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Aviation History
1913
1913 - 0344.PDF
lAJGHI about the military progress of other nations, so long as it does not affect their navies, that people in this country are a little too apt to be deluded into believing that because the aeroplane abroad is a military adjunct, it is, therefore, limited to overland operations. Nothing could be a greater or more fundamental mistake than to associate the aerial developments in France and Germany solely with the military requirements of those countries. The air forces, whatever they may be, are necessarily attached to some main body in whose interests they are to operate. In this respect they are, for example, no more than an improved cavalry or an improved artillery. In their use they amount to this and nothing more, for which reason we fail to find ourselves in accord with a part of the policy so strongly advo cated by our contemporary, the Daily Telegraph, in which, if we understand it rightly, a separate Ministry for the air is advocated. In its actual use, as we have said, the airship or the aeroplane is simply an adjunct to the Army or Navy, as the case may be. It is a mere weapon, and it cannot in any sense of the word operate independently of the main fighting arm. If in the future it were to develop on such a scale as to make the air the main field of battle and transport, it would be another matter; but in the light of present knowledge, we cannot anticipate the use of any aerial fleet as more than a means to the end of opening up the overseas or overland approaches into the enemy's country. It seems to us, therefore, to be bad*strategy to advocate its absolutely independent administration. The broad question—" Should England have an aerial fleet?"—is divisible, just as is any other of its kind, into three parts, which also may be propounded as questions. One asks, first, is an air fleet technically possible? Secondly, one enquires, is it strategically necessary? Thirdly, there is the consideration, is it politically desirable ? There was a time when an adequate air fleet was not technically possible, and the other two parts of the main question required no further answer. It is surely, however, no longer tenable to argue that the technical difficulties are still such as to place either the airship or the aeroplane out of court. Some little capital has been made this last day or two out of the misfortune of the latest German dirigible. There could be no more short sighted policy than to attempt to argue from such a mishap that we may safely let others conduct these costly experiments for a little while longer. The ^ real point that is lost sight of in any such suggestion is that the most valuable part of the whole business is not so much the possession of one particular airship itself as the experience that is gained in building it and in using it. It was the greatest pity that those responsible in this country did not profit by a similar misfortune that befell our own one and only large naval airship. The experience of those who had the handling of that job would have been an invaluable aid to securing of better luck next time. It is essentially those who have been associated with failure on whom one must mostly rely for carrying new work to the point of success. So, the failures elsewhere notwithstanding, we say without any hesitation that the airship as well as the aeroplane has fully entered the realm of technical possi bility, as it is implied in the question whether we can, if we will, possess an adequate aerial fleet. The next point is the strategic necessity, and here it is that we wish to draw particular attention to the mere incidental character of the connection between the air MARCH 29, 1913. forces and foreign armies. The air force is, as we have mentioned, necessarily an adjunct of some main fighting body; abroad this means that it is primarily an adjunct of the army for the reason that the chief approaches between countries on the Continent lie over land and not over sea. But, notwithstanding its inseparable attach ment to something greater than itself, the air force has one very important characteristic that differentiates it from other military adjuncts like the cavalry, for instance, to which it is in some respects analogous when operating over land. It operates in an entirely different medium and can move where these other units cannot go. In fine, the country that develops an adequate military air service commands also a potentially useful naval air force—an(i directly any form of foreign armament touches the question of naval power it affects the one thing vital to the defences of this country. For these reasons, therefore, the answer is the affirma tive one—that it is strategically necessary for the British Aerial Fleet to develop in proportion to the development of foreign air forces, quite irrespective of whether the latter are or are not developed under the agis of naval authority. It stands to reason, however, that in this country preference should be given to those types of aircraft best suited for operation over water. For a power like England, the question of political desirability concerning matters touching national defence must be answered directly by the decision as to their strategical necessity. The issue has, however, been much confused by laying too much stress upon the military aspect of the foreign situation, which tends naturally to identify foreign air fleets with foreign armies, and to that extent apparently to discount their importance to the British nation. It is, doubtless, the recognition of this amphibious character of Service flying that has led the Daily Telegraph to advocate a department for its separate administration. At first sight it is a plausible and, to some extent, an attractive programme. Particularly so in as much as it would place a Minister in office with a special mandate to ensure the adequacy of its immediate development. On closer and more serious consideration, however, the scheme seems to us to lose its glamour. Unsatisfactory as may be the present position in many ways, the soundest policy, we feel sure, is to work for a fuller recognition of the signifi cance of aerial navigation on the part of the Ministers responsible for the efficiency of the Naval and Military Services themselves. The plan on which the Royal Flying Corps is based seems to us to be admirable, and the Central Flying School, at which naval and military officers and civilians undergo a common training is an especially admirable method of establishing a very desirable friendly feeling throughout the personnel. But the separate administra tion of the Naval and Military Wings by the Admiralty and War Office respectively, is, we think, an essential feature in the realisation of the full benefit that the Royal Flying Corps can confer on each service. The matter of real importance is that the public should realise, through the explanations of the Press, the essential fundamental points of the argument sufficiently to prevent any Ministerial juggling. It will not do, for example, to have the Minister for War giving cheerfully optimistic assurances that all we need by way of a Military air force are seven flying squadrons and one airship squadron to accompany our expeditionary army, while the First Lord of the Admiralty may at the same time be excusing a parsimonious vote for the Naval Wing on 350
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