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Aviation History
1918
1918 - 1213.PDF
CHT We know that the one thing more The Threat ^^^^ than anything else by the Germany Germans was the threat of air attack on the industrial towns, of the Rhine Valley. They have never made any secret about their fear, and the only consolation they have been able to get is in the belief that we should not be able to make good our intentions of carrying the air war into Germany. As to that, they have been rudely and progressively undeceived. In June we dropped 66 tons of bombs on German towns. In July this increased to 81 tons ; in August to ioo tons, and in September to 178 tons. That is to say, in four months we roughly trebled the intensity of the attack and are increasing it all the time. Moreover, the abandon- ment of the Belgian coast by the enemy and the pressing back of his line has vastly increased our own facilities for raiding Germany, while his own offensive power has been steadily diminished by the loss of a number of his principal aerodromes. The full effect of these losses is not apparent until we remember that the Germans had concentrated large defensive forma- tions to the south of Luxemburg for the protection of the industrial area north of Cologne. This area has, up to the present, been comparatively immune from attack because hitherto it has been necessary to launch our air raids from the sector between Verdun and Nancy. Obviously, the shortest line to Essen, Elberfeld, Barmen, Krefeld and to Berlin itself is from Belgium. So long as the area lying east of the Belgian coast-line was in enemy occupation we could not take advantage of this shorter road to the interior of Germany. Furthermore, our raiding squadrons were always open to attack from both flanks, owing to the German concentrations in Lorraine on the one hand and in Belgium on the other. Now that we have regained a large area of Belgium, including the whole of the coast-line, we are able to take full advantage of this short line and under better tactical conditions. There is nothing now to stop us from continuing the policy we have adopted towards the more southern towns of the Rhineland right up to Essen, and possibly as far afield as Berlin, while, as we have already pointed out, the attack grows in strength and intensity every day. The Germans realise this as well as we. In fact, it is probable from what we know of the Hun psycho- logy that they realise the possibilities far better. We have heard the howl for pity and Christian feeling which has gone up as a result of what we have already done, and we are listening for the scream that will follow the extension of our policy of air attack on the great industrial and munitions centres. The morale of the German people has fallen very low, as we know, and their authorities do well to regard with misgiving the probable results «of another month or two of persistent attack from the air. Defeated all round, and with her allies falling away from her, it is no wonder if the actual and prospective results of the war in the air have supplied one of the most potent arguments leading up to the peace move. ; In the course of the discussions that Germany have ensued upon the German request and the for an armistice to talk about the terms of th^ °* peace. we have heard a great deal Air about the " freedom of the seas " and the necessity of keeping Germany out of mischief by depriving her of the power to wage ~- . ....-, • OCTOBER 31, 1918 war against our sea communications. We need hardly say that we are in the most complete agree- ment with the views of tliose who hold that never again can we trust the Hun with the means of potential mischief. It was because we feel so strongly on these - points that we went out of our way to write on the subject of a future submarine war against the world's maritime traffic and reproduced a chart showing how the old German colonies covered the whole of the great traffic routes of the seas. But while we are talking about things that are tangible because we know by experience to what an extent they count in the future peace.and security of the world, it will not do to ignore other potentialities of which we know less. We intend—at least, British public opinion intends, whatever may be the views of the Govern- ment of the day—that Germany shall not be given any point d'appui which she can use as a means for once more warring against the peace of the nations. She is not to be allowed to re-establish overseas naval bases. Now, we may be indulging in the intelligent antici- pation of events which is so disliked by the censor and others, but we shall be astonished if the naval requirements of an armistice do not include the surrender of the German^ fleet, including the sub- marine flotillas, and the German mercantile fleet. Anything short of this would be a crime against future civilisation. Certain units of both^ may ultimately be handed back to Germany, but that is a thing apart from the initial terms of the armistice. Then, the military terms will probably be no less stringent. Whatever those terms may be, we may be certain that they will substantially represent the mainlines of the peace settlement and that what we dowfet secure by the armistice we shall not secure at all. That is a point of view we have given expression to before, but it will bear repetition. As we have said, we have heard all about these matters, but so far we have not seen any expressions as to the future of ^Germany in the matter of air power We believe that, great as the advances in aviation of the past four years have been, they are only the beginnings. As a matter of sober fact, we none of us know what developments the future has in store. Air power in the hands of an unscrupulous nation like Germany has shown herself to be may well develop into a far more serious menace than the submarine has been in this war. To follow the argument along its most logical lines, unless we lay down now what we intend that Germany shall be allowed to do in the air it will be too late in two or five years from the present. Unless we say what we mean and include it in the peace settlement it is not at all impossible that we may find ourselves faced with a serious dilemma later on. Let us suppose that Germany, adhering to the letter of the peace treaty, should reduce her army to a police footing; reduce her naval programme to . the barest necessities; and abandon altogether the use of the submarine, she would, however, be free to concentrate all her resources for war on the con- struction of a great air fleet, and could, when taken to task by the other Powers, plead that there was nothing in the treaties precluding her from doing exactly as she pleased in her aerial policy, and in any case she was only building for commercial purposes. We should then have the two alternatives of accepting the explanations offered and of building to meet the menace, or of treating the matter as an immediate casus belli. If, however, we take the strong line now, 1214.
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