June 2012 Archives

London's only commercial helicopter landing site, on the Thames south bank at Battersea, is preparing for unprecedented - but tightly organised - traffic flows during the Olympic Games.

Now called the Barclays London Heliport (BLH), it's been there since 1959, just upstream of Battersea Bridge, looking across the river to Chelsea Harbour. 

London does't exactly have a love affair with helicopters. No other site in the city has been allowed to compete with Battersea since the floating landing site on the north bank at Trigg Lane in the City of London was closed in 1985. 

In fact when the UK was bidding for the Olympics, it was made clear from the start that, for environmental reasons, the Olympic Park was not going to have helicopter access. And it doesn't.

What's more, people who charter helicopters to get to London at the time of the Olympics will not be permitted to follow the river eastward even to look at the Park from above. For security reasons no air movements will be allowed downstream (east) of Battersea Bridge, which you can see in the picture (above).

Operators wanting to access BLH during the Games have to be registered as known users by 1 July, and book slots with the heliport. About 130 movements - over and above normal traffic (which maxes out at 22 an hour) - are already booked, and there will be more. Operators familiar with Battersea will know that, even under normal conditions, VFR routeings in and out are strictly enforced, and this more than ever will be the case, because BLH is in the Olympic Prohibited Zone (see chart)

"Prohibited" is a misnomer, since operations with a booked slot and a flight plan pre-clearance can use the airspace on strict routeings.

So when Olympic-bound passengers fly into BLH from business airports like Biggin Hill, Cambridge, Farnborough or Oxford, what next? Because Battersea is well to the west of London's West End, and the Olympic Park is well to the east of the City of London, on the River Lea just south of Hackney Marshes.

Well, it's either a limo with no traffic privileges, or a charterable river taxi. A new company called Water Chariots has just set up to offer whatever level of luxury you have in mind.

It will not be a fast journey to the Olympic Park - 90min along the Thames and then up the River Lea - but certainly a low-stress way of travelling and a great way to see London's riversides.

Air France 447 was an example, as was the Colgan Air Dash 8 stalling event at Buffalo and the recent incident in which an Air Canada pilot who had just woken over-reacted to the presence of nearby traffic that was not a threat.

For lack of another explanation, the current assumption is that modern flight is more rarely punctuated by the unexpected than it used to be, so pilots are more easily startled.

North Sea oil support helicopter pilots seem to be made of sterner stuff.

Consider the May ditching of a Bond Offshore Helicopters EC225LP Super Puma. 

It was the right decision, and completely successful, despite the fact that the crew were suddenly bombarded with a plethora of strident warnings and alerts while en route from Aberdeen to the Maersk Resilient platform.

This, according to a UK Air Accident Investigation Branch special bulletin, is what the crew faced "almost simultaneously" while while in the cruise at 3,000ft:

WARN red light and aural gong

MGB.P caption illuminates on the central warning panel (pressure drop in main gear box oil distribution manifold)

CAUT amber light

XMSN caption illuminates on the CWP (transmission)  

M.P and S/B.P illuminates on the vehicle monitoring system (oil pressure drop in both main and standby lubrication system)

SHOT illuminated on the MGB control panel (alert to operate the emergency lubrication system)

Zero indication on the MGB oil pressure gauge

CHIP illuminates on the VHM

MGB oil temperature starts to increase

Startled? I would be.

Over to the AAIB's account:

"The commander assumed control of the helicopter, reduced speed toward 80kt IAS, turned back toward the coast and initiated a descent. The crew activated the emergency lubrication system."

But their problems are not over. As the aircraft settles into the descent...

MGB EMLUBE illuminates on the CWP (the emergency MGB lubrication system had failed, for which the drill is to land immediately)

Considering that all 16 people on board a Bond AS332L2 Super Puma died in April 2009 when the MGB failed without warning and the rotor head separated, the crew could have been forgiven for having fairly high adrenaline levels.

AAIB: "The commander briefed the passengers and carried out a controlled ditching."

Easy.

I certainly hope that, when the evidence comes out, there are no signs that Nigeria, which has made massive strides in safety oversight improvement in the last six years, is recessing to bad old ways.

At present there is no evidence that this is so. No matter how good safety oversight in a country might be, accidents can still happen.

For an update on the circumstances surrounding the Dana Air crash, watch this short video: