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October 2009 Archives

Toxic cabin air appeal: has your health been affected?

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This blog has, several times, addressed the subject of the contamination of bleed air supplied to aircraft cabins by toxic organophosphates. Now Susan Michaelis, already the author of the Contaminated Air Reference Manual, is appealing for those who have suffered - or believe they have done - from illness related to cabin air contamination, to get in touch with her. I'll leave the request in her hands:

 

"I am currently in the process of completing a PhD on the health and safety implications of  contaminated cabin air at the University of New South Wales in Sydney. As part of this I am undertaking 3 health surveys. While I have obtained considerable data I am keen to hear directly from pilots from around the globe falling into the following 3 categories: 1) BAe 146/ 146 RJ pilots both past and present; 2) medically retired or pilots who are/have suffered long-term ill health (permanently or for a period of time) after flying the B757; 3) pilots (colleagues or family may respond) who have experienced brain tumors, particularly those having flow short haul or aircraft up to B767 during their careers.

 

To date my research of past and present UK BAe 146 pilots has shown the following preliminary results: Out of approximately 300 pilots contacted, 87% were aware of the contaminated air; 59% had experienced some adverse symptoms that are commonly seen with such exposures; 27% reported medium to long-term 'Aerotoxic' type symptoms and approximately 10% appear to have been either ill health retired, suffered long-term ill health or were deceased appearing to be related to what many call 'Aerotoxic Syndrome'. A similar pattern is being seen internationally  and is supported by published literature from around the globe.

 

The data will all be de-identified and should contribute significant data to the knowledge we have on the cabin air issue. Anyone willing to participate in the basic survey should contact me as soon as possible at: susan@susanmichaelis.com."

Helicopters can escape their niche

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Safety has been - and still is - a problem for helicopters.

It may be the roles they perform as much as their inherent instability and mechanical complexity, but those factors are beginning to sound like excuses for not changing anything.

Actually, helicopters don't have to continue to be the poor relations of fixed-wing aircraft, with safety worries consigning them to niche applications. Because significant safety performance improvement is definitely achievable.

That much is clear from the impressive quantity and quality of work done on rotary-wing safety data analysis by the International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST) between the previous International Helicopter Safety Symposium in 2007 and the one I attended in Montreal last week.

IHSS 2009 018.jpg

The IHSS, 28 Sept - 1 October 2009, the final afternoon

Under the IHST programme, set up in 2005, painstaking study and analysis intended to establish the patterns of circumstances behind thousands of helicopter accidents, has been carried out in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Europe (coordinated by EASA), India, New Zealand, South Africa, UK, USA and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. It is fascinating - although not altogether surprising - to discover, using hard data unsullied by preconceptions, that patterns repeat all over the world. Helicopters crash for the same reasons everywhere. Pilots make the same mistakes or misjudgements, and even the league tables prioritising the factors behind accidents echo each other almost perfectly in countries on opposite sides of the planet.

The facts and wisdom in one accident report normally have little effect on the way the world aviates. But distilled wisdom from thousands of them has real power.

It may be coincidence that global helicopter safety has begun to improve since 2005 for the first time in a generation, because it was not until 2007 that active measures began to emanate from the IHST's findings. But maybe it is connected, just by the fact that the work that the IHST began four years ago created awareness of what could be achieved, and perhaps it sowed the early seeds of a new determination to improve.

This potential energy, however, has to be channelled and harnessed effectively, and that is what regional Joint Helicopter Safety Implementation Teams all over the world, under the IHST, are poised to do.

If there are any in the helicopter industry - from manufacturers to operators - who think they need take no part in this, they should think again. World safety standards and people's expectations are rising inexorably, but until the IHST came along in 2005 the rotary-wing industry's safety record had stagnated nearly 30 years ago. Unless helicopter safety improves, rotorcraft travel will not reach its real potential. It will remain a niche activity, shunned wherever there is an alternative.

Those who use helicopter services have power. For example hospitals that contract for helicopter emergency medical services have a duty to specify the operational standards, capability and equipment they expect and not to settle for less, as do companies that hire helicopters for business travel. Oil companies like Exxon, for example, now specify that any offshore oil support operator they contract must operate a safety management system.

Finally, operators large and small will find, if they examine the free toolkits available from the IHST, that the processes involved in becoming safer - scaled according to the size of the company - are relatively easy to apply.

They are also good for business and the bottom line; unlike continuing to be a relatively high risk organisation in the eyes of potential customers, insurers, and regulators.

Pilot fatigue: the invisible killer is paraded for all to see

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Pilots are conducting a day of action to draw attention to their concern that a scientific study saying European flight time limitations (FTL) regulations are unsafe may be ignored.

The European Cockpit Association says the report, commissioned by the European Aviation Safety Agency, proves that existing regulations, at their extremes, are actually dangerous because of the length of duty periods that they allow.

It is a fact that fatigue in humans has the same effects on mental reasoning and physical coordination as alcohol does.

A pilot may not be able to get away with flying when drunk, but he/she can legally get away with flying when fatigued because it cannot be proven by blood testing. For the same reason, an airline cannot be legally challenged for rostering a pilot to fly when he/she is actually fatigued, as long as the airline abides by the flight time limitations (FTL) regulations. So FTL limits do matter, because they are the only defence against an airline that wishes to push its luck. Most don't, but many do.

Crossair-crash.jpg Fatigue was cited as a causal factor in this 24 November 2001 Crossair crash on approach to Zurich airport. Of the 33 on board, 24 were killed 

 

This is not, however, a matter to be argued in law courts, it's a matter of common sense. But in this case it's also a matter of science. The European Commission required EASA to submit the existing FTL rules to independent scientific analysis.

Obediently, EASA did just what it was told, and the scientists duly reported to the Agency.  

Now, the pilots fear, the report has been put on a shelf and it is being allowed to die.

Meanwhile the airlines have been frantically lobbying against any amendments to the FTLs that might take into account the scientific report's findings. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) claims the report is flawed. Well, it would, wouldn't it? Airlines have never liked FTLs of any kind.

EASA says the pilots are being premature, and that it has no intention of dropping its review of the FTLs, but that consultation with all parties followed by framing the final law will take until 2011.

The pilots are right to keep this process highly visible, however. They know that any proposed legislation against which there is a powerful lobby - like that of the AEA - has a habit of sinking without trace, especially when the issue is a human condition that cannot be measured after the event.