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Aviation History
1912
1912 - 1128.PDF
flJGHf absolutely no practice worth spaaking of at firing at any thing in the air. Moreover, General Stone pointed out that this question of lack of practice resolved itself into a very real difficulty in securing suitable targets. Artillery practice is not by way of being a drawing-room entertainment, and the places where it can be carried out with any degree of safety are strictly limited, and the best arrangement is, of course, to fire out over the sea, but General Stone showed very clearly that it is by no means easy to get a moving air target high enough up over the sea to be of any real use to artillery on land. This is due, in the main, to the common geological formation of the shore. On a shelving beach, shallow water renders it necessary that any boat capable of towing a sufficiently large target should be so far away that the angle of elevation of the gun is reduced far bslow the value at which practice is really desired. When deep water is to be found close in shore, the edge of the land is usually precipitous and the gun is already at an altitude of perhaps two or three hundred feet above sea level, which again brings the angle of elevation to much the same value as it was before. The suggestion of using a model dirigible controlled by wireless was put forward, and criticised on the score of expense; various schemes with kites were also mooted, and General Stone suggested that it might be possible to do something with the painted fish-like aerosacs that the Japanese use on gala occasions for decorative purposes. One way and another, however, it appeared to us that much of the argument relating to the trouble involved in providing a sufficiently difficult moving target, lost considerable weight from the absence of any evidence that artillery could readily hit even a stationary object in the air. If we have read one of the lessons of the present war correctly, it is that successful artillery operations in the field depend primarily upon the extra rapidity and ease with which guns can be laid and fired, rather than on their superior hitting power or their longer range, and it seems to us that if the artilleryman could demonstrate his ability to bring down a captive balloon on the word "go," it would then be time enough to talk about the necessity of providing some more advanced form of practice. If the artillery want practice at high angle elevation, we would suggest the use of hot-air balloons. They are very cheap to make and we should imagine that they might prove very effective. They can be made of considerable size, and the theoretical limit to their altitude, according to a calculation in " Flight Manual," is in the order of 8,000 feet, so they ought to provide all the scope for elevation that is needed. According to another reference in the same book, by the way, there is a statement, on the authority of Major Hildebrandt, that a stationary balloon should be hit within ten minutes ' In ten minutes, forsooth ! Why, a miss would be as good as about ten miles, when firing at a modern aeroplane, if that is the present state of affairs. Indeed, from an observation made by Col. Cook during the course of the discussion—who remarked that an aeroplane travels its own length in less than a second —it is very clear that the artillery, both man and gun, have got to be extraordinarily smart in action if they are to hit even so much as the tail. Another reason why we venture to assert our opinion that the need for exceptional rapid sighting and firing is still likely to prove an unsolved problem when other difficulties have been overcome, is because it is by no means easy to see an aeroplane when it is far off or at DECEMBER 7, 1912. a great altitude. Even when the machine is pointed out in the sky, clear-sighted people are very often quite unable to detect it for a long time. Obviously, therefore, the conditions may often demand shooting at sight, if shooting at all is to be of the least use whatever. Yet another consideration, of still greater importance, which General Grierson emphasised as a matter of his own practical experience during the recent manoeuvres, was to the effect that no one on land could tell whether an aeroplane was friend or foe. If they carried an identification mark for the guidance of their own people, it would equally be visible to the other side, and so it was really impossible to tell whether a machine flying overhead ought to be shot at, or whether it was bringing back comforting despatches as to the disposition of the enemy's forces. Of one thing, at any rate, there was some certainty, namely, that it would never do to shoot at an aeroplane over your own lines, for although a projectile disappears from sight in the air it comes back to earth again sooner or later, and is then apt to have unpleasant consequences where least intended. These different details are interesting in themselves; their real value lies in their power to help one to fix ideas. The general impression they convey at the moment is that the pilot has little or nothing to fear from any serious attempt on his life by land artillery. Very possibly a stray shot may wreck a machine here or there, but people who fly over the theatre of war will scarcely expect to be altogether immune from accident. Of the importance of this general conclusion there can be no shadow of doubt. In the face of General Grierson's remark, it should be impossible, in fact, for doubters any longer to exist. If the conditions outlined above represent the true relationship of artillery and aeroplane—and we have endeavoured to present no more than a moderate expression of the argument—then it is quite on the cards that the general instructions to artillery will be to leave aeroplanes alone in time of actual war. In this case, it certainly becomes, as General Grierson says, " impossible to carry on warfare unless we have the mastery of the air." The enemy's aeroplane flies overhead and observes the position of our guns and promptly reports the same to headquarters, which means the speedy annihilation of the battery. Such being the case, the fighting aeroplane enters into the arena as a machine of first class importance. Not only so, but, having regard to the immense difference between the relative speed of the areoplane and of the army on march, it seems very clear that severe fighting in the air must essentially be a prelude to any decisive land battle, and it is at least conceivable that such fighting may determine the whole issue. Each army will send out air scouts to reconnoitre the country as far ahead as possible, and the distance to which they will proceed in advance of the main body essentially depends on their capacity for remaining aloft on a single supply of fuel. The machines in the Military Trials, for instance, had to carry fuel and oil for 4^ hours and, roughly speaking, most of them would have been able to accomplish a total journey of 300 miles on that supply. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that an air scout might get 100 miles ahead of the main army, and about the time that the opposing forces are, say 150 miles apart, the serious overlapping of the dual recon naissance is sure to have commenced. To what extent the air scouts, as such, may take to fighting amongst themselves is not altogether clear at present, but the idea of such action appears to be 28
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