Helios crash: what has already been done

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This story is sourced from Flight International
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Following recommendations by the AAIASB during the investigation but before the report was issued, Boeing revised its flight crew training manual to clarify procedures for pressurisation control settings and action in the event of a cabin altitude alert. The US Federal Aviation Administration subsequently made the revisions mandatory. The crew had taken off with the pressurisation control selector in "manual" instead of "auto", because it had been left in manual by mechanics carrying out a cabin pressure leakage test on the ground and the crew missed that in their pre-take-off checks. Now Boeing maintenance manuals have been amended to require engineers to reset the control to "auto".

Some of the AAIASB recommendations not accepted by EASA include: when cabin oxgen masks deploy and the aircraft does not arrest its climb or commence descent, cabin crew should immediately notify the flight crew of the deployment and confirm that the pilots have donned their oxygen masks aircraft manufacturers should provide a visual or oral alert of cabin altitude exceedence in addition to the existing warning horn.