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Aviation History
1916
1916 - 1174.PDF
[/OGHT] 21. There is thus one responsible head for :— (a) The efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps as an aerial fighting force, (b) Its equipment, and in this connection, (c) The Royal Aircraft Factory, whose functions were described by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords on August 1st, 1916, as being— (1) Trial and experiment. (2) Research. (3) Preparation of drawings. (4) Repairs. (5) Manufacture of spares. This description is sufficient for our purpose and we adopt it. (d) The inspection Department. 22. The Royal Aircraft Factory has been the subject of much criticism before us, and we shall have constantly to refer to it; but it must be understood that we are only concerned with it in so far as its operations have affected the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps. With its internal administration, its economical or uneconomical working, its business organisation, we have no concern. These matters have been the subject of another and independent enquiry. The relevance of our reference to the Inspection Department will appear when we come to deal with the question of selection of aeroplanes and engines. 23. We have confined our investigations, as far as possible, to the period of the war. The condition of the Royal Flying Corps at the beginning of the war was the result of a policy for which the heads of the Royal Flying Corps are not responsible, but there are two earlier matters to which it is necessary to refer. One is the difficulty experienced before the war in obtaining money fof the development and equip ment of the service, a difficulty which has disappeared since the war. The other is the decision not to build large non- rigid airships, and the transfer of the few small airships we had to the Navy, against General Henderson's wishes, in January, 1914. Large airships demand high-powered engines. The Germans have had the advantage of working down from their big engines to the smaller ones required for their various types of aeroplanes, while we have had to work upwards from the smaller to the larger engines, a position which has proved to be distinctly disadvantageous. 24. In reading this Report, two things must be kept in mind. First, we have not inquired into the Naval Branch of the Air Service and only mention it incidentally now and again. The Naval Air Serice is not included in the terms of the reference to us. Second, all the witnesses agree that there has been a great improvement in the efficiency of the Royal Flying Corps during recent months. The witnesses who attribute the change to their own intervention and agitation are perhaps the most emphatic and speak of the change as marvellous. We think the adjective not undeserved, although, with all deference to the witnesses referred to, the improve ment is, in our opinion, the fruit of the unremitting labour of the Directorate of Military Aeronautics ever since the war began, rather than the result of a spasmodic effort due to agitation*. 25. The charges against the administration and command brought to our attention may be divided into two classes, general and specific or incidental. Of these, the general charges arc the more serious, and we taken them first. GENERAL CHARGES. 26. The general charges are :— (1) Want of foresight in failing to make provision for the types of aeroplanes and engines which has proved to be necessary. (2) " Too blind faith i»-the R.A.F." (3) A number of charges against the R.A.F., the most important being that:— (a) The R.A.F. has acquired an.ascendency over the minds of those responsible for the administration of the Royal Flying Corps. (b) The R.A.F., in the matter of aeroplanes and engines, is the competitor with private firms and the judge of their productions. (c) The R.A.F. has been a dis-service and not a service to the Royal Flying Corps, in that it has failed to design satisfactory types of aeroplanes or engines, and has dis couraged their design and production by private firms. DECEMBER 28, 1916 (d) The R.A.F. has copied designs of private manufacturer for its own use. (4) The insufficient training of our pilots and observers. (5) The provision for Home Defence has been muddle, and inadequate. (6) Loss of mastery in the air. o (7) Various defects in aerodromes and in the system of lighting landing grounds. (8) The inadequate arming of aeroplanes. It will be observed that charges Nos. 2 and 3 (a) are the same charges approached from opposite points of view, and we deal with them both under charge No. 2. Charges 1 and 2 to some extent overlap and run into each other, but we have tried to keep them-as distinct as possible. Subject to these observations, we now proceed to consider the general charges in the above order. CHARGE NO. I. WANT OF FORESIGHT. 27. This charge of want of foresight is based, firstly, upon the unpreparedness of the Royal Flying Corps for the war, a condition for which it would be unfair to hold the heads of the Royal Flying Corps responsible. The unpreparedness is undeniable, but it was the result of a policy which was imposed upon them and not determined by them. Nor would any policy which could conceivably have been adopted with the approval of Parliament or the country have provided an air service adequate to the needs of such a war as we aTe engaged in. Secondly, the charge is based upon want of imagination in foreseeing and providing for the number and types of aeroplanes and engines which now prove to be required. Aeroplanes have to be built to suit the available engines, and not engines to suit aeroplanes. It has been found that, for other purposes than fighting, high-powered engines and big aeroplanes are wanted. For long recon naissance work, for weight carrying, such as wireless gear, bombs and the like, for artillery observation, and especially for mounting a gun for attacking dirigibles, big aeroplanes and engines are required. In the early stages of the war it seemed that they might be required for fighting purposes also, but the view now held is that for fighting purposes what is wanted is a small, easily manoeuvred, fast machine. The charge of want of foresight practically comes to this : Failure to anticipate the necessity for high-powered engines and to provide for their production. Closely connected with this charge is that of failure to order in due time certain types of engines which, although not exactly high-powered engines, were yet superior to any the Royal Flying Corps had. We deal with this charge under the next head—that of too blind faith in the R.A.F. 28. The position at the outbreak of war was that the engines available did not exceed 80 h.p. Soon afterwards there was the Canton-Unne (Salmson) of 140 h.p. All these have since been discarded. The Royal Flying Corps also got within the first few months the 90 h.p. R.A.F. and 120 h.p. Beardmore—the 90 h.p. R.A.F. in by far the largest numbers. Later the Royal Flying Corps obtained the 100 h.p. Mono- soupape and no h.p. Le Rhone, the latter in small quan tities. Later still the no h.p. Clerget, but substantially the highest horse-power engine which the Royal Flying Corps had in quantity for many months was the 90 h.p. R.A.F. Quite recently it has had the 140 h.p. R.A.F., the 160 h.p. Beardmore (orginally known as Austro-Daimler, and now sometimes as the Austro-Daimler Beardmore) and the 250 h.p. Rolls-Royce. So far only a few of these higher- powered engines have been delivered; but the output is increasing, and there are now other high-powered engines in sight. The Royal Flying Corps, has, in effect, been carrying on with engines the bulk of which did not exceed 90 h.p. together with a few very efficient 100 to 120 h.p. engines. 29. The state of affairs thus disclosed was obviously unsatisfactory until recently, especially in view of the fact that the Germans have had from the first engines of con siderably higher power, notably the Mercedes. 30. In order to understand the position we must go back to the spring of 1914. There was then held a naval and military engine competition for engines of from 90 h.p.Jto 200 h.p., with a prize of ^5,000 for the best engine. There were 67 entries. Of these 23 were of engines from 125 h.p. to 200 h.p. There was only one of the latter. Only nine engines came through the test. The prize was won by the 100 h.p. water-cooled Green Engine. The highest-powered engine to come through was one of 120 h.p. H46
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