Getting Oriented: Where's the 787 fleet? Part Three

Shouldn't LN9 be ZA102?

Ok Boeing is building a lot of 787s and I am a visual learner, so how about a table next time so we can track the progress visually?

Thanks and keep up the good work

Is that a dented nacelle? Let's hope it's just a trick of the light!

I am a dedicated reader of this site, but this lookup feature in the bottom left of the website is annoying. I think it could be a great feature for a browser plugin, not something to force on your readers. Everytime I click a story on your page, an annoying pop-up and animation appears. Is there a way to turn this feature off on my machine.
Thanks,
a dedicated reader.

What is the patch on the wing (right of the engine)?

If by "dented nacelle" you're talking about the air intake lip, the non-smoothness of it is probably just wrinkles on the plastic sheet they tape on there to keep things clean; see paineairport.com/kpae2563.htm

I'm calling an audibile (circus left from the Fiesta Bowl play 2007). The line is set 103,104,105,and 115. The wide outs are split left on the flight line ZA105, ZA106. The back field is full ZA102, ZA104 in the house. ZA 101 is on the bench getting a uniform change. The quarter back, ZY997 is just waiting the snap, so to speak, no pun intended. If the snap is not fumbled its a quick 7,errr 8, no 7. Boeing wins. Thats how I see it Jon. Thanks for the play by play.

As a regular reader of this blog and Seattle area resident, I have been tracking progress of 787 for quite some time now. One question that comes to mind in regards to the wing fix is that the fix has been installed on a few planes already, however it has never been statically tested. I'm a scientist myself (pharmaceutical chemist scaling up drug production) so I just don't get how you can start applying a fix that has not been checked. What if it does not pass the load tests on the static rig? Will that mean that it will have to be removed it and something different designed and applied? Please let me know whether these are just stupid questions and no parallels can be applied from different industry or these are valid concerns, although coming from a layperson.

trappeprk,

The other day, just after the latest 787 shuffle, I walked by ZA005 and 006 near the "tent" hangar (noticing the big scars in their side-of-body area, still not restored). The image that came to my mind was a dentist's or doctor's office: Two people who just had a painful procedure sitting in the waiting room tenderly touching the operated area, and a third person walking in all scared, while the two other patients say "Don't worry, it's not so bad" while trying not to wince ;]

Seriously, though, it's interesting how the mod does not require large parts to be brought in, but for access they apparently still need to remove a lot of the stuff from where the wing meets the body, making the mod look more major than it is.

Szymon,

I'm not involved in the side-of-body issue, but: It is possible that analysis alone might be enough for Boeing to be sufficiently confident in the mod to start modding multiple airplanes. The FAA may or may not think that such analysis is reliable enough for certification (It's fairly safe to say that they don't, which is why a static-test airframe is effectively necessary), but Boeing might feel that the chance of the fix not working is so slim that they might as well move forward with the work. It's safe to guess that Boeing understands this failure mode a heck of a lot better now than earlier this year, so this presumed confidence might not be as unwise as it appears to an outsider (but we won't know for sure until the static tests).

More fun in 2010-http://www.arabianbusiness.com/574041-exclusive-boeing-chairman-sees-more-job-cuts-in-2010

There are ways of testing a piece of structure other than sticking it inside a whole airplane, y'know.

I think a good indicator of whether the wing fix worked or not is whether or not we see Boeing management jumping out of windows.

They might as well apply the fix to all the 787s, because if it doesn't work they can just turn out the lights and send the keys back to the bank. It really has to work.

Boeing knows that the wing fix will work because they designed it to be hell-for-stout. That is all.

Consider this - if they hadn't put the untested fix in the flight test aircraft, in parallel with the static test models, there would have been no way to achieve first flight this year.

And the aircraft were sitting idle anyway; it's not like installing the fix interfered with other testing on those planes.

So if the fix works, they get first flight soon. If it doesn't work, there probably isn't any alternative that would achieve first flight in less than six months.

I don't see it as even being a "risk." On large, complex projects, you have to do lots of things in parallel. The project managers watch the critical path very carefully, and look for problems that could shift the critical path from one area to another. Doing the fix to the flight-test aircraft kept that installation off the critical path. It really does make sense.

"There are ways of testing a piece of structure other than sticking it inside a whole airplane, y'know."

Not and be certified as flight worthy by the FAA. If Boeing could test the air worthyness of the wing with a less than whole airplane fix they would do so. They don't just pick a test out of their orifice

SWEET pic Jon!

Hi Jon, Do you know at which airplane Boeing will already have the wing to body join fix completed prior to final body join and will no longer have to perform the fix?
Thanks!

I agree with both Diane and AirplaneJim.

RaiDog,

Thank you ;]

AirplaneJim,

I don't disagree. You get some level of certainty from computer simulations (and this level increases the more you investigate the nature of the failure mode you're worried about). You get a higher level of certainty from component tests (and this level increases the more closely your component's manufacture and shape and loading match those in the real airplane). You get an even HIGHER level of certainty from a full-scale test inside the static airframe.

That last, highest level of certainty (full-scale test) is what the FAA apparently needs for commercial certification. But the previous level of certainty (component tests, or maybe even just computer simulations) is apparently enough for Boeing to start modding airplanes (and might be enough for an experimental certification, which is all you need for first flight, I think. I could be wrong).

Note that none of these is 100% certainty. Maybe the full-scale test is set up incorrectly and gives bad data. Remember that 747 high-blow test where the nose cargo door wasn't closed properly, and was blown open and swung upwards and crashed into the cockpit? Mistakes are made during tests, it happens, people are human.

www.seattlepi.com/business/261731_boeing74704.html

And think about this: 787s were being built (using the original non-mod design) long before the static tests. This means that at that point, before the full-scale tests, Boeing was already confident enough in the design to put the airplanes together. You can't run all your tests before you start cutting metal (or putting down carbon fiber, as the case may be). So Boeing doesn't NEED the certainty from a full-scale test to start manufacturing (or modding) airplanes. And in most cases, this certainty is warranted, and the full-scale tests hold no surprises. That was not the case this time.

The real questions are: Why didn't computer simulations and/or element tests reveal this failure mode, and if they did, why was the design not revised until the last minute? The answers (whatever they are) have to do with the nature of Boeing management, and the rumors I have heard on this topic are too speculative (and cynical) to post here, but I suspect that you have heard them as well :[

that 1/2 view of za001 is very intriguing! that's one interesting picture.