The question of what to do about the Super Puma following the recent fatal loss of the Bond Helicopters machine is an incredibly hard one to answer. And it reverberates through the whole world of helicopter operations.I'm treading on eggshells here, and some people will no doubt object to my even discussing this, but there are really deep issues afoot.
For starters, just what are the common factors in this year's remarkable trio of offshore accidents.
Is the operation of two of the machines by Bond relevant? (One was
certainly crew-related, though with other factors being very important,
and one may or may not be maintenance-related.) How alike are the
original AS332 L1/L2 and later EC225 designs in key aspects?
Is the basic design of helicopters in question - since single-point failures on the products of two totally separate design teams have now resulted in immediate catastrophe?
Is there now a serious question over the efficacy of the HUMS (health and usage monitoring system) that everyone believes is so crucial? Do we need to work harder at getting the HUMS data into the cockpit in realtime? Is that realistic?
And what do the regulators do now? Can we keep on operating the L2 Super Puma in the circumstances when nobody properly understands the failure mechanism? I certainly don't know the answer to that last one and I don't envy the people trying to decide.
Anyway, here's what you need to help make up your own mind. The AAIB initial report is here. A story on the reaction from the unions - entirely understandable in my view - is here. And then there's the extremely interesting string discussing all this on the excellent Pprune rotorheads forum. The title says it all: main gear-boxes and the grand lottery. It's very striking to me to hear the diverse views being expressed there and also something approaching almost fatalism about the hazards of these operations.
Imagine if the same sentiments were expressed by airline pilots.
Is the basic design of helicopters in question - since single-point failures on the products of two totally separate design teams have now resulted in immediate catastrophe?
Is there now a serious question over the efficacy of the HUMS (health and usage monitoring system) that everyone believes is so crucial? Do we need to work harder at getting the HUMS data into the cockpit in realtime? Is that realistic?
And what do the regulators do now? Can we keep on operating the L2 Super Puma in the circumstances when nobody properly understands the failure mechanism? I certainly don't know the answer to that last one and I don't envy the people trying to decide.
Anyway, here's what you need to help make up your own mind. The AAIB initial report is here. A story on the reaction from the unions - entirely understandable in my view - is here. And then there's the extremely interesting string discussing all this on the excellent Pprune rotorheads forum. The title says it all: main gear-boxes and the grand lottery. It's very striking to me to hear the diverse views being expressed there and also something approaching almost fatalism about the hazards of these operations.
Imagine if the same sentiments were expressed by airline pilots.
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