Can humans manage better?
Your analysis (Flight International, 5-11 April) of the UK Air Accident Investigation Board's (AAIB) description of the Airbus A340-600's fuel management on the Virgin fuel diversion of 8 February raises fundamental certification issues in the realm of the UK Civil Aviation Authority/Joint Aviation Authorities, and basic "shopkeeping" duties in the realm of Virgin.
In the former, if the subordinate slave fuel control monitoring computer cannot override an incapacitated master, the effectiveness of fail safe operation is eliminated. That is why commercial jet aircraft are crewed rather than piloted. In the latter, surely when faced with the loss of an engine after noticing it was out of fuel, it should almost be a reflex action to pull up the fuel synoptic on the electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM), with the expectation of another loss? More human-centric than techno-centric certification should be at the centre of approving a system of which a human operator is an integral part. Consider the "archaic" Boeing 747-400 at the same point of tank to engine operation on the same flight sector.
With 13,000kgs (28,630lb) per tank, an engine indicating crew alerting system (EICAS) /ECAM message "fuel tank/ENG" appears, prompting the pilot not flying to push off the override/jettison pumps for tanks 2 and 3 and push 1 and 4 crossfeed valves off, thus isolating for symmetrical fuel feed. Failure of EICAS messaging would prompt some pushing/pressing questions before running out of fuel. Keeping the crew involved in such an integral part of LROPS, mitigates against software errors translating into hardware errors. While the automation lunatics have not yet taken over the asylum, it is surely unwise at this stage to confer upon them the keys to the pharmacy?
David Connolly
Brussels, Belgium