The DEW Line

A new RAND Project Air Force report offers a revealing glimpse into the blue-suiter's perspective on the Joint Cargo Aircraft program. This blog has long been skeptical that the USAF will actually buy the JCA, which, pending a protest decision, is the L-3 Communications/Alenia C-27J Spartan. Based on RAND's report, that skepticism appears deserved. Here's an excerpt:

The first aircraft, the C-27J, is an improved and up-powered version of the C-27A. The second contender for the JCA role is the CASA 295. Each of these aircraft is capable of operating from runways that are somewhat shorter, narrower and rougher than those normally employed by the much larger C-130. However, neither aircraft was designed to provide [short takeoff and landing for rough fields] capabilities like those emphasized in the assault airlifters of the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, building several squadrons of JCA's could improve DOD"s ability to support dispersed counterinsurgency operations by increasing the number of 'tails' available to the presently overstressed theater airlift fleet at a relatively modest cost. However, acquiring such aircraft will leave the issue of developing assault airlift capabilities unresolved."

Hmmm, wasn't JCA's whole point to deliver an aircraft with STOL-RF capability?

Sorry for the lack of new entries during my extended Labor Day holiday. Since I'm still a little bit in the vacation mood, let's talk about Brazil's defense industry for a change -- specifically, Embraer.

Several years ago, Embraer's highly-respected executive team felt the time was right to make a major play at the world defense market, seeking to grow defense revenues from the single-digits to 20% of corporate revenue. It all seemed to make so much sense at the time. International arms sales were galloping forward in the wake of September 11, 2001, and Brazil's air force was not least among the buyers.

The Forca Aerea Brasilia, or "the FAB" for short, was laying plans to 1) modernize its F-5BRs, 2) acquire a new batch of air superiority fighters, 3) upgrade its A-1 AMX attack jets and 4) buy a whole bunch of Embraer Super Tucanos, amongst other major purchases. Embraer figured to be the lucky beneficiary of each one of those big projects.

Several years later, Embraer's bullishness on defense was quenched by the force of reality. Its share of revenues from the defense market remains in the single-digits, and only items #1 and #4 have seen any major activitiy. The FAB's budget for item #3 was turned on only last week, despite the fact that the FAB awarded Embraer a contract to start working on the project about four years ago! Item #2 has been turned on and off more times than I can immediately think to count, and currently remains stuck in limbo.

On top of all that, the company's ambitions to enter the US defense market fell apart in 2006 when the army terminated Lockheed Martin's contract for Aerial Common Sensor, which would have used Embraer's ERJ-145 as the platform.

I sometimes hear US defense companies whine about the uncertainty of the Pentagon's acquisition system. It makes me wonder how the US defense industry would survive in almost any other country, where budgets are often the secret play-things of feckless generals and politicians and there is no 'Big Defense' lobby to push things through in a pinch.

Embraer may soon enough be back in the US market. The US Air Force is due to release a request for proposals on behalf of the Iraqi Air Force for a fleet of turboprop-powered "light combat aircraft". (The USAF previously called this a "counterinsurgency aircraft" fleet.) The Embraer Super Tucano is one of the prime contenders, and would open the door for the company to open a US assembly line in Jacksonville, Florida.

Who wants to abolish the US Air Force? Robert Farley, Ezra Klein, Matthew Yglesias do. David Axe agrees, but uses the term "disbanded".

Who wants to just take away the US Air Force's tactical firepower missions? The Armchair Generalist and Otto Pernotto, that's who.

Who thinks the US Air Force should be left alone? Bill Sweetman and, presumably, most of the USAF.

This blog has repeatedly asked the question: Why doesn't the US Air Force operate a counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft? And I don't mean an F-16 with an M61 Vulcan strafing a ground target, but an ugly-looking, turboprop-powered, low and slow aircraft like the A-1 Skyraider, which was used so effectively in Vietnam.

It (finally) appears that the USAF has been asking itself the same question, and an article published today in the service's official Air & Space Power Journal makes the following conclusion:

"Realistically, the new right-tech platform may be an unmanned aerial system, but to create the opening for a long-term enabling plan, the USAF should first develop a strategy for exportable COIN technologies. If the F-20 legacy still applies, it also means that the USAF should operate these platforms in its own inventory."

The author's chain of reasoning goes like this:

1. The USAF should remain focused on the non-COIN fight and let its lesser-funded coalition partners do the COIN dirty work

2. This means the USAF needs to be able to offer these partners an exportable aircraft

3. The Northrop F-20 was the last time the USAF tried to sell an aircraft to partners that it didn't buy itself, and the fighter flopped on the export market. No one wanted to buy an aircraft that lacked a USAF-supported supply chain.

4. Ergo sum, the USAF needs to buy its own inventory of COIN aircraft, in order for it to have an exportable product to offer to the nations who actually need such an aircraft

Congress may have already decided the issue with an earmark found in the 2008 US defense appropriations bill.

Senator Sam Brownback, of Kansas, has earmarked $3 million in research and development funds for the AT-6B, the Wichita-based Hawker Beechcraft product that is often marketed as a COIN aircraft. The funds have been allocated to the Air National Guard.

Other would-be competitors are the Embraer EMB-314 Super Tucano and the US Aircraft A-67 Dragon.

My post yesterday has sparked a lively discussion at DefenseTech.org (click here). After reading some of the comments, I think clarifying a few points about what makes a COIN aircraft is in order. So here's what I think, but feel free to offer your own ideas:

a) Area weapons (ie, 30mm cannon, 105mm howitzer, cluster bombs, etc) are generally bad for counter-insurgency. Precision is very important. Pinpoint rounds (ie, 10lb high-incindiary explosive, 155mm artillery shells) are much preferred to spraying bullets or submunitions. This is one of the big reasons why COIN is different than close air support.

b) Survivability is another must for COIN. IRCM is the only thing you can do about MANPADs. Armoring and flight control system redundancy are the only things you can do about artillery. Speed and tactics are also helpful. This rules out the Caravan, but makes aircraft like AT-6B, AT-37, OV-10, EMB-314, PC-9 and A-67 more appropriate.

c) ISR is most important role for this kind of aircraft, not firepower. It needs to be the eyes and ears and only should use weapons if it finds a high-value target of opportunity in the right circumstances.

d) UAS are probably the ideal weapon but they are not exportable. Because UAS's technically can be adapted into cruise missiles, the Missile Technology Control Regime bans UAS exports to all but the most staunchest allies (Australia, Italy, UK currently -- although Singapore, Japan and Korea may join the list). In any event, UAS's are still to costly and complicated to operate for most nations with a COIN problem.

One last post on the topic of counter-insurgency aircraft -- for this week anyway.

Two great bloggers -- ELP's War Pigs and HerkEng -- have sent some thoughtful comments to me about the COIN aircraft issue.

ELP's War Pigs wrote:

COIN is also knowledge. And not every solution is kinetic like traditional war. Example: Depending on the situation you may be dropping more leaflets or defoliant than bombs.

SU-25 is cheap on the used market, will even run on truck diesel, and a makeover by the Israelis or Russians if you have the extra cash (make the lights and cockpit NVG (night vision goggle) compatible. Ditto on a Mi-24 including the optional makeover. Cheap comercial GPS for situational awareness (most COIN enemies won't spoof GPS because they use it too) and you would have something.

Add some long range patrols (LRP) depending on the terrain and brown water navy stuff if it is riverine and cheap cell phone monitoring gear etc etc. The COIN aircraft is just one part of it.

You need all that junk above and you also need a good HUMINT social network. Again traditional firepower won't always be the go-to but for my El Jefe COIN force I would pick-

SU-25

Medium UAVs

Mi-17 helo

Mi-24 attack helo

King Air for a SIGINT/COMINT platform

Some other King Airs on rotation that are a flying radio station getting your message accross.

Beat up civilian vehicles that look normal doing SIGINT/COMINT

Good NVGs with good NVG compatible cockpits/lighting for all

Off the shelf GPS

Lots of internet cafes to draw in the bad guys. ( of course under watch)
Internet warfare

Lots of money. Money buys friends, helps turn people.

All equipment not having U.S. State Department restrictions on use. Also the above could be contracted out as a private security force.

HerkEng wrote:

And that is why I am opposed to a UAV trying to do the mission. The "Pilots" in the box have no situational awareness and a limited field of view will not be able to react like a live pilot in the seat. Yes, I understand that UAVs are the future and are getting better everyday…but still not yet.

I am still head-strong and I would like to see the A-67 be that plane...

I feel that the wing hard point issue on the T-6s will be a problem for Raytheon Beech/Pilatus (whatever they are calling themselves this
week)…Would this require a new wing design? Also, like the Airbus
issue in the KC-X race, Embraer will have an uphill battle (not like the T-6 isn't a foreign aircraft...but the majority of the people do not know that or just don't care.)

Ultimately the OV-10 would be the perfect aircraft for the mission with second to none visibility but the outlining requirements take it off right away. (Two engines and of the wrong type) Availability and not being able to start production again would kill it fast.

AT-37 huh :) righttttt

If not the A-67...why not a Pilatus Porter PC-6?