William Langewiesche's book "Fly By Wire" is about the 'miracle on the Hudson' - the successful ditching in the river of a US Airways Airbus A320 commanded by Capt Chesley Sullenberger with Jeffrey Skiles as his copilot.
For me the book's fascination was the author's view on what being a modern airline pilot is all about. Langiewische is an experienced pilot himself, and I reckon he knows what the questions are, but I'm not sure about all his answers.
Langewiesche documents the technical and operational details of the event, the aeroplane, and the historical context well.
His attitude to the piloting profession is somewhat schizophrenic. He clearly admires the skill, knowledge and self-discipline that made Sullenberger the pilot he is, and made the ditching the success it was.
But, he argues, most pilots are not - and can never be - Sullenberger's equal. Even more significantly, he suggests that they no longer need to be. Effectively, he seems to be saying, Sullenberger was overqualified.
Langewiesche is fascinated and impressed by the design philosophy of the A320, and clearly admires the man behind it - the now-retired aeronautical engineer and test pilot Bernard Ziegler - and examines both man and aeroplane in some depth.
Zeigler and the A320 are as much Hudson Heroes as Sullenberger is, Langiewische argues.
For a taste of what I'm getting at, try these quotes:
The A320 is: "...the world's first semi-robotic airliner".
Airline piloting today is: "a profession already in decline".
The A320 has to be designed like it is, Langewiesch argues, because most pilots are much more likely to screw up dangerously, whether in a Boeing or an Airbus, than the automated systems are to fail in a way that matters. He gives examples of specific accidents involving older, traditionally controlled Boeings which would almost certainly not have happened if the aircraft had been a fly-by-wire Airbus.
For an aviator this can be inflammatory stuff. Many aviators tend to be in the Airbus or the Boeing camp. I'm not in either one. Such problems as modern pilots face will certainly be more effectively managed in the latest Airbuses and Boeings than in anything that preceded them.
Where I diverge from Langewiesche's thesis [my interpretation of it] is that I believe, for a long time to come, pilots of Sullenberger's quality are actually still needed when things go wrong. Langewiesche seems to have been seduced by the impressive quality of today's airliner engineering, and the fact that they will hardly ever go wrong (the latter is true).
But the key to Sullenberger's quality is not just his thorough training (pre-military, military, academic and airline), it is his thoughtful personality, his exacting approach to the disciplines of his trade, and his sense of duty. His co-written book, "Highest Duty", is not exactly a racy read, but he's not a racy man.
The dichotomy, which I think is what Langewiesche struggles with - and so do I, is that things today so rarely go wrong, and ordinary pilots cope most of the time when they do, so it seems a waste of resources to train pilots up to the Sullenberger level, even if the candidate pilot is potentially the right stuff in the first place.
That, of course, is the dichotomy the airlines struggle with. I myself have argued that airline piloting is, by default, becoming a blue-collar job.
But things on aeroplanes WILL definitely go wrong in future - if rarely. And when they do, I know what kind of aircraft commander I want on the flight deck.
on July 16, 2011 11:18 PM | Reply
Great Post!
I admire your work, the Airbus, and Fly by Wire. I had a similar reaction to the latter.
Cheers,
Chris
on July 17, 2011 8:44 AM | Reply
David, I know this isn't entirely relevant, but maybe you can clrify a point for me:
Is the number of jet airliners with engines beneath the winga that have been successfully ditched exactly one (Capt Sullenberger's)? I can't remember hearing of any other.
['Successfully' means 'with 75% or more survivors', although I think 50% would probably give the same answer]
Regards
Mike
on July 18, 2011 5:26 AM | Reply
I'm getting deja-vu about this article; must have read a similar discussion before. The thing with relying upon the automation is that the designers and programmers have to anticipate all possible circumstances, including instrumentation failures. It seems an automated response alone would not have fared very well with the A330 AF 447 incident. Not that the crew was successful either, but still...
on July 18, 2011 11:00 PM | Reply
My working collar is white, be I PF or PNF/PM. Therefore, I’ve always considered PF/PNF-PM piloting a tough school of a sweated collar, blue, white or none and a furrowed sweat beaded brow, honestly earned and attained.
David L, yourself, confessedly, being in neither the Airbus/Boeing camp “(I’m not in either one)”, have argued that “airline piloting is, by default, becoming a blue-collar job”, I AGREE. I agree, that is, if s/he is a Boeing pilot. If s/he is an Airbus FBW pilot, they are distinctly “white-collar”, with a demonstrated attendant actuarial hull-loss rate.
Take AF-447-again, like a white collar Lehmann Bros. investment bankster, the FO PF applied continual aft stick leverage, without any lift equity on the MAC balance sheet remaining, but a lift deficit debt spiral. He used up all his altitude insurance liquidity in the process without really trying to deleverage his balance sheet, in fact, quite the contrary, he tried in vain to borrow more lift, while being deeply in the red. Then, without really understanding what he was doing, he went further into the red ,plunging into the drink way over his head and broke even in the deep black, but too late for all of his wiped out shareholders and stakeholders.
Sully/Skiles are the CRM exceptions that make the aggregate rule. Take a side, from your experience. I have flown Boeing in practice, Airbus in sim and default to Boeing. I find Boeing to be more tolerant of tweaking and twitching, intentional or not. The B-787 will be similarly foolproof, following Boeing’s tradition.
As the son of “Stick and Rudder” Wolf, William Langewiesche has a lot of credit in the bank, even before his licenced demonstrated skill in his own name. And Langy calls Sully a Hudson hero ?, Sully and Wolf would surely disagree in embarrassment. Sully is, as you allude, and in my view too, heroic in his thoughtful erudition and humour too. That confirms my view of biological being FL superior to chronological age, all people age differently, Sully is a credit to his middle age. Professional will suffice. Hero has been devalued to hyperinflation, these days , thanks William !. But alas, William, has since 2006 been “international correspondent for Vanity Fair magazine”, devaluing his objective-professional credentials. The vain is the villain, the fair is the hero. In Vanity Fair, the twain have and never shall meet, QED! Considering the ultimate Papa Rupert Hosni Muberdoch and Baby Doch meltdown and considering just how much more approbrium he can take. Sully, is I agree, the example to follow.
For me, Sully, is like BA-038’s Peter Burkill, not specifically heroic, but simply being thoroughly professional. After all, being a hero is to choose to put yourself in danger for the sake of others. Sully and Burkill had no choice.
Lastly consider the brown collars, namely UPS and Asiana pilots. While I am no sartorial fashionista per se, those 2 uniforms in general isolation would justify individual pilot strike action in particular. Words cannot describe either of these clothing exhibits. In general they would justify extra-judicial particular arrest by the fashion police, without habeas corpus. Unlike Asiana, UPS has the mitigating defense of mostly flying by night.
Is not the great aspiration of humanity to be born a true blue collar, aspire to be a great white and be an honest T-shirt , without a collar to be collared or nicked ?
on July 19, 2011 9:17 PM | Reply
I disagree that the Airbus fly by wire require no more than ordinary piloting skills. The aircraft is three different aircraft in one airframe. In normal law my granny could fly it.In alternate law the 320 has a huge roll rate and is quite twitchy.In direct law it is a unconventional aircraft with no feel at all and is very difficult. The trouble is that you do not see these other hidden personalities very often apart from the simulator where the handling characteristics are less than realistic. I am sure that a geek in TLS will have worked out the odds of a less than optimum crew ending up with a direct law aircraft trying to do a non prcision approach into some dark hole in the early hours of the morning but Airbus aircraft only seeem to have a ten year life before they start falling apart. It will happen and they will be left to cope the best they can with their atrophied hand flying skills(if they ever existed). The trouble is the beancounters who decide these operations whereby an FO may only have 200+ hours will not be there to witness it and will blame pilots. Handfly as often as you can you may need it one day
on July 21, 2011 4:36 PM | Reply
How many Blue Collar workers have to pay for their training, and in a depressingly increasing number of cases, have to pay an airline for their first 'job' or internship (presumably in the place of a properly paid and qualified professional white collar worker)? A profession on short final for a major crash more like!
on July 21, 2011 5:02 PM | Reply
https://www.gapan.org/press-pages/press-releases/status-of-professional-pilots/
Some of you have heard or read this speech elsewhere, but I think that it is deserving of wider audience.
on July 21, 2011 5:18 PM | Reply
"Effectively, he seems to be saying, Sullenberger was overqualified."
I am sure all the passengers that escaped from the ditching on the Hudson would NOT share that view!
I'd rather the crew were overqualified than underqualified - what a ridiculous statement to make.
Langewiesche is obviously one of these software engineering types who think flying can be fully automated - how wrong can you be?
on July 21, 2011 5:32 PM | Reply
"Effectively, he seems to be saying, Sullenberger was overqualified."
To be fair to Langewische, he didn't say that. It was my interpretation of his attitude that, now aeroplanes are so much smarter than they used to be, pilots don't have to be so good.
I think he's right about day-to-day flying, but when things go pear-shaped, pilots have to be just as smart as they ever did.
on July 21, 2011 5:46 PM | Reply
David, I take you point but I see the "reliability" and the increased use of automation as a reason for ensuring even more than before that pilots are trained and practised in basic flying skills.
Although all the facts have yet to be published, the accident to AF447 over the Atlantic is an example of what can happen - would more "qualified and trained" pilots have prevented that accident?
on July 27, 2011 8:45 PM | Reply
In the past the twin engined adage was "upon engine failure, the good engine will take you to the scene of the crash". Today we have "smarter" aeroplanes but that same automation takes under-experienced pilots (and I mean had flying hours not cruise pilot hours) subtly to the point of an accident and then disengages the automatics for them to sort out. e.g:
B737 Bournemouth - ILS where auto-throttle disengaged - Stall
B737 Schipol - Stall
AF447 - Deep Stall
The "approved" low hour pilot training schools with their exclusive airline deals (many experienced EU pilots cannot get a look in) share the blame for a lack of fundamental piloting skills in the new generation of pilots. I spoke with an A321 FO the other day who got top marks at such a school - yet he had no clue to what coffin corner or mach buffet really was or why you shouldn't climb too high too early.
Most front end crews do not seems to understand stall recovery - the schools taught them they could simply hold attitude and power out of it! Thrust is not a stall recovery action (it is part of a wind-shear recovery technique) and all FAR23/JAR23 machines need active fwd control column to un-stall the wing before adding thrust. With AF447 there seems to have been no appreciation of Flight path vector (significant nose down was needed to reduce AoA along with idle thrust to recover fm this deep stall) but the aircraft was kept with a slightly nose high attitude throughout the stall.
At least Ryan Air pilots are now joining REPA in droves. Without fundamental change the bean counters will loose a lot more money than they are currently saving (through P2F and low paid cadet schemes) when things do go wrong with these electric jets.
The fact that Flight Global now takes advertising revenue from a company that charges 35,000 Euros for 500h of "line training" on an A320 is part of the problem the industry is in decline and it's pilots are being de-valued.