The A400M's first all-engine, on-wing engine-run 

Now here's a real aeroplane. It has propellers.

And yes, it will fly because we need this machine. At present there's no military airlifter between the C-130 and the C-17 unless you are in the USAF. The maiden flight is programmed some time before the end of the year. But, if it doesn't meet that deadline, patience!

At Toulouse a few months ago I "flew" one of the test simulators for it.

A400M fixed-base simulators, wired up to the "Iron Bird "

test rig for the  new aircraft 

For an ex Herc driver like me, getting your head around this machine takes some doing, and I'm not there yet. It's a sidestick aircraft (which I have. no probs with), and FBW, but flight envelope protection is invisible. You wanna do a barrel roll? Feel free.

I didn't do a barrel roll, but I did roll 110deg into a mock evasive descent manoeuvre (much good may it have done me in real life).

But just like the A400M's Europrop International TP400-D6 engines - which have been giving problems that have extended the programme's spectacular delays - especially the FADECs, its avionics suite and mission systems need some work yet.

Also, the sims need a lot of shaking down before they deliver. But the engines are the most powerful turboprops the Western world has ever attempted, and the avionics are incredibly ambitious.

Problems? Surprise, surprise! Remember how long the C-130J took to shake down? And that was just a simple Herc with digital avionics and upgraded engines/prop systems.

Since when did military procurement go smoothly?

Anyway, the delays associated with this programme have enabled the "Iron Bird" systems mockup of the A400M to go through many more cycles than it would otherwise have achieved before first flight.

The picture of the "bird" is below. Just so you understand what you are seeing, it's the complete hydraulic, electrical and control surface actuator rig that represents the systems on the real A400M, laid out in a hangar and powered. Imagine the layout you see as being the aeroplane flying in a direction that's laterally 2 o'clock compared with your view of the scene. The wings are against the far wall, and they continue around the corners for lack of lateral space to get all the systems in. The red objects are the control surfaces (spoilers etc), weighted to represent real inertia. The walkway down the centre is the rig for the hydraulics/electrics that follow the fuselage line, and on the left, high up, is the horizontal stabiliser with the screw-jack acuator ahead of its leading edge, and the red units representing the elevators where the trailing edge would be. 

It may be rigged to one of the fixed base simulators, but the systems and control surfaces are constantly being flexed as well just to test their durability.

South Africa may have cancelled its A400M orders, but unless they have changed their defence strategy (quite probable) they'll be back. If you need an airlifter in the A400M size/performance category, there's no alternative on the horizon.

Courtesy of Oxford Aviation Academy and SAS at OAA's Stockholm base, I have just flown an A320 twice from Gothenburg to Copenhagen, with identical weights in identical conditions both times.

But, by adopting a few modified procedures the second time, we used 18.4% less fuel.

Don't try all these tricks on your next trip without having a word with your ops and training standards people, because even SAS, which has been working for a few years with OAA to develop "Eco-Piloting" techniques and training, has only just got there, and has not yet begun the process of transferring the new tricks onto the line.

If you want to learn about the techniques SAS/OAA have been trialling, register for Flight International's Pilot Best Practice/Crew Management Conference in London at the end of this month and you can talk to Per de la Motte, OAA's Director of Training, Nordic region about his secrets.

Back to my two short trips.

Given that, on the first trip, my mentor in the right hand seat, OAA's fuel-efficiency guru Peter Fogtmann, ensured that we used normal SAS/A320 SOPs and standard routeing with absolutely no shilly-shallying, I wouldn't have thought a fuel saving of 18.4% was possible. But its what we did. Since it's only a 25min hop, 18.4% translates as a 320kg fuel saving, which may not sound much - but what a percentage! Save that every trip for a year and you're talking big bucks and dramatically reduced emissions.

Of course Peter and I are in a simulator, but it's a Level D FFS, so the figures we get should represent the truth, as near as dammit.

The first trip was done the way any good line pilot would do it, so I won't bore you with that. But here are the differences applied on the second trip:

• Reduced the cost index from 30 to 7 in the FMS;
• Chose Malmo instead of Gothenburg as the alternate, which meant we could carry 450kg less fuel;
• APU was started only moments before pushback;
• Single-engine taxi (using No 1 engine). APU was shut down once No 1 was established and checked;
• No 2 was started with 3min to go to line-up for take-off;
• Take-off was carried out with flap/slat 1 instead of 2, and packs off;
• Power levers retarded to "climb" detent at 800ft (instead of 1,500-3,000ft), and acceleration initiated at that point;
• Request for optimum speed below 10,000ft accepted, and continued at 305kt (opt) instead of sticking to standard 250kt;
• Request direct routeing at every opportunity (in this case the routeing was almost direct anyway, so there were no benefits there);
• Input forecast or actual winds rather than standard seasonal;
• Initiate descent at a carefully estimated point beyond normal TOD because continuous descent approach was likely to be available;
• Flap 1 selected at glideslope intercept; flap 2 at 2,000ft; gear down just before 1,000ft; flap 3 selected just before 500ft (would be 1,000ft in IMC); land with flap 3 instead of 4;
• Idle reverse during landing run;
• 3min after touchdown, No 2 engine shut down; single-engine taxi to stand.

Yes I know you wouldn't be able to do all those things on many regular trips, and hardly any of them in busy terminal areas during the winter, but just doing some of them when you can provides a benefit that makes a difference. Yes I know you have to consider icing procedures in unkind weather, but sometimes the sun shines.

SAS and OAA, who are making this kind of expertise a speciality, say it's about a mindset. A mindset that hasn't been examined critically for a long time, with the result that there are lots of treasured beliefs out there that are effectively urban myths.

Come and listen to Per, and find out what he has found out.

It was Capt Chesley Sullenberger and First Officer Jeff Skiles that put the US Airways Airbus A320 safely down on the Hudson River, but it was the cabin crew that faced the job of getting the passengers out.

I spoke to two of Sullenberger's cabin crew, Donna Dent and Sheila Dail, at the Guildhall in the City of London, just before the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators annual awards banquet on 29 October.

The third cabin crew member, Doreen Welsh, could not attend that evening but she, seated as she was at the aft end of the cabin on that winter's day as the aircraft came to rest on the river, watched as the damaged tail slowly dipped, and the dark, freezing water began to flow into the cabin ahead of her. Dent and Dail were near the forward doors, and I will let them tell their story:

If you read Capt Chesley Sullenberger's just-published book "Highest Duty", you will understand that the success of his Hudson River ditching was no fluke.

Sullenberger is a thoughtful man. Everything he does is considered. He identifies objectives and works resolutely toward them, checking his progress as he goes. It's the way he approaches life and flying.

If that makes him sound like a cold fish, you'll find it's not so. His quiet love of flying and his clear recognition of what's important in life - and what's not - shine through the unfussy prose and the downplayed narrative of events. He treats people, colleagues and family alike, with respect.

He knows he is good at what he does and is proud of that, but he also knows he's good because he has worked hard at it. He may enjoy flying, but he takes the task seriously.

Being a really good aircraft commander and pilot is not something many people can achieve, so if you want to know what it takes, check here.

A few days ago, at the Guildhall in the City of London, just before the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators' awards banquet, I asked Capt Sullenberger briefly to describe what it was like when his Airbus A320's engines were stopped by a massive birdstrike (see video).

Listen to the detail of what he says, and you'll understand why this ditching worked and everybody survived. It was no accident.

Later that evening Capt Sullengberger, accompanied by two of his cabin crew on the day of the ditching, Donna Dent and Sheila Dail, accepted the Guild's Master's Medal on behalf of the Crew of Flight 1549.

You can find out what the cabin crew had to say about their experience of the event in my next blog entry.

This blog has, several times, addressed the subject of the contamination of bleed air supplied to aircraft cabins by toxic organophosphates. Now Susan Michaelis, already the author of the Contaminated Air Reference Manual, is appealing for those who have suffered - or believe they have done - from illness related to cabin air contamination, to get in touch with her. I'll leave the request in her hands:

"I am currently in the process of completing a PhD on the health and safety implications of  contaminated cabin air at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. As part of this I am undertaking 3 health surveys. While I have obtained considerable data I am keen to hear directly from pilots from around the globe falling into the following 3 categories: 1) BAe 146/ 146 RJ pilots both past and present; 2) medically retired or pilots who are/have suffered long-term ill health (permanently or for a period of time) after flying the B757; 3) pilots (colleagues or family may respond) who have experienced brain tumors, particularly those having flow short haul or aircraft up to B767 during their careers.

To date my research of past and present UK BAe 146 pilots has shown the following preliminary results: Out of approximately 300 pilots contacted, 87% were aware of the contaminated air; 59% had experienced some adverse symptoms that are commonly seen with such exposures; 27% reported medium to long-term 'Aerotoxic' type symptoms and approximately 10% appear to have been either ill health retired, suffered long-term ill health or were deceased appearing to be related to what many call 'Aerotoxic Syndrome'. A similar pattern is being seen internationally  and is supported by published literature from around the globe.

The data will all be de-identified and should contribute significant data to the knowledge we have on the cabin air issue. Anyone willing to participate in the basic survey should contact me as soon as possible at: susan@susanmichaelis.com."

Pilots are conducting a day of action to draw attention to their concern that a scientific study saying European flight time limitations (FTL) regulations are unsafe may be ignored.

The European Cockpit Association says the report, commissioned by the European Aviation Safety Agency, proves that existing regulations, at their extremes, are actually dangerous because of the length of duty periods that they allow.

It is a fact that fatigue in humans has the same effects on mental reasoning and physical coordination as alcohol does.

A pilot may not be able to get away with flying when drunk, but he/she can legally get away with flying when fatigued because it cannot be proven by blood testing. For the same reason, an airline cannot be legally challenged for rostering a pilot to fly when he/she is actually fatigued, as long as the airline abides by the flight time limitations (FTL) regulations. So FTL limits do matter, because they are the only defence against an airline that wishes to push its luck. Most don't, but many do.

 Fatigue was cited as a causal factor in this 24 November 2001 Crossair crash on approach to Zurich airport. Of the 33 on board, 24 were killed 

This is not, however, a matter to be argued in law courts, it's a matter of common sense. But in this case it's also a matter of science. The European Commission required EASA to submit the existing FTL rules to independent scientific analysis.

Obediently, EASA did just what it was told, and the scientists duly reported to the Agency.  

Now, the pilots fear, the report has been put on a shelf and it is being allowed to die.

Meanwhile the airlines have been frantically lobbying against any amendments to the FTLs that might take into account the scientific report's findings. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) claims the report is flawed. Well, it would, wouldn't it? Airlines have never liked FTLs of any kind.

EASA says the pilots are being premature, and that it has no intention of dropping its review of the FTLs, but that consultation with all parties followed by framing the final law will take until 2011.

The pilots are right to keep this process highly visible, however. They know that any proposed legislation against which there is a powerful lobby - like that of the AEA - has a habit of sinking without trace, especially when the issue is a human condition that cannot be measured after the event. 

BAE Systems, in partnership with Quest International, look as if they have come up with a brilliant solution to a real problem - contaminated cabin air.

But if you had asked BAE the day before the 15 September press conference that launched this new system (called AirManager) whether contaminated cabin air was a problem, they would have said it was not - or at least not one of any significance.

When I asked - at the press conference - why BAE had produced a solution for a problem that does not exist, the response was accurate and well-rehearsed.

Not the whole truth, maybe, but true. The new system, says BAE, will improve the quality of cabin air, and offering "improvement" is a sufficient incentive for installing this equipment. They have a "duty of care", the company said. How strange that, in previous discussion of this subject, that expression was not evoked.

If the companies' claims for the technical capabilities of AirManager are completely accurate, the improvement would indeed be dramatic.

Most of the media, following the press conference, have hyped one very important benefit: this system kills bacteria and viruses of all kinds.

With a swine flu pandemic predicted to sweep the Northern Hemisphere this winter, maybe an aeroplane kitted out with AirManager could be one of the safest places on the planet. 

The system, originally designed for medical premises, literally sterilises the air, and destroys odours too.

But what of toxic organophosphates that enter the cabin via the engine bleed air pressurisation system when engine oil seals fail?

It will deal with those, too, promises the system's inventor, David Hallam of Quest.

But BAE and the UK Government have told us that events involving oil-based organosphosphate fumes/mists getting into cabin air have been incredibly rare, and when they happen it is not at harmful levels.

I was informed at the press conference that it is more or less a coincidence that the first two aircraft types that have been fitted with this clever invention are the two that have suffered "fume events" more commonly than any others: the BAE Systems 146/Avro RJ series and the Boeing 757.

Maybe we should just be grateful that, finally, it looks as if a viable solution to contaminated cabin air has been found?

No, not good enough. The rights of crew and passengers whose health has already been ruined by neurotoxin fume events have to be properly recognised. The same treatment should apply to those whose health has yet to be damaged by flying in aircraft that suffer unfortunate fume events while their aircraft is awaiting fitment of AirManager (or any other worthy competitor that emerges).

Within a month or two of today, Professor Clement Furlong of the University of Washington, Seattle, will have identified the biomarkers that scientifically link sickness in passengers and crew to aircraft fume events. Then the industry's lawyers will no longer be able to rely on legal technicalities to avoid facing reality.

At least the launch of AirManager is a sign that reality is beginning to be faced in a practical and beneficial way.   

The following is a US-flavoured comment, but thoughtful and illuminating. It's penned by a senior US airline pilot who posts under the name Seaavi8tor, but he's real alright. Some of you will know him and his views.

You can read what he says here, but the following quote provides a flavour of his subject:

"In terms of inflation adjusted dollars, Airline pilots today earn less than half of what they did 35 years ago. The unit of work can be measured by flight hours, duty hours, hours away from home, Revenue Passenger Miles, Available Seat Miles, or most importantly, revenue generated per pilot."

His argument is that if you pay in peanuts you'll get monkeys, and this is what the airlines are inviting into their flightdecks.

I agree - many of them (not all) are doing just that. Especially American regionals, and look at what's been happening to their safety performance recently. Likewise US air taxis over a long period of time.

You'll find plenty in this blog on a related theme, including:

Don't marry an airline pilot (Part 2)

Piloting is going blue-collar

Spanish investigators have just released more information about the Spanair MD82 take-off accident at Madrid Barajas in August last year. If you remember, the crew attempted take off having omitted to set the flaps, and there was no take-off configuration warning to alert them to their mistake. The aircraft was destroyed and almost all on board were killed.

The new interim factual report makes it clear that three opportunities to prevent the tragedy were missed. Twice the crew were distracted during their pre take-off checks, and then there was a technical anomaly whereby tripping a circuit breaker to overcome a minor fault appears - unbeknown to the crew - to have disabled the take-off configuration warning.

In March we revealed a new NASA study that looked at more than 50 events in which crews had inadvertently taken off without setting flaps, and mostly they got away with it - just. NASA's purpose was to find out why it happened, and they did. In a Comment at the time, Flight International said: "Another of those uncanny studies has been produced. The type that produces a conclusion that - once you have read it - is so obvious that it's suddenly amazing the industry has not noticed why a clearly imperfect way of operating has been allowed to continue - since the Wright Brothers - to permit by default the fatal mistakes it does. Like unintended flapless take-offs."

What they "discovered" was that distractions and interruptions between pushback and take-off are legion. This, they say, should be taken seriously for what it is: a very uncongenial state of affairs during a safety-critical sector of the operation. There is no equivalent of the "sterile cockpit" pre take-off. The only reason why, presumably, we have ignored this fact is that it is far too obvious, and there is very little you can do about the R/T chatter on the ground frequency, that late clearance or departure amendment, the "cabin secure" report, etcetera ad infinitum.

But maybe there is. Just a new level of pilot awareness of the fact that the whole pre-take-off period is a minefield of distractions and - literally - an accident waiting to happen - would be a good start.

This subject is one of many that will be examined at the 2009 Flight International Crew Management Conference in London, 30 November-1 December, at which the theme is Pilot Best Practice .