F-35 vs 787, part 1: Rise, fall and recovery

Covering\nmilitary aviation is a big part of my job, but it's not the only part. I also\nwrite about commercial aviation. So I've had a front-row seat to observe the rise,\nsevere fall and ongoing recovery of the once-celebrated 787 production system.

Relating commercial\nand military aircraft programs can be very tricky, but I can't help make\nconnections between the 787 and that other major aircraft production programme with\nglobal aspirations also launched earlier this decade: the Lockheed Martin F-35\nJoint Strike Fighter (JSF), which is also called the Lightning II by the US military.

For those\nwho are not airliner watchers, Boeing's more-electric, mostly-composite 787 (pictured) is\ninnovating beyond mere systems and materials. In the aerospace industry, the\n787 is also a fascinating experiment in globalization. Six major structural\nproducers in three different countries - Italy,\nJapan and the USA -- are not just building up parts and\nshipping them to Boeing's final assembly center north of Seattle. Boeing's Tier 1 suppliers are\nendowed with the unprecedented responsibility to design, build and certificate complete\naircraft sections, to include the electronics, software and computers embedded in\nthe structures.

By\ncomparison, the F-35 industrial blueprint seems modest, but is nonetheless a\ngreat leap even for an international defense program. The F-35's three major\nstructural producers are the USA's\nLockheed (nose and wings) and Northrop Grumman (center fuselage) and the UK's BAE\nSystems (aft fuselage). The international production system will expand as annual\norders begin to escalate from handfuls into dozens starting in 2010. Turkish\nAerospace Industries (TAI) is responsible for delivering center fuselages after\n2012. At the same time, Italy's\nAlenia Aeronautica, an acknowledged key culprit in the 787 production meltdown, will\nbe ramping up production of wings for the F-35.

Both\naircraft are being initially packaged as a family of three variants built on\nthe same production line. (Interestingly, the fate of the short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing\nF-35B is yet more secure than even the short-haul 787-3, which has now drifted\noff Boeing's public delivery schedule.) Both aircraft were selected by their\nrespective industries to embrace globalized supply chains in new and radical\nways.

After each\nprogram began after 2001, both have experienced roughly equal setbacks: first\ndelivery of the F-35 has slipped 18 months after a weight problem forced a\nredesign; first delivery of the 787 has slipped 15-18 months after the experimental\nproduction system basically had a meltdown. Weight remains a design \"challenge\"\nfor the 787, but the problem has not been severe enough to force Boeing to redesign\nthe jet.

Most\nimportantly perhaps, neither airframe has proven itself in flight. Although the\nfirst non-weight optimized F-35 prototype flew in December 2006, Lockheed has\nstill only scratched the tiniest surface of a 6,000-hour flight test phase. The\nfirst 787 flight test aircraft is now scheduled to fly in the fourth quarter of\nthis year to launch a roughly 3,000-hour flight test phase.

Over the\npast two months, I've interviewed the head of the US government's F-35 joint program\noffice and the lead production executives for Lockheed and Northrop. In each\nconversation, a key theme was the lessons learned for the F-35 from the\nperspective of the 787 experience. After all, the F-35 flight test phase and production\nrate increase is less urgent (read: slower) than Boeing's commercially-funded program,\nbut is less than three years away.

How well Lockheed's\nindustrial team applies the 787's lessons and avoid its mistakes will soon be\ndetermined. The F-35 must soon prove itself in the air. But, if Lockheed fails\nto execute, even an effective fighter can be sabotaged on the ground by a 787-like\nproduction meltdown.