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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 1018.PDF
OCTOBER 4, 1917. —men, women and children—have been killed, and a somewhat larger number more or less seriously hurt ; and an infinitesimal proportion of the more neuropathic of the population have had their nerves badly shaken. So far, however, as intimidating the people of London as a whole is concerned, the raids "have only had the effect of steeling their determina- tion to get on with the war and to continue getting on with it until we have put it beyond the power of •• the enemy, once and for all, to pursue his favourite pastime of carrying " frightfulness " to people who only desire to live in peace with the rest of a peace- fully disposed world. - - . Naturally one result of the raids has andiS been t0 Powerfully focus attention Expansion. on *ne development of war in the air. Among the best reasoned com- ments on what, even now, we must call the new method of waging war, is that of the Times, which remarks in a leading article that it is absolutely vital to recognise that air warfare is capable of in- finite expansion and to lose no more time in adjusting our own air policy to the conditions which confront us. Continuing, the Times-says :— " The naked truth about the present situation is that the Germans are continually invading these islands and menacing 'the capital through the air. The reply that they faave not ^accomplished very much does not dispose of the broad .^principle involved. And the demand of the public is very clear and very natural. No one is content with an air policy which aims exclusively at defensive operations. An offensive policy is demanded, over and above the offensive operations conducted immediately behind the German lines on the Western front. If the Germans are constantly invading us through the air, why are we not invading Germany ? The immediate reason, no doubt,' is that our aeroplanes are believed to be better employed; but behind it lies the palpable fact that in the past neither the War Office nor the Admiralty have sufficiently grasped the possibilities of the new arm. Our generals and our admirals have insisted upon regarding the Air Services solely as a subsidiary arm, to be used as an •auxiliary to fleets and armies. But air warfare is fast out- stripping these narrow conceptions, as London again realised last night. Had the Government and the military and aiaval authorities abandoned their limited outlook, and •realised that aircraft and airmen must become a great separate arm organised to wage extensive warfare on its own account, we should not now be hampered by any lack of aeroplanes for every purpose. The Army and the Navy would have had their air branches, but we should also have had a great air fleet capable of carrying the war into Germany. When we attain that ideal, London may again know peace at night," . This is exactly what " FLIGHT," has been preaching for, years past. At one time this journal was a voice crying in the wilderness, and it has required "the bitter lessons of three years of war against a -desperate and scientifically equipped enemy to demon- strate the absolute truth of the arguments that have jbeen set forth in our columns ever since the realisation of all the potentialities of the new science of aviation impelled the foundation of " FLIGHT." NOW the rwhole Press of the country, together with the great mass of public opinion, has been converted to the view that air power matters as much, if not even more, than the sea power upon which the British Empire has stood four-square for centuries. When at last Iwe attain to our ideal of " One Air Service ; One tJniferm; One Badge," coupled with far-seeing administration, we shall begin to feel that, as the L£imes, .itself remarks, we may again know peace atnight—and by day. * •;?•.;.. •._( ""V" Undoubtedly the new defences of London have proved that they are far and away Raiders, more efficient than the old. There has been a very marked improvement in the results attained even since the early Sepffember raids. The system of the " aerial barrage " has worked out fairly well in practice, and our air squadrons have been more than a little successful in breaking up the enemy formations and preventing their machines from attaining their objectives. But all these measures are merely those of passive defence, and it would be too much to ask the people of London to rest indefinitely content with a system of defence which, however effective, it is now, is at best a pallia- tive one. 'What is being demanded, and in no un- " certain terms, is a real defence within the enemy's frontiers—the bombing of German towns. The answer to the demand hitherto has been that our bombing machines are engaged in much more useful work than the aimless dropping of bpmbs on the Rhineland cities. They are being used for bombing enemy aerodromes, ammunition dumps and his communications generally, these operations being productive of direct military effect. That is a good and sufficient answer up to a point, but it ceases to be so once that point is reached and passed. In the first place, the continued aerial attacks on London compel us to keep at home large numbers of men, guns and aeroplanes, and a corresponding amount of munitionment which could otherwise be much more usefully employed at the Front. On the other hand, the strain on the enemy's resources is much smaller, since he need only temporarily detach from their normal duties at the Front a limited number of machines for raiding London and the coast towns— limited, that is, in comparison with the numbers that have to be retained here for defensive purposes. Furthermore, he is enabled to carry out his raiding operations without the necessity for keeping at home for the defence of his own country a single machine or gun. We thus get down to the ultimate argument that if we have the machines of the proper type, the true defensive lies in counter-raiding German towns as being at once the most effective point from the point of view of teaching the enemy that his game is not worth the candle and as being actually the most economical of our own resources. It seems to emerge from the very few official utterances that have been vouchsafed regarding this question of reprisals that the powers that be are actually in favour of counter- raids as the most effective deterrent, but that there are not sufficient machines available after the needs of the field armies have been fulfilled. If that is so, then a deplorable state of things is disclosed. With every desire to do justice to those who have, since the constitution of the Air Board was put on a sane and businesslike basis, given us of their best, we must say that if we have not enough machines in hand to carry the war into Germany, there ought to be. For more than three years we have had all the resources of the world at our command. Money has been poured out like water on every branch of the Service, and leasts of all has it been stinted in the matter of the Air Services. If, therefore, those Services are even now inadequate to the demands which it was long ago foreseen they would have to meet, someone is gravely at fault, and the dereliction should be met with the punishment it deserves. We cannot get -away from the naked truth that Germany, blockaded 1018
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