Air New Zealand Airbus A320 crash report - investigator explains

What a stupid thing to do? That was a death wish doing that test at low altitude. At less than 100 knots, 3000 ft, you have no chance of recovery if stall.

Yes Sir,

too many cooks steering the soup - I guess - and no plan
what to do, yes, no, yes, later, tomorrow and so on - WHY after a lease termination they have to check slow flight - who to hell put´s that on the schedule ? WHO ? The bloody FEDS
or the New Zealand BUSH PEOPLE ?

May they rest in peace....

As a close friend of the Air NZ pilot killed and TRE on the A320 I just ask all you armchair experts who appear to know very little about the protection systems on the A320, to consider your uneducated statements prior to publication.
This is in reference to the comments and not the article.

I am certainly not condoning this test or the altitude that it was conducted.

The major considerations here is that the A320 is a fly by wire protected aircraft. In normal law which the aircraft was in and expected to remain in by the pilots, the aircraft will not stall. Alpha floor protection will kick in. Not the case in this accident! The aircraft unexpectedly went into direct law because the landing gear was extended and then FAC 1 & 2 simultaneously failed because of sensor failure. When in direct law the protections are lost and the aircraft will stall.
What has to be asked is why the sensors failed which then forced the aircraft into direct law with the loss of protection, this being totally unexpected by the pilots. If the pilots new there was a fault and new to expect alternate/Direct law the low speed test would not of been performed as there wouldn't be anything to test because of the lack of protection in direct law, only the stall warning which wasn't part of the check.

Like all these accidents a chain of events has set the final outcome.

In closing airbus designed low speed protection to prevent stalling of the aircraft. Low speed is normally in the takeoff and landing phases of flight when close to the ground, This is when one wants as little height loss and maximum controlability of the aircraft as possible. This is certainly not what happened in France.

"Like all these accidents a chain of events has set the final outcome."

Yes I agree to this statement - nothing else - and actually YOU as an expert did NOT answer the question ?

This are NOT Student Pilots, so why slow flight ? To see whether the paint comes off ? - give me a break.......

Hi there, i know very little about these things, although being a frequent flyer i am not a pilot myself. My dad is a pilot and is godfather to the son of the pilot who was controlling the plane. I'v known the Pilot for a little over 20 years, a responsible person, no hothead and certainly with loads of experience. I just feel the urge to say that he was enjoying a great life and all of his friends did respect him for the person that he is/ was. He certainly had no deathwish, and he was anything but stupid ! Please be a little more careful with your statements here, from what i understand and am being told, even though the slow flight was in a low altitude, there must have been problems with the plane itslef.
Anyhow just my opinion.

Hi,

thanks for your comment, and truly sorry for your loss. I suspect that what went on in the cockpit involved some fairly subtle human factors that nobody yet properly understands. As I said in the original post, I have confidence in the French investigators to come to sensible conclusions about what happened.

Very sad about what occured and feel close the family pain of the crew members.
I m sure what investigators will find the causes of this accident and whether the sensors failed or not and could be part or not of the accident causes.
Just as a reaction to some comments i read on internet lately about some supposed hidden conclusions of the enquiry which is, as everybody knows, not finished yet :
The french"Bureau Enquête Accident" BEA has a very strong reputation of competence and independance in France with references (Air France Concorde, UTA DC1O, Habsheim A320, Mount Saint Odile Air Inter A320 crashes...) .
The "Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile" DGAC impose safety rules to french airlines which is reput to be high level ones. Some of them are even imposed while transit controls to foreign airlines touching french airports which can prevent from being authorised to leave the country. French National Civil Aviation school is known a very elite training school. French Civil Aviation Administration budget has been always marked by the obsession of maximum security spirit and measures. Every day, in every part of France Air France domestic routes are flown mostly by A320, A319, A318.

So, i completly agree with you Kieran, I have absolutely no dought this enquiry will be a sincere and serious expert job.

Why do we flight test things? To see if they work, and what if they don't work, do we expect to crash.... surely when flight testing you find out if it will work,O.K. then what do we expect/do if it does not work....crossing your fingers is not going to help. Surely you don't put yourself in jeopardy without a margin for error.. the bigger the penalty for failure the greater the margin. It all comes back to "the nut holding the control column"

There are two entirely separate issues here: The aircraft failed the test the three pilots attempted; the two crew lost control and were unable to regain control before crashing into the sea immediately below.

Failure of the test will be attributed to two angle of attack vanes stuck in the same position, but when a pilot tests an aircraft he must anticipate failure.

The crew slowed the aircraft below the speed the test should have been successful. Too slow, it stalled.

The test must be done first with the undercarriage up; it was down. The horizontal stabiliser trimming is no longer automatic and the crew must manually wind a wheel.

They did not. The THS stayed ´nose up´; after power was applied the aircraft entered a steep climb and stalled again.

Time from power-on to crash: 60 seconds. Anyone testing an aircraft better know what he is doing. Neither company requested the specific manual from Airbus Industrie.

In my opinion the pilots were badly briefed, ill-prepared and unable to see the danger ahead.

That they should attempt a manoeuvre that might stall the aircraft on an approach is a salutary reminder that Man is a mad animal. Frightening.

Dennis:
From your comments it appears that you have very little flight time in fly-by-wire aircraft, especially the Airbus. The investigation may well determine that the altitude and malfunctioning angle of attack vanes played an important role in this accident sequence, but don't rule out design, maintenance, training, regulatory oversight and all the other possible contributors. I suggest you save you post and see how prescient you really are when the BEA report finally comes out.
Certain comments on a forum like this do indeed confirm the assertion "that Man is a mad animal." And it is frightening.

kiwiflyer
The BEA Interim Report, translated into English for our benefit - although I did refer au francais aussi - gives a second by second account gleaned from the CVR and FDR. Everything I say in my analysis except where I state: ¨In my opinion ...¨ can be referenced back to that report.

What about the photos we see of an apparently almost undamaged fin floating in the water compared to what we understand was a completely disintegrated remainder of the airframe? Could this mean that the fin departed the airframe prior to impact with the water? Was there an explanation of this in the investigation?

Are Kiwi pilots trying to say the aircraft could not have been flown safely? Talk about clutching at straws and fishing for red herrings...

The Interim Report does not give ANY explanations, it simply states facts, and maybe not all of them. I read the facts and wrote a short, coherent and non-technical story that completely explains the outcome AND absolutely fits the facts presented.

I learnt to fly when I was 60, at Ardmore, Auckland. I have flown 800 hours in the last six years in an aircraft that I own and maintain myself. I am a retired dentist. All I know about the Airbus I read on the Web. So come on guys, attack the man not the logic. Make excuses like ¨regulatory oversight¨ and so on.

What is scary is (some) Airbus pilots seem to know less than I do. For the first time in my life I am frightened to be a passenger.

I am very careful whom I fly with privately. Do I now have to interview the crew of my next Airbus?

Until trhe final report has been completed there are no conclusions that can be made whatsoever regarding this incidence. "Transfer" aircraft tests only are done to ensure all systems work effectively and as expeced before signing over the aircraft from one company to another . Would you drive and check out a car before buying it or just hope the brakes work after you paid for it?

Yes it could be pilot error
Yes it could be a systems failure hence the early conclusion of the test
Yes it could be the Maintainence company at fault
Yes it could be birds into both engines
Yes ther could be indicision caused by interpretation between the German pilots and the Kiwi third pilot
Yes bla bla bal yada yada.

Just wait for the final report and any official debate surrounding this.

Martin
Amature aircraft investigator, Private pilot and proud son in law of an avionics and airframe aircraft engineer.

Marty, you might want to check the brakes before buying a car in case you ever need to brake hard to avoid a collision. So, would you take the car onto the motorway and aim it at a bridge abutment?

If a passenger or instructor asked you to demonstrate a stall on ´final´ would you do so?

Where in the Interim Report did you read about birds in both engines? I must have missed that.

From Marty. Well done Dennis for missing the analogy using a figure of speech to describe in minimal terms why a test flight is needed to check all systems before signing off an aircraft

Any pilot knows at idle speed you test the brakes and in my case on small aircraft at run up checks as well.

As for a passenger or instructor requesting a low speed test on final (Or any low altitude for that matter) by law as pilot in control, of course I would deny and not comply with the request. Nor would I expect the experienced pilots on the XL flight to do so

The interim report did not mention birds. It did not mention birds were not considered. Bla bla bla yada yada was not in there either.

Instead of attacking individuals how about some constructive comment around the possible contrbuting factors - why were the black boxes reported "damaged" when thay can withstand 4300G impact 2000 Deg C for 2 hours and immersion to 20,000 Feet deep especially in a slow speed low altitude crash? So many factors come into crash investigation so lets hear constructive thoughs.

Also of concern is the history of the French to "cover up" Airbus accidents especially with their huge investment in the Airbus. The first Paris air show ended up with the aircraft crashing into trees. The black box tapes mysteriously were missing data, the pilots jailed and immediately the aircraft manual was updated.

The current sad XL transfer crash. The french "Could not extract data" so they were sent to Honeywell for data extraction. Delay in the reporting due to criminal procedings.

Flight 447. The best technology in the world from the states, the best technology from the french. Honeywell black boxes again Water current data, weather conditions and all "french investigations" of pings are investigated as false. Can't discern a whale fart from a black box.

Now that is off my chest something constructive. Does anyone know with the Airbus aircraft the expansion and contraction of the metal and pressure bulkheads how is the stiff carbon fibre tailplane attached to allow for this?

Lastly sincere regards to the families of all lost in this tragic event.

Interesting that Pascal PEREA uses the absolutely fraudulent Air France Concorde total hull loss report of the abjectly corrupt Bureau Enquête Accident (BEA) as evidence of the latter's "competence and independence."

If there has ever been a more corruptly fraudulent report of anything at all than is the BEA's "report" of Air France's mechanics' and aircrew's sloppy and arrogant destruction of Concorde F-BTSC (I refuse to use the word "accident" to describe what happened, which was the inevitable consequence of a comedy of errors, not an accident) then I have yet to see it.

The BEA report says that a piece of metal fell from a passing Continental Airlines DC-10, was stuck by the Concord,(at five thousand five hundred and seventy-seven feet - 5,577! - around 1.7 kilometers! - almost 1.1 miles! from the start of the aircraft's take-off roll -- and well beyond the aircraft's calculated take-off point) caused a blow-out, which caused tire debris to penetrate a fuel tank, which then leaked fuel, which then caught fire and the aircraft crashed.

A typical New Zealander's response to that aught involve male cattle and his sentiments regarding Muoroa Atol and/or the Rainbow Warrior.

The none-BS reality went something along the lines of:

Air France mechanics left out a foot-long spacer in F-BTSC's left-hand main undercarriage truck;

The pilot elected to take off with an eight-Knot tail-wind, beginning his t/o roll on a several-thousand-feet-long extremely rough and already long-overdue for re-surfacing, condemned section of runway;

Late-arriving and poorly loaded insofar as reference to Weight and Balance and Center of Gravity was concerned baggage and the failure to have burned off the couple of metric tons of fuel calculated for taxi combined to put the aircraft's weight six tons over the permissible Maximum Take-Off Weight and its center of gravity so far aft as to have been beyond even the Test-Flight-Envelope limit of 54%;

The spacer-less undercarriage assembly caused a left-hand undercarriage tire (while simultaneously having a severe braking effect and causing the aircraft to veer left) to tear itself apart and throw chunks of itself through a fuel tank, whose spilling contents were then - at least one kilometer, according to extremely credible eye-witnesses, before it reached Continental Airline's DC-10's metal strip - ignited by the afterburners;

Because the aircraft was yawing left it was put on a collision course with a holding B-747-400 (with Jacques Chirac on board);

Unable to otherwise avoid a collision with the 747 if he attempted to abort, the Concorde's driver dragged the six-metric-tons overloaded and, by that time, way out of C-of-G range and out-of-control aircraft airborne at 188 Knots - 11 knots under its minimum safe take-off speed; (By that time so far off the runway center-line that the wrecked left-hand undercarriage assembly struck and destroyed a steel runway-edge light-fitting as he did so)

When the captain called for "gear-up" it was discovered the undercarriage, damaged secondary by the missing-spacer-caused scrubbing etcetera, was stuck in the extended position;

At around that time the airborne aeroplane plumber, (AKA "flight engineer") Gilles Jardinaud, elected on his own authority and at an altitude of just 25 feet, to shut down the number two engine -- thus making the aircraft's 220 Knots V2 airspeed unreachable -- and an inevitability of the aircraft's loss.

As a 15-year veteran British Airways Concorde captain, Captain John Hutchinson, observed at the time: "The captain (didn't) know what's happening; the co-pilot (didn't) know; it (was) a shambles. Once you deviate from rules and procedures, it's chaos."

Bureau Enquête Accident's so-called "accident," then, was but the consequence of a lethal combination of Air France maintenance-department's criminal negligence, of the state-owned airline's disastrously-sloppy cockpit management, of gross operational error and of arrogance.

Or, in other words, of Air France's (to this day) standard operating procedures!

The cover-up was massive and involved every branch of the French government and every agency involved in and/or with the aircraft's destruction. These included the (government) owners of Air France -- and its management -- -- the (government) owners of the Bureau Enquête Accident -- and its manageent, the (government) owners of the airport -- and its management -- the (government) owners of the French media -- and their management -- the government owners of the French insurers -- and their management -- etceteras.

"Pascal PEREA" says the BEA enjoys a very strong reputation of competence and independence "in France."

Bet it does. In France. And quite likely elsewhere in the every-bit-as-systemically corrupt Brussels/Strasbourg-based Euro-peon Neo-Soviet, too.

But the reality is that the BEA is systemically corrupt and has a long track-record of quod erat demonstrandum (QED) "investigation." Of the kind, that is, in which it predetermines the desired conclusions and then does whatever is required of it to arrange the appearance of "evidence" to confirm whatever has been predetermined will best suit the interests of the fasciSSocialist owners of everything French.

And as Marty seems to have rather subtly suggested, the same may be expected in the case of the accident being discussed here. Particularly if this one turns out to be another of the scores of pointers to the fact that (s)Airbus's computer-driven fly-by-wire system's computers are capable of leaving way too much out of the (s)Air-bus-drivers' control -- and of turning perfectly simple situations into out-of-control catastrophes. And, way too many times, in France, in Bahrain, in India, in Australia and in other places have done so.

Perhaps, who knows, to the recently lost Air France A-330 -- and perhaps, also, to two Qantas A-330s. Just to point to a couple -- and, as even a little research reveals, the list grows ever longer.

Brian Richard Allen
Los Angeles Califobambicated 90028
And the Far Abroad

Hi Richard

Excellent summary of the Concorde "incident" - and I totally agree. (I am a New Zealalder but I will ignore the comment and find it amusing anyway! Next time try sheep and numbber 8 wire).

Close to home the unexplaned Qantus A330 drop in altitude which injures included some spinal, OXYGEN MASKS FALLING and some minor panels falling brings back memory of my father in law, may he rest in peace, who was an aircraft airframe and electrical engineer telling us about being on one of the first Airbus flights where the OXYGEN MASKS dropped on takeoff. He was not surprised but my future wife very young at the time became scared and sick on subsequent flights until she was older and came back to New Zealand on one of the first 747's. I guess Nothings changed.

Our last joke together was regarding the A380. "They are clever, now they have worked out how to kill 800 people in one go" Pretty horrible but I guess cancer drugs do that to a person. I have a wicked sense of humour hence have no real issue with flippant comments.

Back to serious comment I do want any aircraft company to succeed regardless of the manufacturer and engineer a successful and safe aircraft, but unfortunately history repeats itself with the English/european countries experiments hurried and not properly tested, starting way back with the Commet.

The look of the Commet in my opinion was beautiful however my father in law commented quite rightly if and engine disintergrated or caught fire they are placed right next to the fuselarge inside the wing. As it turned out the skin was too thin and split. The were some high altitude unexplained Commet disintergration so who knows. Funny enough Commets were grounded and an enquiry by the British high court. I Can not remember what got them back in the air but they had a short life after that being uneconomical.

The skin on the A380 wing seems too thin re designed to bring into line the weight promises made by Airbus (Saw the documentary on the making of the 380 and the problems with the difference in software used by seperate countries making the cabling too short) Also the engineer "wistle blower" voicing concerns about using a standard chip used for car computers etc being used on the Airbus aircraft.

Most other aircraft have the engines suspended under the wing and modern engines are now being manafactred with a membrane that contains any engine disintergration (Blades etc)

American, Canadian and other countries are not perfect either including here in New Zealand but the record of experimentation and failure still stands in Europe.

Again I am interested in how composites marry with metals. I have not had much time to look into the dreamliner and understand the Dreamliner is "mostly" composite?

This is my last comment on the subject and will just visit the site now and again to see if there is an answer to to the question posed earlier.

Signing off - Martin Haisman of New Zealand - Alias Marty.

Forgot - history Commet

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Lab/8803/fcometcr.htm#local