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Aviation History
1911
1911 - 0902.PDF
[/GGHT ED i' In last week's issue of FLIGHT we published . Th* an interesting letter from " R. A. (Retired)," in War which to some extent traversed the con clusions at which we arrived in our editorial article of the 7th inst., dealing with the Aeroplane in War. The subject is a very wide one, and one that can scarcely be dealt authoritatively with by the layman. Indeed, we do not know that anyone is in a position to speak with authority on the precise role of the aeroplane or the •dirigible in war, for even in their present relative perfec tion they are but the arrivals of yesterday, and their application to the purposes of an army in the field is practically still in a state of crude experimentalism. That is to say, the military aeroplane and its work is still a matter for much speculation with exceedingly little practical data to guide us, so that the layman's con clusions are as likely to be reasonably near the mark as those of the trained soldier and strategist. That is why we, in our original article, ventured to lay down certain mild theories of our own. Agreeing with our dictum that the first duty of the aeroplane in war will be the gaining of intelligence, our correspondent reminds us that in the fog of war, intelli gence worth having generally has to be fought for, the inference apparently being that the scouting aeroplane •will have to undertake a sort of detached action of its own before it will be able to gain intelligence worth having. The rule is quite near enough to the facts of the case to be accepted as true, under the conditions with which we are familiar. But the introduction of the aeroplane as part of the equipment of the modern army brings a new and unknown factor into the case, and the strong probability is that in future wars much information will be gained by an efficient aerial scout corps without any fighting at all. We have got so used to talking of " aerial fleets " that we are apt at all times to use the analogy of the marine service in thinking of or discussing aerial strategy and tactics. This is, doubtless, a perfectly correct analogy to draw, but there seems to be one point of confusion which has arisen and by which our corre spondent has allowed himself to be influenced. That is, to regard the military aeroplane as the destroyer of the air, whereas so far as it is possible to determine with the data at present to hand, its functions in relation to the army in the field will be much more analogous to those of the cruiser to the battle-fleet. That is, its primary business will be that of gathering intelligence, avoiding action if at all possible until that intelligence has been gained. Visions of aerial navies grappling to death in the " blue Empyrean "—we believe that is the correct description to use—are all very well in the pages of H. G. Wells' novels, but we cannot see that there is much justification for the dreaming of such dreams at .present. Undoubtedly, the aeroplane will be forced to action under certain circumstances, as for example in the case where a general officer commanding may send out his aerial scouts to gather vital intelligence and order them to push home their reconnaissance at all costs. Their functions immediately become those of the searching cruiser squadron intent upon getting into touch with the enemy's fleet, maintaining at the same time communication with their own ships. In this case the function of the enemy's cruisers is to drive off the searching vessels and prevent them gaining the intelli gence it is their mission to obtain. Generally, unless the one squadron is in much greater strength than the other, OCTOBER 21, 1911. this will mean a very pretty action or series of actions, but it must be kept in mind that these actions are taking place merely as incidentals to the main object of cruiser tactics. So it must be in the case of the aeroplane reconnaisance. Its first rule of tactics must be to avoid and not to seek action, until it has fulfilled its first mission. After that has been finished with, the functions of the aeroplanes of an army may be anything or nothing. As it is conceivable that under certain circumstances of war an admiral may use all his fast craft, including his cruisers to perform the functions more usually associated with the torpedo boat and the destroyer, aerial corps may be employed on destructive missions in the same way, but not until they have carried out their first duty and can be of no more use to the general commanding in that direction. Our correspondent appears to take the view that we in some way were arguing against the arming of the aeroplane. That is not so. What we cannot see is the aeroplane as a bomb-dropping device. True, it may be used on occasion for such hazardous work, from which it is practically certain there will be no return, but as we have insisted that is not likely to be its first or most important duty in war. Undoubtedly the armed aero plane must come, and as our correspondent says, a constructor who could instal a maxim gun effectively in an air-craft would be doing good service. Or rather—for we do not see a great deal of constructional difficulty in fitting a maxim mounting in almost any of the best types of aeroplane—if someone will show us how to make a steady gun-platform of an aeroplane manoeuvring in gusty weather, he can rely upon receiving the thanks of the French War Department—our own would probably wave it aside as something not worth bothering about. • <•• • The action of the Royal Aero Club in Raising the determining to issue two separate forms of Standard, certificate to aviators is most commendable. The certificates may be desciibed as elementary and advanced, inasmuch as the qualifications necessary to obtain the first will probably remain much as they are at present while those demanded for the second will be of a much higher standard. In deciding to retain for the present the examination for what we have called the elementary certificate, the Club has, we think, shown a wise discretion, for much as we have advanced during recent months it is still essential that the embryo aviator should not be discouraged by making preliminary examinations and tests too stiff at the outset. But the fact that the ruling body has officially recognised the fact that something more is necessary to make the efficient airman than the relatively easy test which it imposes on the would-be pilot—for that "is what it amounts to—is an earnest of what must come in the very near future. Compared with the machine of the date at which the original tests were devised, in many respects the aeroplane of to-day is a greatly advanced instrument of flight and as it improves and becomes capable of evolutions, under the growing skill of pilots begotten of experience of others, which were impossible even a few months ago, it is but right and proper that a higher standard of qualification should be demanded of those over whom the Club exercises its control. In a word, the Club's tests must be progressive in direct relation to increasing knowledge ot air navigation, the improvement of the machine and its facility of control. 904
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