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Aviation History
1913
1913 - 1098.PDF
(/OGHT OCTOBER II, 1913. AIRCRAFT IN WAR. THERE has been a good deal written lately on the subject of the use of aircraft in war, particularly from the point of view elucidated by the lessons of recent military manoeuvres, both in this country and on the Continent. Much of this has necessarily been of a speculative character, and is thus of merely theoretical value. Not but what all discussion is useful, since we have nothing much to go upon in the way of practical experience in the " real thing," but the main point is that very little we have seen recently bears the stamp of real authority. Therefore, we are the more pleased to have read, in the Daily Telegraph of the 8th inst., a closely reasoned and excellent appreciation of the lessons of the late man<jeuvres, from the pen of that journal's aero nautical correspondent. So interesting is this contribution to the subject, that we feel we need make no apology to our readers for reprinting it in extenso. The following is the text of the article in question :— " The recent Army Exercises will be memorable chiefly for the excellent work accomplished by the air scouts, and for the eminently valuable experience gained in this new branch of warfare. From the very first the conditions militated against success, but every obstacle was overcome, and generally the achievement of the pilots was brilliant, "In the first place, the weather was continuously bad throughout, low-lying clouds rendered observation impossible from a height exceeding 2,500 ft., while high and gusty winds prevailed. Next, the country was most unsuitable for aerial work, owing to the absence of good landing ground in the manoeuvre area. And, lastly, the scouts attached to the Brown Army were severely handi capped by the fact that the White Army was a mere skeleton, so that they were deprived of the advantage, possessed by the White scouts, of being able to observe large bodies of troops. Where a whole company is represented by one private, not only are the difficulties of the air scouts enormously increased, but guesswork must necessarily play an important part in their reports. " The Brown forces were allotted No. 3 Aeroplane Squadron, consisting of twelve biplanes ; to the White army were attached sections of Squadrons 4 and 5, together with a detachment com prising six machines from the Naval Air Service—a total of twenty- four aeroplanes and two airships, the ' Delta ' and the ' Eta.' " As already stated, the work of the aeroplane squadrons was eminently satisfactory, especially when the unfavourable conditions are considered ; and the high wind proved in a measure a blessing in disguise, since it not only served to bring out the fine qualities of our military pilots, thus showing the immense strides that have been made within the past six months, but furthermore taught one conclusive lesson. A considerable proportion of the White aeroplanes were biplanes of a relatively slow type, with a maximum speed of fifty-five miles an hour. Throughout the exercises the wind blew strongly, and on several days attained a velocity of some fifty miles an hour. On these days the slow White biplanes were simply unable to accomplish any effective work. True, they ascended ; but, their speed being insufficient to allow them to make headway against the wind, they were unable to attain the enemy's lines, though but a few miles distant. Importance of Speed. " The more speedy machines, on the other hand, were never inactive, and flew day after day, heedless of wind and weather. In real warfare these would have disposed of their opponents without difficulty, and could at an early stage have firmly established them selves masters of the air. The lesson is obvious : the slow machines, ideal for the purposes of instruction, are worthless for active service. "Another lesson, equally conclusive, is the unsatisfactory nature of the aeroplane of the BE type for purposes of accurate observation. In this respect the R E (which stands for Reconnoitring Experi mental) is equally deficient. If the observer is to accomplish his work, it is absolutely essential that his field of vision should be as wide as possible ; in no event should it be interrupted by a pro peller revolving in front. Undoubtedly this consideration will exercise a decisive influence on the trend of design, which is already apparent in the latest military aeroplanes produced by the Aircraft Factory. These are of the Henry Farman type, in which both pilot and observer are seated in front of the main planes, the latter, whose place is right forward, controlling a light machine gun mounted on a revolving platform, with an uninterrupted field of fire ahead. "In the points of transport, facilities for repairs, and shelter ;,ummodation, great progress has also been recently accomplished especially during the past few months, though great effort is still needed to bring the squadrons up to even their meagre establish ment strength, owing to past neglect. " Two further lessons were taught, each of which will no doubt exert an important influence upon future developments. In the first place it was proved throughout the whole course of the manoeuvres that in order to fulfil his work conscientiously, an air scout must make his observations from a height not exceeding 2,500 ft., at which he is undoubtedly vulnerable to rifle and gun fire from below. In the second place (a curious point this), military tents in the future will have to be made of some coloured material, for the white tents now universally in use constitute the most glaring landmarks to the aviator, which it would be impossible to miss on even the dullest day. On the other hand, if dun-coloured, they would be practically invisible. " But if the work of the aeroplane squadrons was satisfactory in every respect, that of the two airships was the reverse. The fault lay not with their crews, for they were handled in the most praise worthy manner, but was inherent in their nature. Both airships were small, incapable of ascending to any height, and (cardinal defect), being slower than the slowest aeroplane, would, with their enormous bulk, have proved the easiest of targets to every hostile aeroplane and to attack from below. They, too, were rendered entirely useless on the days when a high wind prevailed, and, even when the wind had dropped, the Brown aeroplanes made a practice of circling around and above the airships, which they could have destroyed with ease. Role of the Airship. " Once again the lesson is clear, and the conclusion is one already formed by every Continental army, and by Germany in particular. The slow, non-rigid dirigible is certain to be destroyed should it attempt to take part in daylight warfare. Speed, and speed alone, can save it; but speed can only be obtained through a vast increase in power and in size. The process is clearly seen in the evolution of the Zeppelin. That built in 1906 measured 423,000 cubic feet in volume; that of 1911 already scaled 627,000 cubic feet; the first naval craft, lately wrecked off Heligoland, measured 776,000 cubic feet; while the second Naval Zeppelin, • L 2,' has a volume of no less than 950,000 cubic feet, and still larger craft are on the stocks. Speed has increased correspondingly ; from the thirty-six miles an hour attained in 1906, the Zeppelin reached fifty-two miles an hour last year, and the present naval dirigible is stated to be capable of close upon sixty miles an hour, a speed but little inferior to that of the average aeroplane. " It is clear, therefore, that a small airship, with its slow speed and restricted radius of action, must inevitably give way to the vessel of capital size. " But in considering the military value of the airship two facts have ever to be borne in mind. First, an airship is capable of carrying out its work by night, when the aeroplane is perforce unable to ascend, or at all events, ceases to be effective. For the purpose of reconnoitring on land, this feature may not be of very great value, it is true. But at sea, and particularly if the dirigible is regarded —and the view is firmly held in Germany—as a weapon of destruc tion, capable of dropping large quantities of explosives, its capacity for flying at night, when it may hover over a selected spot, silently, invisible, immune from attack, becomes of enormous value. " The second point is this : an airship of large size, and especially of the rigid type, is wholly unsuitable for use in such a country as England under ordinary campaigning conditions, and as part of the equipment of the Army, for an enforced landing would inevitably spell disaster. On the other hand, its vast radius of action enables it to work from a base far removed from the scene of operations, and renders it ideal for work over the sea. The Outlook In Aviation. "While the whole of experience, therefore, goes to show that the day of the small non-rigid airship is irrevocably past, it is equally certain that the large war dirigible is only now entering upon its career, the full extent of which we cannot yet foresee. However efficient our aeroplane service may be—and it is only in the very first stage of its development—it remains powerless to deal with the danger of a fleet of great airships working over enormous distances. If it is the task of the Army to develop the aeroplane, it remains just as certainly the duty of the Navy to provide the large airships essential for national defence as a whole, and for lack of which it will be placed at a serious and possibly decisive disadvantage as compared to its more enterprising rivals. " Unfortunately, for the reasons already given, the manoeuvres afforded no means forjudging the respective capabilities of aeroplane and airship when matched against one another, or of their powers of offence." r 1124
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