Safety: July 2009 Archives

Air France has released a statement on an incident two weeks ago in which an A320, fited with the upgraded Thales pitot tube, experienced an airspeed indication anomaly. Icing is suspected. The incident was first reported by Le Figaro.

The Air France statement reads as follows:

A very brief 6-second anomaly in airspeed data display was observed on 13 July on an Airbus A320 aircraft (Flight AF1905, Rome - Paris Charles de Gaulle) fitted with the Thalès BA probes (latest model). This was probably due to icing at high altitude. The crew applied the necessary procedures and the aircraft maintained its flight path with no change.

 

As the failure of the airspeed sensors had been reported in the ACARS messages at the time of the accident of the Rio-Paris flight, particular attention is accorded by all crews to the accuracy of the speed indications.  Even though fleeting, the incident on the A320 was reported, and is currently being closely examined by the manufacturers and the authorities.

 

At this stage, it should be clear to all that the extreme vigilance of the pilots, maintenance personnel, specialists working for the manufacturers and the authorities is the best guarantee that the flights carried out with the various types of authorized sensors take place in complete safety.

Happened plenty of times before and no doubt will do again. Although a distressing surprise to see American managing it. Reportedly at Fort Worth Alliance during ground checks after a test-flight after a heavy check.

 

No ifs or buts, there is an actual whacking great hole in the fuselage as you can see in the picture below. Full depressurisation drill and diversion from best part of FL350. No explanation so far. Going to be a busy day for 737 operators (or else an extremely quiet one!)



Here's what Southwest says:

SOUTHWEST AIRLINES INFORMATION REGARDING FLIGHT 2294

Scheduled Nashville-Baltimore Flight Diverts to West Virginia

DALLAS, TX--July 13, 2009--Southwest Airlines confirms Flight 2294, the 4:05 pm Eastern scheduled departure from Nashville to Baltimore/Washington diverted to Yeager Airport in Charleston, W. Va at approximately 5:10 pm Eastern today after a cabin depressurization. All 126 passengers and crew of five onboard landed safely and are awaiting a replacement aircraft in Charleston that will take them to Baltimore/Washington International Airport later this evening.

The aircraft cabin depressurized approximately 30 minutes into the flight, activating the passengers' onboard oxygen masks throughout the cabin. Medical personnel in Charleston assessed passengers and no injuries are reported. Southwest Airlines is sending its maintenance personnel to Charleston to assess the aircraft, and the airline will work with the NTSB to determine the cause of the depressurization. According to initial crew reports, the depressurization appears to be related to a small-sized hole located approximately mid-cabin, near the top of the aircraft.

There is no responsible way to speculate as to a cause at this point. We have safety procedures in place, and they were followed in this instance to get all passengers and crew safely on the ground. Reports we have are that our passengers were calm and that our Pilots and Flight Attendants did a great job getting the aircraft on the ground safely.

In an abundance of caution, we have initiatied an inspection of all 737-300s tonight. We expect only minimal impact to tomorrow's schedule until all of those inspections are complete.

The investigation into the loss of British Airways Boeing 777 BA038 at Heathrow last year continues, but now the fuel-oil heat-exchanger (FOHE) thought to be at the heart of the matter has been redesigned by Rolls-Royce. European operators anyway have got until the end of next year or or 6,000 flight hours, whichever comes sooner, to fit it. No doubt the FAA will follow up with the same thing.

The EASA airworthiness directive (AD) doesn't tell you anything more about it - but here it is anyway.

I recently blogged about the research going on in France around this affair. Still a very difficult issue.

The captain of the Emirates Airbus A340-500 that suffered the multiple tail-strike at Melbourne has told his story to the Melbourne's Sunday Herald Sun and an interesting tale it is. Nice scoop guys.

You can read the whole thing here. But here's a couple of points of interest. First is that the pilot, who's a 42 year-old European who doesn't want to be identified, says he had slept for 3.5hr in the previous 24. On the other hand he appears to be ambivalent about the effect of that in the wider picture. Clearly the eventual Australian report is going to be an important document in the ongoing fatigue debate.

Second, the pilot is very clear about what happened to him when he arrived back in Dubai. According to the paper: He and his co-pilot were ordered to resign. They were handed pre-prepared letters of resignation when they returned to Emirates headquarters.

So, contrary to what Emirates said in a formal public statement, they were in fact sacked. And furthermore it looks as if it had been decided before they returned to Dubai that they were to be sacked. As I've said before, I don't see any way that that can be justified.

There are veterans of Britten-Norman Trislander operations who would argue that the best thing that could happen to the damn thing is that one of the engines would shut down, at least then you could hear yourself think. Although you'd then have plenty to think about. Ideally it would be the weird one up on the fin, just for stability.

However, you'd want it to happen in a slightly more controlled fashion than in this incident yesterday which involved the propeller making an unexpected attempted entrance to the cabin. Extraordinary in-flight slide-show here, and full story here.

I suppose it's the ideal Trislander engine-loss really - the noise goes away and so does the prop-drag.

Some of you will be familiar with the splendid spoof Islander flight assessment that emanated from the Cairns neck of the woods some years ago. Follows below. If you haven't read it, it's a don't-miss.

An interesting question. These are the folk who really think about this issue because, the world being the way it is, their whole business is based on understanding it.

Right now they're doubtless thinking about it harder than ever because they're having a pretty horrible year, not that anybody else is likely to lose much sleep over that I suppose. One of the biggest players - Aon - says claims in the first half of 2009 alone are already about 11% higher than the average for a whole year.

In fact, if the rest of the year hits only the 13-year average then this will be the worst ever year in terms of claims apart from the special circumstances of 2001. Aon says the figure would come in at $2.2 billion, which is a hefty 60% up on the average $1.4 billion. Unsurprisingly, renewal premiums are now running at about 25% higher than last year.

But to go back to the question I came in with. Here's the answer. This document shows the questions that the International Union of Aerospace Insurers recommends that its members use as best practice.

Some of it obviously relates to the size of the risk, but most of it is explicitly safety-related. And section 2 is really educational.

The press conference is still going on. It's being given head of investigation Alain Bouillard. Not a huge amount to say, but here it is so far.

He says: "As of today we are far from having any real idea of the causes of this accident."

• No pre-existing faults reported by crew or ACARS
• Aircraft did experience inconsistent speed indications
  
• Aircraft "was not destroyed while it was in flight and the aircraft seems to have hit the water on bottom of fuselage with a sharp vertical acceleration" - derived from damage to recovered parts, especially galleys
• The aircraft reached the sea whole - it had not been damaged at that point
  
• Aircraft did not blow up in flight
  
• More than 640 pieces of debris found from all over the aircraft. Notably internal furnishings.
• No distress call of any type
• No inflated lifejackets been recovered
• Black box pingers last for 30 days nominal with up to 10 days possible after that
• Search with submarines and robots to continue to 10 July
• Second phase using different techniques to begin 14 July
• Other aircraft encountered storms and diverted by 10-80nm and all had trouble communicating with Dakar.

More to come