Within the past 10 days, we've learned that CSIS thinks the US military can't buy the aircraft it needs and, even if they could, RAND doubts those aircraft are up to the job.
So it's great timing this week for the annual convention by the Association of the US Army (AUSA) to roll into town.
The sweeping revitalization of army aviation over the past five years may offer an intriguing object lesson for fellow aviators in the air force, navy and marine corps.
Consider that only five years ago the army faced the same aircraft inventory challenges that are now so acute in the other services. With the distressing exception of scout helicopters, I think it's fair to say that the army procurement accounts for attack, cargo and utility helicopters are in great shape through at least 2015.
The CSIS report mentioned no concerns about the overall state of army aviation.
What did the army do? It decided in 2004 -- by itself, mind you -- to cancel the RAH-66 Comanche, trading 121 Block 1 scout helicopters to buy at least 800 new aircraft and re-capitalize 1,400 aircraft already in the fleet.
The politics of defense procurement make it hard to cancel active programs. But it certainly helped that the two industrial partners on the RAH-66 program -- Boeing and Sikorsky -- stood to gain at least as much by its cancellation. The army re-invested the $14.6 billion to buy hundreds of Apaches, Chinooks and Black Hawks, not to mention scores of other manned and unmanned aircraft.
The obvious corollary for the air force and navy would be to cancel the F-35A and F-35C and plow the savings into buying oodles of new F-16s, F-15s and F/A-18s. The US Marine Corps has no choice: the F-35B is the only option to recapitalize the STOVL AV-8B.
I want to emphasize that I am not advocating this solution.
But I do want to raise the option as a question: What would you do?
So it's great timing this week for the annual convention by the Association of the US Army (AUSA) to roll into town.
The sweeping revitalization of army aviation over the past five years may offer an intriguing object lesson for fellow aviators in the air force, navy and marine corps.
Consider that only five years ago the army faced the same aircraft inventory challenges that are now so acute in the other services. With the distressing exception of scout helicopters, I think it's fair to say that the army procurement accounts for attack, cargo and utility helicopters are in great shape through at least 2015.
The CSIS report mentioned no concerns about the overall state of army aviation.
What did the army do? It decided in 2004 -- by itself, mind you -- to cancel the RAH-66 Comanche, trading 121 Block 1 scout helicopters to buy at least 800 new aircraft and re-capitalize 1,400 aircraft already in the fleet.
The politics of defense procurement make it hard to cancel active programs. But it certainly helped that the two industrial partners on the RAH-66 program -- Boeing and Sikorsky -- stood to gain at least as much by its cancellation. The army re-invested the $14.6 billion to buy hundreds of Apaches, Chinooks and Black Hawks, not to mention scores of other manned and unmanned aircraft.
The obvious corollary for the air force and navy would be to cancel the F-35A and F-35C and plow the savings into buying oodles of new F-16s, F-15s and F/A-18s. The US Marine Corps has no choice: the F-35B is the only option to recapitalize the STOVL AV-8B.
I want to emphasize that I am not advocating this solution.
But I do want to raise the option as a question: What would you do?
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