Recently in KC-X Category

• 'Boeing KC-767A'
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• 'Mobile home' [...re the Alabama assembly line]
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• 'Fruit of the boom'
• 'Just desserts'

You could view this as a reflection of our increasingly globalized defense trade. Perhaps it's even a clue about the next move for the Northrop/EADS partnership.

It's a Spanish-language copy of the infamous Northrop Grumman/EADS "spider chart" that apparently proved so persuasive to the US Air Force.

The photo below was snapped in the exhibit hall of Chile's FIDAE air show last week. The anonymous photographer kindly uploaded the shot on his Flickr page.

The Spanish-language chart also adds to the original by inserting the A310 MRTT into the comaprison. It surprises me by comparing fairly well against the KC-767, at least in terms of overall performance.

Chile's air force has a need to replace its aging Boeing 707-based tanker fleet. Either the Northrop/EADS team or EADS alone is already hoping to transfer their KC-X win into a new contract in South America.

Here is the original spider chart, in English:

Freelance photographer Matt Cawby has posted great photos of the first flight of N526BA, a 767-400ER once destined for service as a US Air Force testbed for the aborted E-10A program. Two more good shots on the ground here and here.

The USAF cancelled the contract for the N526BA in October 2007 after deciding not to make the third and final progress payment.

So Boeing now has a 767-400ER and -- so far, I think -- no customer. The USAF has paid about $90 million, or two-thirds of the total price tag, but has no airframe.

It is now the "lost 767-400ER".

Regular updates will return on March 12.

Until then, I invite you to view the growing list of comments about Northrop Grumman's shocking victory for the KC-X contract.

Also, I'll invite you to revisit some highly speculative thoughts I wrote a few months ago about the potential industrial base implications of a KC-30 victory.

Here's a quick excerpt:

But it is because: The implications of the USAF decision, especially in the event of a victory for the Northrop Grumman/EADS KC-30, are enormous for the US industrial base.

We’re talking about nothing less than the revitalization of a competitive domestic civil aircraft industry for the first time since Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in 1997.

We may never know how Northrop Grumman's price compared to Boeing's offer because the loser never has to say.

Neither may we ever learn exactly how price factored into the US Air Force's surprise selection of the KC-30, which is based on a modified Airbus A330-200 passenger airliner. USAF officials merely said that price was among the lesser of five evaluation categories.

But -- thanks to the commercial background of the KC-X competition -- we can be certain that Northrop's bid gave the USAF a great bargain on price.

Airbus doesn't regularly publish list prices for A330s, but some of their customers do. In June, for example, aircraft lessor Aircastle quoted an average list price for a new A330-200F, which is a pure freighter. That figure was $173.3 million per aircraft.

Of course, Northrop is not offering the A330-200F precisely. Instead, the USAF is buying a passenger A330-200, which is then coverted to a freighter. The difference is subtle, but it means the list price for the KC-X (er, now KC-45A) type should be roughly equivalent to the A330-200F.

That figure -- $173 million per aircraft -- does not include any tanker-unique equipment or systems, such as the refuelling boom, refuelling pods, remote operating controls, etc., etc.

So what was Northrop's price?

The USAF revealed that Northrop is promising a $10.6 billion price to deliver 64 new tankers during the production phase. My calculator says that amounts to average price of about $166 million per aircraft.

If you wish, throw in Northrop's $1.5 billion price tag to deliver four additional test aircraft and the average price rises to $178 million.

Of course, no airline customer pays list price for a new aircraft, but by any measure the USAF is still getting a good bargain.

Some may fairly ask whether Northrop low-balled the government. The history of military acquisition is filled with examples of balloning costs based on unrealistic price offers. It will be Northrop's responsibility to prove the critics wrong.

As reported yesterday by the Malaysia Sun:

I attended the US Air Force's media roundtable on KC-X held on 15 February in the Pentagon. You can download my audio recording of the event here. The first four minutes are missing because I arrived a little late (darn that security line!). But I still got a seat at the head of the conference table -- the best spot for capturing audio on my humble recorder!

The speaker is Lt. Gen. Donald J. Hoffman, military deputy to Sue C. Payton, assistant secretary of the air force for acquisition.

Download file here.

I've never met Carlos Longoria, but his YouTube profile tells me he's a Mercedes enthusiast living outside Travis AFB in California.

He's also apparently an unusually enthusiastic fan of the KC-30, so much that he created his own marketing video that frankly rivals the best defense industry propaganda I've seen.

So enjoy -- I think:

I’ve really been scratching my head over Boeing’s press release yesterday that claims the 767-200ER enjoys a 24% fuel efficiency advantage over the Airbus A330-200. The statistic is not trivial, as it could be a huge factor in the evaluation for the US Air Force’s KC-X tanker replacement contract.
But the statistic would seem – to me, anyway -- to be counter-intuitive. Airbus designed the A330-200 a decade after the 767 entered service. The whole point of the A330 design was to offer a more efficient aircraft in roughly the same passenger class.
Airlines clearly believe that Airbus has the more efficient aircraft, voting with their airplane orders heavily in the A330’s favor over the past decade. The A330 continues to be popular in the commercial market, even despite facing the hugely successful (marketing-wise) 787. By contrast, orders for Boeing’s 767 have slowed to a trickle, and it’s reasonable to argue the production line wouldn’t exist without the potential of the KC-X contract.
But, upon further study, Boeing’s claims appear to have some statistical merit, but also some serious potential flaws. To make sense of it, you just have to look at the performance statistics a little differently for a tanker than you would for a passenger aircraft.
An airliner carrying a maximum passenger load is not carrying anywhere near its maximum lifting capacity. For example, the 767-200ER’s empty-weight plus a maximum payload of passengers, luggage and cargo adds up to about 270,000 pounds.
However, the same aircraft stuffed with fuel instead of passengers is certificated to lift a maximum of 395,000 pounds. The total amount includes the weight of the aircraft (184,000 pounds) and the weight of the “useful load” of fuel (211,000 pounds).
[All of my statistics come from Boeing’s report.]
Looking at the statistics this way would seem to give the 767-200ER a clear advantage over its rival. The Airbus designed the A330 to be optimized for a growth version of the aircraft, so the -200 proportionally carries more “empty weight” (265,700 pounds) than the 767-200ER. This means there is proportionately less “useful load” available to carry fuel (248,065), factoring in the A330’s larger overall size compared to the 767.
But Boeing’s claim of a 24% fuel advantage rests on a dubious (perhaps even ridiculous) assumption, at least to my thinking. That statistic appears to assume that the US Air Force will operate the tanker at a maximum “useful load” of fuel on every takeoff for the next 40 years.
In fact, I would argue it’s more reasonable to assume the future tanker will almost never takeoff at the aircraft’s maximum gross takeoff weight, whether it’s the 767 or the A330.
This means Boeing’s entire statistical analysis is useless as a reasonable measure of operating performance, although it does raise an interesting point that in theory the tanker version of the 767 can be more efficient than the tanker version of the A330. I’d like to see Boeing re-compute the numbers, but this time using reasonable operating assumptions.