (hopefully) will be more functional.

And, to be clear, the partner model was a Boeing creation. It may have seemed like a great idea going in, but it doesn't fit with their culture and has other inherent problems. Boeing gets full responsibility for the resulting mess.

For the record, I admit to all sorts of adventures that seemed like a great idea at the start.

With 5-1/2 years of exposure to the 787 program, watching all of the leadership changes (which are many), no one is currently accountable for the current state of the program.

All of the people who set-up the failed business plan and program strategy are gone. None are still associated with the 787 program and most are no longer at Boeing. See the list below:

Alan Mulally (now at Ford) sold the 787 design and business plan when the Sonic Cruiser flopped.

Harry Stonecipher (now discredited) was CEo who guided Mulally’s plans and concepts to get board approval.

Frank Statkus (retired after many senior management roles at Boeing) was VP of Tools, Technology, and Processes

Walt Gillette (retired after many Senior Engineering Management assignments at Boeing) was 7E7 chief Engineer and VP of Airplane Development, 787 Program

Mike Bair (still with Boeing) was 7E7/787 Program Manager then VP and General Manager, 787 Program.

Scott Strode (still with Boeing) was 787 VP Production.

Thus, you can’t hang any of the current managers/Senior Executives with the core problems caused by the fouled-up program structure. Now you may be justified accusing any of the current management of being unable to make the current program structure function successfully. But, as others have stated earlier, this form of outsourcing may well be flawed-beyond-all-ability-to-recover (FUBAR).

In regard to the most recent program slide, I can assure you that much of the workforce in Everett knew about the wing structure problem in general terms within a week of the tests being run. The fact that the Senior Executives “didn’t know about them” is intentional. If they know of matters of material information that can affect investment value (stock price) they are obliged to make it known to all – to the public. Thus, these senior executives don’t want to know about big problems until they are fully understood and what the impacts may be. Thus, this information is closely managed and finessed right to its disclosure. Incidentally, that’s why FlightBlogger is the key source of information for Boeing employees. It’s a rumor until it’s confirmed by FlightBlogger. Boeing Management doesn’t communicate any better to the workforce than they do with the Senior Executives – by design I assert.

Senior Management has known since day one that the Partners were in big trouble in late 2005. I saw their status charts showing every partner with problems and no plan to correct them – a red “meatball” as overall status. Boeing people were already on site at their facilities propping them up to get them started on production. This was common knowledge along with the lack of cooperation and communication of the partners that had been well established by this time. Do you suppose that’s why everyone that build this business model retired before the fat-went-into-the-fire? Hummmmmmmmmmmmmmmm.

So, please blame the right people for the mess we have. There is plenty of blame to go around to those from the past as well those that are currently responsible.

It seems that today’s management model, the so called matrix management model (you have two or more bosses) along with the rotational management concept, means that there is no one that is responsible for anything. The day of the “Buck-stops-here” is long gone – along with real leadership. And that’s the real issue, with Boeing, Jon – no Leadership.

Very thoughtful approach Jon, with a perspective that sorely needs to be discussed. Also, Bull-of-the-Woods, well done on your explanation of the culture at Boeing.

Quick technical point Jon, is there a way to number each comment so that on these long threads we can more easily keep track of what we've read day-to-day?

Bull-of-the-woods said:
"It seems that today’s management model, the so called matrix management model (you have two or more bosses) along with the rotational management concept, means that there is no one that is responsible for anything. The day of the “Buck-stops-here” is long gone – along with real leadership. And that’s the real issue, with Boeing, Jon – no Leadership."

Fully second that.

There's another large airliner manufacturer that is suffering from the same management culture: Matrix organisation, rotational management, lack of accountability, lack of leadership. Spice it up with the power struggles and managerial infighting that came after a merger.

Boeing bashing ought not swing out as far as was the mania in 2007 (despite the notion of equal reactions - pendulum).

Perhaps, Boeing will now emphasize that big projects need incremental planning, testing along the way, and not getting the cart before the horse.

...

Do we need to list all the critics of Boeing (and Airbus) and match their own accomplishments against the engineering, and manufacturing, folks?

Making oodles of money is not the same as doing something that has real consequences which anyone who has tried to so knows. Supplying commentary does not add to any solution.

The 787 might be Boeing's gift to us as a chance to allow all the intricacies of big projects (and products) to come to fore so that we can discuss them in a reasonable (and productive) fashion and thereby learn. Hey, maybe even Microsoft might learn something.

As was said before, hypothesis before hype. Can we learn that?

Well done Jon.

Good reporting. People were beginning to think you were going off the boil.

Obviously not...

I have to preface this by mentioning I retired nearly a year ago and have no particular insights on subsequent developments.

The issue that has always been stuck in my craw is how much effort is being wasted on the first handful of 787 airframes. The amount of abuse that has been subjected to these aircraft is almost unimaginable and unlikely to be replicated in decades of revenue flying and heavy maintenance. How many of these issues would NOT manifest themselves in a fresh build assembled correctly the first time and not hastily dismantled a million or more times?

There probably isn't an airline on earth that would take delivery of these monstrosities following testing, so just scrap them and start-over. Idle 787 components for subsequent builds are probably stacked to the moon by this time.

If a "virgin" 787 exhibits all the same problems as the existing ones then there really is a cause for concern. Otherwise were just chasing ghosts.

How many remember Mike Bair's speech where he vented his ire at the suppliers:

"Some of these guys we won't use again"

(http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/124901.asp)

It cannot get more unprofessional than that.

Jon

Great commentary and blog. As an insider I do not see all the parts of this problem just my immediate area. The worst is for all those working directly at Boeing this is extremely depressing and all the cheer leading does not go very far. We have wasted so much effort going through panic slides one month at a time over a 2 year period that even the newbys do not trust the schedule. To all those that have retired, this is a different environment. And to think we used to joke about peter principle, and now we are living it. So with the new management training, where in this country of ours do we have good technical leadership?
I also have compassion for those I have worked with that have retired from management for "health" reasons, translate that as stress.
The 787 will fly and it will be a great airplane in service, but not out of the box.

Jon wrote: A 2006 speech by Boeing CEO James McNerney given in the wake of the US Air Force tanker scandal tackled this culture head on:

So then we had to ask ourselves some really tough questions: Were these lapses symptomatic of a larger issue with our corporate culture?...Did our people feel confident enough to speak up about ethical concerns without fear of retaliation?

McNerney discussed the solution to the problem:

To make sure everyone understands this, I think that you have to create a work environment that encourages people to talk about the tough issues--business- or ethics-related--and to make the right decisions when they find themselves at the crossroads between hitting their numbers for the quarter and stepping forward when there's a problem.

Boeing should ask itself if McNerney's vision has yet to become a reality."

No one answered Jon's last sentence.

The answer is obvious--"McNerney's vision" as stated above never became reality.

But it was never meant to--it was just tanker scandal CYA talk that the company never intended to walk.

And I can personally vouch that people who speak up about ethical concerns or internal Boeing corruption are retaliated against severely. My case is one of many such examples, albeit one of the more severe. Boeing SOX IT whistleblowers have been fired for talking to the press about SOX violations. People in Boeing's OIG have been fired when they refused to ignore wrongdoing in Boeing's antithetically named "compliance organizations."

So, when people are retaliated against for reporting lawbreaking within Boeing to Boeing senior management and/or the press, then it should not be surprising that the same executives punish those bringing bad news about program issues to upper management.

The 787 program is perhaps the best example of program mismanagement. The "program management" used on the program was obviously fatally flawed.

One comment that rings of truth above is that these announcements are not made until the last minute and upper managers given implausible deniability about having known about them prior to the announcement to protect the value of those executive's stock options.

Why are private corporations like Boeing seemingly incapable of reforming incompetent and corrupt management? Government moves at exponential speed in reform comparatively. One group of politicians doesn't work out and they are replaced the next election at the latest. Where is such accountability with Boeing mismanagement?

Both Jim McNerney and Scott Carson need to be fired. Especially Scott Carson who has lost complete control over the flight program. Carson didn't have any understanding on how airplanes are built. Carson did not get involve in managing the aircraft development.

This is the single worst delay by BCA. Even 747 had only a few months day and that was a completely game changing aircraft with new technology and design.

Telling people that the 787 delay was a result of new tech does not fly. Why were people in the 60s, without the aid of current technologies, can build an aircraft on time?

Leadership is a huge issue here. It this is not resolved, Boeing might as well go under.

To mel on July 10, 2009 10:55 PM

sorry for the delay and not having a direct answer,
but:

Found another applicable situation for our new word ;-)

Boeing's undercover henchman Richard Aboulafia has a very
interesting article on corporate culture at Boeing,
the historic background and all that jazz to the pling,
pling of "Geschichtsklitterung" :
http://www.richardaboulafia.com/newsletters/

Usually busy presenting a slightly worse of Airbus
for any problems Boeing faces this looks like
he lost his calm and forgot to mention Airbus at all.

Is this preparation for another big iceberg hit
under the Boeing waterline?

uwe

I was fortunate to work in product development on many new airplanes during my career at Boeing. During my time there, it was populated by very strong technical people and the top program managers were very strong technical leaders. There was room for disagreement and it was recognized as necessary to listen to disenting view points as long as you had your technical facts straight. Toward the end of my career, there were some not so subtle changes occuring. We had a CEO that was enamored by GE's Jack Welch and Boeing started getting like GE in their internal thinking i.e. "this is the GE position and everybody get behind it or get out."

Some executive engineering managers started behaving that way and it there was a "shoot the messenger" mentality that started to be exhibited. I once heard a guy that is now CEO elswhere say to his managment team, "It all right to bring me news of a problem but you better have the solution!" Let me tell you, in airplane development that's a near impossible task because if you had the solution, you wouldn't have had the problem to begin with. It was the begining of a "management by fear" culture.

It didn't help when the merger took place and all the Douglas folks showed up and displaced long time Boeing people who, by the way, were the ones that helped put Douglas out of business. Harry Stonecipher was a fear motivation manager. Even his old colleagues at GE were glad he was at Boeing and not there.I'm not saying that Boeing was a utopia to work at. It was anything but. It was extreemly competitive. But it was populated by people who loved airplanes and loved to deign and build them.

I remember during my last months at Boeing, being interviewed by some "special task force members" and being presented with the "new" way" of developing airplanes with "risk sharing partners" who were to be responsible for major parts of the aircraft. Boeing would not audit their capabilities to do the job or monitor their work as we had in the past, to "save money". I thought it was nuts then and I said so. We had some very strong history that led us to do those things. (Santana said that those who ignore history are doomed by it.) They said that would be the "new way of doing things".
The development schedules were shorter than we knew were reasonable but they would find a way to do everthing quicker. They didn't know how, but they would. You know, "now a miracle happens" kind of thinking.
Well they did it that way and the 787 Program is the result. I hate like hell to watch the venerable company that I worked for look like a bunch of bumbling clowns. It seems like everyday there's more bad news. There nothing wrong changing the way you develop airplanes IF you have the correct planning to get you to the the delivery date for the customer. But it can't come down to "a miracle happens!" You have to have the facts and data to know you can do it. To get the facts and data, you have to spend the money developing the processes ahead of time.

The program looked doomed to me from the start.
The program management for the 787 was wrong from the get go. The guy in charge couldn't hit a bull in the butt with a banjo and to put him in charge of the most complex progam that Boeing ever undertook in commercial airplane development was a plum wrong decision.
When the Chief Engineer retired in the middle of the development, it was my first tip off from the outside that Program was going South. It seems like it's gone down hill from there. I guess maybe Ol' Alan took the Ford job to get away from what started on his watch. He sold the plan to the Board probably under a great deal of pressure from Harry Stonecipher who was CEO by then.
As I said, I hate to watch all this happen but it seemed so predictable from the start. Boeing needs to get back to what made them the dominant player in commercial airplane development and manufacturing for over 40 years. They need senior management to be ethical and technically capable people who understand the airplane business. Eliminate management by fear. Tolerate different points of view when it's backed by facts and data. Audit and monitor subcontractors or partners or whatever the buzzword is for those guys that make the major subcomponents. And honor your commitments both internally and to the end user. Boeing was on the right track with the 777 and they got derailed on the 787. I hope they can get the train back on the track and running in the right direction again. They have the working people to do it but their management leaves some thing to be desired. Thanks for letting me ramble.

The postponement of the first flight as well as the uncertainty of the fix and future schedule has resulted in some pains of doubt about the progress of the 787 and its future. Its inability to get into the air just invites skepticism and criticism.

This is understandable, but there have been very few voices to counteract this tide. Is this just a bump in the road to success or a crack revealing deeper issues.

I guess we will have to live with the doubters for a while until this obstacle is overcome which I hope will be in the near future. Retired Boeing workers are ranting about past mistakes...historians are blaming McDonald Douglas. There is a real crisis of confidence as reflected on this site.

It would be uplifting to get by this and have some optimism return to a new technology and new approach to flying. It would also be encouraging to hear some experienced voices come to the floor and express some deserved confidence in the process

It's simple. Boeing confounded without bound, ought to have known better, would not wake up from their dream despite clamors of warnings, and are just, seemingly, awakening from a nightmare.

Is all hope lost? Nope. It'll be fun watching the real knowledgeable people excel.

Does Scott C need to be moved out of the way?

New Poll: be the first to vote!!

Boeing is cutting into their Tech Ex program.

http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/173713.asp

So, does that mean that their messages will be PR and guidance which, as we know, leaves holes?

Hence, bloggers like Jon will have a bigger role assuming, of course, that the info that they get is vetted. At any point, Boeing could close the security leak and be the only source of info.

How believable will that flow of info then be?

Outsider,

The flow of info from Boeing has been PR controlled and fact bereft for years now. Technical experts have no role in Boeing PR to my knowledge. Mismanagement has a far greater role in such announcements. Just look at the reliability of their past guidance and announcements.

The "kill the messenger" thing works in Boeing PR as well. If were a sufficiently powerful/knowledgeable Boeing employee and wanted Boeing PR to release negative, factual info to the public about a particular program, you should expect to have your message and/or job to be "killed" before it ever got near the light of public view, especially if it could negatively affect the stock price, or if it had to be released at some point, it would be at the last second possible.

Until Boeing PR is reformed and regains some credibility, blogs such as Jon's and the forum posts thereon will have to serve to inform those who want the facts about what is happening at Boeing, who is screwing it up, and why it is incapable of reforming/replacing its mismanagement.

Waddie,

Great post. Too bad Boeing sabotaged its formerly reliable, safe, and functional management processes as you described in the name of greed.

Thusly, with all the related screwups, the new and vastly less competent Boeing management has proven what everyone else except themselves already knew--"If it's not broke, don't fix it."

http://eastmans.web.aplus.net/pblog/index.php

The real man overseeing the BCA side of Boeing is Mike Cave in Chicago. A McDonnell man. Specifically a Harry legacy. It has been a well known fact since the merger that you only tell Mike good news. Bad news messengers are axed (and that would include Carson).
So every status meeting has been full of good tidings and great joy.
Until the rubber meets the tarmac.