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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0693.PDF
JULY ^2, 1917, It is unfortunate that the Prime Bomb Minister was unable to see his way toGerman ,. ,, ,, , . , - . Towns. discuss the matter 01 raids in general, and last Saturday's in particular, in - open session of the House. We fully appreciate that there are facts and figures which cannot, in the interests of the country, be made public, but there are certain things the public, which is very intimately concerned with the question, desires to know and has a perfect right to be enlightened upon. For -example, in the summary of Mr. Lloyd George's speech, issued by the Press Bureau, we are told that he was much impressed by the sang froid displayed by residents in the bombed areas when he visited them after the raid. But the official summary does •not tell us whether he was equally impressed by the demand of the people for reprisals, though we have reason to know that wherever he went the word " reprisals " was in the air. Our own attitude with regard to reprisals has been made abundantly clear in the past, and we see no reasons for modifying it now. We are told in so many wrords that we cannot spare the machines for raiding enemy towns. If that is so, how is it the •enemy can spare them to raid London at a time' when, we are told, he is hopelessly inferior in the air in France? Surely, he ought to be using every machine he has in the endeavour to redress the balance. The truth, of course, is that for the purposes of raids it is not necessary to permanently detach machines from the front. They are employed in raiding London to-day and in their normal work over the lines the day after to-morrow. The defence against raids, however, is an entirely different matter and means that large numbers of machines must be kept always on hand to deal with raiders, because we do not know when the enemy's selected moment is likely to fall. Now, on the principle that it is a poor rule that does not work both ways, and knowing, as we do, that one of the principal objects of the Germans is to compel us to keep pilots and machines at home, a steady policy of counter-raids would surely impel the enemy to the like course of action. He would have to keep numbers of machines in the threatened area, unless he elected to let his civilian population and his munition factories take their chance, which is hardly likely. Therefore, it is fair to claim that raids on German centres would attain a salutary military effect. In addition, we are very strongly of opinion, for reasons we have given in previous articles on the subject, that if we adminis- tered to the Hun liberal doses of his own medicine there would be such a squeal from his own people that the game would speedily be voted to be not worth the candle. Up to the present we have had no satisfactory pronouncement from those in . authority on the subject of reprisals. We trust that those members of the House who have made aerialma tters their especial concern will continue to press for some •definite statement. WTmt the nation wants to know is whether, after allowing every latitude for military necessity and requirements, we are going to take these raids lying down, and if so why, or whether we are going to carry the war into the enemy's own country ? . • «» ••- When all the reasons have been given of the and the excuses made> so far as the Defence. Government can be persuaded to give the one and make the other, the fact stands out that in the last two aeroplane raids on London the defence has failed deplorably. We acknowledge that it is not possible to provide at the moment all the machines that are necessary for the prevention of raids, without seriously depleting the armies in the field. We have, it is true, the best designs both in machines and engines, and it is probably true that, class for class, our individual machines are better than the Germans can show, but it is equally true that our present manufacturing - facilities are not on a sufficiently large- scale to provide all the machines we require for the front and at the same time to ensure an adequate number for home defence—that is, enough to make raids either impossible altogether or so risky that the enemy will not attempt them. Therefore, the army and its needs must come first and we at home must simply be content to carry on until, by increasing our manufacture of engines and machines—not forgetting the right sort—we have arrived at the condition predicated. When this has been conceded, however, other things fall to be considered. Now, we know that, while we have not enough machines in this country to make raids out of the question, there ought to be no possibility, even with what we have, of a large aerial force being able to raid London and get back as far as the sea practically untouched. The question is, are the air defences of London so organised and controlled as to be of maximum effect under all the circumstances ? We are afraid the answer is in the negative. We should like to know exactly what proportion of the machines detailed for the defence of London, were in the air in time to tackle the raiders. Let us make it clear that we do not for a single moment desire or intend to suggest that our airmen, as distinct from those in control, failed in their duty to the smallest degree-—they made a gallant, if ineffectual, effort to deal with the enemy's attacking squadron, and the failure was no fault of their own. But we hear most disquieting reports of failure on the part of the higher command. We are assured that at certain stations on the outskirts of London machines were actually out of their hangars, engines running and all ready with their pilots to take the air, but that they were not allowed to go up until orders were given by superior authority and that those orders were not received until long after—many minutes, at least—the raid was over. If these statements are in fact true, then a most deplorable state of affairs is disclosed, amounting under the circumstances to criminal culpability. It is a point we hope to see raised in Parliament, and, further, we trust it will not be allowed to drop until a satisfactory answer is returned. If the system of transmitting the necessary orders is at fault, then the system must be changed without an instant's unnecessary delay. If it is the men at whose door the fault lies, they should be ruthlessly scrapped as incompetent. The report to which we have referred has obtained a wide currency and it must be thoroughly investigated. We can excuse short- comings in our defensive system wrhere shortcomings are unavoidable, but slackness or inefficiency in the use of what we have is absolutely unpardonable. That there is a habit of holding back official information of an unpleasant character is very evident from the fact of the fatal ending to one of the R.F.C. officers who did attack, being entirely unreferred to until the inquest gave away the calamity. 693 E
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