Today, you can:
Northrop Grumman rolled-out the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye this morning, giving journo hacks like me a chance to dig into a program that is almost never in the news.
A quick scan of the Department of Defense's budget justification books for 2006 and 2007 reveals a very interesting discovery. The navy's plan to buy 75 E-2D aircraft with their rotating UHF-band APY-9 electronically scanned arrays remains the same, but the cost from last year to this year has jumped nearly $1.3 billion!
You can look it up yourself. Just compare the number found on page six of this document in 2006 with the number on page 4 of this document in 2007.
On page 1 of the 2007 document there is a cryptic reference to a "program replan precipitated by cost growth in the areas of air vehicle design and parts/materials."
It's never a surprise when there is a DOD acquisition program experiences cost growth.
Maybe I'm not cynical enough yet, but it is still a shock to me that the cost of a single program can jump $1.3 billion and no one in the public even notices. You wonder what else you may not have seen in all those pages of budget documents released every year. '
Hmmm ...
I don't know who Bigfoot is, but he/she wins The DEW Line's coveted "best comment of the month" for submitting this brilliant reply to my open invitation for Dr. Strangelove references:
"Actually, the CSM may be recallable if the CRM-114 Discriminator isn't damaged."
Bigfoot says:
I think the ability to hit any spot on the globe within minutes is great in theory. The problem, I think, is the decision cycle. Striking HVTs under the circumstances described is a political and bureaucratic, not military problem. You might have actionable information, but by the time anyone has actually decided to do anything, the target has long since gone.
You can always have a B-1/2 loitering on station and have them flying shifts for several days while suits at the NSC pound desks and pontificate. It would be just as accurate a platform and recallable at the last moment. (Recallable seems to be a big deal, particularly civilians, probably because of movies like Dr. Strangelove and Fail Safe.)
Delivering the payload in a quick and efficient manner isn't a problem--the length of the decision cycle is.
FYI: Dr. Strangelove references are always welcome on this blog. Thank you.
NVH writes in:
"Oh come on, the recent history with the Clinton Admin stressing over killing UBL's family members and the UAE Prince's on the hunting trip b/c of collateral damage would be eliminated with a weapon like this. We could have killed UBL with little consequence to the innocents he surrounds himself with ( not anymore, but we can't find him, now ). As for the long term impacts, if we had it back then to kill him with, look where we wouldn't be today? Is that long term enough?"
Hi NVH. Great questions!! This is exactly what we should be debating. I agree that you have a valid point and that the weapon could be used properly. But I don't think that alone disqualifies the validity of concerns that the weapon could be used improperly.
Also, we are talking about a 4,000lb warhead slamming into the earth from sub-orbital space at hyper-mach speed. That isn't what you might call a surgical weapon. Don't think it won't cause considerable collateral damage.
Yesterday, I argued why the air force's proposed Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) is not the nuclear boogey-man that its critics often say it is. (Read here to see why.)
Today, I want to explain the real reason why people need to be concerned about weapons like the CSM -- and the whole concept of the Pentagon's Prompt Global Strike strategy, in general.
US Strategic Command wants the CSM because it's the ultimate fantasy weapon.
Yes, air- or ship-launched cruise missiles can attack pinpoint targets at distances as great as from Washington DC to Saint Louis. But there has never before been a non-nuclear weapon that can be launched from the continental United States and strike a precise target (read: person) as far away as Asia, Europe or Africa.
From a cozy command bunker in Omaha, generals can play XBox-warfare without the nasty political baggage that comes with nuclear weaponry.
The CSM is no Doomsday device; it's more like a "Boomsday" device. It's the weapon of choice when you don't care enough to send the very best: ie, a marine ground task force, an aircraft strike package or a carrier battle group. You don't even have to bother with sailing a Tomahawk-carrying navy destroyer to within 2,500km of the target.
It's exactly the weapon that can be all too convenient for someone as politically sensitive as the President of the United States, and can be too easily employed without regard to the long-term impact such a Boomsday device may have on the nation's security.
Forget about the Russians. This should be the real debate about the CSM.
My friend Sharon Weinberger at the Danger Room blog thinks the air force's plan to introduce a conventional strike missile (CSM) may be protested by Russia and opposed by Congress.
I'm not so sure.
It's true the navy's conventional Trident D-5 proposal got shot down by Congress because the conventional missile would be loaded on a sub that simultaneously carried nukes.
You would forgive the Russians if this caused them some confusion.
However, with the air force's concept for a Minotaur III-class CSM, the issue is very different. The trajectory of a CSM would look nothing an ICBM shot. The missiles would be launched from bases completely separated from the nuke fields in the northern tier.
Russia can't object and be taken seriously.
After all, what to stop the Russians from believing that World War III has started each time a B-2 stealth bomber takes off from Whiteman AFB? The B-2s carry nukes and -- if the advertising brochure is correct -- can sneak into any country at will to launch a first strike.
Russia doesn't object to the B-2s because they know they would be laughed at. The same logic is likely to work with the CSM concept.
Today, you can:
What's it going to take to get the sorely-needed .45-caliber handgun in the US military's arsenal? An act of Congress, maybe?
Well, apparently not.
According to DefenseNews.com, Congress has moved to block a new effort by the US Air Force to do what the US Army and US Special Operations Command have proven unable to do for several years: buy a .45-caliber handgun.
The story says:
"Congressional negotiators have put a hold on the U.S. Air Force's plans to replace the M9 9mm handgun so the Defense Department can consider the possibility of a joint plan for upgrading or replacing pistols."
There was a joint plan to replace the M9. It was called the Joint Combat Pistol. It failed miserably in the hands of, at first, the army, and secondly, the Special Operations Command. The air force probably got fed up waiting for a joint program to take shape, so started its own procurement. Now, that's blocked, too, in the name of "joint-ness", which is how we got into this mess to start with!!!
FlightGlobal.com today has an image showing the potential design for Russia's next-generation fighter, the Sukhoi T-50. The image was released by the engine company NPO Saturn, not Sukhoi. It appears every bit a hybrid of the Lockheed Martin F-22 and one of the design concepts for the FB-22 (see photo at bottom of page).
Perhaps the Russians have learned the lesson that, for all of the F-22's many merits, the Raptor's inherent limitations for range and payload capacity will forever crimp its mission flexibility.
Here's the T-50 image:
And here's the FB-22 image:
Today, you can:
Weekly Standard blogger Michael Goldfarb, who has a keen eye for aerospace and defense industry issues and technology, also seems to have good connections.
Goldfarb has posted an email from an anonymous "friend" who conducted some of the trade studies in the CSAR-X competition, who writes:
"My analysis showed it coming in a poor third behind the Sikorsky S-92 and the EH-101. The only thing it had going for it was range and payload, both of which were excessive for the mission. From a survivability perspective, it is not a good choice, being large, slow and unmaneuverable. Its landing footprint is so large that many extraction points available to the other two candidates would be foreclosed to the Chinook, meaning that aircrew would have to be extracted by cable hoist--a slower and more dangerous proposition, since while the aircrew are being winched up, the helo must hover for an extended time.
Boeing kept its costs down by using remanufactured CH-47D airframes (as if the Army has enough!) to MH-47F standards, which would include a new glass cockpit, new digital engine controls, enlarged sponsons with increased fuel capacity, uprated transmissions, a new mission avionics suite (common to all three candidates, so the cost there was a wash), and additional armor around the crew stations and flight control system.How it won, I don't know. My suspicion is two factors were at work. First, the Air Force wanted to ensure that this was an "interim" solution that would not, in the long term, endanger procurement of the MH-22 Osprey as the "objective" system--though it is not clear to me that the Osprey is really ideal for CSAR except from the perspective of speed and transit time. Second, the MH-47F would add a significant special operations capability to the USAF inventory, which would make it more of a player in the SOCOM community, and pose a challenge to the Night Stalkers of the 160th SOAR. After all, the 160th has only a small number of MH -47Es, so the addition of sixty or so birds with equivalent or superior night flying capabilities, each with the capacity to carry 40+ fully equipped troops or a light vehicle, would give the Air Force a lot of credibility."
Today, you can:
Meet Larry Dodgen: retired army lieutenant general and former commander of Army Strategic Command (ARSTRAT).
Larry's new employer is Northrop Grumman Corp.'s Mission Systems sector, where he will serve as vice president of strategy for the company's missile systems business.
This is the same business sector that is currently competing for a big contract called the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System.
The contract will be awarded by a unit of the Missile Defense Agency, but in operation will be used by Dodgen's former employees at ARSTRAT, who had a hand in shaping the requirements for the system.
No conflict of interest there.
Ares blogger Joris Jansen Lok -- aka, the giant Dutch-man -- today offers a smart piece on the purpose and relevance of air power in modern combat.
I can't agree more with his point that the US Army's air defense units, such as PAC-3 and MEADS batteries, should be absorbed by the US Air Force, a la the Israeli Air Force. Presumably, this would sharply reduce the risk of friendly fire, as when PAC-3 batteries in Operation Iraqi Freedom mistook three coalition fighters for phantom enemy warplanes or cruise missiles. Perhaps more tactical systems, such as SLAMRAAM or Avenger, should be left within the army's force structure, as they provide air defense for small, manuevering units.
I know that Sweeden lumps close air support forces with its artillery forces, which also seems a sensible pairing, but can you ever imagine the day that the US Army gets to own the US Air Force's A-10 fleet?
Today, you can:
Twenty years ago the US Department of Defense DOD decided to replace the .45-cal M1911 handgun with the 9mm M9 Beretta as the standard-issue sidearm.
To say this decision was controversial is to understate the term.
You will find plenty of defenders of the M9, such as this one on DefenseTech.org, but also many, many critics. The critics say the M9's 9mm bullet lacks the "knock-down" power to immediately disable a human being. If this human being is shooting at you, you'd also prefer a bullet that could make this person stop.
I give you the Air Force Future Handgun program, which has just entered the market survey phase. The air force says it "may specify" a .45-calibre round, which is larger than the 9mm and the same size used on the M1911 phased-out in the late-1980s.
The air force program comes several months after the army and Special Operations Command cancelled the Joint Combat Pistol program, which also sought to bring back the .45-calibre sidearm.
History may be repeating itself. Air force General Curtis LeMay kept interest alive in the Colt M16 rifle while the army hopelessly pursued the Springfield M14. Will the air force now usher the .45-calibre sidearm back into the inventory, with the army again forced to play follow-the-leader?
This morning, the Ares blog notes that I "disagree" with its post about Deepwater.
That's true, but yet incomplete. Yes, I disagree with the overall point, but my objections really go beyond that. The posting is simply wrong. It's not a matter of opinion. The post is wrong on basic facts. To wit:
a) Lockheed Martin had nothing to do with the hull buckling problems on the 123-foot patrol boats as David Axe asserts. Northrop Grumman performed the ill-fated conversions, but only because the Coast Guard told them to do it.
b) There is nothing "unlikely" at all about the pairing of Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman on Deepwater. This shows a fundamental lack of understanding of how the defense industry works. Is the Lockheed Martin/Northrop Grumman/BAE Systems industry team on Joint Strike Fighter also an unlikely pairing?
c) The coast guard commandant yesterday blamed his own agency as much he blamed the Deepwater contractor, which is Integrated Coast Guard Systems, for the many management blunders that have occurred to date. If you know anything about the saga of the Maritime Patrol Aircraft acquisition or the internal sabotage of the National Security Cutter design, you'd see that the Coast Guard's acquisition system is as much to blame for Deepwater's un-doing as anything the prime contractor mis-managed.
d) The same post on Ares can also be found on the Danger Room blog, but with the egregiously incorrect headline that the "Coast Guard Slams Lockheed".
Today, you can:
"The Coast Guard will assume the lead role as systems integrator for all Coast Guard Deepwater assets," Allen said, and the service will require that all future Deepwater work be opened up to competition. Lockheed and Northrop will return to mere contractor status. Ouch."
And this:
"Kudos to the Coast Guard for taking even more drastic measures to remind industry that the military is the customer, and the customer is always right."
Is that a fact?
I wish someone would explain to me why the Coast Guard is in any better position to manage Deepwater than the contractors it just fired. Fine, ICGS is no longer in the lead systems integrator business. Does any one really believe the coast guard has the acqusition talent and support to pull off a $24 billion modernization program all on their own? I just don't see it.
"A few thoughts on your thoughts Steve, if I may.
"The T-6 is a trainer, and attempts by Hawker Beechcraft (or whatever it's called this week) to remodel it as an armed platform are not convincing. That's not what it was designed to do.
"Remember, the T-6 is just a Pilatus PC-9 and the original Swiss design is forbidden by law from being armed...anyone with armed PC-9s has made their own, alternative, arrangements. So flying in combat is not in its genes. Attempts by Raytheon to compare the armed T-6 with the F-15 were met with an embarrassed silence at one show I remember, not so long ago.
"The Super Tucano on the other hand was designed to be a combat aircraft from Day 1 - that's why it makes a lousy trainer because it's so big and heavy. The Brazilians deploy it into Amazon dirt strips to fight drug smugglers, it has guns (not an "internal gun pod" but two 0.50-cals in the wing), it can carry air-to-air missiles and has a very sophisticated (datalinked) cockpit (thank you Elbit). In its class the Super Tucano is probably the aircraft you want to go to war in.
"Of course, the aircraft you REALLY want to go to war in is the A-10 but I know you're not seriously comparing the Texan II to the Thunderbolt II (are you ??).
"The A-67 is an amusing diversion. "
The Air Force Research Laboratory is starting work on a new sensor called SITES. This is a highly interesting development, but to explain why will take some doing. Here goes:
I hope that's clear.
Now, the really cool thing about this new seeker is that will come with a special feature. Conventional seekers do just -- and only -- that: seek for targets, which includes detection and selection of an aim point for the warhead. The SITES will do all that plus serve as the fuze. This is not going to be easy, given the trouble US defense contractors seem to have with mastering conventional fuse technology.
Click here for the document that the air force released last month describing SITES.
Click here for budget documents on JDRADM. There's only about $10 million over the next two years, but, hey, you have to start somewhere.
Paul from Australia writes in with a bold prediction of his own:
"I predict the demise of mono hull Naval vessels over the next couple of decades, except for very large sizes."
He also says: "The GD vessel hull design is Australian (Austal) where of course the fastest, largest aluminium vessels are designed and built."
Thanks Paul. But count me as a sceptic on the aluminum hull of the General Dynamics candidate for the Littoral Combat Ship program. I say this because the US Navy and the US naval shipbuilding industry have little-to-no experience with aluminum in ship construction. Given the recent trouble with basic steel construction on naval ships, I really do wonder how ready they are to adapt to a new raw material. I'm also wondering if the cost of aluminum must have escalated dramatically over the cost of steel over the last few years, although I don't have any data to support that speculation.
I've decided to list a few top candidates for a counter-insurgency aircraft for US Special Operations, if (or when) a requirement is produced. Feel free to add more suggestions if you like, or -- if you must -- tell me why I'm an idiot for selecting the aircraft I already did. The candidates are:
Parting thought: The Corum and Johnson book persuasively argues that the ground attack mission in a counter-insurgency campaign is miniscule. Instead, airpower is best applied in support and surveillance missions. "In numerous counterinsurgency campaigns the ability to airlift army and police units to remote locations and to keep them supplied by airdrop and helicopter has proven decisive," the book says.
This just in: The US Navy and Lockheed Martin have agreed to to disagree on a restructured contract for the third Littoral Combat Ship. That apparently means General Dynamics wins the LCS competition by default.
My prediction: someday, the Lockheed Martin LCS design will make a comeback. I don't know when and I don't know how, but big defense primes just don't walk away from contracts of this size. Maybe General Dynamics will have a setback and Lockheed Martin will present their ship as a "risk reduction" alternative. Maybe the navy will come up with a new requirement. Who knows really, but Lockheed Martin's LCS will be back.
Legally-speaking, the business of killing even in war can be quite tricky.
Consider that the military now operates dozens of armed unmanned vehicles -- in the air, on land and in the water. That number is expected to rise exponentially in the near future.
The Law of Armed Conflict dictates that unmanned systems can not fire their weapons without a human operator in the loop. As new generations of armed robots proliferate, the pressure will inevitably increase to automate the process of selecting -- and destroying -- targets.
Now comes the weird part.
A new legal interpretation has been proposed within the military to deal with the thorny issue of removing humans from the trigger-end of the killing process.
Here's how it works: program all armed robotic vehicles to aim only at weapons, not humans. For example, an autonomous vehicle spots an insurgent with an AK-47. The robotic vehicle is authorized to destroy the AK-47. If the human is killed in the process, that's what's called "collateral damage".
This particular legal theory is the brainchild of John S. Canning, chief engineer at the Naval Surface Warfare Center at Dahlgren, Indiana. His presentation on the subject can be downloaded here:
I have written about Canning's proposal in Jane's Defence Weekly. For its part, legal representatives in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has disavowed any knowledge of or interest in Canning's proposal.
JLENS, the US Army surveillance system that has recently completed a functional review, is mostly known for its comically truncated acronym, which stands for (deep breath): Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System. (Exhale)
Basically, it's a very large balloon tethered to the ground carrying a 7,000 pound radar -- a derivative of the Lockheed Martin SPY-1 found in Aegis combat system-equipped destroyers and cruisers. As its clunky name suggests, JLENS is supposed to do one of the hardest jobs on the battlefield: spot slow, low-flying and sometimes stealthy cruise missiles flying in the general direction of friendly forces.
I know JLENS for another distinguishing characteristic: its price tag.
What do you think it would cost to buy a tethered balloon (okay, call it an aerostat), a radar, a ground station and a fiber-optic cable?
The answer: $391 million, according to the Government Accountability Office. To put it in perspective, this aerostat-plus-radar costs almost more than one F-22.
The location and date of the first V-22 deployment will be announced Friday by US Marine Corps Commandant General James T. Conway.
Let the speculation begin!
I can think of three most likely options for the location:
My money is on option number 3.
The potential propaganda coup of a V-22 shootdown in Iraq should rule out number 1. Lingering questions about the V-22's shipboard suitability may also rule out number 2. A marine corps battalion is on the ground in Djibouti, offering a relatively safe operating environment for the tiltrotor's introduction into service.
Bill Sweetman, the freshly-shaven editor of Defense Technology International, asks on the Ares (as in, the mythical God of War; not, as in, the NASA space vehicle) blog: what is the Q-14?
This is a good question. All unmanned aerial vehicles are designated by the letter "Q", as in RQ-1 Predator, RQ-5 Hunter, RQ-7 Shadow, MQ-9 Reaper ... and so on. Sweetman has discovered that a new UAV designed by DRS Technologies has been christened the RQ-15. That leaves the existence of any vehicle called RQ-14 a mystery. Does it exist? Is it a classified project?
Sweetman hasn't found the answer but he's looking.
I don't know the answer either, but I have a suggestion.
There happens to be a non-UAV system called the AN/ASQ-14 Advanced Sensor Distribution System. The Federation of American Scientists site calls it a "general-purpose, sensor distribution system that provides for the correlation, distribution and displaying of tactical data on a real-time basis". It's operated by the navy.
I'm wondering if someone in the military wanted to avoid any confusion that may arise from having a navy sensor and a navy UAV both using variations of the desigation Q-14.
Any other theories?
Cheers to Sharon Weinberger at Wired's Danger Room for unearthing the air force's not-so-secret-anymore interest in reviving non-lethal chemical weapons for the Global War on Terror.
However, after reading the text of the report, I don't see that there's much to be alarmed about. Here's the paragraph that describes the extent of what's really being proposed:
"Chemical irritants such as CS or pepper spray, traditionally used in situations requiring crowd control, may be replaced by new developments in calmative agents. New adhesives (sticky foams) may be used to stop foot-traffic access to protected locations. Infrared dye markers may be used for clandestine tracking of individuals. Metal embrittlement, polymer agents, and super caustics may be used against equipment and materials for area denial. Malodorants may be used to clear structures or tunnels in lieu of CS."
The real concern about CW is not the effects of the weapons themselves. I would argue that shredding a man's guts with shrapnel is no more humane than suffocating him to death with chlorine. The problem with using CW is that it may encourage other actors to stockpile and and employ CW as well.
The paper included a foreward signed by Lieutenant General Bob Elder, who was then commandant of the Air War College. Elder is now the commander of Air Force Strategic Command (Hmmm...).
Thumbing through my weekly copy of Space News, I spotted a fascinating Peter de Selding article. For six months in 2006, the satellite comunications service provided by Thuraya of Abu Dhabi was jammed. Thuraya executives believed the source was the US or Israel, both of whom at the time were waging warfare against insurgents and militants in the Middle East.
But the real source of the jamming signal is now revealed to be (drum roll ...) Libya: one of Thuraya's shareholders!!! Quoting an unnamed source, the article says:
"Those doing the jamming were apparently concerned that smugglers carrying Marlboro cigarettes or other contraband from Chad or Niger into Libya were using Thuraya satellite phones. They wanted to disrupt their operations and throught this was a way to do it. I don't know whether they even realized the effect this was having on the Thuraya signal way beyond the borders of Libya."
The article, perhaps betraying the identity of the source as someone inside the Thuraya company (note the term 'we') , also quotes the source saying:
"Having a shareholder do this was certainly not what we expected."
I'll bet.
From 2000-2006, 'real' (read: adjusted for inflation) US defense spending grew at an average annual rate of 5.45%.
Not bad.
From 2007-2011, real US defense spending is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 0.90%.
Ouch.
This data comes courtesy of the US Government Accountability Office, which published its (very helpful) Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs last week.
If taken at face value, such projections seem to contradict a chorus of voices, led by staunch defense industry optimist Loren Thompson, who argue that current defense spending growth levels may continue indefinitely.
The problem is I'm not sure the data can be taken at face value.
The GAO's data, gleaned from the DOD's own projections, assumes that the account for research, development test and evaluation will decline at an average annual rate of nearly 3 percent. That would mark a nearly 11.5-point shift from the very positive growth rate in RDT&E spending from 2000-2006. It seems implausble to me that Congress would allow the DOD to reduce its investment accounts by so large a margin.
Let me get this straight:
So much for top-down budgeting.
Bad news last week for the Airbus A400M.
Flightglobal.com reports that the turboprop-powered military transport -- and Europe's best hope for knocking the C-130J and the C-17 out of business -- will enter final assembly in Spain three months late.
The news comes shortly after US Air Force leaders took the unusual step of singling out the A400M as a potential candidate to replace dozens of C-130 used by special operations forces to refuel helicopters. The A400M delivery schedule is already a squeeze to meet the air force's requirements, so every new delay puts that contract further out of reach.
I just received this comment from "J", which I love so much I'm posting for all to enjoy:
Although I have also enjoyed Jane's information products, I have always found their price range to be overly inflated. Maybe they are the best in town, but the mid-to-lower range of analysts can't afford their work.
As an example, I was/remain annoyed as to the Jane's CB defense handbook they started about five-six years ago. It's a thick book, but they basically plagerized government reference books to create it. Absolutely minimal new info, and only 200-300 bucks! What a bargain!
Why does my employer, Jane's Information Group, exist?
This is not an academic question. It is now public knowledge that the company founded 109 years ago by Fred T. Jane has been put up for sale by its current owners: the Woodbridge company. The winning bidder should be named within a few months, and until then the fortunes of my colleagues and our products are really anybody's guess.
I, myself, will not be with the company when the new owners are announced. I have already accepted an offer to re-join my former colleagues from The Flight Group, where I will serve as Senior Editor, starting on April 23. (This new arrangement will have profound implications for the future of this blog, which my new employers are very eager to promote and support ... but more on that later.)
Despite my pending departure, I will continue to be concerned about the future of Jane's, with it's invaluable stockpile of open source information on the world's militaries, weapons and arms makers. My hope is that the new owners realize they are not just sitting on a pile of "content", but rather a treasure of vital data that shouldn't be sold piecemeal for short-term profit.
The real brilliance of Jane's is the ability to open a book or a magazine and read highly detailed information about all kinds of things that go "boom". Keeping such information public and outside the domain of the world's military and intelligence communities is an imperative for peace and security.
Fred T. Jane was surely aware of the national security implications of the products he launched. I will quote from his biography, "Fred T. Jane: An Eccentric Visionary":
"The adoption of steam by the French Navy had caused the first of many naval panics back in the 1840s. The changes of the next 50 years gave rise to a whole series of more or less serious war scares. Often these were based on ignorance, partly of 'enemy' intentions and partly their capabilities. ... There was at that time no means of comparing the real fighting value of potentially hostile fleets, containing as they did a hotchpotch of more or less obsolescent designs. Contemporary war stories exploited the confusion to maximise public paranoia, their hostile squadrons often including vessels later dismissed by [Jane's] Fighting Ships as of "limited fighting value".
The C-17 and the F-22 have a lot in common.
As aircraft development programs, they both:
One of the worst things about the current war is the creation of so many would-be war correspondents.
I am referring to the ones who get an "embed" and think this makes them the second-coming of Ernie Pyle, who, by the way, is still the best who ever lived.
When I think of a war correspondent I think of Pyle and I think of a man like Kurt Schork.
After serving as a staffer on Capitol Hill for several years in the 1980s, Schork got in the journalism business. He worked for Reuters and spent the 1990s covering every bloody flare-up on the planet. He never "embedded", and probably was unaware the term existed. Unfortunately, Schork's luck ran out in 2000, and died in spray of gunfire as his jeep neared a rebel checkpoint on a road in Sierra Leone. A very similar fate also met Pyle, whose jeep was ambushed by a Japanese machine gun nest on a road on an island off the coast of Okinawa.
As my tribute to these real heros of the profession, I wish to quote a few lines from the novel "War Trash", by Chinese-born author Ha Jin. The book tells the story of a Chinese POW in the Korean War. Jin's narrative is sparse and dry, but sprinkled with profound insights. As the story is told, Jin describes a "thirtyish combat correspondent from the New York Herald Tribune named Margaret Hinton, a tall blonde with the looks of a second-rate movie actress." Jin writes:
"In one of her interviews, she claimed she would not marry until she found 'a man who's as exciting as war.' Having read those words, I felt sick at heart. For her, the war had been a publicity stunt, a game. She should have been given a rfile and made to fight like an infantryman so that she could undergo the physical suffering and taste the bitterness of betrayal, loss and madness. One article even concluded: 'Korea is her war.' Who can bear the weight of a war? To witness is to make the truth known, but we must remember that most victims have no voice of their own, and that in bearing witness to their stories we must not appropriate them."
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