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Aviation History
1916
1916 - 0229.PDF
MARCH 16, 1916. »s well as the finest planes came out of private factories. He doubted very much the wisdom for any branch of military equipment of setting up Government manufactories except on a very small scale. It was on the big firms they must rely when the time of strain came. The French had more powerful planes than we had, and it was right to acknowledge the debt we owed them. We were copying many of their planes in our workshops, and they had been very generous in the way they had helped us. Lord Montagu then quo'ed references showing how he had warned the Government for many years, and he went on to say that what we had to look at now was our policy in the future. There was no comfort in the phrase that " no damage had been done of military value." The truth wa> we had had stupendous luck up to now. He knew one case where a great munition works escaped by a few yards, and that in the raid of January 31st one of our most important machine-shops for making air-engines was only missed by a few yards also. That luck could not be expected in the future. Sooner or later not only large manufactories would be destroyed, but an immense damage done in the country. The subject was a very serious one. He had tried to say nothing which would help the enemy. He could tell of scandals which until a few days ago were still going on—of one which was worse than a scandal, for the man responsible for it ought to be hanged. Our shores were within easy reach of the enemy. We were unprepared to resist or to destroy any Zeppelins that came over in force. The advantages of our insularity were rapidly disappearing. Even those of meteorological conditions were diminishing. Upon the efficiency of the Air Service now and in the future much would depend ; and if he would end on the note of grave warning he would say—Let it not be said with shame of our generation that we did not trouble to guard in the air what our forefathers won on the sea. Lord Oranmore and Browne said that about three weeks pre viously he raised the question of an Air Ministry, but not much encouragement was given to the suggestion by Lord Kitchener. He was surprised, too, that cold water was thrown on the scheme from various parts of the House. The Cabinet having reached its present unwieldy dimensions, it did not matter much whether it consisted of 21 or 31 members. The great disadvantage of leaving the control of the Air Service in the hands of the Army and Navy was that they would be more concerned with the particular needs of their own services, and would fail to look at the matter from a broader point of view. Viscount Haldane said he was in entire agreement with the two noble lords, but the question was not what we desired but how we were to get it done. A Minister of the Air was suggested, another Minister to be added to the already very large Cabinet. But what was the new Minister to administer ? The noble lord had suggested that he might look after the personnel not only of the defence of London, but of the whole Air Service. He wondered how Admiral Jellicoe would like to have under him in the North Sea airmen over whom he had no command. Lord Oranmore and Browne suggested that the Air Minister should be responsible for home defence and the supply of aero planes, but that aeroplanes and airships when co-operating with the Army or Navy should be under local command. Viscount Haldane said that really meant there were to be three services instead of two. We should be worse off than ever. If the men were not trained under those who were to be responsible for them and there were three services instead of two there would be still greater confusion. To him it was clear there were two quite distinct questions. One was how the machines were to be used, and the other was how the requisite machines were to be provided. Owing to the division of energy we had suffered, for we had not been able to concentrate all our resources. But, after all, this was a question of settling first principles. We had heard a great deal too much of push and go, what was called violent action before thinking, instead of violent thinking before action. He wanted to see a little more violent thinking introduced into this problem. In every respect the lesson of the war had been the clear necessity of getting clear conceptions of our wants and working them out. That principle had been developed in military affairs and perhaps in naval affairs. It was absolutely necessary that we should apply it now if we were to make any real progress with aircraft. He had had a good deal to do with the early question of aircraft, and in order to get at first principles the National Physical Laboratory had been taken for Lord Rayleigh's Committee to work on what was required, and experimental prac tical work had been carried 00 under the direction of Mr. O'Gorman. The result of that work had been that, although somehow this country had not taken a real interest in the Air Seivice such as that taken in France and Germany, we had very early in the war established our supremacy in the air. Now we were far behind, but not in construction, and not in design. When he came to speak of Zeppelins he had a different tale to IfiiSHT) tell. The Zeppelin was an invention of the enemy in which we were lamentably behind. Speaking for himself, he thought we missed a great opportunity of applying to the construction of Zeppelins the same amount of science that we endeavoured to apply to the construction of atropines. He believed that if the same cours: had been taken we should be much farther advanced than we were to-day. As it was, the progress had been very uneven. At the present time what they had to l>e sure of was that the same amount of science was being devoted to the construc tion of the Zeppilin as was devoted to the construction of the aeroplane. He did not know what course the Govern ment were taking in this respect. But he did not think it was possible to turn round suddenly and take the construction out of the hands in which it was at the present time. He would be sorry to see the control of the direction of the Army Air Service in any way removed from General Henderson. He put down our want of progress to a want of seriousness about the constiuction. We had to make up for neglecting science. There were depart ments in which the most scientific consideration had been devoted by other nations to problems which would arise immediately after the war. He wished he could be certain that we were devoting anything like the time we could to that kind of reflective considera tion. He was sure we were not. The question before the Hou-e was not a question of making some energetic person Minister of the Air and saying, " Now produce something.'' If he were appointed then in a very short time the silken rope to which allusion had been made would be about his neck. He agreed that in the future the war in the ait was likely to play a much greater part than it did at present: how grea\ it was useless to prophesy. All we knew was that we were far behind in the matter of scouting ; and we were materially hampered in not having a fleet of Zeppelins. But we should not make matters better if we snatched things out of hands in which they were and put them in the hands of somebody who had probably had less experience than those who were handling them now. What they had to do was to strengthen the scientific foundation on which the service rested at the present time, and to make sure that no action was undertaken which did not rest upon a basis of carefully considered action. Lord Beresford said he entirely agreed that the new air warfare was going to be perhaps of so tremendous a character that it might supersede the Army and Navy. Anyway, we should be ahead in the air the same as we were on the water. Zeppelins were a very great danger. If they dropped explosive bombs which contained explosive liquid the lire could not be put out except with sand. Therefore once they dropped them over magazines or arsenals the danger would be extremely great. He proposed that Zeppelins should l>e built as soon as ever it was possible, for the simple reason that in all war machines you must meet like with like. And Zeppelins must be met with Zeppelins. The reason why we did not raid enemy places as we did at the beginning of the war was that the machines we bought were bad machines and had not got air endurance. If we had taken English artisans and had machines of English manufacture we should have been a great deal more advanced. We had lost several of the finest young men in the world by sending them up in bad machines. It was murder to send men up in this way, and the money we had spent uselessly was fabulous. With regard to the suggestion for an Air Minister, he did not think it would help the case, and he did not agree with Lord Montagu in having only one air service. An air service was needed for the Army and another for the Navy. The soldier and the sailor ought to consider carefully what he wanted for certain purposes, and then the thing should be turned over to the scientific man to consider how it should be made. The only thing we could do at present was to lit the best machines we could to cover the distances Lor<< Montagu had mentioned, and then weekly—and daily if possible—attack the German Zeppelin sheds. He suggested a small committee for the Army and u small committee lor the Navy, and that they should consider the question of designs for the air service. The Marquess of Lansdowne : Lord Montagu has been appositely described as a prophet in connection with this particular subject; and to-night he appears not only as a prophet but as a physician. He gives us a diagnosis of the disease and prescribes the remedies. No one, I think, will deny that there have been very serious shortcomings in connection with the air service of this country, and that it is our duty to devote all our energies to correct the defects which have arisen, and I would only ask people to remember that this science is still in its infancy. It is undergoing the most extra ordinary and rapid developments Just as there have been new developments in trench and submarine warfare, so there have been rapid developments in aerial warfare, and accordingly it is impossible to say that the Army or Navy should at any given moment have been supplied with standardised equipment of any particular kind or 229
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