FlightGlobal.com
Home
Premium
Archive
Video
Images
Forum
Atlas
Blogs
Jobs
Shop
RSS
Email Newsletters
You are in:
Home
Aviation History
1917
1917 - 0938.PDF
mCHT dropped on British towns our airmen are dropping five tons or more on important enemy points. True, we have not yet laid Cologne in ashes, but we may take it that if the best military effect were to have been obtained by constantly bombing „ Cologne or any other of the Rhineland cities, it would have been done in preference to the bombing of Ghistelles, St. Denis-Westrom, Zeebrugge and Bruges and other places which constantly figure in the reports issued by the Admiralty and the War Office relative to British air raids. That is, it would have been done under the circumstances if we assume that those who direct naval and military policy are fit for their posts. As we do assume that these authorities are so fit for their posts, we are driven to the assumption that our principal objectives can be better attained by leaving the cities of the Rhineland alone for the time being and concentrating attention on other points which have, for the time being, more military importance. Incidentally, one of the best answers to the school of prevention, as we must call it, is contained in the official reports of our own night raids, which tell us, day by day, that " all our machines returned safely." It seems to follow that if the Germans cannot bring down our night-flying machines in raids on known objectives, it is fairly hopeless to expect our own people to deal adequately with Gejman haphazard raids on British towns. The whole question is simply one of a sufficient number of machines to carry out the tactical functions necessary at the Front, to give reasonable protection at home, and to embark on a great aerial offensive against Germany. It would be well if we had enough, but the plain fact of the matter seems to be that for the moment we have not, and that in the mean- time we must be content to go for the objectives which will give us the maximum of'military effect. Naturally, the question arises of why we have not sufficient aircraft to enable us to extend the aerial offensive to include the whole of the objectives. The answer to that we do not propose to discuss now. It has been dealt with at considerable length in the pages of " FLIGHT " on many occasions, but we are not concerned with it at the moment. What is under discussion is the actual position at the moment, and this we have endeavoured to set forth. It seems to us that the main lesson to TreaSeryofbe le*med f/°cm *he ^masking of the Sweden, treachery of Sweden is that there are no longer neutrals in this war—that those who are not with us are against us. There" are no words in the language to adequately describe the devilry of German diplomacy, which is convicted of -deliberately plotting the murder of nationals of the SEPTEMBER 13, 1917. country to which her representatives are accredited. Nor are there terms fit for polite ears to describe the conduct of Sweden, or, rather, of Swedish officials who have broken every canon of international decency by assisting Germany in her policy of indiscriminate murder on the high seas, a policy which has been directed as much against th«ir own people as against those of other neutral nations. Until it is proved to the contrary, we decline to believe that the Swedish people are at one with their officials. Swedish ships have been sunk and Swedish seamen done to death by Hun submarine commanders, and it would be impossible to think that Sweden herself could acquiesce in the despicable policy which her Foreign Office and its representative abroad appear to have identified themselves with, in face of the mostA solemn asservations of impartial neutrality. For- tunate it is for Sweden that the Allied Powers are actuated by no aggressive ideals in the carrying on of the war, else the disclosures of the week-end would unquestionably have been taken to constitute a casus belli without further ceremony or inquiry. We have no hesitation in saying that had the positions been reversed and had Germany discovered one of the Scandinavian neutrals at a similar game directed against herself, she would have declared war on the instant. However, Sweden has the good fortune not to have Germany to deal with, and will at least be given time to make what explanations she is able. Whether these will dispose of the case againsfTier to the satisfaction of the Allies remains to be seen, and until those explanations have been tendered it will be as well to suspend judgment. Another reason which renders delay advisable is that the elections are taking place in Sweden and the people will thus have an opportunity of pronouncing their verdict on the conduct of those who have hitherto been charged with the conduct of their affairs. If they endorse it, then we know where we are. If they condemn it, and turn these traitors out of Swedish public life—well, the Entente does not make war on peoples who desire to observe the decencies of civilised intercourse. There is some reason to think that the, official anti-Allied feeling in Sweden has its genesis in a higher quarter than even the Foreign Office and that, as in that of Constantine of Greece, it is once more a case of cherchez la fetnme. Unquestionably, the sympathies of the Swedish Royal House have been with Germany from the first, as was to be expected when we remember the close relationship subsisting between the German and Swedish ruling families. If it does nothing else, the episode supplies yet another cogent argument for getting rid of the Hohenzollern taint, not only from the German Court, but from all the Courts of Europe. The Navy and Aerial Policy. AT a meeting of the Executive Committee of the NavyLeague, held on the 6th inst., at the Central Offices of the organisation, 13, Victoria Street, S.W.I., Colonel WilfridAshley, M.P., presiding, the following resolutions were unanimously adopted :— 1. That the achievement of such supremacy in the oceanof the air as the Navy enjoys on the surface of the sea should be an essential feature of British national policy.2. That the command of the air is of vital importance to our future existence as a maritime Power and as a unitedEmpire. 3. That, notwithstanding the experience of the war, it isstill unfortunately the fact that the dominant part which air power plays in the preservation of British liberty and security has not yet been fully recognised by the nation and by thoseresponsible for the direction of national affairs. 4. That the Navy League definitely adopts air policy asa concrete part of its propagandist and educational activities, and by every means possible shall urge upon the people that, asaircraft must become more and more the eyes of the British Fleet, it will be a vital factor in the determination of luturenaval policy. 5. That the Executive Committee of the Navy League,therefore, invites the co-operation of the presidents and chair- men of all branches of the organisation in the United Kingdomand overseas in the advocacy of this view and in support of the demand that an all-powerful air fleet as the necessarycomplement to the British Navy, with an Air Board raised to a similar status to that now enjoyed by the Board^ofAdmiralty, shall be created. . -•" ~ 938
Sign up to
Flight Digital Magazine
Flight Print Magazine
Airline Business Magazine
E-newsletters
RSS
Events
