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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0041.PDF
JANUARY II, 1917. sent home in batches, as also are pilots when promoted orwhen sent home to form new squadrons. 146. The charge was made in perfectly good faith, andaffords an excellent illustration of how a witness who retails information of the " gossip " order may be misled, and,incidentally, of the class of unfounded sinister suggestions which we found to be abroad. 147.. Of the accidents and misadventures under letter (p),we only deal in the report with the first thre*. The remainder, while regrettable, as are all losses of British airmen, areinstances of the kind of mishap at present inseparable from flying, and raise no question of principle. (p) 1. THE MISHAP TO MACHINES ON JANUARY 31ST LAST.148. This case was presented to the Committee in the following words :—" I think, if the Committee will inquire into the actual condition of the actual occurrence on the night of January 31st,they will discover that 14 or 15 machines were sent up, that approximately 7; per cent, of the pilots were killed and thatno useful purpose, as far as I can see from the Military stand- point, was either accomplished or attempted." 149. The facts of the case as brought out in evidence are,that on that particular night, a Zeppelin raid was reported as threatening London, and orders were issued to nine stationsas follows :—" // weather conditions permit you will send up the first patrol at 7.35 p.m. The second patrol will go upat 9 p.m." 150. In view of the often repeated allegation that peremp-tory orders are issued from the Royal Flying Corps Head- quarters to send pilots up without regard to the local weatherconditions, we call attention to the form of this order, which is typical.151. There was in most places a ground mist, and had no attempt to ascend been made no fault could have been found ;but the zealous and brave airmen, taking great risks, ascended into the air and, owing to the thickness of the weather, metwith many accidents on attempting to land, the total casual- ties being that four pilots were injured, two only compara-tively slightly, whilst two eventually succumbed to their injuries. Of the machines, seven were damaged and fourhopelessly smashed. 152. Serious as the results were, they fall far short of theallegation that 75 per cent, of the pilots were killed. In its Interim Report, the Committee has already drawn attentionto the self-sacrificing devotion and bravery of the pilots ; and. as it appears that all the pilots were experienced in night-flying, it only remains for us in this Report to record our opinion that no blame can attach to the Directorate of theRoyal Flying Corps. (p) 2. THE DE HAVILLAND SQUADRON CASE. 153. This case occurred on March 25th, 1916. It concernsa squadron of new scout machines—single seated and fast— which was urgently required at the front. The machijies hadonly just been completed, except three which liad been stationed at Gosport (where the 29th Squadron, the one inquestion, was being trained) for a month or six weeks for training purposes. Altogether 12 machines were required inFrance, two of which were to go from Hendon and 10 from Gosport. The machines were being delivered at Gosportduring the days immediately preceding the 25th, the last arriving on March 24th. 154. It is said that the pilots were refused leave to trytheir machines, but there is evidence to show that all pilots had some practice in them, though some of them had toolittle. 155. The 10 from Gosport got into a snowstorm, and six hadto make forced landings between Gosport and Dover. Fresh machines were procured and more accidents occurred, withthe result that, in order to deliver 12 serviceable machines in France, 26 or 27 were consumed, of which four were com-pletely smashed and the remainder eventually repaired. Mercifully only two pilots were hurt, and they only slightly.Apparently two of the 10 pilots from Gosport were considered very experienced. The two from Hendon reached Francein safety, but did not encounter the snowstorm, but whether those two pilots had been overseas before is not quite clear.An attack of measles had prevented the presence of the mechanics at Gosport for some days previously, and thismay partly account for the disastrous results ; but Brigadier- General W. G. H. Salmond. R.A., who reported on the affair,considered the snowstorm was the main cause of trouble. It is noticeable that even the two experienced Gosport pilotsalso came to grief. 156. It appears that of the 10 machines which were dis-patched from Gosport—six of which made forced landings between Gosport and Dover—six had no compasses ; butwhether the six which were forced to land were all those with- out compasses there is no clear evidence. We were Informedthat.as the demand for the Squadron was urgent, the despatch- ing officer felt himself justified in sending off the*«8ix machines,arranging for them to pick up their compasses at* Folkestone, which they eventually did. 157. It has been urged before the Committtf that notwof the accidents resulted from th<> absence of compasses. This view, however, the Committee is not prcpaml to accept,as, without evidence to the contrary, it is quite possible that the absence of compasses materially contributed to bringingsome of the machines to grief. 158. It appears also to the Committee that the pilots hadnot sufficient experience to compete with such a snowstorm in machines which were more or less iww to them ; and that,in ordering the squadron to proceed to France without giving more time for getting thoroughly efficient in flying 'a newand by no means easy machine, considerable risk was taken by the Royal Flying Corps Directorate. But whether thestate of affairs in France at the time was such as to necessitate so great a risk being taken by the Directorate - and, in thecase of the compassless machines, by the Dispatching Officer at Gosport—is beyond the knowledge of this Committee. 150. The point which impresses us most in this De Havil-land Squadron Case is the absence of a formal enquiry. We are strongly of opinion that, upon the happening of a disasterof this magnitude, involving great loss of Government pro- perty and of (ex hypothesi) urgently needed machines, acourt of inquiry should liave been at once assembled, and a most searching investigation made. It is true there was noactual loss of life, but that does not alter or modify our opinion. The incident was, we think, treated far too lightly. (/>) 3. THE LANDING OF AN F.E. 2D MACHINE WITH A ROLLS- ROYCE ENGINE AT LILLE. 160. This incident happened on May 31st last. It wasdesired to send to France an F.E. 2D machine fitted with a 250 h.p. Rolls-Royce engine, a new combination of which thehighest expectations were entertained. The machine was at Farnborough. There are stationed at Farnborough ferrypilots whose duty it is to fly machines to St. Omrr in France and to return. It was intended to send one of these pilotsacross with this machine. The particular pilot selected was required for some other duty on the day in question, butother ferry pilots were available. As a fact, no ferry pilot was sent, but instead. Lieutenant Littlewood, who was con-sidered very efficient, but had never flown to France before, flew this machine across. How he. came to be chosen for theduty is not clear. 161. The officer responsible for detailing the pilot for thepurpose tells us that he received a telephone message from the War Office to say Lieutenant Littlewood was coming downto take the machine over. This officer informed us that he told the person speaking to him on the telephone that LieutenantLittlewood had done no flying on an F.E. 2i> machine, but had done a little on an F.E. 2B. The reply was that he hadbeen well reported on and was considered capable. Lien- tenant Littlewood was intended to remain in France. Thewitness was pressed for the name of the person who spoke to him on the telephone, but he had forgotten it. This was asomewhat singular lapse of memory seeing that, although he did not give evidence before us until August 1st, the incidentwas well known the day after it happened, and, one would have thought, it would have made a considerable impressionon the minds of the persons concerned in sending Lieutenant Littlewood over. It is to be presumed that the somewhatmysterious gentleman who was at the War Office end of the telephone knows who he was and why he gave the order. Itis unlikely that both gentlemen should suffer from so singular a lapse of memory about an incident of such importance.It is the more unlikely as the Rolls-Royce engine was only the second of its kind sent over. The speaker from the WarOffice was not called, nor did he volunteer to come forward. He has preferred to remain a voice. 162. Lieutenant Littlewood went, and took with him astaff officer who had never, so far as we know, been in a machine before. This gentleman was said to have animportant engagement in France. He was over here on leave, and if he had gone by train and boat he would have neededto start a day earlier. On the other hand, he would have kept his appointment. 163. Lieutenant Littlewood mistook Lille for St. Omerand landed at Lille. In the course of his descent ho was fired at, and the machine was brought down by anti-aircraft gunsand badly smashed. This latter point is important, as we have undeniable evidence on the subject and it refute* anallegation explicitly made before us that the machine was handed over intact to the enemy. Lieutenant Littlewoodand the staff officer are prisoners.
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