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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0662.PDF
JULY 5. "'. !:: of divided, there is still enough to form matter for very serious disquiet. There is only the one real remedy for this state of things, and that is to totally remove the Air Services from the administrative control of the Admiralty and the War Office and to constitute them one separate Sen-ice under an entirely independent administration. We would go the whole hog in this matter of separating the Air Service from the others, and, so that there should be no possibility of confusion or of the one. service laying claim to administrative control over the units placed at their disposal by the Air Board, we would advocate a completely distinct and distinctive uniform as the outward and visible sign that the Air Service was neither Navy nor Army, but as distinct from both as these are from each other. If we are going to have a separate Air Service, then let it be in fact separate and visibly so. We cannot see any valid objection to this course, while there are numberless arguments in its favour. The Navy wants seaplanes and airships. The Army wants aeroplanes, and both want the wherewithal for their working and proper maintenance. Very well. That would, as we have always held in the past, be the business of the Air Service, to provide all the machines, pilots and appliances necessary for the proper carrying out of the aerial functions of war. When working in the field the units of the Air Service would be placed under the absolute orders of the military commander- in-chief and his subordinate commanders, so that m> questions of disciplinary powers or command could arise. The same would" be the case where the units detailed to work with the Navy were concerned. Administratively and for purposes of supply, however, they would be under the Air Ministry, and wear their distinctive Air Service uniform and Badge. Doubtless, once again, the point will be urged that the creation of another Service would lead to possible conflict of opinion in the discussion of measures for the prosecution of war. We do not think so. The existing Services are in constant touch and consultation regarding the major issues and the necessary co-opera- tion of the sea and land forces, and it is not apparent that serious conflict of opinion often arises. Naturally, there must be conflict of a minor character where neither side is an expert in the other's business, but these are matters which are quite easily settled with a little common sense and mutual understanding. Nor can we see that there need be any more real conflict of opinion if there were three Services in consultation. Indeed, it would be all to the good, for the reason that each of the three parties to the discussion would be specialists to the extent that each might be expected to know all about his own Service, its capabilities and its limitations. Apart altogether from the aspects with which we have dealt, there is the vital question of supply and production to be taken into account, and there does not seem to be a shadow of doubt that this could be materially accelerated if the whole were under a single administration. Nominally, that is the system to which we have already arrived, but we do not think it is actually as near that desirable state of things as the mere outsider might imagine. We must not forget that there are still the two Services, each urging its prior claims to consideration, and each giving excellent reasons why it should come first. It would require a very strong man at the head of things, and equally strong men as the heads of departments, to remain uninfluenced by constant appeals of the sort we are able to envisage. Admittedly, we should not altogether get away from that sort of thing even if we had the separate Service we are advocating, but there would be a very marked improvement. The two Services would lay down their requirements, and it would be for the Air Service to see that the necessary co-operation was forthcoming, while—and this is a most important point—there would be a Minister responsible to Parliament and liable to be called to account for any lapses of the department. We are quite convinced that there is no other way to put matters on a permanently satisfactory basis. Any further " reorganisation " of the present system will merely .be perfunctory and temporary. It is manifest to all who have given the matter intelligent study that sooner or later we shall have to create such a separate Air Service, with its own administration, its own distinctive uniform and badge, and, in the name of efficiency, let it be done sooner rather than later. Nothing seems to have escaped the Aeroplanes general atmosphere of deplorable dis- in the organisation which characterised theMesopotamia ° . , , - ., Report. conduct of the first Mesopotamian cam- paign, which was the subject of the damning report issued last week. On another page of this issue of " FLIGHT " we publish an extract from the report dealing with this section cf the administrative shortcomings in the conduct of the war in the Middle East. Who was responsible for the ill-equipment of the Army in Mesopotamia so far as the supply of aircraft is concerned does not emerge, but there must be some individual in the background upon whom personal responsi- bility should be fastened. We see that so early as January, 1915, Gen. Barrett was begging for more machines, but, in the words of the report, " it was found impossible to supply any until May, 19T5." Then two machines were sent, both of a type which experience in France had already shown to be obsolescent ! Two months later another pair of equally out-of-date machines arrived, followed in yet another month by six of another type. And so the sordid story goes on of a gallant army starved and rendered ineffective by the crass ineptitude of people who were paid to know better and to do better. Granting that the main efforts of the R.F.C. were employed in the European theatre, and that there were, in fact, no Armv machines that could be spared, was it not possible that the Navy could have come to the rescue and sent out two or three squadrons to fill the hiatus ? Were they offered, and if so, what was the answer ? If they were not, why not ? And if they were and were declined by the Army, what was the reason and who was responsible ? These are matters which might very usefully have engaged the attention of the Commission. Yet the report contents itself with the bald statement that " the deficiency of aeroplanes as one of the defects of equipment con- tributed to the ill-success of the British Army in Mesopotamia during the winter and spring of 1915- 1916." Evidence accumulates fast that it is time we had a separate and distinct Air Service. We should then, at least, know whom to hang for such deplorable ineptitude as that which seems to have characterised the supply of the aerial service in Mesopotamia. 662
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