The DEW Line

Here is the original 7E7 artist's concept when Boeing launched the program on April 26, 2004:

And this is an image of Boeing's first actual 787-8 Dreamliner. Quite a difference, no?

Why does Boeing want to make it harder for 787 passengers to survive a plane crash?

That's the hugely loaded question that is being asked this week by a 46-year Boeing engineer, Vince Weldon, who went public with his concerns about the 787's crashworthiness on a Dan Rather-hosted TV special last night. Watch the show here.

Weldon believes Boeing is rushing the 787 into service before it knows for sure how the all-composite fuselage will behave in a crash landing scenario. Two key questions: Will composite structure absorb as much of the impact shock as an aluminum airframe? Does composite resist fire as well as metal?

I had my say about this issue during a live spot on the TV morning show Fox & Friends this morning, but -- in case you missed it -- here's the gist of what I said.

The bottom line is that Boeing will have to prove that the 787 meets at least the crashworthiness standard of aluminum structures. If there are unknowns or validated problems, the FAA will rightly refuse to certify the aircraft.

Weldon's real question, however, may be whether Boeing or the FAA knows enough composite structures to make a reasonable judgement.

This may be a philosophical clash more than anything else.

Weldon comes from a generation of venerated Boeing engineers who were famous for being hard-headed about safety and testing. This is a group that believed in physically validating almost any assumption.

But times have changed across the the industry. These days, more engineering assumptions are validated digitally in computer labs versus physically in flight test conditions.

I would not write Weldon off as a disgruntled employee grinding a composite ax. But nor would I write off the consensus opinion -- shared by every airframe manufacturer in the business -- that composites are a safer and more efficient alternative to metal.

Boeing has announced a six-month delay for the 787's first delivery to All Nippon Airways. Read the announcement here and the report by Flight's Mary Kirby here.

Jim McNerney, Boeing CEO, James Bell, Boeing CFO and Scott Carson, President of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, is updating the press and market analysts at 1:30 pm.

1:31: Hold music. I'd describe its style as "jazz-fusion-eurotrash".

1:34: The call has started!

1:36: McNerney says delivery is delayed six months to next November-December. Meanwhile, first flight is delayed from November-December to 1Q of 2008. The delays became "apparent" to Boeing's executive team at a program update review held earlier this week. I must say I'm highly surprised that they were unaware of such a huge delay until just this week!

1:38: Carson says travelled work and parts availability on airplane number one is driving the delay. This means software coding issue is not the problem. "Individual installation jobs have taken longer than planned to complete," he says.

1:42: Carson says airplane came off its jacks on Sunday, which means they finally put it back o its own landing gear.

1:43: Coding IS still a problem. An "interim" load is in the cockpit. But it's apparently not the main issue driving the six-month delay.

1:44: Carson also says that all 109 aircraft can still be delivered by the end of 2009, which, given the circumstances of a six-month delay for first delivery, seems very ambitious.

1:45: Bell, the CFO, says earnings guidance will not be changed because of the delay. Thirty to 35 deliveries will shift from 2008 to 2009 because of the delay.

1:47: Question one, by Howard Rubell (sp?): He asks about customer response. Carson says early response is disappointment mixed with understanding. The reaction is "as we expected".

1:48: Q2: What about changes in distirbuted supplier management approach? Carson says "clearly have learned some things about how we could to this job better in the future". Structural partners are fully engaged in the current plan, he adds.

1:50: Q3: by Ron Epstein of Merrill Lynch: Why are you confident that 109 by 2009 is achievable? Carson says production process moves forward, but it's just the flight test schedule that has been delayed. Carson adds that they've now completed primary structure on airplane one and are now focused on systems integration. Also, and this is important, Carson says they have put margin back in the flight test program. "We have much more confidence in our ability to achieve this plan," he says. (Click here for my story on how the previous plan left Boeing with extremely little room for manuever during the flight test phase.)

1:54: Q4: Robert Singarn (sp?) with CreditSuisse, asks for details about cost impact from delay penalties. McNerney says it's a mixed bag because some customers demand penalties and some decide to work with the manufacturer. For suppliers that are meeting schedule, Boeing will treat them "as we normally would" and "we're going to try to help them where it makes sense."

1:56: Q5, by Heidi Wood, of Morgan Stanley, asks, as I did above, why not be more conservative about 2009 delivery plan? Carson repeats that it's not a production problem, so there's no reason to delay production schedule.

1:58: Analysts are clearly skeptical about Boeing's claims that the delay will not cause a financial impact.

2:00: Biggest suprise of the call so far: the original production plan -- 109 deliveries by the end of 2009 and full rate production starting 2011 -- will remain intact despite six-month delay for flight test. (Although 30-35 aircraft deliveries will be shifted from 2008 schedule to 2009 schedule.)

2:05: George Shaprio, the analyst, theorizes that accounting rules allow Boeing can shift penalty payments into capital costs, so analysts never get to see it. Bell says that's a simplistic explanation, but, basically, yes.

2:07: Another critical point is made. The analyst (name unknown) makes an off-hand point that the current schedule means flight test and production will now overlap considerably. McNerney says his staff has considered change incorporation across, say, 35 aircraft instead of 22, and "that is a major risk".

2:09: The analyst follows-up, and asks: "Why are you taking that risk?" McNerney says it's rooted in the commitments we made to our customers. He adds that the supply chain also expects Boeing to perform and a production delay would be unfair to them, too.

2:11: Bell says they'll complete "40 airplanes or so" at the time of certification in November-December 2008.

2:12: Carson says that development for 747-8, 787-9 and 787-3 will also not be delayed as a result of extra resources pouring into 787-8.

2:12: Carson says Airplane One will be the first one to fly.

2:14: Time for the press to ask questions.

2:16: Carson said they've added only one month for the flight test schedule. They presumably still must complete the 3,700 hours ground tests and 3,100 of flight tests during that time.

2:18: Lynne Lunsford, of Wall Street Journal, asks if delay means Boeing got the supply chain strategy wrong. McNerney says: "As we work our way through it, we're going to be glad when we get to the other side of the start-up."

2:22: Here's my question for Carson: Boeing obviously accepts overall responsibility for the delay, but is the balance of mistakes made that led to the delay greater on Boeing's management of the supply chain or on errors of execution by the supply chain itself?

2:23: Carson says the "silver-lining" is the delay gives them much more time to get the software mature.

2:26: Carson says the delays are caused by the travelled work on Airplane One alone. The following aircraft will not be affected.

2:30: NPR asks: How embarassing it is that Boeing has a delay? Er, with all due respect, how embarassing is it to ask such a pointless question!

2:32: The call is concluded.

I just published a news story on FlightGlobal.com about Boeing's decision to open a modification line for the 787 airliner in San Antonio. Check out the full story here.

I don't mention this in the article, but I believe this carries some significance for the US defense industry and for Boeing's defense division, in particular.

San Antonio is the home of Boeing's maintenance and modification center for the KC-135, KC-10, C-17 and the C-130 Avionics Modernization Program.

This is the first time I can think of that a Boeing commercial program has leaned on a defense program to play a major role in production and not vice versa. In the past, Boeing's defense sector has borrowed the 737, 767 and even the 747 to sell militarized derivatives to the Department of Defense and other militaries.

But this is the first time I can think of that a Boeing airliner program has reached out to its defense brethern to play a major role in the production of a commercial aircraft.

I'm sure there must be other examples of this sort of thing US aerospace industry, but none immediately come to mind. Please feel free to share if you can think of some.

Everybody else seems to be Monday morning quarterbacking how Boeing lost the KC-X contract, so why can't I?

The US military acquisition community always SAY they want best value, but what they really want is best performance. Best value is a conveniently loose term that can be fudged to justify any decision.

That's why I wonder if Boeing botched the bid by failing to offer a tanker version of the 787.

Yes, it would mean the USAF might have to wait a few more years for production slots to become available. Yes, the all-composite fuselage would present some engineering challenges to make it a tanker. Yes, it would be more costly than a KC-30B proposal.

But, with hindsight, you have to wonder how a Boeing bid anchored on a KC-787 proposal would have turned out.

Remember that the 787 is just larger than the A330-200, but not quite so large as the 777F. Remember, too, that the 787 was designed to knock the A330-200 out of the commercial market, and it is by all accounts a formidable machine on paper (once Boeing works out the costly bugs in its production system).

And remember that the USAF above all prizes performance when it buys aircraft. One wonders in retrospect if the KC-787 could have been unbeatable, and whether Boeing made a classic strategic error by failing to promise the aircraft's availablility for KC-X.