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Aviation History
1917
1917 - 1101.PDF
OCTOBER 25, 1917. ..-•! r -I ;"'yV :-;;.J .; qualification, parentage, schools, &c, should be stated, and if approved he will be invited to a personal interview with a view to his selection and the completion of his official applica- tion form. All cadets have to attest before joining, and after joining they receive pay as a cadet until commissioned. The course at the cadet wing proper lasts for about two months. This course, devoted to instruction in military duties and drill, ends with a simple examination in these subjects. Cadets then proceed to a school of military aeronautics for instruction in technicalities, such as engines, appliances, construction of aeroplanes, and theory of flight. This course lasts six weeks. They are then given probationary temporary commissions on the general list for service with the Royal Flying Corps, drawing pay at the rate of' 7$. 6d. per diem, plus 45. flying pay, and are sent to elementary squadrons, where they are taken up in aeroplanes for first lessons in flying. Thence they advance to higher training squadrons, where they learn to fly Service machines under Service conditions, including air tactics, bombing, photography, and artillery observation. They then obtain their ' graduation certificates,' and are gazetted as ' flying officers,' entitling them to pay at the rate of £1 per'diem with allowances. It will be seen that a successful pilot may arrive at his commission with the full pay and duties of a flying officer in from five to seven months after joining the officers' cadet wing, and it may be added that in the Royal Flying Corps the prospects of distinction and of subsequent promotion are unrivalled." , It is certainly to the credit of the Ger- of tlie1"1 mans that they succeeded in springing Zeppelin, something of a surprise on us on Friday of last week. We had thought, after the fate which had overtaken their raiding Zeppelins at the end of last year, that the enemy would have concluded the game of attacking London by dirigible was one that had been demonstrated to be far from worth the attendant risks. However, they seem to have thought it well to make another essay, and cer- tainly succeeded in reaching London with one out of probably eleven Zeppelins and dropping three bombs which only did, apart from the inevitable and regret- table loss of life, only very insignificant damage of any kind and absolutely none of the slightest military importance. It was unfortunate that the conditions of atmosphere and the height at which the enemy raiders were flying prevented our air defences from getting at them, though it is satisfactory to know that it was largely the necessity for flying high and keeping quiet that really led to their undoing at the hands of the French air services. It seems clear that owing to the height at which they were compelled to fly and to the necessity for stopping their engines for long periods they were unable to get their motors going again, and thus fell victims'to the efficiency of our gallant Allies. It was perfectly natural that bombs having been dropped on London, with no visible reply from our own defences, the public should have wanted to know what, if anything, was wrong and who was responsible. Fortunately, Parliament is sitting, and it was thus possible to raise the matter on a motion for the adjournment and to get the facts from the Government. As a matter of fact, we ourselves deprecate the manner in which the question was raised. It could have been just as well disposed of at question time in view of the explanations given by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. We agree with Mr. Bonar Law that if ever the Germans laughed at our methods of making war, they will do so when they read the reports of the debate on what has quite justly been called the greatest aerial defeat the enemy has ever sustained. It is an unquestioned and -unquestionable fact that it is quite impossible to entirely prevent these raids. The one thing we can do—and are doing—is to make them as dangerous as possible to the enemy, and when we are satisfied that this has been done it is humiliating to the last degree to hear people, as one member put it, squealing like a lot of frightened jays. The people of London are not panic-strieken—they are not even afraid of these raids, but if we were to take seriously all that is said and written by a very small minority we should be bound to conclude that our morale was in grave danger of going altogether. Nobody likes these raids. We all hate them, but that is a very different thing from the psychological state that the enemy will think he has reduced us to if we are going to make every raid the subject of a discussion on a motion to adjourn the House. We realise full well, as the Chancellor said, that the squealing comes from a very small minority, and that it does not represent the sense or feeling either of the House or the community, but the trouble is that it will be difficult to get the Germans to see this. For Heaven's sake, let us look at the matter in its true perspective ! Let us not lose all our sense of proportion ! We are far from being adherents to the " darkness and composure " theory. Quite the contrary, as our columns in the past have shown. We are all for a proper and far-sighted scheme of defence, and for carrying the air war into Germany. We believe we have got the first. It is not impregnable, for the best of all reasons that there is no such thing as an impregnable defence against aerial attack, as our own airmen are demonstrating every day of every week. That means, if it means anything, that we shall have more raids on British towns—as surely as dark follows light we shall have them whatever the quality of our defences. If we keep this in mind, as we must, then it seems to us that those who, admittedly with the best of motives, make a habit of demanding someone's head on a charger every time a raider penetrates our defences, are in reality doing a great national disservice by assisting to throw the people into a state of nerves, the next development of which is panic. That is the way the thing appeals to us, and so, we imagine, it will appeal to most. Do not play into the hands of the Boloists. We have deprecated the manner in which the debate was raised, but at the same time we cannot but view with apprehension the manner in which the Speaker attempted to stifle it at its inception. He ruled that it was not competent to move the adjournment to discuss the failure of the Government to appoint an Air Minister, because the appointment involved legisla- tion which had been promised. We know little and care less for the rules of the House of Commons, but if that is the rule in this particular situation then we do not like it at all. What it means is that the Govern- ment can delay indefinitely making good their pledge that an Air Ministry is to be created and that the question cannot be discussed by the House. If that is so, it seems to be an absolute negation of policy—something which is worthy of politics and politicians. However, we trust the Government does not intend to use the rule in this case merely as a means of stifling discussion, and that it will proceed at once to the intro- duction of the promised Bill. There is certainly no time to lose if we are to have the advantages a separate Air Ministry will confer for the purposes of this war. • - :. IIOI
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