LONDON -- On July 31st, ZA001 was rolled from the flight line to Paint Hangar 45-04 where the first 787 will remain for at least several weeks, as preparations are underway to install the wing fix on the static test airframe in the first major step to remove the obstacle standing in Boeing's way to flying the Dreamliner.
Boeing has begun preparations on the static test airframe (ZY997), the aircraft on which the problems were first discovered, sources confirm. Once installed, the wings of test airframe will again be flexed to validate the static strength of the structure.
Since the June 23rd delay announcement, much of the focus has been centered on not only developing the fix itself, but the challenge to Boeing engineers and assembly crews to install the side of body fix for the 787.
The installation, which will take place on the upper part of the side of body of the 787, is centered on two areas on both the port and starboard sides of the aircraft. The process of reinforcing the structure that connects the wing to the body of the aircraft will see modifications of both the Section 11 (center wing box) and Section 12 (wing box) of the aircraft.
The physical constraints of the area where repair crews will be working has been described by program sources as a series of "interconnected phonebooths laying on their side."
To paint a picture of just how tight the area is, imagine a 17-foot long space along the wing root that is just over 5 and a half feet tall and about three feet wide. The areas on the top panels of these "phone booths" needing the fix are 17 I-shaped stringer beams on the Section 12 wing box and another 18 on the Section 11 center wing box that are affixed to the upper skin. The area requiring reinforcement is extremely tight providing just 3-4 inches from the top skin of the wing.
Crews will gain access to the inside of Section 11 by way of an access door into the center fuel tank from the rear spar inside the right hand landing gear bay. Two additional access holes leading from the side of the center wing box allows for crews to work inside the area on the Section 12 area of the side of body.
ZA001 and ZA002 hold unique challenges from the remaining four flight test aircraft because the interior working areas inside the fuel tank have been fully closed out and fueled for the previous APU and engine runs. Sources say ZA001 was drained of fuel before being moved back inside the paint hangar.
Supplier sources say that the reinforcing parts required for ZA001 and ZY997 have been shipped to Everett. ZY997, which will be the first test aircraft to receive the fix, has been surrounded by scaffolding in preparation for the installation.
Boeing continues to move forward with increasing the pace of deliveries to Everett, even as 787 is stalled by the fix. Boeing has begun final assembly on Dreamliner Eight, ZA101, though the upper panels of the final body join, sources say, will be done in an incomplete way to allow easier access to the the inside of the aircraft for installation of the fix. Wings for Dreamliner Nine (ZA102) are set to arrive later this week, just under 30 calendar days after Dreamliner Eight's wings were delivered from Nagoya, Japan.
The first production 787, ZA100, has been moved to assembly position two inside Building 40-26, while ZA004 remains at position four closest to the door where it underwent gear swing tests this week.
The Section 11 half of the wing fix is expected to be incorporated at Global Aeronautica beginning with Airplane 15. The Section 12 side of the fix will continue to be completed in Everett because aspects of the modification require the wing box and center wing box to be in the wing to body join process, sources say.
Though as Boeing continues to churn through its internal assessment of first flight and first delivery expected to be ready later in the 3rd quarter, many outside the program are increasingly placing estimates on a slip of greater than six months into the first quarter of 2010 with a first delivery not occurring until the first quarter of 2011.
Over the previous week, FlightBlogger gathered the comments from several news reports, analysts and suppliers to aggregate the estimates on the timing of first flight and first delivery of 787. In addition to the public comments, six aerospace analysts, were polled on their estimates. They were provided the option of declining attribution due to the investment position of their respective firms. A total of 10 data points were collected.
The results, though gathered in an unscientific way, provide a basic framework for a window in which first flight and first delivery may take place. The consensus appears to trend towards early 2010 first flight with first delivery coming a year later in the first quarter of 2011.
The following are the assembled data points:
Boeing has begun preparations on the static test airframe (ZY997), the aircraft on which the problems were first discovered, sources confirm. Once installed, the wings of test airframe will again be flexed to validate the static strength of the structure.
Since the June 23rd delay announcement, much of the focus has been centered on not only developing the fix itself, but the challenge to Boeing engineers and assembly crews to install the side of body fix for the 787.
The installation, which will take place on the upper part of the side of body of the 787, is centered on two areas on both the port and starboard sides of the aircraft. The process of reinforcing the structure that connects the wing to the body of the aircraft will see modifications of both the Section 11 (center wing box) and Section 12 (wing box) of the aircraft.
The physical constraints of the area where repair crews will be working has been described by program sources as a series of "interconnected phonebooths laying on their side."
To paint a picture of just how tight the area is, imagine a 17-foot long space along the wing root that is just over 5 and a half feet tall and about three feet wide. The areas on the top panels of these "phone booths" needing the fix are 17 I-shaped stringer beams on the Section 12 wing box and another 18 on the Section 11 center wing box that are affixed to the upper skin. The area requiring reinforcement is extremely tight providing just 3-4 inches from the top skin of the wing.
Crews will gain access to the inside of Section 11 by way of an access door into the center fuel tank from the rear spar inside the right hand landing gear bay. Two additional access holes leading from the side of the center wing box allows for crews to work inside the area on the Section 12 area of the side of body.
ZA001 and ZA002 hold unique challenges from the remaining four flight test aircraft because the interior working areas inside the fuel tank have been fully closed out and fueled for the previous APU and engine runs. Sources say ZA001 was drained of fuel before being moved back inside the paint hangar.
Supplier sources say that the reinforcing parts required for ZA001 and ZY997 have been shipped to Everett. ZY997, which will be the first test aircraft to receive the fix, has been surrounded by scaffolding in preparation for the installation.
Boeing continues to move forward with increasing the pace of deliveries to Everett, even as 787 is stalled by the fix. Boeing has begun final assembly on Dreamliner Eight, ZA101, though the upper panels of the final body join, sources say, will be done in an incomplete way to allow easier access to the the inside of the aircraft for installation of the fix. Wings for Dreamliner Nine (ZA102) are set to arrive later this week, just under 30 calendar days after Dreamliner Eight's wings were delivered from Nagoya, Japan.
The first production 787, ZA100, has been moved to assembly position two inside Building 40-26, while ZA004 remains at position four closest to the door where it underwent gear swing tests this week.
The Section 11 half of the wing fix is expected to be incorporated at Global Aeronautica beginning with Airplane 15. The Section 12 side of the fix will continue to be completed in Everett because aspects of the modification require the wing box and center wing box to be in the wing to body join process, sources say.
Though as Boeing continues to churn through its internal assessment of first flight and first delivery expected to be ready later in the 3rd quarter, many outside the program are increasingly placing estimates on a slip of greater than six months into the first quarter of 2010 with a first delivery not occurring until the first quarter of 2011.
Over the previous week, FlightBlogger gathered the comments from several news reports, analysts and suppliers to aggregate the estimates on the timing of first flight and first delivery of 787. In addition to the public comments, six aerospace analysts, were polled on their estimates. They were provided the option of declining attribution due to the investment position of their respective firms. A total of 10 data points were collected.
The results, though gathered in an unscientific way, provide a basic framework for a window in which first flight and first delivery may take place. The consensus appears to trend towards early 2010 first flight with first delivery coming a year later in the first quarter of 2011.
The following are the assembled data points:
| Source | Type | First Flight | First Delivery |
|---|---|---|---|
| Senior | Supplier | Late 2009 | 3Q10 |
| Barclays | Analyst | Late 2009 | Late 2010 |
| Morgan Stanley | Analyst | Late 2009 | 1Q11 |
| Seattle Times | News Org. | Early 2010 | -- |
| Richard Aboulafia | Analyst | 1Q10 | 2Q11 |
| Analyst 1 | Analyst | End 09/Early 10 | 1Q11 |
| Analyst 2 | Analyst | End 09/Early 10 | -- |
| Analyst 3 | Analyst | End 1Q10 | Mid-2011 |
| Analyst 4 | Analyst | 1Q10 | 1Q11 |
| Analyst 5 | Analyst | Nov-09 | 1Q11 |
on August 6, 2009 1:17 PM | Reply
I was pleased to read that the reinforcng parts for the 787 wing fix have been designed and shipped to Everett. I gather that the challenge is the installation.
Without further engineering input, this article describes the space constraints which inhibit an easy installation.
The big question is whether they will be able to accomplish this reinforcement without having to do more extensive "surgery" on the area. Obviously, the designed part is the first and easiest solution if it can be applied successfully.
1. Is this a challenge that can be met 2. Are they sure that this installation will solve the problem and allow a successful first flight
3. If this is the correct solution, what other reinforcement methods be used for the future planes in production and how so.
In the general poll, it is a supplier who is most optimistic as to the fix time.. I suspect it is really an engineering guesstimate that has weight here but probably still too early to be definitive or at least indicative The analysts all have longer expectations...a more cautious point of view.
Jon has managed to give us some interesting details about this situation and I hope will continue to keep us informed as to its progress. Otherwise, there seems to be a wall of silence on this subject and the overhang of this problem has put a cloud over the Company and its management.
on August 6, 2009 2:43 PM | Reply
I am puzzled by your information Jon, when at the earnings call only a few days ago, Boeing were saying that an announcement on the "fix" would be prior to the end of September.
If they were so close to a solution, why did they make such a statement?
on August 6, 2009 4:04 PM | Reply
Interesting Jon ... but besides the technical aspects of the repair it would be very interesting to also gain some official Boeing response regarding timelines for the fix installation and testing.
Even if Boeing officials declined to comment it would be good to know that you made the earnest effort to ask and they politely declined. What's REALLY frustrating in all this is the level of secrecy that surrounds this program, as if they were building a stealth aircraft.
As "andrew" states above it appears there is much "misinformation" and disjoint on this program and clearly the financial and marketing/PR personnel have the upper hand in controlling what gets said or announced.
It would be great to get such additional perspective, if possible, to further enhance your otherwise superb technical reports and analysis.
on August 6, 2009 4:28 PM | Reply
Reuters has reported today that Chris Musoke, the 787 Program 's Chief Engineer, said at a breakfast for the Organization of Black Pilots, that a revised schedule for the 787 is just a "few weeks " away.
This is the first reported comment made by a Boeing Official since the Quarterly Earnings statement .
on August 6, 2009 5:05 PM | Reply
Has the modeling software been corrected and verified?
on August 6, 2009 5:19 PM | Reply
How can there be a timeline at this point in that they have not yet installed the modification successfully nor tested it. It would only be a guesstimate.
The more pressing question is when and how they are going to install it ( fix details) and how long after the installation will the static frame test of that wing take.
on August 6, 2009 5:47 PM | Reply
Hi, Jon.
Are you aware of the internal notice of
at least 1 year delay towards first flight
(Q2 2010) at Premium Aerotec in connection with
a staff directed "corporate health and future"
announcement?
http://www.aero.de/community/topic.php?id=3977&page=5
look for "Dornieaner328"
uwe
on August 6, 2009 5:55 PM | Reply
gorbidog> you incorrectly assume that Boeing owes you any answers or transparency on this program.
andrew> extensive testing on the static frame is still required, and this will probably take more time than the initial proposed fix does
on August 6, 2009 6:26 PM | Reply
lol >>> Boeing doesn't owe ME anything. All I'm suggesting is that Jon "FlightBlogger" Ostrower get some representatives of Carson or McNerney to come to the forefront and answer some basic questions.
Jon's detailed analysis is almost without equal, but at the same time, we're not learning about the "truth". We ALL know Boeing is HIDING information, and there's a reason for it.
How do we get the INSIDE SCOOP??? That's what "inquiring minds" want to know.
Therein lies the challenge ... get it???
on August 6, 2009 6:50 PM | Reply
Well, wouldn't it be nice for inquiring minds to find out where the fountain of youth is hiding as well.
I think that most of us expect the Boeing Co. to be open about every thing they do. From a seller point of view that would not be a savvy decision since it might put them at a disadvantage against competitors. After all, are we pressing all the other airplane manufacturers for info regarding they program as well, or as hard?
on August 6, 2009 6:53 PM | Reply
"After all, are we pressing all the other airplane manufacturers for info regarding their program as well, or as hard?"
No, of course not ... don't be silly - because OTHER airplane manufacturers haven't PROMISED airlines an airplane that is TWO years behind schedule - with NO end in sight as far as FIRM delivery schedules.
I mean, forget about delivery schedules ... how about FIRST flight?
Seriously, Boeing has MAJOR credibility problems, and they are NOT doing anything to improve their image ... or LACK thereof.
on August 6, 2009 8:50 PM | Reply
I seem to remember a certain other aircraft manufacturer slipping a major new airliner by two years, after first flight. Very sloppy.
As for Boeing, I don't expect any announcement until after testing is complete on ZY997. Either the fix works, or it doesn't; there's not a lot else to say until that question is answered.
on August 6, 2009 9:58 PM | Reply
Very nice detail again. Well, engineering has been on top of the fix and delivered it pretty rapidly. It appears that the fix itself is quite small, but long. I guess, this episode is a great opportunity to do repair type work on this aircraft - work which should validate Boeing's repair techniques.
on August 6, 2009 10:47 PM | Reply
Jon, my question is not about first flight, but when will the first test on the current proposed fix be completed?
A Fix Process diagram can not have a timeline. If one attempts a timeline until first flight, the program will have too many assumptions built into the schedule causing the Boeing credibility gap to once again rear its ugly head and further sink confidence in this aircraft. Lack of confidence is now becoming a detrament to its goals and sales position.I would think Boeing is unwilling to over- promise again until after fix validation is complete and assurances are accepted from its oversight partners. It sounds like Boeing is in hot pursuit and is closing on the intermediate solution to get this bird off the ground. If testing "this first solution for the Wing Box " becomes a success, then a timeline for first flight would emerge shortly afterwards. Jon, my question is not about first flight but when will the first test on the current proposed fix be completed? Boeing is close enough on that answer since parts have been delivered and are now going through installation. The current installation will develop procedures, resources and move through a learning curve that will replicate through-out the modification of succeeding aircraft. At this point everything is a good guess but not precise. A more precise schedule is after all this stressful stuff is done. I hope Boeing supplies gallons of coffee and lots of focus. I think the whole project is in the balance over the next 30 days. I don't know how many plates are spinning in the air at this time (brakes, weight, and unknowns). This is my 2 cents worth from the cheap seats. I wish them well.
on August 7, 2009 12:16 AM | Reply
It sounds like the physics of the problem is understood and that the solution should work. The problem is 'is the installation certifiable?' Will the mechanics of the retrofit be precise enough and repeatable enough that its performance can be guaranteed within a known range? Then how will it fatigue? Can tooling/methodology be designed to achieve specification or is it literally a waste of time? Huge question. No pressure here.
on August 7, 2009 1:50 AM | Reply
Jon, thanks for your story. It's great to get the details that we can't get anywhere else.
One story line that I think would be interesting to follow:
--Some analysts are predicting that Boeing will move the second 787 line elsewhere. But it hasn't been reported much about the heavy risk this would entail for the company. I was at an aerospace summit outside Seattle on Monday where Michel Merluzeau, an analyst and managing partner of G2 Solutions, said Boeing would be hurt by moving the 787 line. "I don't think taking risk at this stage for Boeing makes sense at this point," he said.
Does it make business sense for Boeing to uproot such a critical program?
on August 7, 2009 7:22 AM | Reply
Jerry1t
Reuters has reported today that Chris Musoke, the 787 Program 's Chief Engineer, said at a breakfast for the Organization of Black Pilots, that a revised schedule for the 787 is just a "few weeks " away.
He said,"I think we're just weeks away from doing that,". Key words there are, 'I think'. Translation, Don't hold your breath, exhale!
By diane
"I seem to remember a certain other aircraft manufacturer slipping a major new airliner by two years, after first flight. Very sloppy."
Agreed. The slide was 18 months after first flight and the plane entered service. Here we are 24 months later and still waiting for first flight let alone delivery
"The Incredibles" moniker can now be applied to BCA management, in a perverse sort of way. Their credibility is in the tank, and even some suppliers i.e. Senior don't believe their pronouncements
on August 7, 2009 8:11 AM | Reply
JE, if the fix wasn't certifiable it wouldn't be much of a fix.
The precision of the mechanics' work is covered by the definition and tolerancing of the detail parts and their installation. Either the installation meets the definition or the non-conformance is bought off with further analysis.
Fatigue is covered in the stress reports for the components and assemblies.
The specification drives aspects of the design, so when designing you (should) take into account whether it is possible to make what you design.
on August 7, 2009 8:23 AM | Reply
Watch Boeing's stock in the coming weeks.
Is it time to bet on Boeing?
http://verovenia.wordpress.com
on August 7, 2009 8:24 AM | Reply
It has been reported that Boeing has spent an ADDITIONAL $11 billion ... that's right ... BILLION ... as in eleven BILLION dollars additionally over their ORIGINAL budget for the program with all the re-design and delay penalties to airlines ordering the plane.
How can a program that is SO far over budget ever catch up? Unless you sell thousands of these planes, you might not ever catch up. Of course it is possible, but I'm not counting on it the way things are going. Because of added weight, the plane is now somewhat "overweight", which will further challenge the performance credibility of the plane as well.
If it's not ONE thing, it's another!
on August 7, 2009 8:40 AM | Reply
gorbidog, the same analyst who made the $11 billion estimate (Joe Campbell from Barclays Capital) also said that he believes the jet would be highly profitable over 2 decades of production.
on August 7, 2009 8:52 AM | Reply
Diane,
yes the A380 slipped 2 years after first flight, during the customization/industrialization phase.
Boeing is 2 years late on first flight and at best is now only having possible nightmares about the customization/industrialization phase. They still have to get the plane flying and certified using an analysis model that has missed 2 high load areas on the aircraft. Will there be more? Will flight test run as smooth as they hope?
Airbus has a disaster on their hands with the A380, but the low number of customers, the delay of delivery penalties were not as prohibitive as they will be for the 787, due to the high number of delayed aircraft. Boeing can be thankful that there is a recession now, and that some customers wish to delay their aircraft, allowing Boeing to move some slots forward. But the fact of the matter is that, even if all goes well from here on out, they will be at least 2 years late with their first delivery (first delivery was forecast as May 2008).
Only the blind (and perhaps Messrs. McNerney & Carsons) do not recognize this as a disaster, but those that can really see the "Emperors New Wardrobe" are not fooled.
on August 7, 2009 9:17 AM | Reply
The fix is currently being installed in the 'already damanged' static test airframe ?
Is the damage repairable or is the installation to test the installation, maybe to test the total strength and then at a later point fix the static airframe by replacing the damaged parts and do the real certification tests.
Is it possible the fix we are seeing now on the static is not even going to be what they used for certification ?
on August 7, 2009 10:46 AM | Reply
Hi JE. Seattle times showed a picture of the proposed fix
http://www2.pic-upload.de/23.07.09/andjondhkkm.gif
Your questions really can only be answered by boeing engineers. As a material engineer I can provide some general answers.
- Fatigue can be a problem for these materials. In the proposed solution the drilled holes and cutout could be problem areas depending on the prevalent stress levels.
- Because this job is done by manual rework the variation of strength will increase with the strengh. Boeing needs to increase the local strength and increase the safety margin on the strength as well.
- Inspection of the location would be next to impossible. monitoring and early warning on the stringers could be possible.(eg fitting strain gages to critical area's). This could facilitate a test only solution.
They might have a testworthy solution with this. But to be honest I would not fly in it. Not because of the fix. The fix will probably be the most tested part of the airplane.
Problem is that they made a very big (30%) error in calculating local stress levels or in calculating material strength. I have not yet seen a guarantee from boeing that this does not impact other parts of the design.
on August 7, 2009 2:23 PM | Reply
Top skin stringers only?
I can understand why the inner flange of the stringers on the upper skin needs to have better carry-through to the center structure. The test that was performed puts the upper skin in compression, but inner flange of those upper stringers is in tension.
But what I can't figure out is why the inner flange of the stringers on the LOWER skin don't also need the help. Doesn't the same set of tension forces apply to the inner flange on the lower stringers on landing? Could the aircraft not run into a durability problem on normal cycles and extensive repairs from single hard landings?
on August 7, 2009 3:18 PM | Reply
VERY well said Sloppy!
on August 7, 2009 5:24 PM | Reply
Responding to Marvin: Since you are a meterial engineer, you are certainly quaified to raise some engineering points.
I can only ask questions. I thought the wing fix on the first seven or so planes will eventually be incorporated into the production line and eventually incorporated in a more refined way into the next tranch of planes.
That is, if one of the problems you are concerned about is fatigue, the first six test planes will not suffer from that exposure so it is not of paramount concern because the planes will only fly for a year or so .
I thought this is to satisfy the requirements for flight and flight testing but the data coming from these flight will then be incorporated into planes 21 and on. So there are opportunities to refine and rework a solution that is satisfactory . Isn't that the way new production works.
Lastly, I thought the problem was localized and this was the only area that showed discrepancies in the stress test...You are claiming that the model is in error and therefore the whole certification process is in question.
If so, I belive that would have been made very prominent by the press, etc. Boeing continues to proceed with the testing on other planes.
It also sounds like you are sure that the air flight testing will reveal these issues ...because the whole model is inadequate.
Perhaps you and others can add to this dialogue but I know that Boeing has one of the best testing divisions in the world and these sort of mistakes do not come down from management. The engineers are in charge here and manage to send alot of planes and satellites into the skies safely and in orbit and that only results from rigorous testing criteria that enables it to happen
on August 7, 2009 6:46 PM | Reply
incredulous:
"The test that was performed puts the upper skin in compression, but inner flange of those upper stringers is in tension."
No, both flanges are in compression, the lower one less so than the upper one, but still in compression. Everything above the flexural axis of the box is in compression.
incredulous
"what I can't figure out is why the inner flange of the stringers on the LOWER skin don't also need the help."
The lower flange is free to warp, which reduces internal stress. The upper one can't warp because it is cocured to the skin. That's why it succumbed to internal stress.
on August 8, 2009 10:05 PM | Reply
I am 63 years old and worked in the advanced research labs at Rolls Royce, Derby (1964-1965)on the TRISTAR compressor blades. Believe me if Boeing had seen all the troubles we had with composite materials they would never have dreamt of using it on their wings. In fact the results were so bad that RR went bust because of it. What seems to happen is once you have fixed one problem another appears - the see-saw effect as we called it. I hope for their sake Boeing can fix this problem but I'm afraid I won’t be counting on it !
on August 8, 2009 11:40 PM | Reply
Hi Jerri. I have no doubt that the engineers at boeing are among the finest. But even the finest engineers need to be supported by time, facilities, procedures and a management that listens. If the engineers were in charge we would no doubt have a flying airplane by now.
This is the second major error in the same structure. First the Central Wing Box needed reinforcing and now the stringers. In both cases testing showed the models wrong.
Of course when you start patching you will eventually get it to 150%, but this does not necessarely mean that you now understand what is going on in the structure. And if you have no clear view of how this structure behaves you are potentially overlooking some lifetime performance issues.
A second point is how this problem could remain ignored until days before first flight. Boeing might have a good testing department, the results are certainly slow to percolate to management level. How did that happen, and is there a risk of challenger type communication errors?
Instead of acknowledging these concerns, management is only yelling: "it's no biggy, we'll have her patched up and flying in no time".
IMO Boeing needs to fix the program first and then the airplane.
on August 9, 2009 4:12 AM | Reply
Marvin...would you please clarify what you mean by "Boeing has to fix the program first and then the airplane".
If I understand what you are driving at is there is an essential flaw in the overall design and that Boeing is minimizing this magaproblem by saying that each challenge is but a small obstacle.
You are alleging that the entire wing fix structure issue still masks an even greater overal design problem that cannot be "patched".
I am disappointed and reluctant to believe that which you say and hope it is not correct.
There is a certification process and obviously alot of stress tests that must be passed. Are you saying that in spite of these gauntlets, the plane is inherently flawed as revealed by this latest challenge
on August 9, 2009 5:30 AM | Reply
Want a good laugh? Go to http://blogs.crikey.com.au/planetalking/ and watch the video "Hitler's 787 is delayed again." If the fix for the 787 doesn't work and/or if there's another delay,I have no doubt that Boeing's 787 customers will be screaming the last line of the script at the top of their lungs.
on August 9, 2009 10:46 AM | Reply
Jerry, With models you can make four types of errors.
1) Geometric error. Usually related to configuration management. For instance you model an M12 bolt and use a M10 without updating the model.
2)Model error. Incorrect build up of the model (eg mesh error). To speed up calculation you use a mesh of discrete elements. The mesh determines the resolution. The more critical an area is, the finer you take the mesh. Take it too wide and you miss stuff.
3) Input error. To set up a model you need to input properties like the elasticity, thermal expansion etc. Not only of the materials but also of the joints. Get it wrong and you can get stress concentration in the wrong places.
4) Output error. A model just gives you a nice colored stress picture. Someone needs to look at it and identify possible issues, based on his/her understanding of the materials and their behavior + available data.
The errors at boeing point to insufficient understanding of the materials (Type 3 and 4 errors) and these are generic errors. To be blunt they seem to be designing a plane based on materials and methods of which they do not exactly know how they hold under stress.
Combined with a management which is more concerned with rushing the program forward than anything else, this is a recipe for more problems. I am not saying there are, just that this is an environment in which they can occur and escape detection.
With fixing the program I mean. Boeing management should do the prudent thing. Delay the whole program by at least a year and take the time to review the design descisions so far, do the necessary testing and work out some real improvements.
It seems like a good idea to make a patch first and then work on a final solution. But please realise it will be probably the same guys who have to rush out a patch, design a final solution, and monitor the incoming parts and integration at the same time. Sounds like a fun job does it?
on August 9, 2009 2:27 PM | Reply
Is it possible that the 787 is an ambitious project whose schedule completion was accelerated by marketing and fiancial influences.
What is being experienced are normal challenges to a problem of this scale. What is aggravating critics is that each delay is interpreted as a major flaw in management and programatic content.
But in truth, the program is progressing and getting close to first flight and the major error was promising something that could not be fullfilled. These stumbles are part of the process and the testing criteria are intended to reveal them.....all part of the program.
In essence, I am wondering whether what is normal is being characterized as abnormal and there is a harsh price Boeing is paying from critics, some of which is unwarranted.
Are there other people who think things will work out and do not think these challenges are a systemic issue
on August 9, 2009 3:01 PM | Reply
Engineers at the top would not have produced a flying
plane yet either. ( but they would adhere (better) to
their published timeline targeting a first flight in
2010Q3, EIS in 2012Q2, Boeing would have had to pay
penalties for 3 month delay for a backlog of 450 planes ;-)
Boeing currently seems unable to produce an airplane
to modern design and manufacturing standards.
i.e. preparation, processes and controlling done in a
way that allows to "produce as designed".
This imho is a systemic failure at (nearly) all levels
and it is aggravated by Boeing historically being a
more "play it by ear" airframer than Airbus which is due
to the differences in setup and geographic distribution
of manufacturing sites.
AFAIU Marvin, there is no certainty about further design
issues either way. Everything could be green and without issue forever _or_ a complete aft section could separate
one year after EIS and nobody would have expected it or
know why.
But that exactly is the issue here. For certification you
must show that no issues remain from a "best engineering practice" viewpoint.
Boeing currently cannot vouch for that.
Has the FAA said anything to the Boeing announcements that
insinuated positive FAA conformance?
I find this absolutely fascinating to watch.
Things used to be designed for functionality. Form follows function, "beauty" for the educated, a view that percolated
to the general public later on.
These days we see things designed to "look good" ( unfortunately for a laymans eyes )
Was that triggered by all the fake engineering in the Movies?
Historically this is similar to the loss of capabilities
in the late Roman Empire. ( And neither limited to Boeing or the US, Read Asimov's Foundation series for the general idea)
uwe
on August 10, 2009 4:04 AM | Reply
Marvin, what makes you say 3 and 4 rather than 2 and 4? Given what is in the public domain I would have thought it more likely to be due to an error in judgement on how to refine the region (an error of type 2), rather than a gap in knowledge of the materials. I agree with you that there was probably an element of 4 in there, possibly dismissing a result as an artefact of the analysis rather than a genuine result. It was mentioned somewhere that analysis showed "hot spots" in this area.
I know it is easy to be flippant about the output of FEM (everyone knows that its true purpose is to produce pretty pictures), but there is a lot more to analysing the composite structures than looking at the stress and saying it's OK one way or another. Once we have that FEM there's a significant amount of further processing to analyse for the many possible failure modes.
on August 10, 2009 7:58 AM | Reply
We all have a tendency to see things from our particular point of view. Marvin is a materials engineer and his discussion about modeling seems to focus on some error in the model relative to the composite material and its response to stress..
The list of possible model failures appears to make sense but I question why there implies a conclusion that Boeing is guilty of having failed in its modeling.
Is it possible that the modeling picked up partuclar area of local stress that resulted in a delamination issue that is simply not as major as Marvin and Uwe suggest. Much of the prior delay has been caused by supply chain implementation as well as overpromising.
But again, I simply wonder whether we are inidicting a methodology that has been able to pick up issues during testing as it is intended to.
Acknowledging the wing fix issue, some other large percentage of the plane has already passed FAA certification standards and nothing has been made public about any FAA compromises or threats to the program. In addition, Less than 6% of the orders have been cancelled indicating that many carriers do not find the situation as dire as being implied.
If a fix and revised schedule is announced, will this indicate that the program is once again moving foward or do these suspicions remain in place.
on August 10, 2009 12:08 PM | Reply
While I am still incredulous that Boeing could have messed up on such a fundamental design detail as the wing to body stringer joints, until more details emerge there are a number of questions and scenarios that come to mind.
First of all, is the "phone-booth" access for the re-work not the same access available to perform the production join up? Could it be that some of the delamination problem was caused by poor fastener installation due to the cramped work-space?
If, as it seems, the joint delamination started to emerge back in May at below limit load, why was the decision made to keep on loading up the wing so as to make the problem worse? Perhaps a case of fingers crossed in the hope that the level of damage would level off and not prohibit first flight.
Now the situation is that no meaningful flight testing can be conducted until reinforcements are made, which confirms that delamination must have started at well below limit load.
It also appears that Boeing will have to certify two different wing joint configurations, the titanium reinforcement retrofit for early build aircraft and the final production "all-composite" configuration. Will the FAA require another full scale test article to validate the final re-design of the stringer joints?
Finally, for those who keep bringing up the problems of the Big Bus, that aircraft has a composite outer wing panel and a composite center box, with metal wings in between. So they managed to successfully design two complex wing joints. There was some slight weakness in the metal wing section, no doubt fairly easily fixed.
on August 10, 2009 1:27 PM | Reply
I have had exchanges with knowledgeable people who do not work for Boeing but are familiar with this issue and believe it is a local matter and solveable.
They do not believe that there is a material or modeling problem....and the challenge is the installation in the assembled planes not the subsequent ones.
Reading some of the contributions above makes it appear they will have to scrap the plane and hire new management. The essential question is always the proportionality of the challenge and its real place in the scheme of things.
It appears some people have a more confident view of the 787 future.
on August 11, 2009 3:24 PM | Reply
Hello. Uwe, FYI (I would assume you are from the "field") - FAA has nothing to say, for the moment.
The issues when it comes to that will be between Boeing's ODA office (BDCO) and Engineering. Seattle ACO might (only might) get involved. At that point it gets political and the reasoning on how Boeing can not produce per modern design and/or manufacturing standards gets irrelevant.
One needs to be fully involved with all the aspects of a specific OEM's processes and procedure, local culture etc (Boeing, EADS ,Bombardier, Embraer or else) in order to make such a statement (being or not being able to work in line with modern standards).
Personally, I've been involved with all of the OEMs I mentioned and I've seen quite a few similarities - especially in "making ends meet". Quite contrary to your statement.
Cheers
on August 12, 2009 1:48 AM | Reply
I thought the modelling is done to reduce or eliminate nasty (expensive, time consuming and possibly embarassing) surprises during the testing phase. Does the modelling itself get submitted to the FAA (EASA, CAA etc)? I do not have that impression. My understanding is that the test results, along with various stress reports, amongst a vast array of other documentation, is what counts.
I do not know how the fatigue rig is linked in with the type certification (I assume that the number of cycles that an aircraft is required to be tested is not yet completed by the time the type certification is issued) but I do have confidence that Boeing (& Airbus & Bombardier & Embraer etc) have done everything required to ensure as safe an aircraft as possible, meeting FAA/EASA requirements, at the time of delivery. By the way, if FAA would have something to say, i doubt very much they would be sayint it to the public. That is an issue between the FAA and the OEM.
Having said that, one cannot ignore the fact that Boeing has large problems (a 2 plus year delay before first flight cannot be ruled as anything else but an expensive, embarassing failure in the design and build phase) with getting this thing flying and once they do, they still could have a whole mess of unkown issues to resolve up until the day of delivery. Is this project a failure that is about to be cancelled?
Very unlikely, but the lustre of 2 years ago has long gone. Only time will tell if it comes back but until then, one would be extremely naive not to look at all things 787 related with a full & healthy dose of skepticism.
on August 12, 2009 8:32 AM | Reply
Given the delay and obstacles needed to be overcome, skepticism is a healthy reaction,but not necessarily the final judgement.
When the first flight takes place, there should be some sigh of relief that many of the challenges of launching this plane are behind us. The testing Boeing puts the plane through is very thorough and the programs have been able to be matured with the delays.
There are always things that will come up during the flight tests but the probability is that they are programatic glitches and not structural issues. I still remain confident that this is a remarkable plane and it will distinguish itself when things come together.
There are as many reasons to be positive as there are reasons to be skeptical. A few delays does not make for failure. It can also insure success.
on August 12, 2009 9:12 AM | Reply
It is interesting that only 6% of the total orders for the 787 have been cancelled.
Qatar, who was bad mouthing Boeing, seem to have settled its differences and remains a large purchaser.
There seems to be the belief on the part of Boeing's customers that the plane will be delivered, albeit delayed, with the efficiencies that were promised . In some cases the delay has been of benefit to the Carrier but only in a few has there been the wish to cancel. I imagine that they are all better aware of the specific circumstances than the general press and public.
on August 17, 2009 12:27 PM | Reply
There is no need to hurry with the cancellations for the airlines. They wait until the first 787s are in commercial service.
If the 787 doesn't meet the specifications then, many (if not all) orders will be cancelled.
Best regards from Germany
Andreas
on January 4, 2010 7:49 PM | Reply
Impressive remark about seo. I'm frankly stunned that that hasn't been told earlier.