Yesterday's announcement of a fresh delay to Boeing's 747-8 Freighter program wasn't triggered by a single large event but rather the accumulation of small issues that added up to an additional three month slip in first delivery to Cargolux to the fourth quarter of 2010.
"It is more akin to death by a thousand cuts," says one program engineer of the latest delay.
At its heart, the delay was attributable to resource constraints driven by the engineering responsibilities diverted by the 787 program.
"Consequently", the engineer says, "more engineering errors escaped than what could be considered normal."
For example, the leading edge Krueger flaps had to be reworked because they weren't fairing properly.
For those on the assembly floor, "workers are adjusting to building a new airplane. A lot of them have been moved around...so their work lacks continuity which leads to production errors," says the engineer.
747 vice-president and general manager Mohammad 'Mo' Yahyavi said in May, "I have all the resources I need now for both the freighter and the Intercontinental."
Program executives addressed this central question about resource allocation for the 747-8 after the 787 was grounded in late June for the side-of-body fix:
"The 787 will identify the requirements they need to address their challenges, but that won't have an impact on the 747," Todd Zarfos, the vice president of engineering for the jumbo-jet program, said in an interview today. "Over the last two years we've aligned our engineering resource ability to make sure we meet all our commitments."Despite the planning that was put into effect to avoid such a repeat of previous resource starvation, the 747 again fell victim to the engineering demand of the 787.
747-8I launch customer Lufthansa, whose passenger variant entry into service remains unchanged, expected that a further program delay would result because of the 787 resource shift.
Lufthansa CFO Stephan Gemkow was quoted on June 25th as saying:
"I'm sure again the delay of the 787 will mean that they have to pull in more engineering resources, and that will have even further delays, as a consequence, for the 747-8. I would not be surprised to learn this some weeks or months in the future."
Prior to yesterday's announcement, RC501, was set to leave the 747 final assembly line for the paint hangar around October 11th, with first flight planned for December 9th.Of the total number of tasks required to build a 747-8 from structural build up all the way to pre-flight activities, just over 50% had been fully completed at the time the delay was announced, according to company sources.
Of the balance of tasks or "jobs" that have yet to be completed or "sold" many remain "open" or partially completed, paced by engineering changes. As a result, the total level of completion was far above 50%, but the open and unfinished jobs created a critical path bottleneck that has to be overcome before moving forward.
CATIA and the IRON BIRD
Boeing decided against a full systems integration lab (SIL) for the 747-8 derivative aircraft, due to the influence of the legacy systems on the current design. However, because a SIL was unavailable, says a second 747-8 program engineer, many of the system level issues were encountered on the aircraft, rather than being caught in the lab.
In addition, without a universal computer model derived from Dassault Systemes CATIA v5 software, Boeing has found itself "trying to bridge the gap between 1969 and 2009," says a veteran engineer based at one of Boeing's 747-8 suppliers.
For example, the new wing design and enlarged empennage were designed through CATIA v5, while a portion of of the internal fuselage structure and other parts of the aircraft were built using legacy engineering drawings.
Some parts and their associated engineering drawings, the engineer says, have not changed since the 747-100, which in some instances has led to a loss of tolerance control in some areas.
Any gaps in the structure are typically addressed with structural shims to align and help parts fit together. However, as the resources have been stretched so thin, the engineering for those shims has been slow to take hold, say the engineers.
"The scope of this delay doesn't compare to what the 787 has been going through, but it is still disappointing," says the first engineer. "Boeing and its employees so desperately need something to celebrate right now."
Photo Credit Boeing (mid)
on October 8, 2009 3:13 AM | Reply
Oh my. Mess after mess after mess. Honestly, these days, can Boeing do even a single thing right? Maybe they're reluctant to do anything to the 737, as they'd probably mess than up, too. They can't even make changes to legacy aircraft (747, 767 tanker, 767 cargo) in reasonable amounts of time without problems.
Honestly, they're starting to look like they have system-wide incompetence.
on October 8, 2009 3:14 AM | Reply
Oh my. Mess after mess after mess. Honestly, these days, can Boeing do even a single thing right? Maybe they're reluctant to do anything to the 737, as they'd probably mess than up, too. They can't even make changes to legacy aircraft (747, 767 tanker, 767 cargo) in reasonable amounts of time without problems. About the only thing they have done right is the 777 cargo aircraft.
Honestly, they're starting to look like they have system-wide incompetence.
on October 8, 2009 7:55 AM | Reply
Not a good story and no reason why Boeing did not have sufficient resources and engineering for both programs. This is what management is all about and the rest is excuses.
There is another aspect to this story and that is the lack of orders and the production rate. In this environment it appears that it is best to take the writeoffs in 2009 and to slow down the completion of this model until the demand increases.
Boeing has no more excuses for failure. They have used up all their investor's patience. If the 787 does not make it up into the air this quarter, it will be a major failure.
on October 8, 2009 8:03 AM | Reply
No, patching major amounts 21st century work onto '60s era designs is just a real pain in the backside. This is especially so if most of your engineers were born in the '70s and '80s and grew up with the vastly different levels of design drawing accurcy now available.
Lockheed must be wizards to be able to keep it up the way they do with their Hercules.
on October 8, 2009 8:15 AM | Reply
Parts of this report just indicate plain incompetence. Yes...incompetence.
The section about CATIA and the Iron Bird and the misuse of engineering drawings sounds like a plane build by mistake. There is absolutely no excuse for the lack of engineering resources and management controls.
This posting indicates an amazing failure on the part of a Company to protect its product development and to expose its operation to such mistakes. There has been an enormous failure on the part of Management and this is but one exposure and result of hubris and incompetence.
It is painful to express these thoughts
on October 8, 2009 8:44 AM | Reply
This is what happens when you take shortcuts.
on October 8, 2009 9:24 AM | Reply
If the total number of "tasks required" required for completion currently stands at slightly above the 50 percent level, perhaps first flight should only be expected to occur in Q2 2010.
on October 8, 2009 10:27 AM | Reply
Utter management failure !
on October 8, 2009 11:02 AM | Reply
Why is Jim Mcnerney still the main chief of Boeing?
on October 8, 2009 1:44 PM | Reply
It's modern day Boeing, that's what went wrong.
Completely a marketing company, Boeing is no longer an engineering company and it is very sad. Maybe it's time to start ensuring you can actually build the damn things before you sell them and mislead everyone. Seems they can't really get anything right, or even done.
on October 8, 2009 2:32 PM | Reply
It's very clear that Boeing senior leadership is the architect of their own woes (how Shakespearean).
So it can be truly said that Boeing's latest product was developed with slide rules. A marketing nightmare or bonanza, depending on which side you're on.
I'd bet on a shakeup around the next stockholder meeting.
on October 8, 2009 2:34 PM | Reply
It's very clear that Boeing senior leadership is the architect of their own woes (how Shakespearean).
So it can be truly said that Boeing's latest product was developed with slide rules. A marketing nightmare or bonanza, depending on which side you're on.
I'd bet on a shakeup around the next stockholder meeting.
on October 8, 2009 2:54 PM | Reply
Dave, this is the direct result of the MD takeover, and Condit's complete incompetence. Stonecipher and his "do it on the cheap" methods, and adversarial management has spawned a hellchild in the middle of Boeing.
Boeing is in major trouble, both on the IDS side, and on the commercial side, and there is only ONE guy responsible for letting this happen, McNerney. He needs to be fired, but he won't be, he's got too many buddies packed on the board for that to happen.
on October 8, 2009 3:36 PM | Reply
This is a prime example of the so called "Circle of Friends" promoting and protecting each other to the highest level of incompetence!
Like Chip & Dale...Oh you look marvelous....ohhhh No YOU look marvelous! Ohhhhh..... we both look marvelous yes yes yes...
It sure is bad when a Fifth Grader makes you look stupid...
Time to hire people who know aviation not chemistry...
on October 8, 2009 4:00 PM | Reply
Let us not forget that Boeing just elected an ex military Submarine driver to the board... AIRPLANE people build airplanes best and submarine drivers sink the ship best!
Argh my maties damm the torpedoes and sink that ship!
"The Circle of Friends Continues"
on October 8, 2009 6:32 PM | Reply
Boy oh boy do they miss Alan Mullally!
on October 8, 2009 8:19 PM | Reply
The CATIA remarks are only partly right. Firstly, v5 is not a panacea. 787 used the new suite; where are they? And that question is on the mark. Leaving behind legacy, as alluded to, is called a green-field movement, and it has its own problems.
Secondly, there has been work with v4 that was significant. Remember the 777? There were other variations on that same software platform: 737 NG, 747 freighter, 767.
Now, from the view of those who know, the main at-fault thing here is Dassault's reluctance to maintain consistency across variations of their software. Oh yeah, they want to come in and throw away everything old and start anew. Well, it doesn't work that way in that one main requirement is support for the model throughout the life of the program. But, that costs; managers don't like the reality of the situation.
Look, people, how many didn't go to Vista when MS wanted because of the problems? Isn't XP still around?
From where I sit, and through my years, I've seen plenty of new stuff come in that is terrible. You have to know and trust your algorithms. Hence, computing ought to have resolved the evolution of algorithms through time early on. But, no, software was driven by sales; or by hubris; or, no one wanted to own up to the maintenance problems (talk about a place where some money ought to be (have been) put on a regular basis).
An hybrid approach that wraps the more modern logic around the legacy gems is very much doable. And, there are efforts to create the ways and means to counter Dassault's (to whom some Boeing managers seem to want to kiss up) arrogance in this regard.
Boeing used to have top-notch software. I notice that some is available for licensing. Yet, if you talk to the IT people in Boeing, their heads are into this off-the-shelf notion (oh yes, Dassault likes that) where you completely ignore that specifics related to your business are your competitive advantages, meaning, of course, they are something that you need to cherish and preserve.
Where the heck does the idea come from that you can get that off the shelf or from the web? Oh yes, part of this idiocy is the out-housing (oops, out-sourcing) trend which has a belief that we can just spread around work and get back excellent results.
Ah, the modern age!
on October 9, 2009 3:22 AM | Reply
Quite often when you design something on the drafting board, and then send it to the production guys will fudge it here and their, and make little changes and not have the drawing updated. So when you go back to the orginal drawing to change or modify all these little very subtle changes come back to haunt you. Lockheed is better at this because Kelly Johnson kept the engineers as close to the production foor as possible, so Lockheed tends to note all the little changes better. See Kelly Johnson's 14 Rules of Engineering Management.You break these rules and you pay and pay and pay.
on October 9, 2009 5:37 AM | Reply
The idea of selling the 787-8x is really like entering your granny in the Miss USA 2010 competition. Yes, she was Miss Texas 1966 and she does have the basics (arms, legs, winning smile and an urge to save the world) but is it enough?
You will need to do a lot of work and need a lot of time to get her ready. Better aim for Miss USA 2012.
on October 9, 2009 7:04 AM | Reply
In a distributed design and production environment this is
no longer an available option.
You _must_ have an established _and_ functional framework
for backporting changes and managing cross method/tool "crosstalk/interdependency.
But modern management doctrine has two major faults that come
to my mind:
"The map is the territory"
i.e. all things work as stated on (some) paper.
nothing breaks, no unknonw unknowns ;-)
"The only creative souls involved are managers"
i.e. everything else is COTS materials ( be it Aluminium stock
or clones for the workforce ).
As ever the US is in the lead in this.
( And it is not a save assumption that Airbus management has been shocked away from following this path any further,
the Dark Force is strong ;-)
uwe
)
on October 9, 2009 11:15 AM | Reply
Just hire me back at a good base salary plus incentives.
I'm pretty much done with Ford and I can only stand one more winter here in Dearborn.
Oh ... and be sure to throw in a significant "signing bonus" in the high seven-figures to keep my wife satisfied - we'd like to plunk down some good coin on a mansion somewhere near Bill Gates' neighborhood - but not TOO close.
About late first quarter would be perfect - just in time for Spring training for the M's!!!
on October 9, 2009 12:01 PM | Reply
Is there any particular reason why comments in these threads get posted 2, 3, 27 times?
sPh
on October 9, 2009 2:16 PM | Reply
Based on some of the above comments, there seems to be a criticism that cost savings choices made in the applications of IT resources result/ contibute to the delays and difficultiies encountered in the 747. Distributed design and production environments need to be seemless and trustworthy.
One comment indicates that the IT Department at Boeing has not kept up with the field as well as it should have .
This is surprisng because I recall when Boeing announced that it would create a" paperless plane" and many of us thought this Company was on top of the curve in this area.
This is really a topic for people familiar with this technology who can evaluate whether these claims are accurate. Is this a management issue or is it similar to the issues facing many companies, where the new software is just too troublesome so there is a hesitancy to purchase it or upgrade. ( Dassault).
I would hope this is not an issue with the 787 as it is an entirely new design.
Can anyone weigh in on this specific area.
on October 10, 2009 4:00 AM | Reply
I guess the problems happen when you have a plane whose design is half paperless and half paper. The Kruegers cited in the article are a new, paperless design. I wonder if that's the case of the surrounding and support structure.
on October 10, 2009 9:00 PM | Reply
This article is a little bit tendentious and grossly inaccurate I should say!
It took less than 6 weeks from assembling the sections to complete the final assembly and running of major functional tests incl landing gears, primary and secondary flight controls.
Adding 'plugs' to the fusalage and reinforcing of certain sections such as wing/ body attachments doese not warrented the use of a new CAD system for an airplane whose entire body already built in boeing's data base on the venerable V4.
The problems as always are lying with suppliers and partners that failed to deliver and inegrated their packages on time, bear in mind that many of these companies already decimated their staff in the wake of the 787 delays so support of another huge program was beyond their means
on October 11, 2009 2:55 PM | Reply
Today it is the IT Department at Boeing has not kept up with the field as well as it should have.
Yesterday it was mismanagement of the supply chain. "We'll never use some of these guys again."
A couple of months ago, it was IAM. Let's just blame SPEEA already. Ah, speaking of the Devil, just google this: UAW - they're next with the mud wrestling.
JUST STORM THE BASTILLE AND FIRE THE MANAGEMENT THAT KEEPS MAKING THE WRONG DECISIONS. FIRE THE INCOMPETENTS. It's excuse after excuse after excuse. Nothing ever works there any more.
And hire Alan Mulally already - set up the high 7-figure bait and just give him his house further than bluetooth range from Bill's.
Come on Boeing, fix the problems.
on October 12, 2009 8:02 AM | Reply
I did a year of contract work for Boeing in 2006. When the A-380 announced its delays, they were SO arrogant about it. They all thought it was quite funny.
The company I work for now does work for Boeing as well as many others. Two years ago we had a Boeing rep onsite and he heard we were having an internal meeting about the programme. He asked why he wasn't invited and we replied that it was internal. He pointed to his shirt with the Boeing logo on it and said, 'See this, that means I decide what meetings I go to, not you.'
The shear arrogance is amazing. It is ironic that it is coming back to bite them now. I guess the A-380 delays aren't so funny anymore...
on October 12, 2009 7:00 PM | Reply
And hire Alan Mulally already - set up the high 7-figure bait and just give him his house further than bluetooth range from Bill's.
Thanks for the support Paulo ... I already have a home on Mercer Island, but another one would be good for tax shelter ... BTW ... Ford ROCKS!!!
on October 12, 2009 8:25 PM | Reply
I worked contract on the 747-8F program structures group. I could not believe that they decided to stay with V4 and not run up to speed with V5. We were re-creating all of the drawings done way back in the mid 60's to V4 solids. Even though the solids were modeled up in V4, there is no issues in converting them to V5. The only group using V5 on this program was the wings group. Everyone had their chance to convert over to V5. Meaning the complete 747-8F program and 747-8I program could of been done on V5. But elected to stay with V4, due to I believe a lack of understanding of how Model Based Definition works. This is the future. Drawings are a thing of the past. You have guys in the groups who know nothing about V5 and everything about V4, but were too scared to make the leap, because this would affect their capabilities, or better yet show their lack of capabilities when having to deal with V5. Therefore decisions were made to stay with V4.
on October 13, 2009 1:32 PM | Reply
The real question that should be answered here is the very economic viability of the whole programme & if Boeing should cut their losses now & run away from what appears to a lack lustre aircraft.
With no orders for three years, that must surely be setting a record for a new airframe and almost unanimous commercial airline rejection.
on October 13, 2009 10:35 PM | Reply
Boeing has become a complete and utter joke.
on October 13, 2009 11:23 PM | Reply
always the problems happen when no good planing
on October 24, 2009 3:30 AM | Reply
I'm shocked that nobody has yet mentioned the role Spirit Aerosystems has played in dropping the ball with this program. Spirit has consistently delivered poor quality sub-assemblies which must be re-worked on every plane just to make them usable. I place Boeing senior management at fault for thinking they could sub contract design engineering.
With regard to what Alloycowboy said about parts being "fudged" on the production floor- when a part does not work as result of design, the discrepancy is documented as an NCR and our in-house liaison engineering has to come up with a fix. This NCR documentation, when extended to cover multiple aircraft, is termed a "greenline", meaning we will fix the problem per the original disposition as long as the discrepant condition exists.
The 747-8 program has already amassed hundreds of these greenlines and these greenline jobs add hours upon hours of rework.
It's no wonder to me why management and labor have such an adversarial relationship. Management comes up with a strategy whereby they think they will save loads of money by cutting corners, but they end up not saving money at all because they have to pay many hours of overtime for the labor to clean up the mess.