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Aviation History
1915
1915 - 0836.PDF
be a Zeppelin attack on a given night they were in a position to assert that there was going to be a Zeppelin raid in the London area. The first news, of course, which the authorities were able to collect, was news of the passage of these Zeppelins, it may be across the North Sea, or across what some people used to call the German Ocean. It had constantly happened that Zeppelins had been out for a nocturnal airing, and had never got inland at all, and it had constantly happened that, although they did touch some portion of the coast of this land, they had wandered about in a perfectly aimless way and dropped destructive bombs on various agricultural areas, or sometimes, whether by accident or design, on perfectly innocent people in various provincial towns and villages. The House would see, therefore, that when one spoke of the authorities knowing there was going to be a Zeppelin attack, the first thing that was known was nothing more than that there were some of these visitors on the way ; but whether they would ever get here, or whether, if they did get to England, they would succeed in making their way to this particular area of London, was a thing no one could possibly prophesy with confidence. There fore, if you were going to give warnings to the public, you must face this, that nine times out often—choosing a round figure— he did not know whether he should express it rightly when he said the public would be disappointed. That was the first difficulty, and it was its connection with that fact, of course, that arrangements were made to protect, not only London, but other parts of the country, as rapidly as the information at the command of the authorities per mitted. He did not think this was a matter on which public interest required that one should preserve complete silence, and he was most anxious that the public should understand how very thoroughly and systematically this problem was being studied and attempts at a satisfactory solution were being made. It was a matter of the greatest importance that we should not ourselves, by foolish gossip, and indiscreet statements, assist these invaders in the slightest degree to identify the part to which they had come. But there was not the slightest reason why the public should not understand the sort of way in which this invasion was sought to be dealt with. As soon as it was known that there might be such an attempt, and long before it was known with any certainty that London was going to be the objective, of course steps were taken in order that all possible observation should be kept by those whose duty it is to keep that observation on the different areas of the coast. If they reached the coast steps were at once taken so as to control the railway traffic in the area affected in order to reduce to a minimum the risk of trains acting as guides to this place or that. That did not mean, of course, that at a moment and in a flash all the trains coming to and from London were stopped, but it meant that the traffic was controlled. The most careful arrangements were made in advance to secure that this was effectively done. Arrangements were made in advance to do this in such areas as were material to the purpose for checkmating the invader. It might be that at a later stage some better and more certain judgment could be formed as to whether the London area was likely to be reached. That some times happens, and sometimes it does not. Of course there were some things which obviously ought to be done and are done as a precaution forthwith. At a suitable moment the special constables were warned. The system by which is secured the service of doctors in London at different suitable points was also put in motion. You could not tell what portion of the London area was likeiy to be attacked, for the best of all reasons, that the Zeppelin itself had not the remotest idea, and there were strong reasons for believing that it had not only no idea in advance but a very hazy idea after the event. Consequently you had to arrange in the London area that a series of precautions of that sort were quietly taken. But it had been thought, after the most careful consideration, that it was better not to make a preliminary announcement at large to the public, for instance, by the ringing of church bells or the sounding of a hooter. A better guide could not be imagined for a Zeppelin wandering about the (flats in Essex or about Epping Forest than suddenly hearing the unanimous chorus of all the church bells and steam whistles of the Metropolis. That was the first difficulty they had endeavoured to face, and that was the conclusion to which they had come. But there was a second point. He had said that it was not panic which disturbed them. After all, if you do tell the men and the women and children of the Metropolis that it may be that in the course of an hour or two hours' time they would be honoured with a visit from a Zeppelin, what is it exactly which the men, women, and children are expected to do? Of course, if those who conduct these invasions were careful to do no damage to civilian life, if they really were prepared and were able to take pre cautions not to strike private property, it would be a very reasonable thing to secure that everybody went home. But tneir own experience went to show that the Zeppelin did not pay the slightest attention to things of that sort. Supposing you tell the population of London that there might be a Zeppelin coming, he could not help suspecting that OCTOBER 29, 1915. what most of them would do would be to go out into the streets and have a look at it, and experience had really confirmed that. It was an instance of the coolness and courage and of the contempt with which the Londoner regarded these dastardly outrages. But that did not assist to protect the lives of Londoners. He asked the other day that the papers should be analysed in order that he might know in regard to the different casualties in the London area whether they had occurred in the open air or in the houses, and the House might be interested to know that a very substantial propor tion of the casualties, both fatal and otherwise, had occurred in the streets, and they would observe that all these attacks occurred at night and at a time when the larger part of the population would naturally be under cover. That went to show that the probable consequence of telling everybody that there might be a Zeppelin to-night would not reduce the number of people suffering injury. He would say frankly that there had been one or two cases in which he had been much puzzled as to what would be the better course to take. It might happen before they had done with these invaders that a theatre got struck, and the people assembled there for perfectly peaceful and innocent enjoyment might suddenly find a bomb dropped among them. If unfortunately that did happen, it might do damage to a number of innocent people, and, great as the coolness of the Londoner is, that might create some sort of local panic. He thought at one time that it might be desirable that they should arrange with the theatres that in certain events they should be warned of this possibility. But he asked the House to consider the arguments the other way. In the first place, it was questionable what the effect would be on a theatre audience. He heard of a case at a cinema where there was some such intimation given, and he believed the proceedings were stopped, and afterwards one or two persons present bitterly complained that, having paid their money, they wanted their money's worth. A great many more people thought the alternative attraction was too good to be missed, and promptly went into the streets. Perhaps these people might be urged to go home, but a large number of them go home by train. If there was any immediate risk of a Zeppelin attack on the London area the trains are stopped, and the result would be that if you were able to warn the peaceful population, a large proportion of them would assemble at the termini of the railway stations. The trains could not run out, and the consequence would be that you would have a great collection of people under another roof which, if the enemy paid any regard to ordinary military considerations, would be a more suitable object for his attention than a theatre or a music- hall. There were all sorts of other assemblies. He was glad of the opportunity of telling hon. members publicly that the view which was presented by the Admiralty and which they had felt it right to adopt, always subject of course to considera tion in the light of further and greater experience, was that, on the whole, it was better not to attempt to warn people of the suggested approach of the Zeppelins. The people must therefore understand that if they felt, as some of them very naturally might do, that this left them in more than one sense in the dark, they must really take their own risk if they choose to go to places where a number of people are assembled together at night, and they would be able to estimate the extent of that risk, and he had no doubt that they would act in the matter reasonably and fairly. This was a matter in which the man in the street was very naturally and closely concerned. He (Sir J. Simon) was anxious to show to the House that it had not been some deliberate policy of the Government to conceal from the people of England the truth. It was a deliberate policy adopted as a practical decision after most carefully weighing the pros and cons of the matter. He might say in conclusion that he believed there were some areas and towns in England where the alternative policy had been tried. He had not had any representations from members repre senting those areas as to how it was worked, but in one such area he had reason to know, the number of false alarms that had been given had produced a very great deal of consternation and dis appointment, and the total result, to say the least of it, was extremely doubtful from the point of view of promoting public security and safety. The truth was that in this and other matters, since we were at war and since our enemy chose to adopt these devices, we had to show him that it was not an idle boast, but a genuine fact, that English men and women, Londoners no less than others, were pre pared to face even the tragic incidents of war with courage, calmness, and resolution. Londoners and others might be perfectly satisfied that everything that could be done would be done in order to minimise any risk to which they may be put. Nobody could feel more keenly than the Government did the seriousness of the individual tragedies which had been created by these horrible attacks, but just as it was the determination of our people to carry this war to a victorious conclusion, so this was, after all, an incident, though a very grave incident, which we at home had got to bear,
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