In the context of this accident it is quite striking and I think it is well worth a read. It describes the difference between the trim system in an aircraft like a 737 – which has an “all trimming tailplane” – and the type found in a basic training aircraft such as the PA28 or C150. The crucial distinction is that the in the 737 the stick must return to the neutral position after re-trimming in order to prevent over-controlling and a potential departure from the normal flight envelope.

Could it be the case that during this go around in night IMC with the trim set to a value suitable for the approach (possibly even increased nose up setting used in the advanced stages of a fail passive approach), the pilot flying pushed forward to prevent excessive nose-up in the go around manoeuvre, and simultaneously trimmed forward, believing (incorrectly) that the nose-forward trim would relieve the load on the control wheel? Combined with disorientation, task saturation in the go around, and fatigue, it is not hard to imagine that this situation went unchecked and the combined forward stick force and forward trimming sent the aircraft into an undesired nose down pitch attitude.

The article cited above mentions that, at the time of writing, there were no known accidents caused by this lack of full understanding between the differences in trimming a conventional stabilizer vs an all moving tailplane. Could this be one such accident?

A deep thank you. I know that you have to tread carefully as Ryanair are suing everyone and anyone at the moment who say anything negative about them, so I think it is very brave to have written such an utterly accurate article in every respect. A brilliant piece.

All we ask is for our voice to be heard and not have to live in fear. Fear of the taxman, fear of the company culture, fear of speaking out.

Respectfully,

A Ryanair Captain

Experience from countries that used EU-OPS subpart Q, shows, that airlines didn’t follow the spirit of the rules, in fact they tried not to regard the rules as a limit but rather as a target value. Which lead to quite unsafe rosters. It would be extremely surprising if airlines now change their behavior all of a sudden in that regard.

Although a FRMS sounds a nice thing in theory, it is easily manipulated. Wouldn’t it be easier to just implement the rules as advised by the EASAs FTL study (Moebus-Report)?

I have to admit i’m extremely skeptical about the independence of the EASA, it seems that it is deeply entrenched into the airlines and follows very closely their recommendations.

http://www.egliair.com/DEAH%20Acft%20Info.html

http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/07/us/alaska-volcano-rescue/index.html

I do not know if the bird is still up there…..

Clearly the Airworthiness Certification or Continued Airworthiness Requirements are lacking and the latest accident suggests that human factors risks of whatever kind have not been adequately managed. So the enquiries need to make a top to bottom examination of the ‘offshore helicopter’ part of the aviation industry and its management.

It also seems to me that there may be too many ‘fingers in the pie’, with industry, operator and regulator enquiries taking place, in addition to the statutory Fatal Accident Enquiry and AAIB Investigation. In the first named three there is a danger of replication of effort and dilution of conclusion unless they are well coordinated.