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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0017.PDF
JANOASY insurmountable difficulty. To provide an area of safety avery large tract is required—and this is not easy to acquire in a thickly populated country like the British Isles—butthe problem should, we think, have been solved long ere this. 73. There have been many cases of pilots and observershaving to fight in the air without a sufficient knowledge of their weapons ; but although all receive a fair training inthis respect now, the training would become much more efficient if special aerodromes were developed for the purpose. 74. In reading the records of the flying in France, we havebeen much struck by the frequency with which the machine guns are reported to have jammed in the earlier days of the • serious fighting in the air, as well as by the apparent inac-curacy of the shooting. The latter view we have formed from the large number of rounds fired—often at very closequarters—without apparently any effect ; and we may remark that inaccuracy of fire from the German guns isequally apparent. It is well known that jamming of machine guns is, and always has been, a matter of common occurrence,and, further, that accurate fire from one rapidly moving object against another rapidly moving object is extremelydifficult ; but it is also known that improvement in both directions comes with careful training. It was largely aresult of the careful musketry training of the Army in peace that British troops were able to hold their own against thesuperior numbers and the less expert riflemen of the Germans in the first battles of the war, and we consider that similarcareful training of British airmen in aerial musketry would prove an equally important factor in battles in the air. 75. It is gratifying to note that while during this year therehave been a very great number of fights in the air the number of reported cases of jamming of machine guns hasvery greatly diminished, and, indeed has now, so far as we have been able to ascertain, become almost negligible. 76. In connection with the training of pilots, it lias beensuggested that a school should be established fa some place where the climate would admit of more hours flying per daythan does our own especially in winter. The south of France was spoken of. We understand this is a suggestion whichhas been receiving attention and is being acted upon. yj. Some complaint was made that civilian training schoolsfor pilots had not been taken advantage of to the full extent. We are satisfied that this is not so, and that everythingpossible has been done and is being done in this respect. 78. Observers, in the early days of the war, were of necessityemployed without experience. As the war proceeded, this defect was gradually remedied. Observers are mostly drawnfrom the fighting officer ranks of the Army, and now they become observers on probation before qualifying for the postof trained observers. The training seems to us fairly satis- factory, except in regard to the use of the machine gun andfighting in the air. 79. The importance of the observer cannot be over-estimated, and this work is said, on unimpeachable authority, to be more difficult and more trying to the nerves than thatof the pilot. The observer too must have sufficient military training to be able to recognise what is of real militaryinterest, such as formation of troops, trenches, batteries, suspicious hostile movements and the like. He must alsohave sufficient knowledge of artillery fire to be able to judge its effect and report for the guidance of the gunners below.In addition, he must understand photography, bomb- dropping and his machine gun. 80. A very special combination of knowledge and alertnessis thus required, and it seems strange that no encouragement by way of promotion is offered to the observer, unless hebecomes a duly qualified pilot. The result is that observers of experience frequently give up their duties at the front,where their experience is badly wanted, and come home to learn to fly and take a pilot's certificate. 81. We consider that, after the war, the ideal to be aimedat is that pilots and observers should be interchangeable. Meanwhile, we think more encouragement should be given tothe observers to remain observers, and we later make a recommendation to that end. CHARGE 5.—HOME DEFENCE.82. A good deal of confusion has arisen upon the subject as to whether the air semces of the Army or the Navy areresponsible for Home Defence, or whether the responsibility is divided. The truth is that the Navy was entirelyresponsible till the middle of February last. Since that date the responsibility has been divided. The Navy is responsibleuntil hostile aircraft reach our shores. From that time the Army is responsible. It is hardly necessary to state that ifa Naval machine was attacking hostile aircraft it would not cease to do so because the aircraft crossed the boundary line (high waiter mark), nor would an Army mar him- > <•:*-<• topursue hostile aircraft when it passed over the liiu- M .wv.uibt. 83. The Royal Flying, Corps is not responsible for anti-aircraft guns. It has no control over them. Nor has it any responsibility for or control over the searchlights which workin connection with those guns. The Royal Flying Corps now lias, however, its own searchlights wherever HomeDefence machines are maintained. 84. The defence of the London Area is under the immediatecontrol-of the Conunander-in-Cliief for Home Defence. In other areas, subject to his general control, it is under thatof the Army officers in command of the particular anti-aircraft defence areas. Those areas are not coterminous with thedistricts commanded by the officers in charge of Home Defence from attacks other than by aircraft. 85. We have appended a Memorandum on the subject o(Home Defence* going more into detail than seems advisable in the body of this Report. 86. It seems desirable to mention that, while the Navy-was still solely responsible for "Home Defence, Lord Kitchener issued an order that Army aeroplanes were to render allpossible assistance, an order which was very willingly obeyed. 87. The Navy have aerodromes for their own purjuttesalong the coast, and we think it reasonable to assume, although we have no knowledge on the subject, that, nowthat the Army is responsible for Home Defence from the coast inwards, a similar order has l>een issued to the Navy. 88. Having regard to the limitations imposed by thenuml>er of aeroplanes, pilots and night landing-placca as yet available, we do not know that, so far as the Royal FlyingCorps is concerned, anything more can be done. 80. It ought, we think, to be generally known that HomeDefence machines and pilots are not now stationed at every aerodrome. It must not be supposed that, becau.se aero-planes are seen flying freely day by day from a given aero- drome, there are necessarily any aeroplanes kept at that aerodrome (it for night-flying or any night-flying pilots thereto fly them. Home Defence machines, with their pilot*, are now grouped at various centres, a plan which, after carefulconsideration, we approve. CHARGE 6.—LOSS OF MASTERY IN THK AIR. 00. This charge relates to the period of some six months, beginning in about October, 1915, when the German Fokker machine made its appearance.91. For more tlian a year after the beginning of the war there was practically no fighting in the air. Our machinedmade their reconnaissances with regularity and without serious molestation. Then suddenly the German tacticschanged. They produced the Fokkers—fast, handy, fighting machines that lay in wait for our machines and mobbed them.We were slow in recognising this change of tactics and slow in adopting means to protect our reconnaissance machines,with the result that we suffered many casualties. As an instance, there were 12 deaths in the first half of March last.The casualties, however, were not all on our side. The German losses during the six months in question were heavierthan ours, and equally heavy in any given month, which is remarkable, as it is clear from the evidence tliat Britishairmen carried out far more work over the enemy's lines than the Germans did over ours. 92. The B.E. 2C. was our chief reconnaissance machine, andit was to fliers of that machine that most harm was done. The B.E. 2c was not so fast or so handy as the Fokker, andneeded, after the appearance of the Fokker, to be escorted by fighting machines. This is now being done. 93. Reports from the front are singularly diverse as tothe extent to which superiority was for a time lost. The battle-front was a long one, and it is obvious that, as wasto be expected, the state of affairs differed considerably at various parts of the line. In some places the Germansuperiority for a time seemed marked, in others it was non- existent. 94. Such local inferiority as there was seems to have beenchiefly due to our tardy recognition of the change brought about by the Fokker, but we think that, although we hadat the front at all times machines capable of dealing with the Fokker on at least equal terms, these machines were notat first available in sufficient numbers. 95. Our temporary loss of superiority has been describedin language of such gross exaggeration as to make us at first disposed to think there was nothing in it ; but a carefulexamination of all the facts leads us to the conclusion that the charge is true to a limited extent, and in the senseindicated. * 96. Our newer aeroplanes, which are now coming forwardin greater numbers, are proving individually superior to those * Not printed. .-•4•t
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