February 2008 Archives

Well, so much for conventional wisdom ...

Here's Boeing's statement:

We were just informed that our KC-767 Advanced Tanker proposal was not selected in the KC-135 Replacement Program known as KC-X.

Obviously we are very disappointed with this outcome. We believe that we offered the Air Force the best value and lowest risk tanker for its mission. Our next step is to request and receive a debrief from the Air Force. Once we have reviewed the details behind the award, we will make a decision concerning our possible options, keeping in mind at all times the impact to the warfighter and our nation.

The Boeing Company would like to thank the many people who helped us in this campaign. We have received tremendous support from our suppliers, elected federal/state/local leaders, unions, community groups, and the 160,738 men and women who work for Boeing.

You can view the US Air Force announcement by tuning in here at 5 pm: www.pentagonchannel.com

You can look this one up. See FY 09 budget request, justification materials, US Air Force, Aircraft procurement-Vol. 2, page 71.

You'll find on that page a detailed description for not one, but two potential mechanical problems that could cause a B-2A to crash.

Here's a sampling (read highlighted text):

The problem is caused by the B-2A's distorted engine inlets.

The distortion causes excessive wear on the stage 1 fan blades for the F118-GE-100 engines. Take that and an unplanned "foreign object damage event", and, voila, your $1.1 billion bomber may experience a "catastrophic in-flight emergency".

But there's another problem. A loose fan blade also can spark an "uncontained titanium fire". According to the same document, the titanium fire -- whatever that is -- may cause a "Class A event", or what normal people call a "crash".

The problem is listed in the budget justification documents because the USAF is buying repair blades this year to fix the problem. I'm sure it will be interesting for the investigators to find out whether the "Spirit of Kansas" had received the repairs before the crash, among other items of interest, of course.

You can view this as a metaphor for the post-contract award protest stage, or just watch for a few laughs.

Thanks to The Woracle for the clip.

As of about 1:30 pm:

Northrop Grumman stock was trading up 2.49%.

Boeing stock was trading down 0.49%.

As reported yesterday by the Malaysia Sun:

It's not unfair to view the first crash of the Northrop Grumman B-2A as a testament to the stealth bomber's admirable safety record.
How many other advanced aircraft designs have avoided a single non-combat related accident after two decades in service? (Nope, I can't think of one either.)
But the crash offers a good excuse to remember one of the B-2's little-known mechanical problems that briefly caused a public scandal for the manufacturer almost 18 years ago, and remains a problem for the bomber fleet even today.
This problem may or may not have played a role in the accident in Guam, but I'm sure it will be checked out by the US Air Force's crash investigators.
The flawed part -- called the actuator remote terminal (ART) -- came to light in 1990. Northrop revealed in its annual report that year that the company was under investigation by the Department of Justice because of the flawed part. A report by The Los Angeles Times, dated April 3, 1990, said:

"The system is called the Actuator Remote Terminal, a device that the Air Force was forced to upgrade while the B-2 has been grounded for modifications since late last year. The ART system has been plagued by severe technical problems, according to an informed source, though the Air Force has denied that the system is not working properly.
The ART plays a critical role in keeping the B-2 stable in flight. It takes commands from the bomber's flight control computer, relays them to flight control surfaces and then provides feedback information to the computer. The B-2, which has an unconventional all-wing design, relies on its computers to maintain stability and without the computers would be unstable."

A year later, USAF officials declared the problem solved. Here's a report from Aerospace Daily in July 1991:

"Maj. Gen. Stephen B. Croker, interviewed by The DAILY in his Pentagon office, said two problems were found in the design of the B-2's fly-by- wire flight control hardware, called the Actuator Remote Terminal System (ARTS), in "the 1987 timeframe," but neither endangered flight crews or renders the B-2 unsafe to fly. Both charges were made in an ABC television program aired Thursday night.
The first problem concerned the fact that "the cooling wasn't adequate in the area of ARTS," and that, presumably, the system would overheat and fail. This was solved by "a redesign...adding cooling vents" to the B-2 airframe in the area of the ARTS, Croker said.
The second problem, more serious, involved the design of a circuit board, which was laid out such that all four redundant ARTS computers relied on a single resistor. A "single point" or "one-path failure" in this part might have had "a cascading effect," disabling the flight controls on one side of the plane and making it unflyable, Croker said. The cascading effect was considered "highly improbable," he added."

Although the problem was "solved" in 1991, the same part was linked to B-2 reliability problems in combat operations nearly eight years. A USAF press release reported on June 11, 1999:

TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, Okla. (AFPN) -- The System Engineering Branch of the B-2 System Program Management Division here has solved a major problem affecting the B-2's mission effectiveness during Operation Allied Force.
In addition, the Tinker Air Force Base, Okla., division cut the flow days from a contracted 45-day turnaround to a two-day turnaround.
The actuator remote terminal, or ART, works the various control surfaces on the B-2. Without it, the wing cannot fly. Because of an airflow-cooling problem, the ART was one of the high-failure items on the B-2 bomber.
"Unlike other aircraft, the B-2 is a fly-by-wire system -- no mechanical interconnects to the flight controls," said Bob Cotton, avionics armament team lead for Oklahoma City B-2 System Program Office. "We send electrical signals from the pilot stick to the actuator remote terminal to the hydraulic actuator, which makes the aircraft perform its various flight maneuvers."
The wing reached a critical point when there was a lack of supply assets for the actuator remote terminal. Rather than cause aborts of combat missions, the B-2 System Program Management Division set out to solve the problem.
"The vendor we were using had a limited capacity for repair," said Cotton. "He was meeting a 23- to 24-day turn around in some instances, but with the increased flying schedule, he was unable to surge his capacity to the point that he could take care of requirements."
Don Ward, flight control avionics equipment specialist, initiated an investigation into how best to repair the actuator remote terminal line replacement units.
A team of engineers from Tinker traveled to Whiteman AFB, Mo., to provide on-the-spot training of ART repair.
The team worked on a compacted schedule around operational mission requirements to accomplish a solution. The sensitive actuator remote terminal has to be set down on a solid granite surface for repairs to ensure leveling. (Courtesy of Air Force Materiel Command News Service)

The scorecard for active electronically scanned arrays (AESAs) in development for Lockheed Martin F-16s now reads: 2 candidates, 0 customers.

This blog reported about the first candidate last summer. The Raytheon Active Next-Generation Radar (RANGR) first came to light in a marketing brochure. Its existence means Raytheon is challenging Northrop Grumman's near-monopoly grip on F-16 radars. For this reason, I rechristened RANGR the "Raytheon's Anti-Northrop Grumman Radar".

But I also knew Northrop could hardly stand on the sidelines, and in November I reported in Flight International that Northrop would indeed develop a thin-array AESA for the F-16. (Northrop already makes an "agile-beam radar" for the United Arab Emeriates F-16 Block 60.)

Read this more background on the emerging AESA radar war.

Northrop's product has now been unveiled and christened the Scaleable Agile Beam Array (SABR), but I will always know it as the Stop AESAs By Raytheon (SABR) radar.

My other job is writing for Flight International magazine. And I'm in full-time training mode this week, which, alas, leaves me with even less time to blog (by the way, is "to blog" officially a verb, yet?).

So allow me to fill some space here this week the easy way -- by pirating copy I wrote for the magazine issue. I was on a bit of a naval aviation kick last week.

Here's a snippet of what I wrote about EPX, but read the full story here:

With three teams already lined up at the starting gate, the US Navy has attracted a competitive field for the newly launched EPX programme that the US defence industry normally reserved for the most high-profile requirements. Yet, the opportunity to replace 11 ageing Lockheed EP-3E ARIES II aircraft - the electronic intelligence-gathering subset of the USN's maritime patrol aircraft fleet - has sparked a wide-open and diverse race despite its relatively small numbers.

Although the size of the EPX contract dwarfs the ongoing battle for the US Air Force KC-X contract, the USN requirement could rekindle the fight between military derivatives of Boeing and Airbus airliners that has characterised the KC-X contest. Boeing is actively pursuing a 737-based platform and Northrop Grumman is publicly considering the Airbus A321.

And here's a sampling of my story about the next-generation jammer, one of my recent favorites:

The US Navy has made the first move to develop and field its first all-new aerial jamming system since 1971.

The next-generation jammer (NGJ) project is first aimed at boosting the electronic attack power of the Boeing EA-18G Growler, which will enter service in June.

But the replacement for the navy's ageing EDO ALQ-99 pod could widen the mission to other platforms, such as an EA variant of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for the US Marine Corps. The US Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) on 12 February kicked off a four-month study to identify and prioritise the functions needed for the NGJ to replace the venerable ALQ-99.

I attended the US Air Force's media roundtable on KC-X held on 15 February in the Pentagon. You can download my audio recording of the event here. The first four minutes are missing because I arrived a little late (darn that security line!). But I still got a seat at the head of the conference table -- the best spot for capturing audio on my humble recorder!

The speaker is Lt. Gen. Donald J. Hoffman, military deputy to Sue C. Payton, assistant secretary of the air force for acquisition.

Download file here.

SCV Quality Solutions LLC could be the first aspiring missile defense contractor in the business to also boast a line of tennis shoe products and accessories. (The FeetSoCool insole, anyone? Just $19.95+shipping.)

But the Madison, Alabama-based retailer is apparently not content with selling merely shoe products, handy clothes hangers and flag pole gadgets.

SCV apparently wants to help the US military thwart everything from incoming mortar rounds to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The company's owner -- Samuel C. Vickroy (initials: SCV) -- was awarded a patent earlier this week for a "system and method for intercepting a projectile".

Vickroy's concept is ... er, unusual. Rather than fire a missile or laser to destroy the incoming round, Vickroy's design wraps the incoming warhead in a exospheric-opening blanket and parachute the whole package gracefully to the ground.

But don't rely on my humble words to describe it. Check out the pictures!

One week ago I made a rather bold prediction about the prospects for a US Air Force contract for the Antonov AN-70.

This week, Russia and the Ukraine announced an agreement to officially re-start production of the sturdy airlifter, only two years after Russia abruptly dropped out of the project. (Read here for more.)

I don't know what this means for the aircraft's future competitiveness for a US Air Force order (per my prediction), but it does at least indicate the platform will be available for a long time to come.

Bob Cox at the Fort Worth Star-Telegram's SkyTalk blog alerts us:

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, apparently tired of the Air Force's very open campaign to buy hundreds more F-22 fighters despite Pentagon policies, has reminded the service's top brass that civilians dictate military policy in the U.S. and not vice versa.

The story comes from pro Pentagon reporter Peter Spiegel at the Los Angeles Times. He reports:

One senior defense official called the remarks by Gen. Bruce Carlson, who heads the Air Force command responsible for testing and developing new weapons, "borderline insubordination," because they contradicted a decision by the president.

Oh dear.
I actually hate it when this kind of thing happens. You may agree or not with what Carlson said. But he unguardedly stated what every USAF officer above the rank of ROTC cadet quietly believes. In my book, Carlson, who I've known to answer questions honestly, deserves a medal for candor and applause for lack of discretion.
Gates may put up a fight over this. But, then again, his job comes with a rather early expiration date. The USAF, Lockheed Martin, and the F-22's legislative allies are surely aware of this. But now they'll just stop talking.

Note to US Department of Defense:

Contrary to today's photo gallery captions on defenselink.mil, an airframe sporting a high T-tail, four turbofans and a massive fuselage is usually not associated with the Lockheed Martin C-130.

Here's a news flash from my esteemed competitors at AviationWeek.com: the US Air Force intends to buy 380 Lockheed Martin F-22s, no matter what it costs them.
The article, which quotes Air Force Materiel Command chief General Bruce Carlson, says:

"We're committed to funding 380," Carlson said Feb. 13 after speaking at Aviation Week's Defense Technology and Requirements conference in Washington. "We're building a program right now to do that. It's going to be incredibly difficult on the Air Force, but we've done this before."

The USAF's unflinching commitment to the F-22 -- whether right or wrong -- is going to be costly. Assuming a 20-aircraft annual buy at $150 million per copy, the USAF must spend another $29.55 billion on the F-22. That also means the USAF will have to commit nearly $3 billion per year over the next decade.
How is the USAF going to pay that bill? Will DOD just give them the extra cash? Must any single large program (F-35, Next-Generation Bomber, KC-X) be sacrificed? Or will the USAF bleed bits of cash from its entire portfolio to pay the annual F-22 bill?
Then again, maybe Congress will be the answer. The US Department of Defense failed to request procurement funds to buy the Lockheed Martin C-130J -- the F-22's sister production line in Marrietta, Georgia -- for most of the first decade of its lifetime. But each year Lockheed's legislative allies found a way to keep the checks rolling.
From my perspective, this will be a fun story to watch. Whatever happens, the F-22's $3 billion-a-year existence is set to become an annual drama, with every other investment account in the Pentagon a potential victim.

CDR Salamander, who, unlike this blog, usually knows what he's talking about, makes a highly provocative case today in favor of Japan's newly-developed Kawasaki Heavy Industries P-X aircraft in comparison to the US Navy's paper concept for the Boeing P-8A.

I'm not optimistic for Kawasaki's plan to convert the P-X into a commercial airliner (a four-engine narrowbody, anyone?), but it does look like a great maritime patrol aircraft.

Cheers to Airpower for forwarding me this splendid video of an Il-76, a barely long enough runway and some wacky air traffic controllers. (Warning: Keep the volume low if you're at work!)

In case you needed re-assurance that the Airbus A400M is going to be a major player in the US military transport market, EADS last month posted the following chart on its web site:

So EADS projects selling more than 400 A400Ms in North America! Subtract 20 or 30 for Canada, and that still leaves a US fleet larger than the combined Boeing C-17s and Lockheed Martin C-130Js currently on order!

(Note to EADS: you may wish to refrain from listing your market projections for the Chinese market on the same slide as the US market for the same aircraft.)

But EADS' projections also change my thinking a little. Last week, I made the somewhat rash prediction that a Boeing/Antonov AN-70 would battle an EADS/Lockheed team offering the A400M.

I still thiink there could be a link between Boeing and Antonov. The AN-70 is too good of an airframe to pass up, and Boeing doesn't have any other options if the C-17 line expires in less than a few years.

But an EADS and Lockheed partnership now seems very unlikely. Lockheed is not going to simply cede a potential market of that size to a European competitor. Instead, I'm betting now that Lockheed will try in some way to respond. The question is: how?

Despite a difficult birth, the C-130J has proven itself as an able workhorse. But it is still no match on paper for the promised performance of the larger A400M. Lockheed has no time and no apparent source of funds to develop an all-new aircraft, but it doesn't have to abandon the C-130J entirely. If memory serves, Lockheed has spoken in the past of a "Fat Hercules"; basically, a wider version of the C-130J that can haul a bulkier payload.

Lockheed still has time on its side. The botched development of the A400M will keep the C-130J's current size and capability viable on the market until at least 2015.

The helicopter community has lost its best American-born innovator and builder. Read more about Piasecki's achievements today at The Woracle blog.

The purpose of the semi-classified Green Dart payload remains a mystery, but I now know that it's a) operational, and b) deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Thank you, random army solicitation document.

I first mentioned Green Dart on this blog here, and followed up here, here and here.

It's getting personal with the F-22 and Gordon England.

I first noticed this a few weeks ago when Loren Thompson, a paid Lockheed mouthpiece and industry analyst, in so many words accused the deputy secretary of defense of using his current clout to settle old scores from his days as a defense industry executive.

England "lost a succession struggle" at Lockheed, Thompson wrote, and "now wants to kill his creation".

England's "creation" apparently means the F-22, which he is indeed trying to kill to secure the future of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

I know what you're asking: Both aircraft of course are built by Lockheed, so why would England's industry past alone presuppose him to favor one or the other? Could Thompson's mercurial hint about a past "succession struggle" at Lockheed have played a part in England's current Raptor antipathy?

Hey, I love a completely unsupported, gossipy and self-serving conspiracy theory as much as the next guy, but this one I thought needed a bit of investigation.

After almost 20 minutes of exhaustive investigation -- well, exhaustive for a blog anyway -- I found an article in The Washington Post, dated May 8, 1995. The headline is "Volleying for big positions at Lockheed Martin," and buried in the story lies either the smoking gun of England's guilt, or a completely irrelevant anecdote. I'll let you decide!

To summarize, the article traced the fall-out of the Lockheed-Martin Marietta merger on the combined company's executive ranks. Keep in mind this merger came only a year after Lockheed purchased the General Dynamics Fort Worth Aircraft Company, where England was posted as President.

One of the jobs up for grabs in the spring of 1995 was president of the restructured Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth-based aeronautics division. The position was left vacant after the previous occupant, Kenneth Cannestra, decided to "retire" early in the wake of a bribery scandal in Egypt. The article says:

"There was a struggle for Cannestra's powerful Lockheed Martin position, and the winner was James A. 'Mickey' Blackwell Jr., formerly head of Lockheed's Georgia-based military aircraft division. Blackwell's elevation prompted England, one of the other competitors for the job, to leave, company officials said."

So there you have it.

The guy in charge of the Georgia-based F-22 program got the job. England got the ticket to that place where ousted defense industry executives briefly retire to until they can win a political appointee job in the next administartion, where they can indulge their revenge fantasies on their former colleagues.

On second thought, maybe England just thinks it makes more sense to allow the F-22 line to die in order to preserve what's left of the long-term viability of the F-35 production line.
Naaaahhhhh ... couldn't be.

Dassault and the French government get a good bashing today by a Forbes magazine article, which does a decent job of describing the export sales record -- or lack, thereof -- of the Rafale.

The Big Engine That Couldn't

For your weekend viewing pleasure:

I started covering the US Navy's off-again/on-again Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program about five years ago. It's been back on for two years and -- last I checked -- poised for a contract selection decision in five days.

This makes me sad. Why? Because I just thought of an obvious angle for a BAMS story that I've missed somehow for the last five years!

For posterity's sake, I'll tell you about it.

If I had the chance to re-interview all of the competitors and USN program officials, here's the first question I would ask: Why is this a winner take-all award instead of a split-buy?

The competitors for BAMs are the Northrop Grumman RQ-4N Global Hawk (high-altitude, turbofan, active electronically scanned arrays), Lockheed Martin/General Atomics Mariner (medium-altitude, turboprop, mechanically scanned arrays) and Boeing/Gulfstream G-550 (high-altitude, turbofan, optionally manned, multiple active arrays).

Each product is basically an off-the-shelf platform modified to meet the USN's requirement. The USN is not paying to design a new aircraft. It's essentially buying a la cart. That's probably why each platform offers vastly different operational strengths and weaknesses.

This competition isn't a choice between two discreetly differerent rivals, like the YF-22 versus the YF-23. This is more like the YF-22 versus the B-1. Each platform is a completely different capability, but both are useful for their intended purpose.

I agree there are downsides to a split buy award: the upfront costs are higher than a winner-takes-all award, you lose some of the marginal benefits of commonality and training gets more complicated.

But there are other advantages. The USN would not be beholden to one contractor for BAMS for the next two or three decades, but could keep playing the two teams off each other over the life of the program. Instead of a narrowly focused solution, the USN's operators could employ the platform that makes the most sense for each mission.

Not to mention the fact that Congress tends to like split buys, as it spreads the jobs more broadly and subjects the defense industry to greater competition.

I'm not saying a split-buy is the best answer for BAMS, but rather that it's an imporant and seemingly logical question that I should have asked long before now.

But tell me what you think about it.

(Full disclosure: my wife works for Lockheed.)

Some people like to knock the Lockheed Martin F-22 for costing $140 million a piece, excluding all expenses for development and spares.

But not to worry! The next fighter coming along -- Lockheed's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- is supposed to be based on affordability, with a flyaway cost at roughly one-third of the F-22's price tag using 2001 dollars.

So, let's see how the F-35 measures up.

The US Navy and US Marine Corps plan to buy a total of 680 F-35Bs and F-35Cs over the next 15-20 years. The FY2009 budget contains budget projections for the remainder of the program. Note that this includes only procurement cost. Amortized development and spares costs are excluded.

Year Aircraft Average unit cost/aircraft

FY2008: 6 $184.2 million
FY2009: 8 $200.2 million
FY2010: 18 $172.3 million
FY2011: 19 $146.4 million
FY2012: 40 $124.4 million
FY2013: 42 $115.1 million
Remainder: 547 $109.3 million
Total: 680 $115 million

Enjoy this high-quality video animation. The video portrays the US Air Force's future airborne electronic attack strategy in action, even if the USAF's leadership has abandoned most of the acquisition programs involved.

The story goes like this: US solider spots approaching tank on terrain vaguely resembling Iran. He wants to call in an airstrike by F-15s, but (wait!) a surface to air missile system rolls out of its desert hideout. Not to be denied, the USAF employs the B-52's standoff jammer, which exists here in animation form but died as an acquisition program in 2005. The fictitious jammer stifles the SAMs long enough to cue a nearby US Navy EA-6B to swoop inside defended airspace. The EA-6B fires its AARGM missile (also rejected by the USAF) at the target, blowing the SAM battery to little bits. Finally, with the airspace clear (and with the radar-evading F-22s apparently safely sequestered in Alaska), the F-15s can answer the soldier's desperate call for close air support. Mission accomplished ... er, air force-style.

I'm going to bash out a little thought experiment on one potential future scenario. Here it goes.

It's 2015. Both the long-lived Boeing C-17 and extremely long-lived Lockheed Martin C-130 production lines either have just shut down or are finally about to close.

Neither Boeing's engineers in Long Beach nor Lockheed's engineers in Marrietta have anything new in the pipeline. Sure, there's some paper drawings of stealthy tactical airlifters getting some buzz, but nothing within at least five to 10 years of coming to flying fruition.

So, both manufacturers decide to do what all US defense companies do in this situation: they go foreign!

Lockheed locks arms with the company they spurned more than 15 years before on a potential joint tanker bid. So the Lockheed/Airbus axis offers the USAF the in-production A400M, which of course will be assembled in Mobile or Marrietta (or both) and fitted with a new 10,000shp-class General Electric turboprop or the Pratt & Whitney Canada PWC800, which was actually the orignal A400M engine before "the Chirac affair".

Boeing, which will never partner with the likes of Airbus, has to be more clever. They decide to link up with the manufacturer they briefly considered for a Joint Cargo Aircraft bid: Ukraine's Antonov! The AN-70 is a rugged beast of an airframe, and Boeing's engineers believe they can smooth out its aerodynamic and mechanical quirks. Boeing parks the new AN-70 assembly line somewhere in the US southeast, with Charleston (South Carolina), Jacksonville or San Antonio on the shortlist.

Okay, that's my crazy theory for the day. Please tell me what you think. Poke as many holes as you like.

Click here for the summary on weapons systems.

Click here for all procurement accounts.

Click here for the research, development test and evaluation accounts.

Click here for CSBA's quickie analysis.

Very big bombs -- like the 10-ton Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) and the 15-ton Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) -- are back in style after about a 60-year hiatus.

Not since the days of Barnes Wallis and his famous Grand Slam have munitions makers been so focused on things that go boom, sans mushroom cloud.

Alas, it's going to be a while before anybody knows whether the MOP actually works, since the first drop test has been delayed 10 months to June. (Ironically, the flight test for the 787 -- a very different aerodynamic specimen also made by Boeing -- was delayed by the same margin.)

Anyway, here's my story on FlightGlobal.com.

An excerpt:

The programme has slipped because of technical problems with a "common carriage" bomb-release rack, says Davis. The undisclosed difficulties have forced the AFRL to design a new bomb rack for the MOP.

Development of the weapon's components, including guidance system, control surfaces, fuses and arming device, remain on track, says Davis. AFRL has increased the test programme's budget to $30 million - a $10 million jump - to cover development of the unique bomb rack.

It is not clear how the delays will affect the timetable for the US Air Forces's plan to integrate the same weapon on the Northrop Grumman B-2. US Congress has blocked the funding request to integrate the MOP into the B-2.

More bad news for the F-15 fighter community, but I'm glad at least the pilot is okay. Cirumstances surrounding the accident remain unclear, but there's no indication from news reports so far that the aircraft broke up before the pilot ejected. Cheers to Eric Palmer for the head's up.

Click here for background on the F-15 crash on 2 November that prompted the US Air Force to ground its fleet.

Have you ever seen a government press release that simultaneously selects and de-selects a contractor for a weapons deal?

Not me.

But it happened in Slovenia this week in a more than unusually weird acqusition announcement for a former East Bloc Ministry of Defense.

The EADS CASA C-295 and the Alenia Aeronautica C-27J were competing for a contract in Slovenia until January 30. That's when the MOD announced that "the decision was taken, a few days ago, to continue the procedure with the company EADS CASA, which has submitted a more acceptable offer."

Ok, bad news for Alenia then and good news for EADS CASA. Nothing too weird about that.

But then it says:

During the time of our procedure, there was a tragic accident of the military transport airplane CASA C-295 in Poland, which is the same model as the one the ministry is considering in the procedure discussions with the EADS CASA.

In these circumstances, the Ministry of Defence has decided, in accordance with the procedural possibilities that are the part of the purchasing procedure, to stop the process of the procurement of the transport airplane for the Slovenian Amred Forces."

In case you weren't aware, a Polish C-295 crashed recently after the pilot tried to land in bad weather and -- presumably -- botched the final approach.

How an almost certainly weather-related aircraft accident provoked the MOD to de-select the C-295 for the contract the same day as the award was announced is, to put it lightly, a bit of a mystery.

Then comes the explanation in the final sentence:

The Minsitry of Defense will, because of the realistic possibility that the procurement of the tactical transport airplane would not be realized in planned timeframe, re-examine the midterm programme of development and equipment of the Slovenian Armed Forces 2007-2012 and propose the changes or modifications, if deemed necessary.