FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0015.PDF
JANUARY 4, 1917. FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND COMMAND OF ^ - THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS. Continued from page 1147.) CHARGE NO. 2.—" Too BLIND FAITH IN THE R.A.F." 36. The point is put as an argument thus : GeneralHenderson, as Director-General of Military Aeronautics, is responsible for th<f R.A.F. It is to his credit if it does well,to his discredit if it does ill. It is only natural, therefore, that he should prefer the designs of the R.A.F., whether foraeroplanes or engines, to those of private manufacturers, and that he should give the R.A.F. facilities for designing aero-planes by letting them have the best engines round which to design their aeroplanes, and refuse the same facilities toprivate firms. The facts, say the critics, are in accordance wit* and supportthe argument, and they rely upon the following :— There was delay in ordering better engines.There was delay in ordering better aeroplanes. The R.A.F.—Napier 200 h.p. engine was ordered in largequantities before it had passed its tests. The better engines, when procured, were reserved for theR.A.F., and none were allotted to private firms. 37. Dealing with these allegations in order—The allegeddelay in ordering better engine? occurred in respect of the no h.p. Clcrget, the no h.p. Le Rhone, and the 200 h.p.Hispano-Suiza engines. All these engines are admittedly good, and all have nowbeen ordered in considerable quantities. 38. There was, we think, no undue delay in ordering theno h.p. Clerget engine. There was very considerable delay in the case of the 110 h.p. Le Rhone engine, and slight delayin the case of the 200 h.p. Hispano-Suiza. 39. The delay in ordering aeroplanes is alleged to haveoccurred in the cases of the Bristol Scout, Nieuport and the Sopwith ij Strutter. We think there was no delay forwhich any blame can be attributed to the Royal Flying Corps in any of these cases. 40. We do not think that the delay in ordering the LeRhone and the Hispano-Suiza engines was attributable, to the fact that the Directorate was trusting to the R.A.F.to produce equivalent or better engines. The only engine of its own which the R.A.F. was engaged upon was the 140 h.p.R.A.F., which could not have taken the place of either the 1 IO h.p. Le Rhone or the 200 h.p. Hispano-Suiza. 41. We are, however, not so much concerned to see whetherthe rhetorical charge of " too blind faith " is made out as to see whether any blame attaches to the directorate for thedelay and whether the Royal Flying Corps suffered from it. 42. In the case of the Hispano-Suiza engine, negotiationsfor its production were entered upon promptly and a draft agreement was sent to the company on November 3rd,1915. The answer miscarried and the matter dropped until February 22nd, 1916, when the directorate reopened thenegotiations and carried them without delay to a successful issue. We think the four months' delay ought not to haveoccurred, although in this case no real harm accrued. The Hispano-Suiza engine was originally one of 150 h.p. Theywere experimenting with one of 200 h.p. The latter was bought for the Royal Flying Corps, and this engine was notin a sufficiently advanced stage to have been procured earlier. 43. The history of the no Le Rhone engine is different.This engine was at first, and in 1915, procured through the French Government, but the French wanted it for themselves.and were unable to continue to supply the Royal Flying Corps. It is a difficult engine to build, and a builder had to be found.This took time. Another fact was that it was doubtful whether both the no Clerget and the no Le Rhone wouldbe wanted, and some time was consumed in comparing the two engines. In the end the Le Rhone was ordered, butafter a lapse of some 12 months or more from the time when there was difficulty in procuring them from the FrenchGovernment. We think this delay was too long, and that it would have been an advantage to the Royal Flying Corpsto have been in possession of this engine in quantities earlier. • 44. It is the fact that the R.A.F. Napier 200 h.p. enginelias been ordered in large quantities and that these orders were placed before the engine had been proved. GeneralHenderson explained to us that in war time one must some- times gamble on an engine and trust to luck. This enginewas being designed simultaneously with the 250 h.p. Rolls- Royce, upon which the directorate did not gamble. Wethink the reason why the R.A.F. Napier engine was selected for the gamble was because it was—at any rate, partly—ofR.A.F. design, and that this b an instance in which great reliance h«\s been placed on the R.A.F. The engine has beenadversely criticised, but whether the faith reposed in the R.A.F. in this case was " blind " or not remains to be seen. 45. Had the Le Rhone engine been procured earlier, ft fewmight have been spared to private firms in order to see whether they could design an improved type of aeroplanein which to fit it, but we are satisfied that, within the limits of the engines actually available, no undue preference hasbeen given to the R.A.F. 46. Opportunities were given to the Aircraft ManufacturingCompany which resulted in the dc Havilland Scout. Several important firms are engaged upon experimental machines at _ Government expense. Other private firms, at the request ofthe directorate, have been trying to design machines for certain high-powered engines, including various types of theGreen engine, all so far without result. It is obvious that, in designing aeroplanes, opportunity and accomplishmentare not interchangeable terras. 47. A salient fact in this connection is one to which we havealready referred, namely the stopping o the designing of the . 200 h.p. R.A.F. water-cooled engine and handing the drawing*to the Rolls-Royce and Napier Companies. 48. In the matter of opportunity, private firms havenothing of which to complain. 49. The truth is that a charge of this nature will alwaysbe made and will be believed so long as there is one person responsible for the Royal Flying Corps as a fighting force,and, at the same time, both for its equipment and for the R.A.F. The position is, in our opinion, an impossible one. CHARGE 3.50. («), (6), (c), (d) are all charges against the R.A.F. 51. It was said that the feeling of the Trade against theR.A.F. was strong and bitter. It may be so, but it in singular that, while several witnesses who were not Trade witnessesspoke to this feeling, the Trade itself was dumb. In the absence of assistance from any Trade witnesses, we haveformulated to the best of our ability the cliarges against the R.A.F. made to us on their behalf. We can only hopethat it will be found that we have included, at any rate, the most serious of the grievances to which the Trade feels itselfunable to give expression—except perhaps in confidence to a sympathetic friend or in furnishing inaccurate copy foran anonymous newspaper correspondent. Charge 3 (a).52. The ascendency of the R.A.F. we have dealt with ia our observations on the " too blind faith " cliarge. Charge 3 (b). ^53. This is the " competitor and judge " charge. Some of the witnesses went so far as to say that the R.A.F. was acompetitive manufacturer with private firms. This is so contrary to the fact that we frankly do not believe that anyprivate manufacturers honestly entertain that opinion, and we dismiss the suggestion as frivolous. 54. The R.A.F. has built no engine except experimentally,and has only constructed for use 77 aeroplanes, of which 50 were to assist a private maker in the fulfilment of an order. S 5. The more correct way of stating the charge under thishead is as follows :—The R.A.F. designs aeroplanes and engines ; private makers' designs are submittted to theR.A.F. and private makers' productions are tested by the R.A.F., so that in matters of design and test the Jt.A.F. isboth competitor and judge. 56. The charge so stated is not in accordance with thefact, in that private makers' designs are not submitted to the R.A.F. Private makers furnish stress diagrams, whichare submitted to the R.A.F., and this may have led to some misapprehension. That does not, however, entirely disposeof the charge, and we think there is some substance in it. No one on the actual staff of the R.A.F.—that is, no one fromthe Superintendent downwards—has any voice in the selection of either aeroplanes or engines. The ultimatedecision in these matters rests with General Henderson. He, naturally, seeks advice, and there is an advisory staffwhose duty it is to make preliminary investigations into new types of aeroplanes and engines submitted for adoption,to get all the necessary information and details into order so as to be able to report upon these to General Henderson,
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
