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Aviation History
1919
1919 - 0052.PDF
THE WORK OF THE I.A.F. THE following was published as a supplement to the London Gazette on January ist:— Air Ministry, ist January, 1919. The Secretary of State for the Royal Air Force has re ceived the following despatch from Major-Gen. Sir H. M. Trenchard, K.C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Independent Force, Royal Air Force :— MY LORD, I have the honour to submit the following report on the work of the Independent Air Force from the 5 th June to the signing of the Armistice on the nth November, 1918. I have also mentioned in the earlier part of this report the work done in the attack on Germany by the squadrons from a base south-east of Nancy before the establishment of the Independent Air Force. In May, 1918, you informed me that you considered it advisable to constitute an Independent Force to undertake the bombing of the industrial centres of Germany. You further intimated to me that you intended to place the whole of the British effort in attacking Germany from the air under my command, and that it would be probable that squadrons would be available to carry out this work from England, as well as from the eastern area of France. On the 20th May, 1918, I proceeded to the Nancy area, where the 8th Brigade, R.A:F., under the local command of Brig.-Gen. C. L. N. Newall, consisting of :— No. ss Squadron, De Hav. 4, 275 h.p. Rolls-Royce ; No. 99 Squadron, De Hav. 9, 200 h.p. B.H.P.; No. 100 Squadron, F.E. 2b, 160 h.p. Beardmore ; No. 216 Squadron, Handley-Page, 375 h.p. Rolls-Royce ; was already established under Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig. With the exception of No. 99 Squadron, this Force had been in this area since the nth October, 1917. I took over from Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig the tactical command of this Force on the 5th June, and the administrative and complete control on the 15th June, 1918. From the nth October, 1917, to the 5th June, 1918, this small F'orce had, in spite of a very severe winter, carried out no less than 142 raids. Fifty-seven of these raids were made in Germany, and included night and day attacks on Cologne, Stuttgart, Mannheim, Mainz, and Coblenz. Long distance raids had also been carried out against Namur, Charleroi and Liege, in order to help in attacking the enemy's communications to the Western Front. It should be remembered that No. 216 Squadron (at that time R.N.A.S.) was hastily formed, and was not equipped until October, 1917. No 100 Squadron was only equipped with short-distance machines, and No. 99 Squadron only joined in May, 1918. No. 55 Squadron was equipped solely with short-distance machines, which had an air endurance of 3J hours only. But the squadron itself rectified this to the best of its ability by adding extra petrol tanks to the machines, which gave them an air endurance of 5i hours. The work during last winter called for exceptional efforts of endurance and perseverance on the part of the com manders, pilots and observers. Preparatory work on the construction of aerodromes, with a view to accommodating a larger force, had been undertaken before my arrival, and had been handled with zeal and tact by the General Officer Commanding the 8th Brigade. The work accomplished by General Newall formed a foundation upon which I was at once able to build in making arrangements to accommodate an increased number of squadrons. In aviation it is essential that the technical and adminis trative controls should be under one command, as the work to be carried out nearly always entirely depends on the administration of the Force. As it had been decided to separate the tactical control of this Force from the British Armies operating in France, it was therefore necessary to separate the administrative control as well; and, in my opinion, it became likewise necessary to constitute all the administrative services on an independent basis, in order to make the Air Force completely independent. This involved the formation of a large staff to deal with the multifarious matters connected with the formation and the maintenance in the field of an aerial force. In addition to this, the Anti- Aircraft Defence and Searchlights came under my command. By the 26th June the stall for the above-mentioned ser vices had been assembled and organised, and were capable of maintaining the Independent Air Force. I take this opportunity of mentioning that the Independent Force was operating throughout in the zone of the group of the French Armies of the East under the command of General de Castlenau, to whom I am indebted for the very valuable assistance which he and his staff gave me and for advice which helped me over the many difficulties inseparable from an organisation of such a kind. In fact, without his assistance it would have been almost impossible to have made an efficient organisation. I should also like to mention that the whole of the ad ministrative services were provided by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig from the British Armies in the field. The British Armies in the north provided me with all the per sonnel and material that was necessary to maintain and organise and operate the Independent Force, apart from technical aeroplane supplies. My first work was to at once push on and arrange for the accommodation of a Force in the neighbourhood of sixty squadrons. This was a much larger task than may appear at first sight. The country is throughout hilly and woody, and where there are any level places they consist of deep ridge and furrow, there being as much as 3 feet 6 inches between furrow and ridge. The aerodromes had to carry heavy machines and heavy bomb loads ; in order to enable this to be done, draining work on a large scale had to be very carefully carried out, and arrangements had to be made for a large installation of electrical power for workshops and lighting and petrol in order to save transport. This work was practically completed by the ist November, 1918. It will be within your recollection that in the past I had referred to the necessity for equipping the British Expe ditionary Force on the Western Front with sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial forces on the Western Front; that the bombing of Germany was a luxury till this had been accomplished, but that, once this had been accomplished, it became a necessity. That is to say, it became necessary to attack what I may call the German Army in Germany, and to strike at its most vital point— its sources of supply ; and the Independent Force was formed with this object. The question I had to decide was how to use this Force in order to achieve the object, i.e., the break down of the German Army in Germany, its Government, and the crippling of its sources of supply. The two main alternative schemes were :—1. A sustained and continuous attack on one large centre after another until each centre was destroyed, and the industrial population largely dispersed to other towns ; or 2. To attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the machines at my disposal. I decided on the latter plan, for the following reasons :— (i) It was not possible with the forces at my disposal to do sufficient material damage so as to completely destroy the industrial centres in question, (ii) It must be remembered that, even had the Force been still larger, it would not have been practical to carry this out unless the War had lasted for at least another four or five years, owing to the limita tions imposed on long-range bombing by the weather. The weather during June, July and August was extremely favourable for long-distance bombing, but during September October, and the first ten days of November it could have hardly been worse for this particular work. Day after day attempts were made to try to reach the long-distance targets, but the wind was generally too strong ; or, if there was no wind, heavy rain and fog prevailed by day and dense mist by night, which lasted often until ten or eleven o'clock the next morning. Often'the nights were perfect, but dense white mist completely obliterated the ground, making it impossible for machines to ascend. Besides this, there are always a large number of technical difficulties to overcome which still further interfere with the continuity of long-range bombing. By attacking as many centres as could be reached, the moral effect was first of all very much greater, as no town felt safe, and it necessitated continued and thorough defensive measures on the part of the enemy to protect the many different localities over which my force was operating. 2. At present the moral effect of bombing stands undoubtedly to the material effect in a proportion of 20 to I, and therefore it was necessary to create the greatest moral effect possible. I also recommended, as you will recollect, that the pro portion of day bombing squadrons in the Force should be slightly larger that that of night bombing squadrons, as I considered that, although day bombing squadrons suffer higher casualties than night bombing squadrons, at the same time, if day bombing is excluded, at least four-fifths of the value of night bombing must necessarily be wasted, owing to the fact that the enemy can then make his arrange ments to work by day and live at a distance by night, and take many other similar defensive steps. Also, if the bombing 52
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