Archives

Recent Assets

  • ITAF_QRA.jpg
  • Hawk KSA 560.jpg
  • 7117003209_0a89e5b7fa_h.jpg
  • 7176702010_df702a73fc_b.jpg
  • Voyager.jpg
  • Voyager 560.jpg
  • Grizzly 560.jpg
  • MSN2 560.jpg
  • 111207-F-AQ406-219WICf22.jpg
  • 120510-F-AD344-089t6vance.jpg

October 2007 Archives

It's arguable that no two companies in the US defense industry compete as fiercely as General Atomics, which builds the Predator, and Northrop Grumman, which makes the Global Hawk.

That's why this obviously mistaken contract award notice today by the US Department of Defense is so beautifully ironic, worthy of my newly-created Typo of the Year trophy. Behold:

General Atomics of San Diego, Calif. is being awarded contract modification for $64,500,000. This action provides for Engineering, manufacturing and development activities in support of the Global Hawk Program. At this time $4,000,000 has been obligated. 303 AESG/PK, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio is the contracting activity (F33657-01-C-4600, P00222).

Er, that's Northrop Grumman, right?

You knew this would happen eventually: The F-22's program acquisition cost and its numerical designation are roughly in synch.

The US Air Force wants to extend the F-22 production line one year past its scheduled closure date at the end of fiscal year 2010.

I asked the USAF to tell me how much it would cost. One week later, the response is: $526 million in fiscal year 2009 and $3.892 billion in fiscal year 2010.

That adds up to $4.418 billion for 20 aircraft, or exactly $220.9 million per copy, including spares, overhead, etc.

I also think it's interesting that the F-22 and the C-17 each cost about $220 million.

Last week, I speculated on this blog that Airbus may use a KC-X contract win to shift more commercial aircraft assembly operations from Toulouse to Mobile, Alabama.

Since I never really know if I'm making a good guess or just talking crazy, it's nice to see more knowledgable experts saying basically the same thing.

To wit: aerospace analyst Scott Hamilton wrote yesterday on his excellent online newsletter:

If Northrop gets the KC-30 contract, Airbus can start producing the A330- 200F in Mobile (AL), right alongside the KC-30. Given the weakness of the US dollar, Airbus badly needs to shift production to a dollar-based cost center. The KC-30 production line in Mobile would enable this for the A330 freighter, which proved a popular this year for sales. Would such a US line open the way for other Airbus products to be produced here? This may sound far-fetched, but the foot-in-the-door may lead the way.

Dassault's Rafale sales campaigns have failed in Korea, Singapore and now Morocco. Some have accused the Rafale's US competitors of cheating. Some have blamed the lack of an active array radar. Others have claimed Dassault and the French government worked at cross-purposes.

Me? I blame the cheesy propaganda video.

Who cares if the US Air Force prefers to call cyberspace a "domain", as in a new battlespace on par with air, land and sea?

It's not an insignificant question, and cheers to Bettina Chavanne at the Ares blog for enlightening us with an email from an anonymous US Air Force officer who's not afraid to commit the professional military sin of doctrinal heresy.

The USAF position that cyberspace must be defended like national territory is worthy of a robust debate, and Bettina's post is as good a place as any to start the conversation. Here's an excerpt, but go read the full email:

"There are a number of real issues that need to be addressed. Should you use the armed forces to respond to one computer hacker in Canada or China? What is the threshold for national interest? Are coordinated attacks on networks worthy of armed forces retaliation?"

Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and the Dubai Air Show are starting to go together like Thanksgiving and turkey (as in, the bird that goes, "gobbledy-gobbledy"; not the country that goes, "What Armenian genocide?").

It was conveniently during the last Dubai Air Show in 2005 that THAAD finally started to atone for 13 years of failure to score a highly-publicized flight test intercept. I happened to be in a Lockheed press conference at the show when news of the intercept was announced. The sigh of relief from Lockheed's executives was palpably thunderous.

With the mid-east defense chiefs turning their spending priorities from massive fighter acquisitions to missile defense (paging Mr. Ahmadinejad!), it's no surprise that Lockheed's latest flight test was staged early this morning within a couple weeks of the big show.

It's your tax money, so you might as well enjoy the pretty picture:

thaadtest.jpg

The already dubious world of international fighter sales has made some geo-political somersaults this week.

Most significant are reports from Russia and Israel that China is selling 24 J-10 fighters to Iran. This comes after months of speculation that Iran was negotiating a whopper deal to buy 250 Su-30s from Russia. The term "Iranian air defense" suddenly doesn't sound so silly anymore.

Still interesting, but of lesser strategic value, are reports that Korea has decided to skip over a second batch of F-15s in favor of buying a fifth-generation fighter, presumably such as F-22 or F-35. If I read the Pacific Rim geo-political tea leaves correctly, this means Japan and China now must get their hands on a fifth-generation fighter, too. Memo to Tokyo's arms buyers: beers are on Lockheed Martin's tab for the next five years.

From the can-you-believe-it file, France has somehow found a way to lose a gimme contract for Rafale fighters from Morocco, which has reportedly decided to buy the Lockheed Martin F-16. The deal may help to console Lockheed executives who last week lost Thailand as a loyal fighter customer to Sweden's Gripen.

Finally, you can read my story next week in Flight International about the US Air Force's new proposal to keep the F-22 production line alive for at least one more year. The implications for the F-35 budget in 2010 could be profound.

That's one heck of a week in the fighter business.

HPM bombs will join the US Air Force's regular munition inventory after 2012.

Read the full briefing here or just this chart.

hpmchart.JPG

If you make military aircraft for a US customer for a living, you're in for a rough decade.

Military spending on new aircraft will decline from $55 billion in FY 2008 to $48 billion in FY 2018 (using constant dollars).

To put that in perspective, military spending has doubled during the previous decade. So if you think the big defense contractors are whiny now, well ...

As you can probably tell, I just got my hands on the military aircraft forecast presented at last week's GEIA 2007 Vision Conference. GEIA's panel of industry experts releases the annual forecast every year. (Yes, I am aware that many industry insiders don't exactly live by GEIA's predictions, but this blog takes what it can get!)

Here's a list of the other big surprises in the GEIA forecast:

1. On a chart of "near-term opportunities", this line is at the bottom: "F-22A Extension (20 a/c)". Apparently at least one panel of industry experts is already counting on the USAF to seek new funds in the FY 09 budget to extend the F-22 production line.

2. Another near-term opportunity is the $1 billion "Common Vertical Lift Support Platform", which will be the next big rotorcraft industry competition after CSAR-X is finally (fingers-crossed) awarded in 2008. That will shortly be followed by the $2 billion Joint Heavy Lift requirement (think: A400M-sized helicopter).

3. Still another line predicts a near-term opportunity for a C-17 extension of between 10-30 aircraft worth between $2 billion to $6 billion. Sharpen your knives, Boeing.

4. "B-52 re-engining", that Holy Grail of the bomber community, is listed optimistically as a mid-term opportunity.

5. A requirement for a "future jet trainer" may emerge around 2015. First time I've heard about this one.

6. F-22 extension and C-17 extension re-appear as mid-term opportunities, too, meaning industry's forecasters are placing at least even bets on these two programs surviving for several years after the currently scheduled demise. Somewhere, Barry McCaffrey is smiling (see next post).


I've decided to upload the McCaffrey memo as great comments keep coming in from Sunday night's post on this blog.

Download the document here: Download file

And here's some of those great comments.

Steeljaw Scribe wrote:

Interesting juxtaposition between this memo of "imperatives" and the discussions going on here and here over the newly released Maritime Strategy.

The former reads as little more than an enhanced shopping list whilst commentaries on the latter bemoan (among other things)the fact that force structure was "punted" down the road...

J. wrote:

I'll grant him the points on C17 airlift and the F22 IF the Air Force drops the C5 modernization funds and the F35 development, as well as starting to phase out the F15/F18 varients. Disagree on the UAVs, the Army should retain tactical UAVs - can't count on the AF priorities. As far as supporting the AF Airborne Laser, HA! It's reaching too far with immature technology, it needs to go.

B.Smitty wrote:

The Air Force needs a "volume" tactical aircraft. Right now, that aircraft is the F-16. They want the F-35 to take its place.

We can't just cancel the F-35 without finding a "volume" replacement.

Posted by B.Smitty | October 23, 2007 2:41 AM

HerkEng wrote:

This sounds like something Carlo Kopp would be writing...if he were in the US

Lugo wrote:

Calling the F-22 "long range" is simply fatuous.

Northrop Grumman's latest strike in the KC-X tanker propaganda war hit my email inbox today. The email contained a letter signed by five southern governors, and it was addressed to President George W. Bush.

The contents of the letter could be significant, despite its many inaccurate claims. The letter states:

"This particular procurement has a substantial relevance for states in the south."

Okay, no argument there.

"For the first time in our nation's history, a partnership of companies has decided to source, assemble and modify and aircraft for the United States Air Force in our region."

Not so fast. Georgia has Lockheed Martin in Marietta and Gulfstream in Savannah. Texas has both Lockheed Martin and Bell Helicopter in Fort Worth, Raytheon in McKinney, L-3 Communications in Waco and Greenville and American Eurocopter in Arlington. Mississippi has EADS and Eurocopter in Colombus and Northrop Grumman teamed up with Aurora Flight Sciences across the street. Florida has Northrop Grumman in Jacksonville and Melbourne, and Crestview Aerospace in Crestview, and is likely to attract both Embraer and L-3 to Jacksonville.

Did I mention Piper Aircraft in Vera Beach, Florida?

The south hasn't exactly been ignored by Big Aerospace. Only southern California and the greater Seattle area can stake a richer historical claim to the aerospace industry than the former confederate south.

"The South has an emerging aerospace industry, but no individual state in our region has anything that remotely comapres to the breadth, depth and significance of the aerospace industry of the Pacific Northwest."

Sure, Georgia and Texas don't build half of the world's annual output of airliners, but they do produce a huge and very, very influential share of the world's fighters, airlifters and business jets.

"Once this production capacity is established in our region, a new aerospace corridor will form to support this work and thousands of jobs will be created across the southern United States."

Even if Northrop Grumman wins the contract, the south's annual industrial output will rise by whatever amount it takes to assemble a maximum of 15 aircraft, of which about 40% is sourced from overseas.

So why do the governors make such extravagant claims?

My only guess is that Airbus has much larger plans for manufacturing jets in the southern US states, and these five southern governors know it, or at least have their fingers-crossed. Other European aerospace manufacturers have moved wholesale production to the US over the last 10 years, so why couldn't Airbus find more work for the south's non-unionized labor force than just assembling tankers?

The letter is signed by Bob Riley, of Alabama; Haley Barbour, of Mississippi; Phil Bredesen, of Tennessee; Timothy Kaine, of Virginia and Joe Manchin of West Virginia.

The US Air Force has found a strategic best friend in Barry McCaffrey, the influential retired Army general and outspoken Rumsfeld critic who is now officially employed as an adjunct professor at West Point.

After getting a whirlwind tour of backgrounders with air force four stars and dog-and-pony technology shows back in August, McCaffrey last week penned an extraordinary memo detailing seven new air power "imperatives".

These imperatives, if followed, would make some of the USAF's wildest modernization dreams come true.

According to McCaffrey, the USAF needs to:

1. Buy 350 F-22s, or about twice the 185 currently under contract

2. Buy more than 600 C-17s, or more than thrice the 190 currently on contract

3. Replace the "vulnerable" and "inadequate" B-2 with a next-generation bomber

4. Retire the entire C-5 fleet

5. Ditch the C-130 as a Future Combat Systems transport

6. And, oh yeah, give the USAF full control of all UAVs in the battlespace

McCaffrey's memo was distributed to his West Point buddies, but was quickly circulated and the memo's quotes about Iraq were the subject of a column last week by veteran military reporter Joey Galloway.

Read McCaffrey's seven imperatives by clicking on the link below.

Let the record show that I have nothing against Bridgeport, West Virginia.

I'm sure many defense contractors would make Bridgeport home even if outspoken and powerful Senator Robert Byrd was not a key member the defense appropriations committee. Never underestimate the industrial appeal of the plainly-but-aptly nicknamed "Mountain State".

So I'm not surprised that the Northrop Grumman/EADS North America KC-30 team would choose Bridgeport to build a very sophisticated refuelling boom, if they win the $40 billion KC-X contract. The announcement was released at 9 am.

But I am a little surprised because Northrop told me in an on the record interview four weeks ago that they had selected Colombia, South Carolina -- not Bridgeport. After the interview, they asked me to keep that quiet until it was announced, and I complied because -- frankly -- it wasn't an important news story for my purposes anyway.

We may never find out what happened during the intervening four weeks that caused Northrop and EADS to de-select Colombia and make Bridgeport the proud home of a refuelling boom manufacturing facillity.

But it sure does make me curious.

I'm stuck in Seattle this week while the real aerospace action is in Seoul, which is hosting its biannual air show.

I've picked up on two news stories from the show: 1. KAI and Eurocopter unveiled a new utility helicopter, but, alas, haven't found any photos. 2. The Korean Minister of Defense announced that his country has set a goal to become the world's 10th largest arms exporter by 2020. (Take that ... er, Poland! Actually, I have no idea where South Korea ranks now on the list or who's currently in 10th, but Poland is as good a guess as any, I hope.)

For your viewing enjoyment, here's some photos of the show:

seoul_a37b.jpg

seoult50.jpg

seoul_f4e.jpg

Click here to read my story this morning about the USAF's interest in the A380 as an Air Force One and C-5 replacement.

I started chasing this story after Boeing told me they expect the US Air Force to replace the 20-year-old Air Force One fleet in the next few years.

As implausible as the A380's candidacy seemed to me at the time, I also knew that the USAF is no longer in a position to sole-source contracts for Boeing commercial aircraft.

I also realized that the President will eventually be flying an Italian-British helicopter, and I remembered how deeply implausible that seemed only three years ago.

So it seemed clear that the only two real competitors to replace the 747-200 are the 747-8 and, of course, the A380. It was just a matter of confirming that the air force was actually interested.

I know some people will tell me this is completely absurd: The President will never fly an A380!

I wouldn't be so bold as to declare otherwise, but I may meekly suggest that strangers things have happened in air force acquisition recently. Okay, maybe not this strange.

Earlier this year, ITT became the first major US defence company to plead guilty to knowingly export weapons technology illegally to China.

The guess here is ITT won't be the last.

Go to the Washington Post this morning for a great read on this topic, but here's an excerpt.

Some of the most audacious cases involve Iran. Through reverse engineering, Iranian engineers have produced only about 15 percent of the parts needed for the F-4, F-5 and F-14 warplanes -- made famous in Tom Cruise's 1986 "Top Gun" -- that have been the mainstay of Iran's air force since the days of its monarchy, U.S. law enforcement officials say. Tehran has also been trying to acquire parts for Boeing 707s, Lockheed C-130 transports, and Cobra, Chinook and Sikorsky helicopters, they say.

This month, Abraham Trujillo and David Wayne were charged in Utah with attempting to export F-4 and F-14 parts to Canada that were ultimately destined for Iran. Last month, Dutch-based Aviation Services International was charged in Washington, D.C. with illegally exporting U.S. aerospace-grade aluminum and 290 aircraft-related components to Tehran. And in July, the founder of Vash International Inc. was charged in New York with illicitly exporting F-5 and F-14 parts.

Boeing may never actually win the Combat Search and Rescue helicopter contract, but maybe they take a shot at an Oscar.

This is one of the most elaborate video productions of defense contractor propaganda I've ever seen. So grab a bag of popcorn, dim the lights and enjoy the show.

Forget the VTOL patent I posted on this blog last week. That's old news.

Walking amidst the exhibits at the Association of the US Army convention, I found out about a completely different kind of aircraft that may finally solve one of the most challenging aerodynamic puzzles: how to design an aircraft that can fly both vertically and horizontally without compromising efficiency in either regime.

Boeing has a contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to study design concepts for a new breed of hybrid vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft. It's called the Disk Rotor, and it looks a lot like this:

dragonfly.jpg

dragonfly2.jpg

I picked these photos off this Swiss web site, but I am reliably informed is very similar to Boeing's concept.

The aircraft achieves vertical lift and hover with rotor blades that fold out from the rotor hub and retract during forward flight. A pair of engines provide the power for forward flight, during which the larger rotor hub functions as a wing.

Boeing has announced a six-month delay for the 787's first delivery to All Nippon Airways. Read the announcement here and the report by Flight's Mary Kirby here.

Jim McNerney, Boeing CEO, James Bell, Boeing CFO and Scott Carson, President of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, is updating the press and market analysts at 1:30 pm.

1:31: Hold music. I'd describe its style as "jazz-fusion-eurotrash".

1:34: The call has started!

1:36: McNerney says delivery is delayed six months to next November-December. Meanwhile, first flight is delayed from November-December to 1Q of 2008. The delays became "apparent" to Boeing's executive team at a program update review held earlier this week. I must say I'm highly surprised that they were unaware of such a huge delay until just this week!

1:38: Carson says travelled work and parts availability on airplane number one is driving the delay. This means software coding issue is not the problem. "Individual installation jobs have taken longer than planned to complete," he says.

1:42: Carson says airplane came off its jacks on Sunday, which means they finally put it back o its own landing gear.

1:43: Coding IS still a problem. An "interim" load is in the cockpit. But it's apparently not the main issue driving the six-month delay.

1:44: Carson also says that all 109 aircraft can still be delivered by the end of 2009, which, given the circumstances of a six-month delay for first delivery, seems very ambitious.

1:45: Bell, the CFO, says earnings guidance will not be changed because of the delay. Thirty to 35 deliveries will shift from 2008 to 2009 because of the delay.

1:47: Question one, by Howard Rubell (sp?): He asks about customer response. Carson says early response is disappointment mixed with understanding. The reaction is "as we expected".

1:48: Q2: What about changes in distirbuted supplier management approach? Carson says "clearly have learned some things about how we could to this job better in the future". Structural partners are fully engaged in the current plan, he adds.

1:50: Q3: by Ron Epstein of Merrill Lynch: Why are you confident that 109 by 2009 is achievable? Carson says production process moves forward, but it's just the flight test schedule that has been delayed. Carson adds that they've now completed primary structure on airplane one and are now focused on systems integration. Also, and this is important, Carson says they have put margin back in the flight test program. "We have much more confidence in our ability to achieve this plan," he says. (Click here for my story on how the previous plan left Boeing with extremely little room for manuever during the flight test phase.)

1:54: Q4: Robert Singarn (sp?) with CreditSuisse, asks for details about cost impact from delay penalties. McNerney says it's a mixed bag because some customers demand penalties and some decide to work with the manufacturer. For suppliers that are meeting schedule, Boeing will treat them "as we normally would" and "we're going to try to help them where it makes sense."

1:56: Q5, by Heidi Wood, of Morgan Stanley, asks, as I did above, why not be more conservative about 2009 delivery plan? Carson repeats that it's not a production problem, so there's no reason to delay production schedule.

1:58: Analysts are clearly skeptical about Boeing's claims that the delay will not cause a financial impact.

2:00: Biggest suprise of the call so far: the original production plan -- 109 deliveries by the end of 2009 and full rate production starting 2011 -- will remain intact despite six-month delay for flight test. (Although 30-35 aircraft deliveries will be shifted from 2008 schedule to 2009 schedule.)

2:05: George Shaprio, the analyst, theorizes that accounting rules allow Boeing can shift penalty payments into capital costs, so analysts never get to see it. Bell says that's a simplistic explanation, but, basically, yes.

2:07: Another critical point is made. The analyst (name unknown) makes an off-hand point that the current schedule means flight test and production will now overlap considerably. McNerney says his staff has considered change incorporation across, say, 35 aircraft instead of 22, and "that is a major risk".

2:09: The analyst follows-up, and asks: "Why are you taking that risk?" McNerney says it's rooted in the commitments we made to our customers. He adds that the supply chain also expects Boeing to perform and a production delay would be unfair to them, too.

2:11: Bell says they'll complete "40 airplanes or so" at the time of certification in November-December 2008.

2:12: Carson says that development for 747-8, 787-9 and 787-3 will also not be delayed as a result of extra resources pouring into 787-8.

2:12: Carson says Airplane One will be the first one to fly.

2:14: Time for the press to ask questions.

2:16: Carson said they've added only one month for the flight test schedule. They presumably still must complete the 3,700 hours ground tests and 3,100 of flight tests during that time.

2:18: Lynne Lunsford, of Wall Street Journal, asks if delay means Boeing got the supply chain strategy wrong. McNerney says: "As we work our way through it, we're going to be glad when we get to the other side of the start-up."

2:22: Here's my question for Carson: Boeing obviously accepts overall responsibility for the delay, but is the balance of mistakes made that led to the delay greater on Boeing's management of the supply chain or on errors of execution by the supply chain itself?

2:23: Carson says the "silver-lining" is the delay gives them much more time to get the software mature.

2:26: Carson says the delays are caused by the travelled work on Airplane One alone. The following aircraft will not be affected.

2:30: NPR asks: How embarassing it is that Boeing has a delay? Er, with all due respect, how embarassing is it to ask such a pointless question!

2:32: The call is concluded.

I'm an aviation buff, so excuse the lack of ground vehicle representation in the list below:

Number one coolest thing: A brochure for an all-new missile by Raytheon called the Advanced Extended Range Attack Missile (AERAM) for cruise missile defense. I'll upload the brochure as soon as I can get to a scanner, but it shows a picture of something that looks vaguely like Raytheon's Miniature Air-Launched Decoy. According to the brochure, it's intended to attack cruise missiles, unmanned air vehicles "and other symmetrical or asymmetrical airborne threats bearing conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction that present a current threat to the US homeland and US military.

Number two coolest thing: the Lockheed Martin P44 missile concept. I don't know much about this weapon yet, but, juding from the mock-up at the booth, I'm guessing it's Lockheed's answer to Raytheon's Precision Attack Missile (PAM), but with elements of Lockheed's much-postponed Loitering Attack Missile thrown in. So, think PAM with longer range.

Number three coolest thing: Sikorsky's poster showing a picture of the X-2 high-speed coaxial-rotor helicopter as a gunship. The US Marine Corps someday will likely need an armed escort for the 270kt V-22 tiltrotor, and I'm guessing this could be one of the candidates. The X-2's first flight is in December, so watch this space for updates.

For most people 2008 is still three months away, but this blog -- er, obviously -- isn't for most people. To the US Department of Defense, of course, 2008 is already upon us, at least as a weird fiscal organizing system.

Hence, it's time to list my top 10 questions for FY08. This list may be modified and perhaps even answered as events unfold throughout the year.

1. How does the US Air Force save its two most endangered production lines -- for the F-22 and C-17 -- while keeping funding streams alive for the F-35 and KC-X?
2. Will there ever be an end to the downselect process for either the CSAR-X or KC-X tanker? If so, does any body still think either contract will be awarded before the first week of November in an election year?
3. Will the A380 face off against the 747-8 when the US Air Force starts up an Air Force One replacement program next year?
4. Will the sweetspot for the tactical mobility fleet shift away from the C-130J? (IE, will the sweetspot shift up to the A400M "box" or down to the C-27J "box"? And how will Lockheed Martin respond if it does? Okay, that's really three questions.)
5. How does the US Air Force regain credibility for its acqusition system after the debacles of FY07?
6. How does the US military continue to afford three separate airborne intelligence fleets operated by the air force, navy and army?
7. Is it too soon to impose technology standards that risk stifling innovation on the unmanned aerial systems market, or will the industry's survival be a problem if there is any further delay?
8. When will the F-35 recover from the electrical short that grounded the test aircraft after the 19th test flight way, way back on May 3, and how will this five-month (and counting...) delay affect the program?
9. Why do people continue to quote the Lexington Institute as if it's an impartial observer of the defense industry?
10. Will the US defense industry get creamed in the next round of international fighter contract competitions -- mostly in Asia -- to European or Russian competitors?

Northrop Grumman posted this video on YouTube last week, expanding its marketing efforts into the realm of blogs like, well, this one.

The point of the video is clearly to show the world that the first KC-30 is already in final assembly, even though contract award may not come until after January. This stands in contrast to Boeing's KC-767, which is an all-new version of the 767 and can't simply roll off the assembly line.

Click here to read The Woracle's brilliant idea to nickname Boeing's KC-767 the "Lego Tanker".

It's such a perfect nickname that I resolved to come up with something at least as good for the KC-30.

So here goes: if the KC-767 is the Lego Tanker then the KC-30 is the Acme Tanker.

Here's why:

The KC-767 is actually a composite of structural pieces borrowed from four different versions of the commercial 767. Hence the Lego moniker. Of course, this can be viewed as either a strength or a weakness. Boeing either wants to or needs to be this flexible in order to meet the air force's requirements.

The KC-30 airframe is a generic passenger-to-freighter conversion A330-200. Remove the two pods on the wings and the boom on the underbelly and it's any other A330-200 found in commercial service worldwide. Again, this is either a strength or a weakness. Either Northrop Grumman and EADS believe they have the perfect aircraft for the job, or simply lack the flexibility to tailor the design to meet the air force's requirement.

I'll let you figure that out for yourselves, as long as you start calling it the Lego vs. Acme tanker race!

My biggest problem with Time's crap cover story on the V-22 is that it gives reasoned criticism of the Bell-Boeing tiltrotor a bad name.

To best view the V-22's shortcomings as a hybrid helicopter-airplane, it helps to look at an aircraft design that may do vertical and short takeoff and landing manuevers better.

Thankfully, Boeing received a patent on September 11 that proposes such a design. Behold:

boeingvtol1.jpg

This is a single-engine vertical takeoff and landing aircraft that uses split-torque face gears to drive three lift fans for vertical lift and two pusher propellers for forward thrust. Gone is the cumbersone complexity of the V-22's tilting wings and two engines.

The key new technology proposed in the patent is the split-torque face gear, which comes from Boeing's recent upgrades of the AH-64 Apache helicopter. As my colleague The Woracle explained to me, this device allows the engine to drive the fan and the pusher-prop simultaneously. The trick will be to figure out how to manage the power loads going to either the fan or the prop. Here's how it looks:

boeingvtol3.jpg

And this is a drawing of the complete system:

boeingvtol2.jpg

In case you're still wondering about my little obsession with Hunter Green Dart this week, I have a new theory.

This is obviously a classified program with an unclassified code name, which is a reliable recipe for driving me nuts until I can figure out what it is. Some of you may remember my earlier blog posts about the Littoral Surveillance Radar System, which was a similar mystery until the navy mercifully revealed the first details about the program in July.

So what is the Hunter Green Dart?

I'm starting with the assumption that Hunter refers to the Northrop Grumman unmanned aircraft system (UAS) designated variously as the E-Hunter, the RQ-5 and the MQ-5B. We also know, thanks to Bill Sweetman's mad googling skills, that Green Dart refers to a payload. And, finally, it belongs to the Intelligence and Security Command, so it's reasonable to conclude as a starting assumption that it generally refers to a Hunter UAS equipped with an intelligence payload.

But what is the nature of the payload and what is its mission? For that, I decided to search for clues in the code name itself. This is not always reliable, of course, but sometimes it's actually a very helpful guide.

What could Green mean? Green has been a code name for two counter-narcotics operations in South America -- Green Clover and Green Sweep, according to William N. Arkin's fabulous reference book: "Code Names". US Southern Command has been increasingly interested in UAVs for both imagery and electronic surveillance as it steps up a campaign to thwart narcotics traffickers in the region. The problem here is, how do you fly Hunter in South American airspace?

So what does Dart mean? That's trickier. There's no "dart" series of code names, but there is one good possibility. The air force ran a program called Compass Dart in the Vietnam War, which basically meant outfitting a fleet of C-47 Gooney Birds with electronic range direction finding antennas and using the fleet to hunt for SAMs.

So there you have it. Green Dart is some kind of signals intelligence payload aimed at narcotics traffickers.

Or maybe not. But that's my theory.

Bill Sweetman at Aviation Week's Ares blog wins the "Best Googling" prize for tracking down a cached version of a US Army document online that refers to a new payload called (drum roll ...) the Hunter Green Dart!

So at least we know for sure that it's a payload, rather than a missile or a new type of vehicle.

But what does the payload do? Well, that's still a mystery.

Somewhere in the DC metro area, Aviation Week's star reporter David Fulghum must be smiling.

I've known David for six years, and I can't recall once making it through a press conference where he didn't ask about high powered microwaves or directed energy weapons. Alas, it seemed he was at least five years ahead of the time for open source dicussion on this most sensitive of military hardware topics.

But no more.

The air force has officially released a request for information to industry for high powered microwave payloads "for use as a Counter Electronics payload that would not cause physical damage to buildings or harm to humans". The RFI seeks technologies that have reached at least the prototype stage of development, meaning the air force may want to get this capability in the field pretty fast.

We still don't know what the Green Dart Hunter is. Northrop Grumman is "not at liberty" to say, and is referring journalists to the Army.

Until the army calls us back, all we can do is, aherm, what journalists do best: wildly speculate in the absence of facts.

My pal Airpower writes in to suggest that the vehicle may be related to a recent contract award to Northrop for Viper Strike.

That's possible, but I'm wondering if a different explanation is more likely.

Northrop is referring reporters inquiring about the Green Dart to a public affairs officer at army's Intellegence and Security Command (INSCOM).

Based on this one clue, I'm going to guess that it's a new version of the Hunter equipped with a very sophisticated intelligence payload -- mostly likely hyperspectral imagery or perhaps a mini-synthetic aperture radar. Both payloads are ideal for that catch-all mission these days: hunting for improvised explosive devices.

It's also possible that the payload could be electronic intelligence -- another IED fixation -- but I'd be surprised if the army has a low-band receiver small enough to be of any use on Hunter.

The price tag is also notable. You should be able to buy at least a few Hunters and a ground station for $22.4 million.

[UPDATE: I'm stuck at a conference, but Paul Richfield (aka, Mr. Anti-blogger) tells me that Northrop Grumman is telling inquirers today that they are "not at liberty" to discuss Green Dart. (see "comments" link.) The plot thickens ...]

Whatever the "Hunter Green Dart" is, Northrop Grumman is building one for the US Army for $22.5 million. (See yesterday's contract announcement below.) There's already a handful of RQ and MQ variants of the venerable Hunter UAS, so perhaps this is another one.

While we attempt to responsibly answser that question, does anyone want to try to speculate/guess/make-up an explanation?

Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Sierra Vista, Ariz., was awarded on Sept. 28, 2007, a $22,499,406 modification cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Hunter Green Dart. Work will be performed in Sierra Vista, Ariz., and is expected to be completed by July 31, 2008. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This was a sole source contract initiated on Aug. 31, 2007. The U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala., is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-04-C-0082).

9-30-07Boeingbull2.jpg

To read what sparked this outburst of editorial genius, click here.

Notes from the annual convention of the Society of Experimental Test Pilots at, of all places, Disneyland:

Most surprising news:
About a year ago, the US Air Force thought they had crashed an F-22 for roughly two minutes. The ground control room lost all contact while the aircraft dove toward the ocean at low altitude. Contact was lost because the F-22 experienced an extremely rare dual-engine flameout, which cut power to the telemetry systems. The F-22 test pilot had tried to make a hard manuever, but he was using the wrong trim setting and the engines didn't like it. The pilot regained control quickly enough to save the aircraft, but not probably nearly fast enough for the panicked souls in the control room, who were left staring at a blank screen.

Favorite moment:
Neil Armstrong showing rarely-seen NASA films from the mid-1960s on the lunar lander research vehicle and lunar lander test vehicle programs -- two of the most unsung and truly bizarre elements of the Apollo race. Think of flying a gantry crane with jet-engine-powered rocket thrusters. Despite several crashes, Armstrong said they were essential training tools for the Apollo pilots. Recognizing that NASA will seek to return to the moon after 2018, he added:"I hope the persons at the controls has a simulator that is at least as good as the LLRV and the LLTV."